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ABSTRACT 
Social groups are a fundamental part of our lives. From early beginnings humans lived in 
family groups and formed 'tribes' that not only provided protection from the many dangers 
they faced but by combining their efforts humans learnt that a group could be more than the 
'sum of its parts'. Collective action has, and still, provides the basis for much of human 
activity, while shared knowledge contributes equally to the advancement of humankind. 
Study into groups has revealed that humans instinctively know when cooperation is the best 
strategy and that not only is collective action often more efficient and effective than that of 
independent effort but that groups are good problem solving mechanisms, often making 
better decisions than individuals through the use of 'collective mindfulness' and a group 
'trans-active’ memory. People do not just create a group memory, there is evidence they 
also ‘become’ the group. As social integration rises, people feel, think, and act more like 
group members. They automatically associate themselves with the groups that they identify 
with. Tajfel and Turner’s theory of Social Identity suggests that people not only join groups 
but take on the ‘group identity’ as their own self-image in a process of ‘depersonalization’. To 
achieve effective collective action requires more than just 'being' and 'feeling' part of a 
group. Effective cooperation requires cohesion between group members, good 
communication and a coherent purpose or goal. Social Identity Theory does not provide 
evidence of how these mechanisms work other than to identify the formation of group norms. 
For that we have to turn to cybernetics, the study of 'purposeful action' and Stafford Beer's 
Viable Systems Model in particular. The Viable Systems Model provides an epistemology for 
examining the viability of systems. Viability is the ability of systems to achieve cohesion and 
coherence through autonomy, recursivity and ultimately closure with their environment.  
This study brings together these two powerful theories to create a more complete picture of 
purposeful collective action and group membership. By building a Viable Systems Model of 
salient social groups  the research provides a mechanism to understand how individual 
human social behaviours form and maintain purposeful social groups capable of self-
awareness, self-maintenance and the ability to sustain their identity, autonomous from 
perturbations in the environment. Not every social group is able to maintain viability. Many 
groups form and expire as the circumstances dictate. Only a few are able to achieve 
organisational closure from their environment and sustain their identity, This research seeks 
to identify what is meant by social viability and what factors make some groups achieve it 
while others do not. It investigates the formation of social groups under different 
environmental conditions in order to 'tease-out' the invariances that contribute to viability and 
it tests the validity of the Viable Systems Model of Social Identity Theory developed for the 
study. In order to answer the research question the study had to address the difficult issue of 
conducting research on complex social systems and to utilises a process of deduction, 
induction and abductive reasoning through both analysis and synthesis to achieve its 
findings.  
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1.  
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
  1
“The Viability of Social Identity Theory and the Identity of Social 
Viability”  
1.1 Aim of the Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to introduce this research into the viability of social groups. It 
provides an overview of the work; starting with the personal reasons for wishing to conduct 
the research and examining the disciplines where there are deposits of knowledge and 
perspectives on the subject of social collectives. It identifies and summarises the principle 
theories that the research will use and states the research question, its aim and the research 
objectives. The chapter then identifies the problems of research into complex social systems 
and suggests the methodologies available to the study. The introduction concludes with a 
brief history of the research and an overview of each chapter.  
1.2 Background 
Since 1991 I have been involved in change management; attempting to restructure and 
organise in order to react to the changing world. In undertaking these projects I have 
become increasingly aware of the power of social groups within organisations to influence 
the agenda for change. These social groups could be well established ‘tribes’ universally 
recognised and aligned within the structure of the organisation or alternatively, they could 
emerge from across its divisions to create a coordinated response whenever a shared threat 
was thought to exist. They were often able to thwart or modify the change programme to 
their own ends. They were very quick to adapt and able to change faster than the 
organisation’s formal management structure could cope with them. The more established 
‘tribes’ worked hard to gain influence and power, attempting to head off similar actions from 
rival groups. In the worst cases the management of the organisation was itself a ‘tribe’, often 
‘elitist’ and running the organisation as a ‘fiefdom’ through ‘fear and favour’.   
When I started to research these groups, I looked around for theories that would fit their 
purpose and behaviour. I found an extensive body of knowledge; groups, or at least mans’ 
ability to form collectives, have been studied in one way or another in philosophy, 
anthropology, psychology, sociology, business culture, political and organisational studies, 
social systems theory, by economists and in literature. However, the most compelling theory 
that I found, at least the one that fitted my perception of what I was seeing for myself, was 
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner,1986) from psychology. This theory explains how 
individuals ‘form’ into groups and how and why those groups react to threats. What it did not 
explain was how some of these groups achieve ‘enduring salience’ to their members while 
others died away. The answer to that problem appeared to me to lie with Stafford Beer’s 
 2 
Viable Systems Model (VSM)(1972,1979); a method of looking holistically at systems to 
assess their ability to remain viable with their environment; that is to maintain their identity.  
The combination of these two theories provided me with the question “are groups with 
salient social identities viable systems”? The interesting detail to me was that while Social 
Identity Theory went to great lengths to examine the dynamic processes of identity formation 
it did not examine identity stability, in fact its very philosophy and construct appeared to deny 
it.  
Would the answer to this problem provide a solution to my original quest to understand the 
development and sustainability of groups? The more I examined the theories the more it 
became apparent to me that there were close similarities between the two. Self-
categorization appeared to closely resemble a self-reflective homeostatic attenuation 
process, while the cohesion and coherence of group alignment to a group prototype seemed 
to mirror the mechanisms of System 2 and 3 in the VSM.   
This research is borne out of a desire to find out. 
1.3 The Study of Social Groups 
Groups are a basic component of human social organisation and behaviour. They form the 
basis of our collective action, social power, shared knowledge, beliefs and values; they are 
the foundation of our social structures and our society. Some groups provide mutual support 
and are self-sustaining while others are not; some are hierarchical while others democratic, 
some groups combine to form larger collectives while others stay fiercely independent. 
Within the structures of organisations, social groups can be self-creating and self-steering. 
They do not necessarily adhere to the defined organisational structure but may cut across 
the organisational divisions. They form under almost any context imaginable; gender, race, 
age, shared interest, traits, protection, mutual admiration and they are the subject of our 
stereotypes, prejudices and rivalries.  
A significant body of research on social groups has been carried out, in one form or another, 
by a wide range of intellectual disciplines; sometimes as organisations and sometimes as 
‘community structures’. Unfortunately, it is hard to achieve a common definition of a ‘group’ 
from this work. The functionalist view, repeated in many of the disciplines, is that groups and 
organisations are some form of ‘social entity’ that is organized in a “structured system”, with 
a “collective purpose”; 
“…a structured social system consisting of groups and individuals 
working together to meet some agreed objectives” (Greenberg 
and Baron, 1995, p11).  
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The constructivists and postmodernists, however, adopt very different definitions. The 
constructivist believe that knowledge is ‘constructed’ through life experience rather than 
discovered as an ‘absolute truth’ (Maturana and Varela 1986, von Foerster 1984, von 
Glaserfeld 1984), and hold a viewpoint of groups that relates to the ‘meaning of the human 
activity involved’. Checkland (1981) defines groups as; 
 ‘…human activity systems’, with “activities ordered in ‘wholes’ as 
a result of some ‘underlying purpose or mission’ (Lewis, 2002, p 
54 on Checkland, 1981). 
Postmodernists, on the other hand, do not believe that any formal structure exists at all 
(Cooper and Burrell 1988; Foucault, 1973; Menzies Lyth, 1988). Cooper and Burrell (1988) 
suggest that postmodernists believe that people only create ‘organising processes’ and that 
their minds create the structures involved. Systems Thinkers, take a much broader, holistic 
view; examining, not just the internal components and processes but the relationships 
between them and the environment. Drucker (1998), for instance, broadens the definition by 
introducing an ‘entity outside that of the group’ - the “community”. 
In essence, the wish to examine the processes in Social Identity Theory ties the study, in 
part, to a constructivist viewpoint on which the theory is based; however, the use of the 
Viable Systems Model enables this viewpoint to be broadened to include structuralism and 
postmodernism. Chapter 3 will establish the philosophical approach taken by the research; 
while the literature review at Chapter 2 will cover the extensive investigation by the research 
to identify if previous work could impart meaning to the study or impact on the research’s 
uniqueness or scholarship to ensure that the study fills a ‘gap in knowledge’.  
1.4 Social Identity Theory  
Tajfel and Turner (1979) started to develop Social Identity Theory as a concept of group 
membership; suggesting that the main reason people form and join groups is to enhance 
their self-esteem. Turner (1981) later developed Self-Categorization Theory to explain how 
people identify and classify groups and how they use the stereotypes, they have created to 
self-categorize themselves.  
Once people have categorized with a group, Social Identity Theory suggests that they seek 
to enhance the group’s image and hence their own self-esteem by making their  in-group 
positively distinct from any rival or comparable out-groups (Turner, 1982). They also start to 
develop a sense of ‘us’ and depersonalise their own personal identity in favour of the group 
identity; acting as a ‘representative’ of the group, adopting the traits, behaviour and values of 
the group prototype (Hogg and McGarty, 1990). Individuals will undertake identity enhancing 
behaviours in an effort to make their group more favourably distinct, by allocating desirable 
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qualities to their  in-group ‘us’, through  in-group favouritism, and undesirable qualities on 
out-groups ‘them’ through out-group derogation (McGregor, Reeshma, and So-Jin, 2008). 
People do not only align with a single group, they maintain multiple identities as they move 
through their social environments, although, under the principle of functional antagonism 
(Turner, et al 1987; Turner and Onorato, 1999) only one identity will be salient at any one 
time. This will depend on cues in the environment that trigger the most relevant identity for 
the individual to maintain cohesion with their beliefs. The particular social identity that people 
consciously or sub-consciously adopt will be heavily dependent on social context, for 
instance; if there is a strong threat from a significant out-group, then the relevant in-group 
salience will increase. A rise in salience will draw individuals more towards the group 
prototype so that they are aligned with group norms, beliefs and values in order to create 
cohesion and consensus within the group (Turner and Onorato, 1999). As individuals align 
more with the group image and attitudes, they will also stereotype and depersonalize 
members of the out-groups.  
Social Cognition is a theory of “…how people think about people…” (Fiske and Taylor, 
1991a, p1) that overlaps some of Social Identity’s purview. Social Identity and Social 
Cognition have evolved in parallel and provide mainly complimentary viewpoints, although 
adherents from both disciplines may argue the differences . Some areas of group interaction 
are covered by one theory and not the other and some are used interchangeably.   
While there are theories that rival or overlap Social Identity Theory’s  subject matter, Social 
Identity Theory nevertheless provides an empirically researched model that explains some 
aspect of human behaviour in groups. Flood and Jackson (1991), however, report a number 
of weaknesses in taking a purely ‘human relations’ approach to examining groups or 
organisations. They suggest that looking at social groups only from a ‘human relations’ 
perspective does not allow for collective goals and objectives, or a connection with the 
environment,  
“…which may drive the purpose of the organization and shape the 
human goals or behaviour with a higher priority than their own, to 
ensure the group’s survival” (Flood and Jackson, 1991) 
Combining Social Identity Theory with the VSM brings the ‘human relations’ approach 
together with a holistic construct that identifies both intrinsic and extrinsic motivations and 
provides mechanisms that connect the system to the environment. Additionally, purely 
‘human relations’ approaches, particularly those based on constructivist or symbolic 
interactionism (Bulmer, 1969) that explain the dynamic nature of human identity, do not 
provide an answer as to how enduring group identities arise or how they are maintained. 
The Viable System Model, by its very construct and its basis in Systems Theory, provides 
the conceptual basis that can explain these phenomena 
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1.5 The Viable Systems Model 
The Viable Systems Model developed by Beer (1972, 1975) provides a holistic, recursive 
model of an ‘open system’, based on Ashby’s (1958) Law of Requisite Variety that can align 
autonomous sub-systems to provide a single purposeful, viable system who’s processes 
exhibit ‘closure’ from  perturbations in the environment that enable it to maintain its identity. 
The VSM provides a model of how systems endure, or more accurately, how their identity 
endures; 
“A viable system is one sustaining the capability for independent 
existence as a recognizable identity. (Beer, 1983b p807) 
Beer recognised that the principle outputs or transformations of a viable system must each 
operate as autonomously as possible with a separate purpose and identity; connected to the 
environment by homeostatic processes that both amplify and attenuate environmental 
complexity in order to undertake the system transformations.  
In order to maintain its identity Beer understood that a viable system must have a meta-
system that was self-referential through recursivity within its own structure, so that it could 
represent a complex ‘system of systems’ linked though homeostats to maintain itself in 
balance with the variety of the environment. The management of these systems had to 
achieve cohesion, through their regulation and coherence, through the synergy of their 
emergent properties. The system as a whole had to achieve a balance of vertical (cohesion) 
and horizontal (operational) variety to maintain Ashby’s Law.  Additional to these processes, 
Beer identified the need for the system to be able to audit itself and to send an algedonic 
signal to interrupt normal operations if the system was threatened. The system had to be 
adaptive to change both routinely and through forethought and finally, be able to protect its 
identity through the ‘closure’ of these sub-systems and their processes from the environment 
1.6 The Suitability of the Viable Systems Model for Social Research 
If the Viable Systems Model and cybernetics are to be used as a framework for the study of 
the viability of social groups a major concern is the criticism levelled against systems theory 
in general and cybernetics and the VSM in particular that they lack the ability to model 
human behaviour. Jackson (1988) suggests that the VSM is unable to represent the ‘social 
dynamics’ necessary for a complete view of ‘organisation’ as identified by Habermas (1972, 
1974 and 1979). This is certainly a viewpoint that has had widespread agreement. 
Mintzberg's 'Ten Schools of Thought about Strategy Formation’ (Mintzberg et al 1998); for 
instance, suggests that a cybernetic approach "neglects power, politics, culture and social 
elements", and from (Boudreau et al, 2003) system models of human behaviour are often 
‘over simplistic’ with “people [that] have predictable behaviour”. The harshest criticism of the 
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VSM’s ability to represent social dynamics, however, comes from Ulrich (1981, 1983) who 
argues that the VSM fails to represent human intrinsic motivations. 
Without a construct that can represent human emotions, intrinsic motivations and behaviour 
examining the formation of social groups within the framework of social identity would be 
unfeasible. To overcome the criticism that the VSM lacks this ability the research has to 
demonstrate that the VSM is capable of semantic,  pragmatic and syntactic reason which 
are the basis of human affective understanding (Brier 1996). The literature review covers 
this argument in full to show that the VSM can indeed demonstrate these factors. If, 
however, the research is to be used practically to ‘solve’ complex-pluralist or ‘messy’ 
problems created by the “intrinsic motivations that occur in social systems”  then a 
methodology would need to be developed from the study to resolve the rivalries and conflicts 
of groups. While this is a very desirable achievement it is beyond the current scope of the 
study and is a subject for future research. 
1.7 Research Approach and Design Strategy 
Research on complex systems is complex. During the latter part of the 20
th
 century several 
eminent academics started to suggest that there were few, if any, ‘scientific methods’ 
available for the study of social systems.  Elster (1983) suggested that while causality and 
‘traditional science’ worked well for the natural sciences, areas like biology needed 
‘functional explanations’ but the social sciences could only be researched by the use of 
‘intentionality’. Hayek (1989) was, similarly concerned that social and management theories 
were created from reasoning that ‘excluded human intentionality’. 
The central failing of science in its use for analysing complex systems is its reductionist and 
determinist approach and its method of structural representation originating from Descartes 
(1637, 1641,1960). Cilliers (1998) who adopts a postmodernist approach takes the view that 
complex systems are constructed of multiple elements connected by ‘multifaceted non-linear 
relationships’ He maintains that reductionist philosophies cannot be applied to complex 
systems because complex systems cannot be reduced in complexity, “otherwise they would 
merely be complicated”. Schwarz (1994) suggests that to deal with these phenomena 
requires an;  
“…extension of science with not only new tools but the need to 
question the usual epistemological and ontological 
presuppositions.” (Schwarz, 1994) 
Several ‘new tools’ have been developed to study complex systems. Stafford Beer (1981, 
p52) suggests that an “algorithm can be used to find a heuristic”, in other words the need to 
abandon rule based models and use general solutions to find general goals. In Complex 
Adaptive Systems “Agent Based Modelling” (Holland and Miller, 1991) is used to give an 
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indication of the answer from computer simulations. Cilliers (1998, p70) who, having defined 
complex systems as distributed systems that cannot easily be represented by rule based 
methods suggests that the only viable way is to construct neural networks, in other words to 
replicate the complex system itself. Alternative methodologies that have been developed in 
systems research to deal with complex social problems  such as Soft Systems Methodology 
(Checkland, 1981) and Critical Systems Heuristics (Ulrich, 2005),  take very different 
philosophical standpoints in order to be able to solve the problems they address. This 
research, however, adopts a solution, also suggested by Cilliers (1998, p80), of taking a 
‘snapshot of the system’. This viewpoint parallels the concept introduced by Beer for 
examining a complex system with the Viable Systems Model of bringing part of the “system 
into focus” (Beer, 1985, p6).  
The concept of taking a ‘snapshot’ of a complex dynamic system by using traditional 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies to measure the values of its components will 
allow the study to fall within the scope of the research. The components of a system are 
defined by Varela (1979) as the elements of  “a network of processes of production”. Taking 
a ‘snapshot’ can be likened to an electronic engineer using a signal tester or oscilloscope to 
measure points in a highly complex electronic circuit; except the methodology will measure 
the value of a social identity process. Like the engineer we know from the theory what 
values we are expecting, however, when they are not observed, working out what is 
happening becomes a challenge.  
Having a ‘snapshot’ of the values of the components of a complex dynamic system still 
requires an understanding of what is happening between the components. To address this 
requirement it is proposed to examine the value of key processes made up of the 
relationships between the components and to utilise  a process of inductive, deductive and 
abductive reasoning - to analyse and synthesis the components and key processes into a 
more complete representation of the system. Barton and Haslett (2007) describe the 
process of inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning that can be used to explain the 
scientific method using Peirce’s (1931-35) theory on abduction; combined with analysis and 
synthesis.  
The Viable System Model is ideal for investigations and diagnostics of this kind.  It is 
described by Golinelli et al (2010) as grounded theory, by Yolles (2006) as its own 
epistemology and by a Harnden (1989) as a interpretist “hermeneutic enabler”. However, 
because the area has not been studied before it is considered desirable to conduct research 
that provides an overview and broad focus of the subject matter being investigated, this 
essentially makes the research an exploratory study that should enable it to answer the 
research question but should also highlight, and provide insight, into those areas that require 
further explanation.  
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1.8 Research Aim  
The research aim is to develop a Viable System Model of groups with salient social identities 
in order to assess their viability  and to validate the model by  studying  groups in different 
environments; such as business organisations, religious orders, societies, charities and 
institutions. The research will not specifically investigate the effect of these environments on 
the groups, but use the different situations to ‘tease’ out any underlying invariant 
components (congruent, cohesive, coherent and consistent social processes, factors, 
structures or relationships) that might give insight as to whether salient social groups can 
become viable and clarify how  their viability can be assessed and measured. 
Within Social Identity Theory the salience of a group’s identity has a significant impact on the 
attitude and beliefs of the individuals of the group. At high levels of salience the individuals 
of the group de-individuate and align with the group prototypicality as ‘one’. With this 
process a social group is formed.  
For the purposes of the research a group’s social identity is considered to differ from its 
organisational identity as the former is defined by the group’s intrinsic purpose while the 
latter is defined by its explicit purpose. In Social Identity Theory a group’s intrinsic purpose is 
to transform the individuals into a single identity in a manner that enhances their self-
esteem. This is achieved by undertaking specific social activities which can be disassociated 
from the group’s explicit activities which are the transformations achieved by its 
organisational purpose.  
The purpose of this research is not to examine what a group does but to examine how it 
becomes a social group, understanding the psychological activities and relationships that 
are developed alongside the creation of social value, prestige, prototypicality and 
purposefulness.  
The difference between the explicit and implicit purposes can be demonstrated by examining 
some social groups that exist solely to achieve group formation and identity with no apparent 
or vague explicit purposes – such as social clubs that may carry out very diverse tasks but 
their implicit aim is the formation of a group, We are so used to seeing the explicit purpose 
and structure of an organisation that it is difficult sometimes to see its implicit functions i.e. 
the people and not the roles or the structure. One way of clarifying this is to imagine the 
organisation as the ‘environment’ for the group, although, this is a somewhat simplistic 
explanation because, in some cases, the implicit and explicit purposes may be closely 
aligned. An alternative perspective, more in line with VSM theory is to consider that the 
research aims to bring the social groups of an organisation into focus while fading the 
organisational structure into the background. 
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1.9 Research Question 
The principle research question is;  
Are social groups with salient identities viable systems.  
1.10 Research Objectives 
 To identify a research paradigm and approach necessary to address the 
research question. 
 To create an influence map of the psychological activities of social group 
behaviour from Social Identity Theory. 
 To utilize the systems map of social identity psychological activities  to develop 
a Viable Systems Model of social groups with salient identities.  
 To develop a research design, consistent with the research philosophy, 
approach and strategy, to examine the research question.  
 To conduct research and assess the validity of the model to identify viable 
groups with salient social identities.  
 To identify if any groups with salient social identities can be assessed by the 
model as viable systems and if possible to assess which factors affect the 
development of viability in groups with salient social identities.  
1.11 Significance of the Research 
The research has several possibly significant results. Firstly it brings human behaviour into 
cybernetics; an area where there has been considerable criticism in the past (Checkland, 
1980). A cybernetic model of the behaviour of group formation brings the powerful 
mechanisms in cybernetics to bear on new subject areas such as psychology and sociology. 
Significant theories from system thinking have already made inroads into these areas; 
Luhmann’s (1995) Social Systems Theory for instance; however, these theories have often 
been criticised for the total lack of human agency (Habermas cited in Bausch, 1997). This 
work is only possible now because psychologist have essential ‘mapped the state-space’ of 
individual and group cognition, opening the door to cybernetic principles. 
Both disciplines stand to benefit from this work. While cybernetics lacks a useful model of 
human agency, Social Identity Theory lacks mechanisms to explain coherent purposeful 
action, goal setting and enduring social identities.  The Viable Systems Model with its 
powerful diagnostic tools (Jackson 1989, p 562)  such as; recursivity, autonomy, cohesion 
and requisite variety can be applied to these new areas.  
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By comparing the processes in the Viable Systems Model with the comparable processes in 
the new disciplines, or the lack of comparable processes, new insights are developed; for 
instance, the research identified the possibility that ‘gossip’ was the social group algedonic 
channel and the mechanism for adaptation of group norms appears to follow closely the 
processes of adaptation used by Stafford Beer.  
While only one level of recursion is reported in the research three levels were investigated. 
The two lower levels were the social individual and the social brain. Both these levels of 
recursion were mapped onto different theories in psychology; the first to Social Cognition 
and the second to neurological processes. In both cases the Viable Systems Model 
developed was able to identify the cohesion necessary between two separate psychological 
theories, providing a mechanism to bring two, hitherto separate, theories together. For 
instance, it identified that the self-motives - namely self-enhancement, self-verification, self-
assessment and self-improvement (Sedikides and Strube, 1997), were recursively mirrored, 
on a group level,  to the processes in Social Identity Theory of  in-group-favouritism and out 
group-derogation?  
At a practical level it is also hoped that by developing the model greater understanding of 
group behaviour can be achieved and that this will lead to better mechanisms for resolving 
conflict within organisations and managing change programmes.    
1.12 Study Direction - A History of the Research 
The Research Question in essence never changed throughout the period of study because it 
was derived from a personal desire to answer the question about whether groups with 
salient social identities achieve viability. Without the focus of the research question the 
complexity of this research could have taken it in many different directions. Robson (2011) 
indicates that the centrality of the research question is vital to research design.  
One problem that did arise with reference to the research question, was recognising that the 
question “are salient social identities viable systems?” would itself  raise questions about the 
validity of Social Identity Theory as a viable theory. On reflection this was considered 
necessary. If a model of salient social group behaviour was to be valid then the model and 
its underlying foundations, both VSM and Social Identity Theory had to be valid too.   
There were several significant factors that made the research a considerable challenge. 
Firstly it spanned two or more different disciplines; systems thinking and psychology. Each 
of these areas had their own expertise, language and culture, each difficult to penetrate with 
a different discipline. Several other disciplines also encroached on the work; philosophy, 
sociology, anthropology and business studies and this raised the second issue, namely, that 
of ensuring that the work had not been covered before in another area. Systems thinking 
penetrated many different disciplines during its heydays of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Katz and 
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Kahn (1966), for instance; brought system thinking concepts into psychology in the 1960s 
while Luhmann’s (1995) Social Systems Theory, also in the 1960s, brought the concepts of 
autopoiesis and closure to sociology. There was, therefore, a considerable amount of 
research to investigate. To resolve this Robson’s advice was followed to use a ‘conceptual 
framework’ by creating a concept map in;;  
“…graphical or in narrative form, [of] the main things to be studied 
– the key factors, constructs or variables – and the presumed 
relationships among them - Frameworks can be rudimentary or 
elaborate, theory-driven or commonsensical, descriptive or 
causal.” (Robson,2011, Kindle 2469). 
The conceptual framework was developed as a ‘concept and argument’ map, see Figure 1.1 
(included as an attachment). This approach helped to map the ‘state-space’ of the subject 
area, and to develop the relationships between components, clarify the relevant research 
material and provided a logical argument for and against the research question. 
The last area of complexity, already discussed, was how to conduct research on complex 
systems. This question is still largely unresolved as the debate is on-going. The solution 
adopted was practical and pragmatic but there should be no doubt that it leaves a lot to be 
desired. Taking a ‘snapshot’ of a complex system and drawing conclusions from this brief 
picture is not ideal, given a greater research scope it would have been preferable to take a 
series of ‘snapshots’ as part of a longitudinal case study, however, recognising  the 
limitations of the research method are important. From the viewpoint of a complex system, 
probably best explained by Cilliers (1998) from a connectionist and postmodernist 
standpoint, the contradictions in many of the well-known processes become apparent. The 
simple answer is that there is no easy way to conduct research on complex systems and this 
should be understood from the beginning.  
While the research is presented here as a linear narrative it was not conducted in this 
manner. Stafford Beer suggests that any Viable Systems Model should represent three 
levels of recursion. To achieve this the original model represented three levels, starting with; 
neurological processes, then social individuals (social cognition) and finally salient social 
group (social identity). It became apparent, however, that research into this larger model 
was beyond the scope of the study and the model was reduced to two levels of recursion 
using only social identity and some aspects of social cognition.    
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1.13 Guide to the Thesis 
1.13.1 Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Chapter 1 covers the introduction to the subject of the research. It explains the reasons for 
the research and introduces Social Identity Theory and the Viable Systems Model. The 
chapter then discusses the issues around the suitability of the Viable Systems Model for 
undertaking social research and follows this with a summary of the research approach, 
design,  research aim and objectives. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
significance of the research, summary of chapters and guide to the history of the study 
direction.    
1.13.2 Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of the subject matter. It examines the concepts of 
Social Identity Theory and then conducts a comparison with its companion theory, Social 
Cognition, before covering the latest research. After a brief summary of other areas of 
psychology that are relevant, the chapter introduces Systems Theory and the Viable 
Systems Model. It explains its concepts and examines the arguments for and against using it 
as a model of human behaviour. This discussion leads to the latest developments in the 
VSM that could resolve some of its  issues.  
1.13.3 Chapter 3 – Research Paradigm and Approach 
Chapter 3 covers the philosophy, approach and design of the research. It starts by 
identifying the research questions and then develops the research paradigm from the 
ontologies and epistemologies of the constituent theories, demonstrating the constructivist 
foundations of Social Identity Theory and the structuralist foundations of the VSM and hence 
the need for a  pragmatic approach  The chapter then moves on to discuss the research 
implications of using analysis in complex systems and qualifies the approach to include 
synthesis and abduction in a mixed-strategy design.   
1.13.4 Chapter 4 – Research Model 
Chapter 4 uses the information provided in the literature review to build a Viable Systems 
Model of salient social identities. It explains how it will represent the elements of Social 
Identity Theory as components of the Viable Systems Model and the relationships between 
them as key processes. 
1.13.5  Chapter 5 – Research Methodology. 
Chapter 5 identifies how the Viable Systems Model of salient social identities developed in 
Chapter 4 is implemented as a research project. It identifies the variables for measurement, 
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linking the data to the propositions, the questionnaire and the semi-structured interviews, the 
conduct of research and questions of validity and reliability and ethical issues.   
1.13.6 Chapter 6 – Research Results 
Chapter 6 provides the research results for the highest level of recursion only; that is the 
conclusion of the synthesis (results for the lower levels are provided in Appendix 3). The 
chapter provides a summary of the criteria used for interpreting the findings and examines 
the reliability and validity of the data. 
1.13.7 Chapter 7 – Synthesis of Components 
Chapter 7 synthesises all the components by group-type along with the qualitative data into 
a narrative describing the key factors of each group-type. The chapter completes with an 
analysis of the invariances of all the group-types. 
1.13.8 Chapter 8 – Research Summary 
Chapter 8 examines the research process and results. It inspects the invariances of the 
invariances, in other words those aspect common across all group-types and all group-ids.  
It confirms the validity of the model but concludes that there is no easy measure of viability 
except the process itself. The chapter then summarises the research findings indicating the 
factors that influence the viability of social groups. The individual components used in the 
research are re-evaluated and the Viable Systems Model restructured to account for the 
lessons identified. Finally the research process itself is examined and assessments of the 
design and methodology are provided.  
1.13.9 Chapter 9 - Conclusion 
Chapter 9, the final chapter revisits the research question to assess the success of the study 
and makes recommendations for future research in light of the experience and knowledge 
gained, detailing the significance of the findings, and their possible future application, . 
1.14 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter introduced the subject of the research. It explained the reasoning behind the 
research as a personal question and introduced the main theories that will be called on, 
namely Social Identity Theory and the Viable Systems Model. The issues surrounding the 
suitability of the Viable Systems Model for undertaking social research was than discussed, 
followed by a statement of the research approach, design,  research aim and objectives. The 
chapter concluded with a discussion of the significance of the research, summary of 
chapters  and history of the study direction. 
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW  
 2. 2
 
 “It’s me against my brother, it’s me and my brother against our 
cousins, it’s me, my brother and our cousins against the town, the 
town against the tribe and the tribe against the world.” - Arab 
proverb 
2.1 Aim of Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a review of the latest research in the areas of Social 
Identity Theory, Social Cognition and the Viable Systems Model, while at the same time 
building the underpinning knowledge required for the research. It concludes by providing an 
argument for the use of the Viable Systems Model as a means of representing human 
behaviour in viable group formation.  
2.2 Social Identity Theory 
2.2.1 How people relate to groups - self-categorization and depersonalisation  
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Abrams and Hogg 1988) is a theory of group 
membership and behaviour  that Tajfel and Turner suggest is driven by a need to enhance 
self-esteem and as a result provides the mechanism for the cohesion of groups.  
Tajfel and Turner recognised that a ‘social identity’ provides a summation of all the effects of 
social cognition (Fiske and Taylor, 1991a) that describes to both oneself, and others, “this is 
who I am as a result of all these things that I believe and do”. It signals the accumulation of 
our beliefs about ourselves and in doing so provides the mechanism for stereotyping 
ourselves and others as a first stage in group categorization.  
The significant breakthrough for Turner in the development of Self-Categorization Theory 
(Turner 1981, Turner and Onorato, 1999), a companion theory to Social Identity, was the 
realization that in categorizing others our capacity for self-reflection means we categorize 
ourselves. Hence, the process of joining and being accepted by a group becomes more than 
just a gathering of individuals;  the process of self-categorization means that when people 
elect to join a group they have self-selected that group because its attributes are aligned 
with their own; as have the others. This means that groups are self-selected in alignment 
with their members personal identity; they are part of it and it is part of them; 
“…the individual's knowledge that he belongs to certain social 
groups together with some emotional and value significance to 
him of this group membership" (Tajfel, 1972 p292) 
 15 
 
Part of peoples’ sense of identity comes, therefore, from their group memberships;  
“…as much as personal identity gives people a sense of "self", so 
social identity is part of a person's sense of “who they are”” 
created through the meaning, values and beliefs of being a 
member of a group”. (Hogg and Terry, 2000) 
The very process of self-categorization, of aligning with a group, causes an individual to 
depersonalise themselves, from ‘me’ they become ‘we’ and from ‘I’ they become ‘us’; 
… the critical contribution of self-categorization and social identity 
theory to the study of group processes is that they link social 
categorization to self-conception and psychological group 
membership. The core idea is that we categorize ourselves just 
as we categorize others, and thus we depersonalize ourselves 
(Hogg and Tindale, 2001, p61) 
2.2.2 Prototypicality and Salience 
The multiple individual self-categorisations of a group, by its members, will not all be 
perfectly aligned. To create group coherence individuals will have to adjust their view of the 
group and if necessary their values and beliefs. People monitoring and socializing values 
with other members of the group achieve alignment or cohesion between the individuals in 
the group. Through the use of schema (Piaget 1952,1973 and Anderson, 1977) the 
members build a stereotype of a typical group member with a prototypical image of the 
group identity which they then strive to attain (Hogg and McGarty, 1990). The prototypical 
image of a group member will be a summary of the group attributes; image, traits, attitudes, 
behaviours and values.  
The salience of social identity varies depending on environmental conditions. It increases 
with similarities within the group and differences between groups. It is increased by social 
context; such as when there is a threat from out-groups. As the salience increases so people 
stereotype themselves more towards the group prototype and alter their personal behaviour 
to adopt group norms and values, to achieve group cohesion (Turner and Onorato, 1999). 
“…self-categorization has additional effects; it not only transforms 
self-conception and generates a feeling of belonging and group 
identification, but also transforms how we actually feel and 
behave to conform to the group prototype. Self-categorization 
causes our thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and behaviour to 
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conform to our prototype of the  in-group”. (Hogg and Reid, 2006, 
p11). 
The key attributes that define a group’s prototypicality will differ depending on the context of 
the group and even the relative context. Some attributes will define the group better in some 
context than others and so too some members of the group, in some contexts, will represent 
the group prototype better than others.   
“…[prototypes] are fuzzy sets, not checklists, of attributes (e.g., 
attitudes and behaviours) that define one group and distinguish it 
from other groups. These category representations capture 
similarities among people within the same group and differences 
between groups. In other words, they accentuate intragroup 
similarities (assimilation) and intergroup differences (contrast) (cf. 
Tajfel, 1959) and thus transform a bewilderingly diverse social 
stimulus domain into a smaller set of distinct and clearly 
circumscribed categories. Group prototypes submerge variability 
and diversity in a single representation that characterizes an 
entire human group. Technically, prototypes obey the meta-
contrast principle - they maximize the ratio of intergroup 
differences to intragroup differences. By so doing, they also 
enhance perceived entitativity - the property of a group that 
makes it appear to be a coherent and distinct entity that is 
homogeneous and well structured, has clear boundaries, and 
whose members share a common fate” (Hogg and Reid, 2007, 
p10). 
Precisely because prototypes define the group and attenuate the complexity of group 
membership they also characterise the group normative behaviours.  
“From a social identity perspective, group prototypes describe 
individual cognitive representations of group norms. And, 
importantly, the process of depersonalization based on self-
categorization, described above, produces conformity to shared  
in-group prototypes and thus produces  in-group normative 
behaviour.” (Hogg and Reid 2007, p11). 
2.2.3 Positive Distinctiveness and Group Enhancement 
Turner (1981) states that once people have self-categorized with a group, they will seek to 
achieve improved self-esteem by enhancing the attributes of the group in the dimensions 
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that are of value to them. To do this they need to reassure themselves that their group is 
positively distinct from other ‘comparable groups’ in these important dimensions and values.  
 “This quest for positive distinctiveness means that when peoples 
sense of who they are is defined in terms of "we" rather than "I" 
they want to see "us" as different to and better than "them" in 
order to feel good about who and what they are.” (Haslam, 2004, 
p21). 
The need to differentiate from other groups and the need to enhance this difference drives 
members to develop group enhancing behaviours (Turner, 1982). They seek to favour their 
in-group and its members and derogate out-groups and out-group members along the 
dimensions that are important to them. As people stereotype and depersonalize themselves 
as a member of the in-group as ‘us’ they will simultaneously stereotype and depersonalize 
members of out-groups as ‘them’. Individuals ascribe good and desirable qualities to their 
group and bad and undesirable qualities to the out-groups. 
As members of a group try to enhance its status. Hogg and Terry (2000) argue that 
‘uncertainty reduction’ is just as important as self-esteem as a motivating factor for group 
behaviour; 
 “In addition to being motivated by self-enhancement, social 
identity processes are also motivated by a need to reduce 
subjective uncertainty about one's perceptions, attitudes, feelings, 
and behaviours and, ultimately, one's self-concept and place 
within the social world. Uncertainty reduction, particularly about 
subjectively important matters that are generally self-conceptually 
relevant, is a core human motivation. Certainty renders existence 
meaningful and confers confidence in how to behave and what to 
expect from the physical and social environment within which one 
finds oneself. Self-categorization reduces uncertainty by 
transforming self-conception and assimilating self to a prototype 
that describes and prescribes perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and 
behaviours.” (Hogg and Terry, 2000, p6) 
Joining a high status group, therefore, seems to provide a sense of security but also 
improves self-understanding, as Hogg and Terry state above, certainty renders ‘existence 
meaningful’ as people search for ‘coherence’;  
“…in order to understand the direction that the search for 
coherence will take” (Tajfel, 1969, p92)  
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Together the motives of self-esteem and uncertainty reduction provide a scale of motivation 
on a continuum from “survive to thrive”. 
2.2.4 Meta-Contrast and Perceiver Readiness 
The process of self-categorization can take one of two specific forms that relate to how well 
an individual believes they ‘fit’ a group (Turner, Hogg and Oakes 1987). An individual’s 
alignment with a group  can be comparative or normative or both. Comparative fit employs 
the principle of meta-contrast; which relates the ‘ratio of similarity’, between an individual 
and the available groups or individuals in the current relevant social context, while normative 
fit uses the principle of ‘perceiver readiness’, which is an alignment of values, beliefs and 
attitudes. 
With the principle of meta-contrast individuals compare the ‘contrast of contrasts’ between 
inter-class and intra-class differences, in other words they define who they see as an out-
group and who they see as an  in-group by amplifying the relative differences and 
distinctions that they see around them. This can have the effect of  changing the same 
groups from out-group to  in-group, and vice versa, at different levels of abstraction; for 
example; if a biologist is surrounded by other biologist and some physicists the two groups 
will accentuate the differences between themselves and the biologist will form an in-group 
with the other biologists and be very much a biologist, displaying as much of the 
prototypicality of a biologist as possible. The physicists will do likewise. However, if the 
group of biologists and physicists is now surrounded by artists they may well consider that 
the differences between them are less than the differences between them and the artists an 
so they self-categorize themselves as ‘scientists’ and create an  in-group with the artists now 
as the out-group. 
These identities, at any level of abstraction, are just as real as the person’s personal-identity 
and go together to create their self-concept; 
“Self-categories at all levels of abstraction are seen to be equally 
real and just as much a reflection of a person’s true self, no one 
level of self-categorization is inherently more appropriate than 
another and hence non is in any sense more fundamental to who 
or what the person is.  This is at odds with the tendency for 
psychological theorizing to give privileged status to personal 
identity. Believing that a person's true self is defined by their 
individuality”. (Haslam, 2004, p31) 
The use of comparative fit to compare individuals and groups by intra and inter-group 
differences is only part of the manner in which self-categorization is utilized. While an 
individual categorizes others with comparative fit  they, nevertheless, examine the nature of 
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the differences between groups to ensure that they are “consistent with the perceiver’s 
expectations about the categories” (Haslam 2004 p 34). This process is known as  
normative fit and is managed by the perceivers readiness to acknowledge the normative 
attributes of a group. In other words the individual has to know what the expected behaviour, 
attitudes or norms of the group are beforehand to be able to judge the nature of the 
differences. 
“… the prototype is therefore normative in the sense that it 
captures the meaning of inter-category differences for a specific 
social comparison; in so doing, it provides a basis for self-
definition and behavior. We have a priori normative expectations; 
nonetheless, the important point is that the norms always reflect 
the salient identity.” (Reid and Hogg 2005, p132) 
There are two important points for the research that relate to the self-categorization process. 
Firstly, because the perception of prototype and category varies between individual and 
group and is changed by context and relativity there are no predetermined categories or 
‘universal’ identities. (Haslam, 2004, p35). Secondly, people will be more ready (i.e. have a 
greater perceive readiness) to self-categorize with groups that they feel will provide them 
with an “enduring sense of self” because they provide a “valued and self-involving 
opportunity for membership (Haslam, 2004, p36).  
2.2.5 Multiple Identities and Functional Antagonism  
Social Identity Theory recognises that people will maintain multiple identities in order to 
function within the myriad of groups that make their social world. However, only one identity 
will tend to be salient at any one time, this includes their personal identity. The increase in 
salience of one identity will cause the automatic decrease in salience of others. This is 
known as the principle of functional antagonism (Turner et al 1987; Turner and Onorato, 
1999). Situations that bring out attributes, attitudes or goals that an individual sees as 
fundamentally part of self will make their personal identity become salient. If a group identity 
has greater salience than a personal identity then the personal identity will diminish. In some 
cases individuals will internalise the group values even if they conflict with their own  and in 
extreme cases they will adopt the group identity as their own and develop a ‘fused’ identity 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1989, Terry, Hogg and Duck, 1999). 
2.2.6 Low Status Groups  
People who are part of a low status group need to restore their self-esteem. To do this they 
may engage one of several different strategies. Firstly, if the situation allows, they may try to 
join the higher status group; this is known as social mobility. If this fails or is not allowed by 
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the high status group then they may either engage in social conflict or social creativity 
(Haslam 2004, p25).  
If the high status group is perceived as legitimate the low status groups may engage in 
social creativity by re-categorizing themselves by a new dimension or attribute that they 
know they do well; such as “they are rich but we are kind”. However, if the low status group 
does not see the higher group as legitimate then they may engage in social conflict; 
particularly, if they feel threatened (Haslam, 2004, p27). High status groups may show 
magnanimity or favouritism in irrelevant dimensions to low status groups to appease them.   
Hogg and Abrams (1990) suggest that self-esteem is not the only mediator of the ‘social 
value’ assigned to group membership; they propose that uncertainty reduction and optimal 
distinctiveness (Brewer 1991, 1993) also play a part. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory 
suggests that there is a balance between group identity and personal identity that people 
strive to achieve. Other areas that have been found to influence group behaviour, 
particularly of low status groups are; network activity, entitativity (Hamilton and Sherman, 
1996) and anonymity (Lea and Spears, 1991).  
Anonymity has a complicated effect of low status group membership which is represented 
with the Social Identity Model of De-individuation Effects (SIDE) (Lea and Spears 1991, 
Postmes et al 1998). SIDE is based on a premise published by Ng (1980, 1982) that; 
“The cognitive salience of group identity is not a sufficient 
condition for normative behaviour to occur”. It is also necessary 
for group members to have the power to express group norms 
even in the face of out-group resistance.”  (Ng, 1980, 1982, cited 
in Reichet et al, 1998, p17) 
With cognitive effects SIDE states that anonymity of low-status group members to out-
groups will increase the depersonalisation effects, precisely because they are anonymous, 
and hence it will increase group identity salience; provided, that is there is a clearly defined  
in-group in the first place. However,  when low-status group members are visible to high 
status out-group members, who hold some power of sanction, the salience of the low-status  
in-group will reduce. Therefore, except for some special occasions, anonymity will also 
enhance the low-status group norms as low-status group members are free to act without 
fear of sanction. In this scenario SIDE demonstrates many of the de-individuation effects 
proposed by Zimbado (1969). 
2.3 Social Cognition - How People Think About People 
Social Cognition and Social Identity form two overlapping theories of an individual’s 
behaviour towards their social environment. The theories are overlapping because they 
 21 
cover some of the same human behaviours, however, they do this from very different 
perspectives. Fiske and Taylor (1991a) defined social cognition as; 
“How ordinary people think about people and how they think they 
think about people” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991a, p1) 
Social Cognition studies an individual’s understanding of, and interaction with, other people. 
It therefore covers a broad spectrum of human behaviour. It provides theories about the 
‘concept of self’ including self-identity and the self-motives, specifically; self-enhancement, 
self-verification, self-assessment and self-improvement, (Sedikides C, Gregg A , 2008). It 
advances theories on personal cognitive behaviour such as cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957), and on how individuals formulate and carry out intentions (The Theory of Planned 
Behaviour, Ajzen,1991).  From the self-concept Social Cognition moves outwards to 
examine how individuals assess other peoples traits and behaviour (causal attribution, 
Kelley, 1973), how they create stereotypes (Allport, 1954), and how they categorize groups 
and social behaviour. Social Cognition posits that these cognitive processes derive from 
people’s goals and intentions and are closely associated with their situation and environment  
(Fiske, 1993). 
The self-motives take a central role in the management of the self-concept. Self-
enhancement increases self-esteem, sometimes regardless of reality. Self-verification 
elevates control and hence maintains self-beliefs. Self-assessment ‘reduces uncertainty’ and 
improves the accuracy of self-understanding by developing skills, knowledge, traits and 
abilities and self-improvement creates a feeling of “progress and hope” and by creating 
genuine growth to self-esteem through self-development, (Taylor and Lobel,1989, Taylor et 
al, 1995, Sedikides and Strube, 1995). 
2.3.1 Causal Inference - Individuals 
Heider (1958) demonstrated that people are continuously making causal inferences on the 
behaviour of other individuals around them. He showed that people try to determine whether 
or not any action is intentional; and hence attribute traits to the person they are observing. 
Uleman et al,(1992) showed that this examination of the environment is spontaneous i.e. it is 
it is carried out automatically. The degree to which it is automatic depends on the perceived 
‘prototypicality’ of the person (Cantor and Mischel, 1979). In Social Cognition prototypicality 
is a ‘graded categorization process’ (Rosch, 1983) whereby items are associated with an 
ideal; for instance, a robin is seen as more typical of a ‘bird’ than a penguin. Memory is 
biased in a prototype manner (Stangor and Mcmillan 1992), which means that inferences of 
high prototypicality are recalled more easily but also, because heuristic process are used to 
categorise them, they cause more cognitive errors.  
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When recognising whether or not behaviour is intentional, Malle (1999) suggested that 
people look for evidence of a reason for the action. He maintains that reasons are derived 
from a ‘desire’ and a ‘belief’ that the action leads to that result. He goes on to demonstrate 
that behaviour is attributed to four modes; 
“People’s conceptual toolbox for explaining behavior thus 
contains four modes of explanation: one for unintentional behavior 
(causes), and three for intentional behavior (reasons, causal 
histories, enabling factors).”  (Male, 2007, p11) 
Recognising reasons why people do something is often derived from a culture's shared 
knowledge (Bruner, 1990). Understanding beliefs, however, is much harder to prescribe and 
requires specific information from the circumstances. 
2.3.2 Inferences About Groups 
The Social Cognitive perspective maintains that generally people make memory based 
judgements about groups and group membership as opposed to ‘spontaneous’ judgements 
for individuals (Susskind et al 1999). However, this depends on the ‘entitativity’ of the group 
(McConnell et al 1997); that is, the degree to which a group can be seen as a cohesive and 
purposeful collective. High entitativity groups are treated to the same spontaneous 
processing as individuals; possibly because they are more easily recognizable and hence 
stereotyped, but also, because they might pose more of a threat or opportunity as their 
cohesive action can be far more powerful than that of any individual; entitativity defines the 
‘potency’ of a group, for good or bad (Sherman et al 1999).  
When entitativity is low people process groups and individuals differently by trying to resolve 
inconsistencies for individuals but not for groups (Welbourne, 1999); however, when 
entitativity is high they attempt inconsistency resolution for both. Entitativity, therefore, 
increases the salience and importance of groups so that inferences drawn about them are 
treated in the same way as individuals; through simultaneous online processing. Lickel et al 
(2000) and Sherman et al (2002) showed that there are three main group typologies that are 
spontaneously classified; intimacy groups, task oriented groups and social groups.  
Sherman et al (1999) suggest that there are many parallels between entitativity and the 
three key-processes in Social Identity Theory; namely, social identity, self-categorization and 
optimal distinctiveness and that these factors work together with entitativity to enable 
individuals to assess the salience and ‘social value’ of groups that they are associated with; 
“…entitativity has tended to focus on understanding the formation 
of group stereotypes, typically without reference to the perceiver's 
own group memberships. On the other hand, social identity 
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research has been primarily concerned with the differentiation 
between  in-groups and out-groups and its various ramifications. 
Despite their differing historical roots and their different points of 
emphasis, both of these concepts have important relevance for 
our understanding of social perception, impressions of groups, 
interaction both within and between groups, feelings about the 
self and social information processing“. (Sherman et al, 1999, 
p80) 
2.3.3 Schema and Stereotypes 
So how does the mind make a spontaneous inference of an individual or a group? When is it 
a conscious thought and when is it automatic? Part of the answer to this lies in the manner 
in which the human cognitive processes make sense of the complexity they are faced with.  
The Gestalt psychologists (Wertheimer, 1912) in examining human conscious processes 
suggested that the “properties of a whole experience cannot be inferred from its parts” and 
proposed that conscious thought was a dynamic process rather than a straight forward recall 
of memories. In subsequent research Wulf (1922) recognised that memory was part of a 
‘schemata’ that became more ‘dominant’ as memories were formed and ‘normalized’ the 
recall process. 
Bartlett (1932) used the term ‘schema’ to refer to “an active organisation of past reactions, or 
past experience” and noted that people did not observe ‘detail by detail’ but took an overall 
impression and filled in the finer points using a framework built through previous experience; 
he suggested that memories were reconstructed using schema rather than simply replayed. 
From his work on child development and figurative thinking Piaget(1952,1973) proposed that 
there were three kinds of cognitive ‘schemata’ that organized thought; patterns of behaviour, 
experiences and objects. Piaget also proposed that ‘intelligence’ could be represented as 
either ‘operative’ or ‘figurative’, where operative intelligence involves action to transform 
memory while figurative intelligence is the static representation of objects retained in the 
mind. Piaget believed that the figurative intelligence was, therefore, subservient to operative 
intelligence and dependent on it for meaning. Operative intelligence assimilates and 
accommodates new information. Assimilation is where new information is fitted into existing 
schema while accommodation is where schema are altered to take account of new 
information that make no sense under existing structures.  
Anderson (1977) demonstrated that schemas are the categorical rules that people use to 
interpret the world, and just as Piaget suggested; new information is processed with respect 
to these rules. This provides people with a framework for not only analysing the world 
around them but also predicting what will happen. This concept of schemas fits exactly the 
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way that the mind stores information; that is as areas of ‘related significance’ in an 
associative network of declarative (semantic and episodic), and implicit (procedural) 
memories (Raaijmakers and Schiffrin, 1981). 
Social schemas can work at several levels; at an individual level by applying known traits to 
a person or at a group level by assigning a person to a certain aggregate i.e. stereotyping. 
When a person categorises an individual with traits or stereotypes as a member of a group 
they not only apply the schema categorical rules to label them but the process will also 
trigger any pre-formed attitudes about the traits or the group. This will shape the person’s 
perception of the individual as they adjust their observations to fit the stereotype and allow 
them to anticipate their actions.  
Categorization and stereotyping are mechanisms that enable the human mind to make 
sense of the world (Allport 1954, Brewer 1988, Fiske and Neuberg 1990, Oakes et al 1994). 
By applying the learned categorizations automatically it also frees the cognitive mind to 
process other problems, provided, that is, that the individual acts as expected. During times 
when a person is more heavily occupied the brain will employ stereotyping to maintain 
awareness of the environment with minimal effort (Lippmann 1922, Allport 1954). Unusual 
behaviour, however, will create a re-examination of the individual and an attempt to 
reassess to take account of the new information (McCrae and Bodenhausen 1988). 
As well as the need to free cognitive resources there are several other factors that control 
the use of stereotypes. Stereotyping can be automatic if; people are unaware of the key 
stimuli (Devine, 1989), it is goal dependent (MacCrae et al 1997), the social context implies 
stereotyping (MacCrae et al 1995), recently activated attitudes (Smith et al 1996) or  with 
chronically accessible attitudes (Fazio and Dunton, 1997). 
The suggestion that categorization and stereotyping are synonymous is supported by a large 
body of literature (McCauley and Stitt 1980, Tajfel 1969), this led to a supposition that 
prejudice was an automatic consequence of this process (Devine, 1989).  However, there is 
some evidence to suggest that the categorization and stereotyping processes can be 
independent under certain circumstances (Lepore and Brown 1999). This work suggests that 
stereotypes are ‘functionalist’ tools activated when it is appropriate for them to be used. 
Locke and Walker (1999) suggest that stereotypes are automatically activated when 
judgements have to be made about a group but not necessarily when remembering 
information about the group; hence prejudice is not an automatic reaction to being 
confronted by a member of the group. They imply that processing goals are the key 
mechanism that activates stereotyping along the lines of a ‘motivated tactician’ (Fiske and 
Taylor 1991a). ‘Motivated tactician’ is a process whereby humans use the least resources 
necessary to process  information especially if it they are having to undertake multiple tasks. 
Similar mechanisms are the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) which 
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controls attitude change using  systematic processing and central route processing. The first 
uses careful evaluation of information to assess the arguments to make substantial attitude 
change, while heuristic processing used the minimum cognitive effort  to assess the 
presence or absence of ‘persuasion cues’. The Affect Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995) suggest 
that people use four different modes to process information; direct access, motivated, 
heuristic, and substantive processing. Direct access and motivated processing use minimum 
affect infusion (emotions), while heuristic and substantive use ‘shortcuts’ to make a decision 
by using emotions.  
Social Identity Theory leans heavily on the concept put forward by Brewer (1988) that 
categorisation provides meaning and as a result has not always addressed the issue of 
automatic stereotyping, neither has it addressed the cognitive mechanisms which connect 
categorization and stereotyping given a particular social context; Locke and Walker (1999) 
suggest that processing goals provide this process. 
 A key question is, therefore, what categories do people make? Attribution research 
suggests that individual traits tend to be categorised along the lines of personality, in such 
areas as neurotic, extrovert, introvert. However, with groups the situation is not easily 
resolved. Some research suggests that group membership tends to focus initially on what is 
called the “big three” (Levin and Levin 1982); race, gender and age, while other research 
suggests that people also tend to categorise others in relation to aspects that differ from 
themselves, shared group memberships, or by deviations from the social norm (Zarate and 
Smith 1990). 
When someone stereotypes another person both direct and indirect influences are 
generated. Direct influence may activate stereotype beliefs, while the indirect influences may 
trigger how information is interpreted; people tend to notice information that confirms their 
stereotype-based beliefs (Bodenhausen, 1988), people tend to interpret ambiguous 
information to confirm their stereotypes and seek information that confirms the view of others 
(Snyder and Swann 1978). 
Social Identity Theorists argue that categorisation is always constructed from the social 
context and that the process of categorisation generates intergroup differentiation by 
measuring the contrast between categories, further it suggests that this process is driven by 
the need for positive distinctiveness and as a result looks for and creates  in-group bias 
(Tajfel, 1971) 
These different approaches are recognised by Vescio et al (1999) who point out that people 
can be categorized in many different ways along many different dimensions and that in 
some cases these categorisations will conflict. They suggest that these circumstances can 
only be interpreted using both Social Cognition and Social Identity perspectives. They argue 
that different circumstances will result in different valued ‘effects’ being assigned to ‘out-
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group’ categories depending on the salience and presence of cognitive sub-group 
representations. 
A possible solution to the different approaches of social perception and categorization is 
provided by the Parallel Constraints Model (Kunda and Thagard 1996). They suggest that 
perception is a function of the parallel operation of excitatory and inhibitory links in a 
network. When provided with only category labels a perceiver will activate the associated 
stereo type and hence its linked traits and behaviours; however, when further information is 
provided the network seeks to achieve a cohesive output by balancing the linked traits, 
behaviours and stereotypes. Hence people with multiple categories memberships will 
activate all stereotypes simultaneously and result in a rationalisation to achieve an overall 
image. Abrams and Hogg(1999) suggests that this model can be modified to include 
contrast and context and hence includes self-categorization theory.   
2.3.4 Gossip 
The last area we have from social cognition is the social cognition understanding of how 
information is passed in groups. Haugen and Villa (2006, p210) suggest that gossip is an 
“efficient means of transmitting information about the rules, norms, and guidelines for living 
in a group or culture”, while Dunbar (2004) suggests that gossip constrains people’s 
behaviour to both conform to group norms and to contribute to group goals; thus preventing 
self-serving behaviour and providing a mechanism to construe such group norms and 
discourage defection. 
“…people want to associate their group with generic norms in 
order to show that it reflects the views of most people and thus 
deserves to have authority and power.” (Moreland and Levine, 
2006, p116) 
2.4 Comparison of Social Cognition and Social Identity 
Hogg and Tindale (2001) state that the principle difference between Social Identity Theory 
and Social Cognition is that while Social Identity focuses on ‘social categories, the 
categorization process and intergroup behaviour, it has paid less attention to processes 
within groups. Social Cognition, on the other hand, has sought to understand cognition and 
perception of social behaviour but has not generally focused on large-scale intergroup 
relations. For this reason the first iteration of the research model, with several lower layers of 
recursion, experienced problems trying to use just Social Identity Theory as there were few 
components to suggest how the individual would respond. This provides a powerful reason 
for aligning the two theories.  
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Abrams and Hogg (1999) bring together the arguments for and against the integration or 
differentiation of social cognition and social identity and demonstrate the links that have 
grown as the two theories have developed in parallel. Operario and Fiske (1999) argue that 
the two approaches are linked through the; 
 “…assumptions that people have pragmatic goals in the service 
of a need to act adaptively and an assumption that individual 
behaviour can only be understood in the wider cultural context of 
human existence”. (Operario and Fiske, 1999) 
While Oakes et al (1999) maintain that the critical difference between the two perspectives is 
in the categorization process of groups and in particular; stereotyping. They state that Social 
Identity maintains that stereotyping is always context dependent while Social Cognition 
suggests that it is, to some degree, part of a cognitive structure stored in memory.  
2.5 Latest Research into Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory, being grounded in psychology, has been extensively empirically 
researched. There are a significant number of diverse areas that have been investigated; 
such as the use of power, commitment, leadership and politics. 
Social identity provides the basis for power-sharing and mutual empowerment. Social power 
is used strategically to advance  in-group interests with group conflict, McGarty, et al (2000). 
Power is used differentially to disadvantage the out-group. Coercive power may be used 
against the  in-group in high threat situations to prevent desertion. Individuals with low or 
moderate power are unable to advance individually then they more likely to embrace groups 
that will give them collective power. 
Jost and Elsbach (2001) show how status and power in organisations can disrupt social 
identity processes. Using Social Justification Theory they show how some low status out-
groups internalize a sense of their own inferiority.  
Moreland et al (2001) show how people join, integrate and can leave workgroups. Their 
original work is founded on three key principles, namely; evaluation, commitment and role 
transition and demonstrates the building of trust and commitment between new and old 
members of a group. This has important consequences in group dynamics and differentiates 
specifically between new and older members of a group, demonstrating the interaction of 
group commitment towards and from individuals. They show how individuals develop 
different relationships with a group over time, as shown in the diagram below. Moreland et 
al’s, original work was founded on Rational Exchange Theory, however, they re-evaluated 
their research using Self-Categorization Theory based on prototypicality and raised 
questions about the transformation of the group prototype over time.  
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Prentice et al (2006) researched the attachment of individuals to both common-identity 
groups and common-bond groups with results that may have important significance to this 
study. They suggest that rather than these two groups types being seen as competing 
theories of group development that they are separate processes in the structure of groups. 
This would suggest, from a systems perspective that Social Identity Theory does not have 
the requisite variety to explain all group types and this will be an important factor in the 
assessment of whether or not Social Identity Theory itself has requisite variety. Their 
research found evidence to support both theories, specifically, that groups can be ‘top down’ 
and based on a common-identity, or that they can be ‘bottom up’ and based on a common-
bond between members. Either way they suggest that ‘group dynamics’ depend on how 
group members cognitively represent their group; 
“Bottom-up accounts suggest that group attachment is an 
emergent feature of attachment to group members: Once there 
are sufficient interpersonal bonds among a collection of 
individuals, they will become a group. Top-down accounts 
suggest that group attachment originates in social categorization 
and leads to, rather than follows from, interpersonal bonds (see 
also Miller and Felicio, 1990)”. (Prentice et al, 2006, p93) 
Figure 2.1 – Commitment over time with group membership From Moorland and Levine (1982) 
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Importantly for this research they identify that a common-identity is necessary to sustain the 
group in the long term, in other words for it to be viable and they speculate that this common 
identity may come from a bottom up or a top down process, although they also stress that 
there is no reason why a bottom up process, namely a group formed from a common-bond 
should always achieve a group identity; 
“…social movement researchers have noted that participants 
must have a common identity that constitutes a significant portion 
of their social existence to sustain collective action (see Blumer, 
1953; Scott, 1990; Turner and Killian, 1957). Similarly, studies of 
utopian communities have revealed that enduring communities 
tend to have strong group identities.” (Prentice et al, 2006, p92) 
2.6 Social Identity and Personal Identity 
Lastly Stets and Burke (2000) demonstrate the connections between Identity Theory, which 
focuses on personal identity, roles in organisations, and Social Identity. Stets and Burke 
argue that there are close correspondences between the two theories that demonstrate the 
interconnections between individual behaviour and group behaviour. In essence these are 
that Social Identity emphasises “who one is” while Identity Theory focuses on “what one 
does”. Stets and Burke suggest that both “being and doing” are key aspects of identity and 
combining the two provides a more complete social theory. The suggestions by Stets and 
Burke imply an interplay between personal identity and group identity (role). 
2.7 The Search for Viability in Social Identity Literature 
During the investigation to determine if Social Identities are viable systems it was evident in 
the review of the literature that nearly all the research in Social Identity Theory focused on 
the dynamic nature of group formation. It was noticeable that little comment was made about 
how groups become ‘enduring’, which would suggest viability. There were, however, three 
significant statements that were found to suggest a recognition that group social identities 
could be viable; 
“…with groups that they feel will provide them with an enduring 
sense of self because they provide a “valued and self-involving 
opportunity for membership (Haslam, 2004, p36). 
“…viable variability may be relatively modest due to the anchoring 
effect of enduring and highly accessible representations of 
important groups we belong to or know about” (Hogg et all, 2006, 
p10), 
One reference was found that suggested the possible autopoietic behaviour of groups;  
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“…on the contrary, group prototypes are grounded in consensual 
views that constitute a social reality that is reinforced over and 
over again.” (Hogg et al, 2006, p11) 
Another important reference that hints at an understanding of complex systems was;  
“…this concept of schemas fits exactly the way that the mind 
stores information; that is as areas of ‘related significance’ in an 
associative network of declarative (semantic and episodic), and 
implicit (procedural) memories.” (Raaijmakers and Schiffrin, 
1981). 
Perhaps the most interesting questions about the viability of groups, in fact what appears to 
be the only question comes from Abrams (1999) who queries how people achieve stability in 
their self-construct and suggests; 
“the research problem for Self Categorization Theory is not to 
determine the structure of self, but to reveal the process by which 
the self becomes structured.” (Abrams and Hogg, 1999) 
2.8 Other Relevant Theories in Psychology 
Psychology is a discipline with many competing and overlapping theories and no central 
model. While it is beyond the scope of the research to create this model the holistic nature of 
systems thinking tends to the inclusion of the different perspectives rather than the 
exclusion. For this reason theories that were originally included in the first iteration of the 
model are mentioned for reference. 
Cognitive Dissonance - While the self-motives provide a strong influence on the self-concept 
and self-esteem to advance the social self; other mechanisms serve to maintain a balance 
with those around us and the norms of behaviour of the social groups that we belong to. 
Most significant of these is Cognitive Dissonance Theory, later developed by Higgins (1987) 
into Self Discrepancy Theory, and its opposing theory, Self-Perception Theory (Bem, 1967). 
People strive for consistency between their beliefs, attitudes and actions; they attempt to 
justify their behaviour in line with their beliefs and their self-concept, however, if for some 
reason, they cannot, then the inconsistency creates discomfort or anxiety and has to be 
resolved, either through changing the original beliefs, adjusting their self-image, or altering 
the facts or perception of the situation to reinstate consistency (Festinger, 1957). Cognitive 
Dissonance provides the System 3* audit for the self-concept. 
Self-Discrepancy Theory. Higgins (1987) suggested that the exact emotions created by 
cognitive dissonance could be determined depending on the circumstances.  Higgins 
suggests that each person holds a ‘self-concept’ of themselves based on their ‘actual self’ 
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and two self-beliefs; an ‘ideal self’ and an ‘ought self’. The ‘actual-self’ is formed from 
observations of their behaviour while the ‘ideal self’ is an image of the person that they 
believe they could be. The ‘ought self’ is an image they believe others would have them be. 
Higgins maintains that people are constantly assessing these viewpoints from two 
‘standpoints’, that of their own self-knowledge and that of their social interactions with 
others. From these interactions they assess, how they have behaved, what they and others 
aspire for themselves and what they and others are expecting of themselves. When these 
viewpoints conflict emotions are generated to realign the individual within a framework of 
normative behaviour. These emotions range from guilt, when the individual fails to live up to 
what is expected of them to shame when they fail to live up to their own ideals, The 
emotions created when there is a discrepancy are shown in Table 2.1; 
Table 2.1 – Self Discrepancy Theory 
 
STANDPONTS 
ON THE SELF 
DOMAINS OF THE SELF 
Self-Concept Self-Guides 
Actual Ideal Ought 
Observed behaviour Hopes and wishes Expected behaviour 
Own  
Actual own vs. ideal own 
 
Disappointment & low self 
esteem 
 
Actual own vs. ought own  
 
Guilt 
Other 
Actual own vs. actual other 
 
Identity crisis 
 
Actual own vs. ideal other 
 
Shame 
Actual own vs. ought other  
 
Expectation of punishment – 
anxiety 
 
 
Self-Evaluation Maintenance Theory. People do not use self-enhancing tactics with close 
‘others’ and are more likely to use self-verifying strategies (Sedikides et al 2002). Having 
people close to our self-concept can cause significant issues. The closeness of others will 
cause comparisons and reflections when their actions cause success or failure. If a person 
we are close to is successful at a task which is highly relevant to our self-concept than that 
success can decrease our self-esteem through comparison in the self-evaluation process 
(Tesser, 1988). Alternatively, if they are successful at something that is not relevant to our 
self-concept then we are likely to share in that success. This concept provides a part of the 
model in System 4 for evaluating the environment that is used by the individual to provided 
relative balance from the other comparisons they are making.  
Social Comparison Theory. According to social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954), we 
learn how to define the self by comparing ourselves with those around us. Social 
comparison theory argues that beliefs, feelings, and behaviours are subjective; comparing 
ourselves with others provides an external, objective benchmark against which to compare 
our thoughts, feelings and behaviours. This again is part of the model in System 4 for 
evaluating the environment. 
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Behavioural Self-Handicapping – fear of failure can lead to a deliberate act of placing 
obstacles in the way of success to avoid having to face the emotional consequences of 
failure (Berglas and Jones 1978).  
Social Impact Theory. Social impact theory developed by Latane (1981) posits that the 
strength, immediacy and number of people constitute key factors in social influence. 
Strength is a measure of influence, power or intensity that a person believes the group has. 
These are determined by such factors as age, social class previous relationship or 
anticipated future 
Dynamic Social Impact Theory. Latane (1997) maintains that there are four components that 
determine how ideas and beliefs are transmitted through social systems. These are 
consolidation, clustering, correlation and continuing diversity. Consolidation occurs when 
those with a minority opinion adopt that of the majority, clustering relates to those that are 
geographically closer that will merge ideas and beliefs. Correlation is the relation of 
previously unconnected ideas and lastly continuing diversity suggests that because of the 
creation of subgroups through clustering consolidation will never be totally dominant. 
2.9 The Complexity of Human Systems 
We can see from the previous section that human nature is diverse, complex and dynamic 
and while psychology provides us with a model of group forming behaviours it does not 
recognise or provide an explanation for the existence of enduring structure, assuming that 
such a thing exists.  
The dialectic arguments between structure and agency in sociology (King, 2011) or between 
functionalism and constructivism in cultural and philosophical studies, demonstrates clearly 
that there is an ontological dichotomy between how social structures emerge from the 
interrelationships of human beings; this is central to our discussion of how humans create 
enduring groups and the basis for this research.  
Unfortunately social systems have proved to be difficult to study and particularly difficult to 
apply traditional scientific methods to. Boulding (1956) assigns social systems to level 8, the 
highest practical level in his 9-point ‘hierarchy of complexity’ and concludes that they were 
among ‘the most complex systems imaginable’; surpassed only by “transcendental systems 
yet to be imagined”.  
Several authors have suggested that traditional methods are inadequate for the study of 
social systems; 
"…on their way to increased complexity, systems acquire new 
properties through the phenomenon of emergence. Self-
organization, self-production, self-reference, are features that 
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appear only beyond some threshold of complexity and are 
therefore not understandable by the usual mechanistic natural 
sciences. Such necessary extension of science requires not only 
new theories and new formal tools like non-linear dynamics, 
chaos theory, fractals, cellular automata, cybernetic networks, etc. 
but also, in our opinion, invites us to question the usual 
epistemological and ontological presuppositions." (Schwarz, E, 
2005, p1) 
Hayek (1989), in his Noble Prize lecture entitled “The Pretence of Knowledge” suggested 
that applying scientific methods to social systems is; 
“… often the most unscientific, and, beyond this, in these fields 
there are definite limits to what we can expect science to achieve" 
(Hayek, 1989). 
Elster (1993) demonstrates why this might be the case by arguing that causality is the most 
effective methodology for the natural sciences involving inorganic matter; where cause and 
effect are often evident. For the inorganic natural sciences, however, functional 
explanations, working under an overarching causal explanation (such as natural selection) 
can demonstrate the purpose of a system or its behaviour. However, neither of these 
approaches works for social science where Elster suggests that intentionality is the only 
means of understanding human actions.  
The Theory of Intentional Stance (Dennett, 1996) defines three levels of abstraction. The 
physical stance, is the domain of the natural sciences, physics and chemistry where interest 
lies in mass, energy, velocity, and chemical composition and causality can be directly 
attributed. The design stance, is the domain of biology and engineering and is focused on 
purpose, function and design. However, most abstract is the intentional stance  which is the 
domain of software and minds. At this level, we are concerned with such things as belief, 
thinking and intent.  
This view of complexity is reflected by those studying Complex Adaptive Systems. These 
are systems in which many agents and subsystems interact in densely connected networks. 
Social groups with multiple inter and intra relationships can be considered as complex 
systems. The key aspect of these structures is that:  
“. . . The whole cannot be understood by being divided into or 
reduced to its elements . . . interaction and connection are non-
linear, and non-causal determinism is the rule” (Wulun, 2007, 
p398). 
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This touches on the systems concept of “emergence” (von Bertalanffy, 1951). Emergence is 
a property that can only be observed with synthesis as the properties only ‘emerge’ when 
the sub-systems combine, when the system is examined by analysis they disappear. Cilliers 
(1998) argues that a complex system “…cannot be reduced to a collection of its basic 
constituents” (Cilliers, 1998, p10). 
The use of quantitative studies in systems research, particularly using statistics, is difficult 
because of the nature of complex systems. System Thinking (von Bertalanffy, 1951, Wiener, 
1948, Ashby, 1956, Beer, 1979, Cilliers, 1998) maintains that all internal couplings within a 
“system of systems” are feedback loops. A complex system is a “circularity” in that there are 
no readily recognisable causes and effects.  
These arguments demonstrate that to identify and verify “what it is” in a social systems 
means that, at least in part, our theory must be studied holistically and with synthesis. That 
is as a whole system and not a series of constituted parts.  
The use of ‘agency’ within many studies is also a problem that should be recognised. Most 
social theories abstract human behaviour in some way; it is simplified, generalized or 
conceptualized. This is, after all, the basis of the scientific method based on reductionist and 
deterministic thinking, developed from Descartes (1637, 1960) but in reducing human 
behaviour in this manner the full richness and complexity is lost. King (2011) examines the 
ontological dualism of structure and agency which he claims is “hegemonic” in current social 
theory and advocates a return to a focus of sociology based on “social relations”; in other 
words a return to understanding how humans actually behave. The problem is expressed 
well by Layder; 
“We are emotionally unique beings, not simply rationally self-
reflexive agents choosing the most appropriate way of maximising 
our satisfaction (as suggested, for example, in rational choice 
theories). Emotions such as jealousy, anger and hatred are 
capable of disrupting the smooth veneer of social situations and 
relationships. Motivations associated with these emotions drive us 
to behave in ways contrary to custom, ritual and routine, although 
this behaviour is also shaped by important social components. 
Such emotions and motivations ensure that we are never entirely 
the creatures of society. We are distinct individuals whose 
psychological requirements are often antithetical to the social 
order. Because we are unique, the fit between the individual and 
society is imprecise, imperfect and much more tenuous than most 
sociologists would allow indeed, from the point of view of domain 
theory, anxiety and insecurity are never completely allayed, 
conquered or successfully ‘inoculated’ against. Every situation 
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must be regarded as a potential threat to inner security for even 
the most calm and mentally stable of us.” (Layder, 2006, 275). 
Recognising the complexity behind the multiple interrelations in groups we will treat the 
social system of group formation as a complex system and examine it from this perspective.  
2.10 Applying System Thinking To Social Groups 
Systems Thinking is a holistic, multi-dimensional, recursive approach developed by 
Bertalanffy (1951), Wiener (1948), and Ashby (1947). They studied the behaviour of 
systems, taking as their guide the behaviour of “organisms” in nature. Their ideas of, holism, 
closure, purposefulness, transformation, feedback, variety, emergence, boundaries, 
hierarchy, differentiation, equifinality and multi-finality all provided an insight into the 
structure and flow of information, energy, entropy and resources within systems and 
provided a framework for hard systems concepts using a Functionalist approach; known as 
General Systems Theory.  
It is not surprising that many of Systems Thinking principles were absorbed by sociology and 
psychology. Norbert Weiner (1948), considered the father of cybernetics, developed the 
concepts of “feedback” and “transmission of information” that he applied to social systems.  
Weiner’ ideas were adopted by Parsons and used to help construct his Social Theory of 
Action. Katz and Kahn (1966), applied the principles to create the field of organisational 
psychology and Luhmann (1995) used Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form (1994) and Varela 
and Maturana’s (1979) autopoiesis to develop his Social Systems Theory. 
However, while systems thinking was readily applied to traditional sciences new problems 
were encountered when it was applied to social systems.  
“Living systems are self-structuring as well as self-maintaining, 
they are autopoietic in the meaning put forward by Humberto 
Maturana. Social systems are more than just self-structuring and 
self-maintaining, they are additionally self-creative. This relates to 
the fact that individuals are active, self-conscious subjects that 
can choose to a certain extent in which systems they want to live 
and how their systems are designed. And they have the ability to 
create new systems and structures”. (Fuch, 2002, p2) 
Von Foerster’s (1981) work provides an insight into the nature of the complex world of social 
systems with 2nd Order Cybernetics (the cybernetics of cybernetics), which questions the 
position of the observer in a system. Von Foerster (1981) and Maturana and Varela (1980, 
1986) recognised that much of General Systems Theory took the view of an objective 
observer, outside the system. Von Foerster recognised that every observer is a ‘part of the 
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system’. From this perspective, von Foerster maintained that it is difficult to be objective and 
to understand the whole system. This is highly relevant to the study of social systems where 
we are always ‘inside the system’ and it is impossible to be an external observer.  
From this new perspective von Foerster offered theories of cognition and language that 
explained how reality and meaning are created in society (von Foerster, 1989). He 
maintained that information and meaning only arise from self-organized systems which have 
a practical and historical relationship with a “domain of living”; a “domain of living” is 
explained as an ’autopoietic system’ as described by Maturana and Varela (1986). Maturana 
and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis provides an understanding of how “self-production” of 
boundaries and identity can occur. Autopoiesis is a vital concept that can go on to explain 
how communication happens in social systems and how the creation of meaning can be 
achieved. Mingers explains an important connection between autopoiesis, closure and 
adaptation. From Maturana and Varela work, Mingers connects autopoiesis to closure 
through the “continual circular process of production”; 
“A continual, circular process of production must be established 
that produces all that is necessary for continued autopoiesis. 
There is thus a deep closure of the system – it produces that 
which is necessary for it to continue to produce that which is 
necessary for it to continue to produce . .  
He then connects closure to autonomy; 
ii. Since the system produces itself it gains a significant degree of 
autonomy – it depends less on other entities for its continual 
existence. At the same time, if it ever fails to produce that which is 
necessary then autopoiesis must break down and the entity will 
disintegrate. No functionalism is involved however – the system 
either contingently maintains autopoiesis, or it does not.  
And finally clarifies that closure means to be organisationally ‘closed but structurally open’ 
iii. The theory distinguishes between the structure and the 
organisation of a system (see glossary). The structure (the actual 
components and their relations) may change dramatically over 
time, or may be realised in many ways, so long as the 
organisation maintains its relations of self-production. It can be 
said to be organisationally closed but structurally open.” Mingers 
(2002) 
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Geyer (1995) examined the advances of the application of cybernetics to the study of social 
systems since its development in the late 1940s and recognised the problems created by 
self-referential systems, such as social collectives, in that they are subject to self-fulfilling 
and self-defeating prophecies (Henshel, 1990) where; 
“the accuracy of earlier predictions, themselves influenced by the 
self-fulfilling mechanism, impacts on the accuracy of the 
subsequent predictions. In much of empirical social science 
research, however, self-referential behaviour does not loom large 
which is rather amazing in view of its supposedly being an 
essential characteristic of individual human functioning” (Henshel, 
1990, p20) 
Geyer recognised that the 2nd the Order Cybernetics of Von Foerster impacted significantly 
on the study of social systems; stating; 
“futility of large-scale and detailed planning efforts has led to the 
increasing realization that both individuals and organizations are 
to a large extent self-steering.” (Geyer, 1995, p20) 
This, he suggested leads, in complex modern societies, to highly dynamic and interactive 
systems that are generally “far-from-equilibrium” (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984) where 
relatively small inputs can trigger large changes. These are the properties of Complex 
Adaptive Systems (Langton, 1989, 1990) and Geyer suggested that this model represented 
social systems with their properties of self-organizing, self-reference and autopoiesis. These 
properties produce systems with “their own strategies and expectations, with intertwining 
processes of emergence and adaptation.” 
To Geyer, this created a system that was almost impossible to study. Self-fulfilling 
prophecies, 2nd Order Cybernetics and Complex Adaptive Systems that changed and 
fluctuated constantly creates methodological problems for social research; 
“It is already very difficult to apply the principles and methods 
(e.g. feedbacks and non-linearities) of first-order cybernetics to 
empirical social research, much more so than to sociological 
theory, and nearly impossible to incorporate a second-order 
cybernetics approach in one’s research design. Indeed, as far as 
empirical research is concerned, second-order cybernetics may 
be a bridge too far, given the research methodology and the 
mathematics presently available.” (Geyer, 1995, p27) 
Geyer concludes; 
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“For the time being, sociology should perhaps model itself more 
on meteorology than on the natural sciences, and force itself to 
give up the ambition to make accurate medium- and long-term 
predictions, except in delimited areas of research where 
complexity is still manageable or can be more or less contained. 
Ex post facto explanation of how things have come to be as they 
are is already difficult enough for social scientists nowadays. The 
best they may do at the turn of the millennium is to get a grip on 
the underlying laws of change, perhaps by a theory transfer from 
those subfields within biology where second-order cybernetics 
was developed, and consequently to develop further the theories, 
the non-linear mathematics and the simulation techniques 
required to investigate the growth of complexity of human 
society.” (Geyer, 1995, p28) 
However, while Geyer suggested that the study of social systems was impossible, von 
Foerster did not take the same view. While his perspective is highly constructivist he 
nevertheless recognises that stable ‘behaviours’ can emerge from this confusion through 
processes that transform onto themselves, in what he calls ‘eigenbehaviours’. 
Von Foerster (Poerksen 2003) recognised that the ‘machinery’ of Spencer-Brown’s ‘Laws of 
Form’ (1994) enabled a new logic that allowed language to speak about itself, that was; 
‘…constructed in such a way as to permit application to itself. His 
operator can operate on itself and in this way becomes part of 
itself and the world it creates”. (von Foerster cited in Poerksen 
2003) 
For von Foerster this was important because language limits our ability to understand self-
reflective systems. From this perspective von Foerster (2003) suggested a ‘Cognitive 
Foundation of Behaviour’ that implied that cognition must be built on a recursive structure 
that produces processes that map to themselves; von Foerster suggests that these 
‘eigenbehaviours’ are how cognition and stable social structures develop from the multitude 
of independent actions. Unfortunately von Foerster fails to explain in any detail what these 
eigenbehaviours are.  
A different perspective of cybernetics and its connection with social structures and viability is 
provided by Stokes (2004) who suggests that the VSM provides a way forward; 
“There were two problems applying cybernetics to the social 
realm. One was a conceptual problem – how exactly do you apply 
the insights and ideas of cybernetics to social science? Efforts to 
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date must be judged to have failed, including socio-cybernetics 
(Geyer and van der Zouwen 1996). The other was a matter of the 
‘structural coupling’ of a cybernetic sociology to the historical 
conditions of society. I want to propose that both problems have 
now been overcome, and that the concept of identity holds the 
key to both. In relation to the first I want to suggest that Stafford 
Beer’s work gives us the conceptual infrastructure necessary to 
unpack the potential of the concept of identity as a foundational 
concept of social science. In this sense, the concept of identity is 
intrinsically a cybernetic one, which describes both a process and 
a structure. Secondly, it has now become possible to apply these 
insights and ideas because society has become what I call an 
‘identity’ society.” (Stokes, 2004, p1) 
2.11 The Problems with Systems Thinking as a Model of Human Behaviour 
While Hard Systems Thinking provides an account of the structure of social systems it does 
not provide any representation of human behaviour, so much so that concern has been 
expressed about the application of Systems Thinking. Some found the analogy of 
organisations as organisms to be troublesome (Kast and Rosenweig 1972), while Hoos 
(1972) documented the many difficulties that arose in trying to apply systems analysis to 
issues of public policy. Roberts et al (1974) bemoaned the fact that Katz and Kahn’s 
application of System Theory to psychology is constructed at such an abstract level that it is 
difficult to reduce its principles to testable hypothesis. Many of these problems come from 
the level of abstraction applied to social systems theories which could be related to 
Dennett’s (1996) three levels of abstraction. Dennett argues that it is best to understand 
human behaviour at the level of the intentional stance; this implies a low level of detail in 
exchange for a better generalization. It is this generalization and high level of abstraction 
that makes social system theories difficult to apply.  
Jackson (2000) and Flood and Jackson (1991) provide comprehensive analysis of System 
Theories and identify their strength and weaknesses. In particular, they categorise Systems 
Theories in their ability to deal with Simple or Complex problems on a dimension of Unitary, 
Pluralists and Coercive contexts, see Figure 2.2; 
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Figure 2.2 – Jackson’s Systems Framework – Flood and Jackson (1991) 
 
From Jackson’s (2000) analysis it can be seen that no system theories are able to resolve 
issues that deal with complex coercive problems except maybe postmodern systems 
thinking of promoting diversity. That ‘hard systems’ such as Operational Research fail to 
allow for human nature is almost self-evident, however, the failure of the interpretivists and 
constructivists approaches to deal with coercive issues demonstrates that they too fail to 
engage the full scope of human interaction.  
The various interpretivist/constructivist methods and theories, such as; Soft System 
Methodology, Interactive Planning and Social Identity Theory etc… seek to establish a 
common ‘social reality’ amongst the participants. Checkland’s SSM does this through the 
mutual construction of ‘Root Definitions’ while Ackoff tries to achieve consensus through the 
participation of the constituents in ‘interactive planning’ and Social Identity through a 
common prototype. 
Churchman’s (1979) theory of aligning world views (Weltanshauung) by seeing “the world 
through the eyes of another” provides the underlying philosophical theory for the 
interpretivist/constructivist approach. Flood and Jackson’s analysis raises three main issues 
about this approach; firstly, that they are unable to deal with coercive contexts because they 
rely on Churchman’s theory of aligning peoples’ world views (Weltanshauung) which can 
occur only in a cooperative environment. 
“If participants are in a coercive relationship to each other, they do 
not share common interests, values and beliefs are likely to 
conflict, they cannot agree upon ends and means and genuine 
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compromise under present systemic arrangements is not 
possible” (Flood and Jackson, 1991, p158) 
Secondly, that by containing all problems within the context of self-created social realities is 
a narrow interpretation of the nature of problems; 
“…Interpretive thinkers see social reality as the self-conscious 
creation of human actors. Problems arise when individual actors’ 
perceptions of reality do not overlap... This is really a very limited 
view of how problem situations occur. It ignores, for example, the 
cybernetic insight that organization can fail to function properly 
because communication and control systems are poorly 
designed. The idea of cybernetic laws, which must be obeyed 
when complex systems are being organised is not taken seriously 
by soft systems thinking... (Jackson’s, 2000) 
Thirdly, that they fail to acknowledge the use of power and politics; 
In essence, and to use Habermas’s threefold categorisation of 
human interest, SSM serves only the practical interest in bringing 
about mutual understanding. The technical interest in prediction 
and control of natural and social affairs cannot be encompassed 
within the rationality of SSM. Similarly, the emancipatory interests 
in ‘communication free from distortion and in realising participative 
decision-making free from the effects of power relationships’ is 
not granted attention. (Jackson, 2000) 
The interpretivist/constructivist approach, while arguing that each person’s concept of social 
reality is solely self-constructed and different from everyone else fails to address the issue of 
mutually created social realities that it seeks to establish. Once the process of SSM,  
Interactive Planning or in our case Social Identity Theory has created a set of shared beliefs 
how do these shared beliefs persist or endure, or do they just dissipate.  
If they dissipate then it appears that there are no enduring identities created by shared 
beliefs, although we should be open to the idea that identities could be created by other 
means, i.e. shared purpose. If, on the other hand they persist, then we have to acknowledge 
that we have created a shared belief and hence a ‘group’ that can be seen, in certain 
contexts, as an entity. We must then accept that we may not be dealing with social realities 
that are only self-constructed and individual but ones that are group created and social. We 
also have to acknowledge that processes that create social groups with shared beliefs may 
be self-organising, in other words able to create themselves, not just requiring the interactive 
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systems approach to achieve success, in which case we have a system that is creating its 
own solutions that moves beyond the interpretivist/constructivist understanding.  
2.12 Complex Systems and Representation 
Cilliers (1998) identifies the properties of complex systems as; consisting of large numbers 
of richly connected [local] elements that are open to their environment which dynamically 
interact in a non-linear manner using either positive or negative feedback to maintain their 
system far from equilibrium in a state that is [inherited] from its past conditions. He explains 
that the; 
 “behaviour of the system is not determined primarily by the 
properties of individual components but is the result of complex 
patterns of interaction” (Cilliers, 1998, p3) 
He argues that there are two ‘indispensable’ capabilities of complex systems; firstly they 
must be able to store information for future use and secondly that they must be able to adapt 
their structure when necessary (1998, p10) i.e.  they must be self-organizing. Cilliers (1998, 
p15) shows that to store information for future use a complex system must have a way to 
represent the ‘meaning’ of this information. This could possibly be done in two ways; through 
rule based systems that use syntactics and semantics or through ‘distributed representation’ 
where the information is stored in the very structure of the system itself (neural networks). 
Since a complex system cannot be simplified, otherwise it would not be complex it would 
only be complicated, it cannot be represented properly by ‘rule based’ systems because 
these rely on simplifying the system. In representing information in the system with a rule, 
the process of simplification would require that meaning was lost.  
“…a complex system cannot be reduced to a collection of its 
basic constituents, not because the system is not constituted by 
them, but because too much of the relational information gets lost 
in the process.” (Cilliers, 1998, p10) 
Distributed representation, therefore, is the only way to represent or store information in a 
complex system, however, to do so means reconstituting the exact same system. Within a 
distributed representation the system can only be understood from a system perspective; 
“Saussure (1974) presented us with a system of distributed 
semiotics by arguing that the meaning of a sign is a consequence 
of its relationships to all the other signs in the system. Meaning is 
therefore not a specific characteristic of any discrete unit, but the 
result of a system of differences. In order to generate the meaning 
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of a sign, not only that sign, but the whole system is involved – 
the meaning is distributed.” (Cilliers, 1998, p81) 
So if we want to store information in a complex system or if we want to model the system we 
cannot do so easily without recreating or being part of the systems itself. This postmodernist 
perspective presents a dilemma. How do we model or represent complex systems in order 
to be able to study them?  
To do so Cilliers suggest building and training neural networks to learn to solve the problem 
themselves, however, he also accepts that it is feasible to take a ‘snapshot’ of the system so 
long as we are aware that this is a poor representation; 
“Despite the fact that we cannot represent the essence of a 
complex system in determinate terms, we cannot resist, or 
perhaps even avoid, the construction of some kind of 
interpretation of the nature of the systems at a given moment. 
These interpretations, however, are in principle limited. We are 
always constrained to taking snapshots of the system. These 
shots are always take form a certain angle and reveal some 
aspect of the system at some moment. Nothing prevents us from 
attempting explanations of the system – we can take as many 
pictures as we want – as long as we realise the limitation of each 
particular one.” (Cilliers,1998, p80) 
This viewpoint is very similar to Stafford Beer’s (1985, p6) concept of System In Focus. 
Whereby, we bring the elements of the system that we wish to examine to the forefront but 
accept that we cannot isolate them without the systems losing its integrity.  
One way to overcome this issue is, having taken a ‘snapshot’, to then reconstruct the 
relationships and meaning in the system as best as possible by developing an 
understanding of its components and key processes. To do this from a ‘snapshot’ of the 
system a process of inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning can be used to analyse 
and synthesis the components and key processes into a more complete representation of 
the system by using the process described by Barton and Haslett (2007) Their method 
brings together Peirce’s (1931-35) theory on abduction combined with analysis and 
synthesis. An even greater understanding of a complex dynamic system could be achieved 
by taking a series of ‘snapshots’ as part of a longitudinal study, 
2.13 The Development of Viable Systems 
Von Foerster (2003) demonstrated that memory alone is insufficient to produce cognition, 
and shows that only a recursive process that has the faculties to perceive, remember, infer, 
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learn, evaluate communicate and move can do so. Furthermore, he suggests that the 
recursivity of these processes will produce ‘eigenbehaviours’; that is behaviours that map to 
themselves and so never change. This is the very essence of cognition, identity and social 
structure at successive levels of recursion, but what are they? Stafford Beer (Beer 1972 p 
87) suggests that they are the ‘invariant’ elements that make a ‘viable system’. 
We have seen from Social Identity Theory that a shared identity is the basis for the formation 
of a group. This shared identity could be a common trait, a mutual need or something much 
deeper such as shared beliefs and values. The principles of comparative and normative ‘fit’ 
from Social Identity Theory provide us with the mechanism by which identity creates human 
groups.  
The key suggestion, and the basis for this research, is the idea that should a salient group 
prove to be viable and, should it be able to maintain its viability with its environment, then it 
will continue to exist by preserving its identity. Further by continuing its existence it will 
establish the structures and ‘meaningful relationships’, as emergent systems, that we come 
to recognise as a fundamental part of that group’s identity; 
 “A viable system is one sustaining the capability for independent 
existence as a recognizable identity. (Beer, 1983b) 
Schwarz (1997) demonstrates exactly this process with his overarching theoretical 
framework for systems thinking; the Three Domains Model. This is a trans-disciplinary meta-
model that can explain all systems. This is particularly relevant to our research because it 
demonstrates how systems develop. Schwarz proposes the “six cycles of viable systems”; in 
which the iteration of several cycles generates long term evolution toward ever more 
complex and autonomous systems, characterized by the successive appearance of six 
circular relations of increasing abstraction. The six logical cycles are; entropic drift, 
morphogenesis, vortices, feedback/homeostasis, autopoiesis and autogenesis. Schwarz 
demonstrates (1997) how change and evolution occurs in the meta-model through a “spiral 
of development, maturity, drift and metamorphism”. Put simply Schwarz suggests that 
independent systems react with one another, and if the interaction creates a mutual 
feedback response (vortices), where one affects the other, they become self-regulating 
(homeostasis), they may then start to develop a common system that is self-organising. If 
this system is able to produce itself then the system will become autopoietic, that is, able to 
change its boundaries and react to its environment; in system terms it will start to 
demonstrate “closure”.  
While system development may start off in the phenomenal domain, that is the plane of 
energy or real objects, at each stage of development it starts to connect with the other 
domains, those of information and ultimately of “being”. Autopoietic systems have, by 
definition, to be able to connect to the plane of information. Autopoietic systems, are 
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essentially life forms, able to adapt and react to changes in the environment, however, they 
may not be aware of this change. At the next stage of development their system will create a 
connection to the plane of “being” when it starts to be capable of self-reflection; this process 
is known as autogenesis. From here the system becomes self-reflective and self-conscious.  
The Figure 2.3 shows the three domains, namely; “being”, “thinking” and “doing”  or the 
existential, the noumenal  and the phenomena” (from Schwarz 1997). Schwarz’s model 
provides us with an understanding of how systems develop; however, it is very abstract in its 
design and to make sense of it requires that we apply it to the real world processes that we 
have seen in human behaviour.  
An examination of viable social systems was undertaken by Yolles (2000) who developed a 
theory of Social Viable Systems. (Yolles, 2000 and Yolles and Guo, 2003). This provides a 
rationale for viable social processes based on the cybernetic principles of Schwartz’s Three 
Domains Model applied to Habermas’s Theory of Knowledge Constitutive Interests. It 
suggests that all coherent social communities can be modelled in terms of the three domains 
and have cognitive properties because they relate to human orientations. While this is highly 
significant to our work, and indeed provides proof that these concepts can be connected, it 
nevertheless is very abstract and cannot be applied directly. So we need to establish what 
we mean by viability.   
Figure 2.3 – Three Domains Model – Schwarz 1997 
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2.14 Viability 
Within Systems Theory there are several systems methodologies that tackle the question of 
viability, but only three that tackle it directly; the Viable Systems Model (Beer 1981), Living 
Systems Theory (LST) by Miller (1965) and Aubin (1991) Viability Theory. Aubin’s theory is a 
mathematical based and algorithmic and beyond the scope of this research. 
Living Systems theory identifies seven hierarchal levels of systems of increasing complexity 
performing life processes; cell, organ, organism, group, organisation, society, and 
supranational system. These are all open systems, which are in turn made up of subsystems 
processing imports, throughputs and outputs of various forms of matter, energy and 
information. 
Beer maintained (1972 and 1979) that to survive in its environment a viable system has to 
exhibit five key attributes. These “sub-systems” determine the identity, purpose and 
behaviour of the overall system and coordinate its activities and audit its processes. 
Importantly, Beer determined (1959: 169) “that no control system can discuss itself, and that 
a higher order system is needed in order to describe the behaviour of a system in a given 
language.” 
The inclusion of a meta-system into the model was a unique insight by Beer that provides for 
higher order management and direction but more importantly adopts the concepts of 
autopoiesis and autogenesis proposed by Maturana (1975) and, as we have seen from 
Schwarz; is necessary for the development of systems which enable a system to adapt and 
change to developments in the environment; to reproduce or modify its identity though self-
reference. Beer (1979) defines self-reference as; “the property of a system who’s logic 
closes in on itself; each part makes sense precisely in terms of the other parts, the whole 
defines itself.”  
Each part of the model, Beer developed, is recursive, depending on the “system in focus” at 
any time; so that the whole model can represent a complex system of systems. The key 
parts of the system are linked though “homeostats” that maintain the whole system in 
balance by monitoring the “variety” of the states of the environment.  
Schwaninger (2006) identifies the comparisons between Living Systems Theory and the 
Viable Systems Model. They both have similar backgrounds and pedigrees, both come from 
systems theory and cybernetics and both models represent; 
“…concrete, realistic systems which exist and evolve in time and 
space. This differentiates theirs from other theories, for example 
from Luhmann’s sociological theory (Luhmann, 1995), which deal 
solely with abstract systems of action or relationships”. 
(Schwaninger, 2006, p343) 
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However, Schwaninger identifies very real differences as well. Miller's perspective is 
positivist while Beer's is constructivist. While this enables more precise analysis in Millers 
model it severely limits its use for the purpose of analysing “human behaviour”. Beer saw his 
model as a “heuristic aid” to create discourse about the diagnosis and design of 
organisations, human aspects such as ethos, meaning, sense making and self-reference are 
regularly mentioned which is not possible in Millar’s model. 
Miller's concept is objectivist, complexity increases unbroken and drastically up through 
every level. As we have seen Beer adopts the concept of recursive complexity management 
distinguishing between recursive structures and hierarchical ones. 
In Miller's theory the purpose of the system is life; Beer defines viability explicitly as the 
maintenance of identity, “the purpose of the system is what it does” Beer (1979). 
Schwaninger concludes that The Living Systems theory has better empirical underpinning, 
while the Viable Systems Model has a stronger theoretical claim and diagnostic potency. 
The preference for our research will, therefore, be the Viable Systems Model. 
2.15 Foundations of the Viable System Model 
The VSM is a complex construct that can be used in a structured, functionalist way or as an 
epistemology to understand a viable complex system. It is built on the principles of 
cybernetics (Wiener 1948, Beer 1966, 1971, Ashby, 1947) that developed from General 
Systems Theory (von Bertalanffy 1951). Before examining it in detail a brief overview of GST 
is relevant to understand the concepts of what we are dealing with.  
From the foundations of Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety in particular, and General 
Systems Thinking in general, Beer (1966) introduced to systems thinking the metaphor of 
“system as neurocybernetic”, that was a significant extension to the thinking of the time. 
Beer’s insight was inspired by Gödel’s discovery that no system could describe itself, he 
realised that any system needed a meta-language to be able to function, out of this he 
developed the concept of a meta-system. Beer’s introduction of the Viable Systems Model 
(VSM) provided a holistic, recursive and autonomous model of an open system that was 
able to demonstrate ‘closure’, that is to maintain itself despite perturbations in the 
environment. Viability was seen by Beer as an emerging property of a complex system. 
Beer recognised the significance of von Forester’s, Maturana and Varela concept of 2nd 
Order Cybernetics and autopoiesis; in fact he wrote the foreword to Maturana and Varela’s 
book in 1986. He saw the workings of autopoiesis within the VSM. However, Mingers (1992), 
disputes that Maturana and Varela intended for the concept of autopoiesis to be used with 
social systems or that it can be applied meaningfully. This critique has implications with 
respect to the use of the VSM for social systems and it will be examined in depth later in the 
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review. The key property of the VSM is that it recognises the concept of ‘system identity’ and 
demonstrates how systems can preserve this, in other words “survive”, in relation to their 
environment. 
“The goal of survival is different from other goals. It is a purpose 
that closes in on itself; it is a matter of preserving identity (Beer, 
1979, p. 114).  
“…The remarkable property of the viable system is that it is 
designed to preserve its identity. The enterprise may last for 
hundreds of years, changing all of its components parts many 
times, and assimilating many kinds of change on the way – and 
yet it is recognisably itself.” (Beer, 1979) 
…The primary characteristic of a viable system is not the power of 
self-reproduction but of self-production. It is continuously in 
business to produce itself, to be what it is, to preserve identity” 
(Beer, 1979, p. 277). 
Beer, identified (1972 and 1979) five key functions, or attributes, that a viable system has to 
have to maintain its identity. These are System 1 – the transformations that are conducted 
with the environment, System 2  - the creation of group cohesion,  System 3 – the creation 
of group coherence, System 3* - the audit of the system, System - Future planning, System 
5 – the ethos of the system. As well as defining the structure and processes of the VSM, 
Beer also defined several ‘laws’ necessary for its function. Stokes (2006) defines a viable 
system as; 
“A viable system is recursive. It is intrinsically scalar in that it replicates itself in self-similar 
patterns and in a nested manner at all levels of organization. It is essentially embedded in an 
environment, which is the source of its challenge to acquire “requisite” variety. It respects the 
autonomy of the parts that make it up, with one proviso that is agreed by all: that restraints 
on autonomy shall be computable functions of the purposes of the system and no more than 
this. Such purposes are given in the organization’s self-identity. Furthermore, a viable 
system provides a means for the co-ordination of the interactions of the level one 
autonomous units so as to avoid oscillatory behaviours among and between them. It 
provides a further means of systemic cohesion by seeking to achieve synergies among the 
unit elements. It does this through a process of resource bargaining and of intervening to 
maintain the integrity of the whole if threatened. It is also at this level that a certain selective 
bias is evident (reflected in resource bargaining outcomes) –activities more in accord with 
the identity of the system as a whole are typically favoured over those that do not. 
Engulfment and isolation are both extremes on the continuum of possible outcomes here. 
Up to this point, the system has been inwardly focused on issues of “here and now” 
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cohesion and integration. However, any viable form of organization must also be oriented to 
the two major environments in which it is embedded: its contemporaneous environment of 
stakeholders and others as well is its future environment. The tension between the “here and 
now” focus and the “there and then” focus must be managed. They are so done under the 
sign of identity that provides the reference standard for all-inclusive infra-level regulation. 
(Stokes,2006, p133),Beer (1987) defines autonomy for the VSM as specifically referring to 
the relationship of System 1 to the meta-system and other subsystems, He explains that the 
only way in which subsystems can maintain their freedom to absorb variety for their own 
effectiveness but at the same time connect with the purpose of the system as a whole is if 
they have a “convergence of purpose” that is; 
“the freedom of an embedded subsystem to act on its own initiative, but only within the 
framework of action determined by the purpose of the total system.” Beer (1987) 
For the subsystems to have convergence of purpose then autonomy must be “computable 
functions of the purposes of the system and no more than this” 
Mingers definition of autonomy and closure, see Section 2.10, relate closely with Beer’s. For 
each System 1 to maintain autonomy in the VSM it must achieve closure within itself. Beer 
defines closure as “self-reference: the assertion of Identity” (Beer, 1987). In Mingers terms it 
must be ‘organisationally closed but structurally open’ where ‘organisation’ refers to the 
relationships between the subsystems own elements and components. However, to be 
viable a system itself must also be ‘organisationally closed but structurally open’ in its totality 
as well as its subsystems because the system is recursive and self-reflective. A viable 
system, therefore, must achieve closure at each level of recursion.  
Since Beer relates autonomy to “embedded subsystems” the independence of the system as 
a whole from its environment, achieved by its closure will be referred to as “organisationally 
closed” or “organisational closure”  of the system.   
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Figure 2.4 – The Viable Systems Model by Stafford Beer 
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2.16 Limitations of the VSM 
A summary of the criticisms of the VSM is provided by Jackson (1988). Jackson’s critique 
identifies that the VSM lacks the representation of social dynamics necessary for a complete 
view of organisation as identified by Habermas (1972, 1974, 1979); in particular, the role of a 
manager in the development of organisational culture and the use of power is not well 
demonstrated by Beer.  
A similar criticism comes from paradigms based on the idealism of Kant, primarily Ulrich 
(1981, 1983) and Checkland (1980, 1986); who were influenced by Vickers and  
Churchman. Both argue that the VSM puts too much emphasis on the mechanism of an 
organisation and not enough on the people. Ulrich argues that the VSM predominates with 
‘intrinsic control’ because of its reflection of the ‘organic’ paradigm which defined its roots, 
where control is a function of the meta-system, but, he argues that it fails to address the 
‘intrinsic motivations’ that occur in sophisticated social systems because it is a cybernetic 
model that relates to the syntactic correctness of a systems rather than that semantic and 
pragmatic reasons (Jackson 1988);  
“The VSM predominates with ‘intrinsic control’ because of its 
reflection of the ‘organic’ paradigm which defined its roots, where 
control is a function of the meta-system, but, it is argued that it 
fails to address the ‘intrinsic motivations’ that occur in 
sophisticated social systems because it is a cybernetic model that 
relates to the syntactic correctness of a systems rather than that 
semantic and pragmatic reasons” (Jackson, 1988) 
In other words the VSM fails to show the feelings of people. The particularly concern of the 
Critical Realists being that the VSM can be used in an autocratic way because it fails to take 
account of the shared purpose and values considered necessary by the Critical Realist 
(Ulrich and Probst 1984). 
Checkland (1980) also criticised the concept of variety as “a poor measure” and 
“unexceptional”. Jackson dismisses these claims, however, Achterbergh and Vriens (2011) 
do demonstrate that from a Functionalist perspective that while the VSM is a good 
diagnostic tool because it provides a framework for viability from organism to organisation, it 
is, nevertheless, lacking as a design mechanism because “it does not positively 
conceptualize all these infrastructures and their design.” Achterbergh and Vriens resolve 
these issues by introducing de Sitter’s et al (1997, 1998) functional design parameters to the 
VSM. 
Mingers (2002) also raises the issue that it does not make sense to apply autopoiesis to 
social systems that are outside of its original paradigm; that of biology; 
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“This is not to say that Maturana discounts the importance of 
Beer’s point that systems must respond to prevailing 
environmental circumstances. It is just that on Maturana’s view 
autonomy is not the mechanism through which this occurs. For 
Beer, autonomy is a mechanism for adaptation; for Maturana, 
the parallel mechanism is ‘structural coupling’ which is 
something different. The point is that while autopoietic and 
viable systems are both autonomous, the nature of the 
autonomy and the manner in which it is realized in the two cases 
are different. However, the situation becomes more confused 
since Maturana (1991) does acknowledge that autopoiesis can 
exist in the conceptual as well as in the molecular/physical 
domains. Thus arises the possibility that the VSM might be a 
conceptual autopoietic system, if not a physical/ molecular one”. 
(Mingers, 2002, p5) 
A key issue with the VSM, and indeed cybernetics is that they are fundamentally teleological 
in nature. The VSM is built around the concept of purpose which most social research shies 
away from.  Mingers (2002) raises this point; 
In debating the distinction between viable systems and 
autopoiesis, the teleological nature of the former is significant. 
Whereas notions of purpose, function and goals are pivotal to the 
theory of viable systems, these concepts are irrelevant to 
autopoiesis. No matter how you look at viable systems it is difficult 
to get away from the idea of purpose. Inevitably, then, when the 
VSM is applied to some sort of social system, it is brought forth in 
functional terms. In other words it is constituted as something that 
fulfils some external purpose.” (Mingers, 2002, p7) 
2.17 Resolving the VSM’s Issues 
In response to the criticisms of Ulrich, Espejo and Harnden (1989) argue that the VSM can 
be used as an hermeneutic enabler, Jackson (1997) explains; 
“2nd Order Cybernetics can change the way that we apply the 
VSM. Espejo and Harnden (1989) have argued for a different 
reading and use of Beer’s VSM. The VSM is no longer to be seen 
as “representational,” as trying to express certain fundamental 
laws governing the organization of complex systems. Rather, it is 
to be aligned with interpretive theory and regarded as a 
“hermeneutic enabler.” Organizational models should be seen not 
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as seeking to capture objective reality but as aids to orienting on 
going conversations about complex social issues. The VSM is a 
particularly good model because it permits an extremely rich 
discourse to unfold about the emergence and evolution of 
appropriate organizational forms. It provides an “umbrella of 
intersection” for different perspectives, and this should help us 
coordinate our interactions in a consensual manner”. (Jackson, 
2000, p278) 
Espejo (1997, 2000 and 2004) also uses the framework of the VSM in respect to the 
management of complexity in recursive structures to show how autonomous social 
organisations as Complex Adaptive Systems can handle the complexity they create by 
establishing a social space within which social subsystems exist autonomously and thrive.  
“A system's meaning is produced by the interactions of its 
components. But which are these components? Are they just 
individuals as roles as suggested so far or are there other 
components as well? What is the case for a complex society or a 
global corporation? We can hypothesise more complex 
structures. Our interactions produce social systems that are 
constituted as roles of larger social systems and so forth. From 
the other side general social meanings constitute subsumed 
autonomous units (roles), which themselves constitute subsumed 
autonomous units and so forth. This constitution/unfolding of 
complexity is at the core of the recursive organization of social 
systems (Beer,1979, 1985). However, their alignment depends on 
being aware of the meanings we want to produce. Working out 
which are/ought to be these components in complex societies is a 
major challenge. This has important implications for the 
production of desirable social meanings. (Espejo, 2000, p960). 
Espejo examines processes of communications, knowledge, learning, identity, cohesion, 
trust, citizenship and performance using an adaptation of Luhmann’s Social Theory (1995) 
and Habermas’s (1984) Theory of Communicative Action. While he constructs arguments to 
show that management of the social dynamic is possible in the model he also recognises the 
need to create “purposeful” organisations, rather than to allow the “automatic creation” of 
unjust social structures. He also points out that understanding the behaviour of individuals in 
an organisation is a function of the communications channels and that it is here that 
organisational structure and social dynamics are joined. 
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Jackson (2000) considers the VSM to be an ideal structuralist tool and lists its principle 
advantages and disadvantages; amongst these he addresses the problem of its supposed 
lack of democratic purpose raised by Checkland and Ulrich;  
“Because of the link between efficiency and democracy 
established cybernetically by Beer it is clear that the model [the 
VSM] depends for its full and satisfactory operations on a 
democratic milieu” (Jackson,2000) 
Jackson also demonstrates that the VSM can model complex structures that are vertically 
and horizontally interdependent; by use of its acknowledgement of recursivity, its attention to 
command and control that allows it to spread control democratically throughout the system, 
its structure for information flow and its interactive relationship with the environment. This 
provides a powerful way of simplifying any given system; that is, in Beer’s terms, “unfolding 
their complexity”; this can apply to all manner of organisations, including social collectives. 
While this goes a long way to resolving the issues raised by Ulrich about the VSM it still 
does not answer the main criticism that the VSM relates to the organisation rather than the 
people. It is easy to see how this criticism can be raised as many of the examples given by 
Beer in his writing relate to organisational structures, however, it is also clear from the many 
comments that he makes that he clearly saw how the VSM related to people and their 
behaviour; Beer replies to Ulrich (Beer 1983a) that the VSM is democratic simply because 
without democracy any system will ultimately not be viable and that the VSM is 
fundamentally built on democratic concepts of autonomy. 
Stokes (2006) examined the application of the VSM to social structures and concluded; 
“The question must now be posed: does this model of viable 
organization contain within itself sufficient variety such that all 
forms of social organization can be mapped onto it? The answer 
is yes. Not only is a viable system designed to contain the 
structured antinomies of social life, but also it is designed in such 
a way that each portion of the model absorbs the variety disposed 
by the others. It does this not as a closed system but as an open 
negentropic, dissipative system. ’All subsystems of a viable 
system control each other’ (Beer, 1979, p. 362)”. (Stokes, 2006, 
p27) 
This leaves us with Mingers criticism on the use of autopoiesis outside of actual living 
systems. Yolles argues that there is a relationship between “autopoiesis and its second 
order form autogenesis” which is supported by Jessop (1990) who maintains that 
autopoiesis occurs in systems that have ‘radical autonomy’. That is when a system can; 
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 “define its own boundaries relative to its environment and its own operational 
code; 
 implement its own programmes; 
 reproduce its own elements in a closed circuit; 
 obey its own laws of motion; 
 has “autopoietic take-off” when their operations can no longer be directly 
controlled from outside, though there may be a variety of indirect controls that in 
part constitute its “environment”.”(Yolles, 2006a, p63) 
Yolles explains the connection between autopoiesis and ‘closure’;  
“Autopoietic organizations become ontologically coupled 
phenomenally. If the coupling is coherent … the organizations 
share realities by engaging in ontological migrations. However, 
the phenomenal nature of their connection implies that their 
cognitive processes play an additional though incidental part. The 
more usual way of explaining this is through closure. That is, 
organizations are behaviourally connected to the environment to 
which they are structurally coupled, but closed to the environment 
in respect of their rational organizing processes.” (Yolles, 2006a 
p63) 
With autopoiesis the VSM can easily be extended in line with Espejo’s belief that the 
elements that constitute the system are the ‘roles’, and we will see later how this extends to 
‘individual identities’. 
To demonstrate the function of autopoiesis within the VSM Yolles (2006b) places the VSM 
within Schwarz’s Three Domains Model and shows the relationships between the domains 
and the VSM systems. He places System 1 inside the phenomenal domain, System 2 and 3 
within the noumenal domain connected to the phenomenal domain through autopoiesis, and 
Systems 4 and 5 within the existential domain connected to the  noumenal and phenomenal 
through autogenesis. System 3* is part of the autogenesis process, see Figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5 – The Viable Systems Model Represented in the Schwarz Three Domains Model – 
Yolles (2006b) 
 
Yolles goes on to demonstrate how the process of autopoiesis and autogenesis (Maturana 
and Varela 1980) within the phenomenal, noumenal and existential domains of Schwarz’s 
(1994 a and b, 1997) model creates the conditions for interaction and change between the 
values of individuals and the environment.  
The issue of the failure of cybernetics to demonstrate ‘semantic and pragmatic’ forms of 
communication is addressed by Brier (1996), who connects motivation, intentionality, 
autopoiesis and semiosis in the creation of Cybersemiotics. The differentiation between 
biological, psychological and social communicative autopoiesis and the introduction of a 
technical concept of meaning is resolved by Brier in his development of Cybersemiotics. 
Brier recognises that 2nd Order cybernetics lacks explicit and ontological concepts of 
emotion, meaning and a concept of signs. To overcome this he aligns Varela‘s triadic 
calculus for self-reference with Peirce’s triadic second-order semiotics (1931-1958) using 
second-order cybernetics to create Cybersemiotics. 
Brier shows that Varela’s calculus for self-reference, based on Spencer Browns “Laws of 
Form” provides a mechanism between observer, observed and interpretation, a triad without 
which no understanding of difference can exist, then in a similar way he shows that Peirce’s 
signs are necessary to communicate the difference;  
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“Signs are what Varela, Bateson and Spencer-Brown use to make 
and communicate their distinctions. Only signs can be thought 
and communicated: we maintain that a difference that cannot be 
communicated exists in our consciousness”. (Brier, 1996) 
Explaining Buchler, (1955, p 99-100) he states Peirce’s Theory; 
“…signification is never just a relation between a sign and its 
object (what it signifies). The sign can only signify what it is 
capable of being interpreted as. Therefore the interpretant is a 
necessary part of the sign, just as Varela has developed in his 
calculus of self-reference, (Brier, 1996, p241) 
To create the pragmatic and semantic communications necessary for social systems within 
autopoietic structures, therefore requires; 
Peirce’s definition is second order because all the elements of the 
sign process are signs themselves. Furthermore, a sign is not a 
thing, but a process. Peirce’s definition of signs is very cybernetic 
and self-organized. Thus it is the semiotic web that creates 
meaning. It is even so reflexive that it is second order, since all 
the parts of semiosis are signs. From this it follows that 
signification, meaning, rationality and logic are not born fully 
fledged but are gradually crystallized out from vague beginnings 
through the historical drift of praxis and the dance of languaging, 
and that we must accept signs and concepts as just as 
fundamentally a part of reality as material objects. They are also a 
kind of eigenvalue established in communication. In accordance 
with Bateson we would say that we interpret differences as signs 
when they really make a difference for both communicators, that 
is to say when they establish a shared meaning. (Brier, 1996, 
p242) 
With this development Brier opens the door to applying semantic and pragmatic 
communications to the cybernetic paradigm and hence allows the use of methods of 
communicating ‘intrinsic motivations’ into the VSM; in particular the development of a shared 
purpose.  
It is my opinion that this cyber semiotic frame of thinking takes us 
a step forward in understanding how signs get their meaning and 
produce information inside communicating systems. Information is 
an Eigen relation of actualized meaning in shared sign or 
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language games in a recursively operating, double closure 
coupling between autopoietic systems in a self-organizing 
universe (Brier, 1996, p243) 
The VSM is therefore, able to model social systems by demonstrating its structure, 
communication, knowledge management and the creation of meaning. We can therefore 
show different aspects of social structures that, together, provide a comprehensive model of 
organisations and even society, however, these developments also open the door to 
showing human emotions in the VSM as these can be seen as “signs of human feelings”, 
and it is only by mapping actual human behaviour and feelings into the VSM that we will 
achieve a greater understanding of system behaviour.  
One further point is highly significant - the recent development of Social Identity Theory 
maps out the state-space of group behaviour. Previously, psychology had focused on the 
behaviour of the individual and groups were seen only as a collection of individuals  with 
general human affective attributes such as, anger and jealousy. Now Social Identity Theory 
gives the states of human individual and group behaviour given the conditions in the 
environment and this puts it within the reach of cybernetics.  
2.18 Using the VSM 
While there are many models that we could use to fit Social Identity to, only one model 
crosses the hard soft paradigm divide effectively and that is Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems 
Model. This is because the VSM is based on cybernetics and can be described as both a 
hard and a soft methodology depending on the viewpoint of the observer (Flood and 
Jackson 1991). Ulrich’s criticism that the VSM allows for the autocratic dictation of purpose 
demonstrates that the VSM can be used from different viewpoints when modelling social 
systems and  allows us to use the VSM to show a  system as purposeful or purposive 
through the application of its power structures and identity.  
We have, therefore, seen how adaptable the VSM is and how robust its construct; it provides 
an ideal vehicle with the extensions that we have identified, to form a framework for a model 
of human behaviour.  
There is one key parameter that aligns most of these aspects from both the system and 
social perspectives; that is identity. The identity of the individual sub-systems has to be 
coherent with the identity of the system as a whole. This is a key requirement of the VSM. 
Sub-systems have to have sufficient autonomy to be able to function effectively without 
excessive command and control but at the same time they have to be identifiable as part of 
the system. They have to have a common binding purpose. This was the issue with Ulrich; 
the democratic identification of purpose. This purpose has to be common with the social 
groups within the organisation. The degree that they are aligned with their local system and 
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that of the organisation should indicate the effectiveness of the groups function. The purpose 
of the social groups is a function of their identity and once found it provides mechanism to 
reward strategies, communications, motivation and recognition of conflict.  
2.19 Identity – A Link Between Social Identity and the Viable Systems Model 
Both Social Identity and the VSM are founded on concepts of identity. This section examines 
those concepts and compares their compatibility. 
Von Foerster provides some clear insight into the problems of ‘identity of self‘ with his 2nd 
Order Cybernetics (1979, 1981, 1984). Drawing on Spencer-Brown’s Laws of Form (1994) 
von Foerster suggests that every act of observation begins with an act of distinction. The act 
of distinction is the separation of what can be seen while the act of distinguishing makes a 
selection within that framework;  
“…the act of distinction is the taken as the fundamental act of 
cognition; it generates realities that are assumed to reside in an 
external space separated from the person of the distinguisher.” 
(von Foerster cited in Poerksen, 2003). 
However, von Foerster is keen to point out that the distinctions that we make are made as 
observations; the objects that we make distinctions upon remain unaffected by our choice. 
The act of distinction is internal and reveals more about the properties of the observers than 
the objects themselves.  
Von Foerster goes on to elaborate this point by suggesting that for humans the act of 
“observing others” is the only way that individuals can understand and define themselves; 
“I become aware of myself though the existence of other. Being 
together, togetherness is what makes for the human condition. 
Only through reciprocity, through being with one another, two-
getherness, as Buber (1942) always calls it, am I actually born….” 
(Von Foerster cited in Bröcker, 2003)  
This is almost exactly the approach taken with Self-Categorization Theory and Social 
Identity; where the social context of our environment causes us to make distinctions, and 
these very distinctions define us and create who we are.  
Von Foerster extends his observations of observation to the concept of identity, how is it, he 
asks, that we can overcome the paradox of change and identity? If something has changed 
then logic suggests that it is no longer what it was, its identity has changed, has the thing 
changed or is it our description of it that has changed?  
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“The essence of change is constancy” (Chuang Tzu) 
Beer’s VSM addresses this problem directly by making identity the very soul of his model as 
does Social Identity Theory, both address the issue of “who we are” and “who we think we 
are” head on.  
While the Theory of Social Identity is embedded in psychology that of viable systems is 
derived from systems thinking and managerial cybernetics. One provides human nature in a 
continuum from individual to group, and demonstrates human emotions, while the other 
provides the mechanisms for system behaviour and survival; both are recursive systems 
embedded in an environment with an identity derived from purposeful behaviour. In System 
5 the VSM creates an ‘ultimate whole system identity’, or ethos, that relates to, and aligns 
with, the ‘individual identities’ recursively embedded within it. We have seen from Social 
identity Theory that people readily form identities to create groups and assume the identity of 
the group. This mechanism has similarities to the one identified in the VSM. What is more 
they do this more easily than they align values and beliefs, which they find hard to change 
as these are embedded deep in their self-concept. Identity appears to be a quick and 
effective way of creating group alliances for any given circumstance along the lines of Hejl’s 
syn-referentiality (1984).  
In both Social Identity Theory and managerial cybernetics identity is a summary of the 
totality of the system. it is the sum of the variety created by the interconnection of many 
meanings (Burke, 1991) and the cohesion of many discrete meanings into one coherent and 
complex meaning (Burke and Tully,1977). Meanings are made by the systems sense-
making and value-making structure (Beer, 1995). An identity is therefore recursive, the 
elements that make up the system each have a discrete identity themselves and they 
combine to provide a uniqueness to the total system (Beer, 1995). It therefore depicts the 
ethos, purpose and entirety of the group of meanings, summarizing what it is and providing 
closure from the environment. And for that final meaning to have meaning it has to be what 
makes it distinct from other systems “a difference that makes a difference” (Batson, 1972). 
In Social Identity Theory identity is a summary of ‘who we are’, it is a continuum from 
personal identity “who am I” to prototypicality, i.e. group identity “who are we?” The “I” and 
the “we” match the recursivity in the VSM, however, when comparisons are made; 
“The definition of others and the self are largely "relational and 
comparative" (Tajfel and Turner, 1985, p. 16); they define oneself 
relative to individuals in other categories. Identification is viewed 
as a perceptual cognitive construct that is not necessarily 
associated with any specific behaviors or affective states. To 
identify, an individual need not expend effort toward the group's 
goals; rather, an individual need only perceive him- or herself as 
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psychologically intertwined with the fate of the group.” (Ashforth 
and Mael, 1989) 
So when we map Social Identity to the System Identity of the VSM it is whatever people 
identify as being the totality, the purpose, of that group that they are identifying with.  
There is a temporary use of identity that emerges from Social Identity Theory. We know from 
the principle of comparative fit that people do not necessarily have to agree with the values 
of a group to join it,  it is just that ‘in that moment’, for whatever reason, self-protection, 
social status etc… that they find that they have more in common with a particular group than 
the other groups around them.  
Social identification is distinguishable from internalization (Hogg 
and Turner, 1987) (cf. Kelman, 1961; O'Reilly and Chatman, 
1986).Whereas identification refers to self in terms of social 
categories (I am), internalization refers to the incorporation of 
values, attitudes, and so forth within the self as guiding principles 
(I believe). Although certain values and attitudes typically are 
associated with members of a given social category, acceptance 
of the category as a definition of self does not necessarily mean 
acceptance of those values and attitudes. An individual may 
define herself in terms of the organization she works for, yet she 
can disagree with the prevailing values, strategy, system of 
authority, and so on (cf. "young Turks," Mintzberg,1983, p. 210; 
"counterculture," (Martin and Siehl, 1983, p. 52). 
This last point is important as it hints that there are several levels or types of group 
membership. With collaborative fit people will join groups with whom they are not align in 
values and beliefs, either for self-esteem or protection (reduce uncertainty), when the group 
is no longer salient its value fades. However, this is not case with normative fit where they 
are aware of the normative behaviours when they join and may internalise these as part of 
their self-concept.  
2.20 Summary of Chapter 
We have evaluated how people observe and categorize the social world around them; from 
both a Social Identity and a Social Cognition perspective and how this leads to the formation 
of social groups.  The Social Identity approach suggests a process of depersonalisation that 
creates a sense of ‘us’ and encourages group members to engage in identity enhancing 
behaviours of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation to create positive 
distinctiveness for their group and improve their self-esteem and self-understanding    
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The review also covered the theory of Social Cognition, which overlaps that of Social Identity 
Theory and Self-Categorization Theory. The review of Social Cognition demonstrated how 
causal inference between individuals and groups is thought to work and how individuals use 
schema to make judgements of both individuals and groups.  The review then explained the 
relationship between schema and stereotypes and how these concepts relate to Self-
Categorisation Theory. A comparison of Social Cognition and Social Identity Theory was 
then followed by the latest research relevant to the study. 
The literature review then addressed the issues of enduring social structures and examined 
the application of System Thinking to social groups. It highlighted the limitations of System 
Thinking and the problems of using it to model human behaviour. The review then 
scrutinized the problems of representation of complex systems and the generation of viable 
systems before comparing the three theories of viability. It explained the foundations of the 
Viable Systems Model and examined its recent developments. The limitations of the VSM at 
representing social systems were highlighted and discussed before concluding that it 
provided the means necessary to conduct the research. 
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CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH PARADIGM AND APPROACH 
 
  3
“I have the feeling that it is like a round dance, where some 
dancers reach out to one another and dance around in a circle. 
And there you can name these dancers; one of them is 
cybernetics, the other’s name is ethics, the other is cognition, the 
other I, the other You, Anyone. These are mutually-created 
perspectives, that mutually support each other, and that by 
contemplating, thinking, feeling, help us find a leading thread in 
this incredibly fascinating, almost impenetrable world.“ (Heinz von 
Foerster cited in Bröcker 2003). 
3.1 Aim of the Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the research paradigm from the ontologies and 
epistemologies of Social Identity Theory and the Viable Systems Model. The chapter will 
then move on to specify the he type of logic used in the approach and the strategy and 
methodology used to measure the to achieve the required design. The chapter will examine 
the advantages of quantitative, qualitative and mixed method designs in answering the 
research question.    
3.2 Research Questions   
The research was initiated out of a desire to answer the question; 
Are social groups with salient identities viable systems? 
This very general query was useful in that it provided a research focus as well as ‘situating’ 
the position of the researcher from the beginning of the study. Robson (2011, kindle-1910) 
suggests the use of a “working title” to provide focus and a point for “starting where you are” 
for these very reasons (Lofland Snow and Anderson, 2006). This question, however, does 
not fit the Blaikie (2007, p 6) standard format which indicates the type of answer required 
from the research question by using ‘what’, ‘why’ or ‘how’ to preface the question. It is 
possible to rewrite the research question as ‘what social identities are viable systems?’ or 
‘why are social identities viable systems?’; or ‘how are social identities viable systems?’ All 
these questions, however, presupposes that social groups with salient identities ‘are known 
to be viable’ which has not yet been established. The first question that needs to be asked is 
“can they be viable systems?”. So the original question is a good starting point for exploring 
the subject area as it forces the research to take first things first and establish what ‘viable’ 
means for salient social systems in the first place?”.  
 64 
Saunders et al (2009) stress the importance of clarity in the research question to ensure that 
clear conclusions can be achieved with the research. They cite Clough and Nutbrown (2002) 
who describe the ‘Goldilocks Test’ for a research question; in other words, is it ‘too big’,’ just 
right’ or ‘too small’. Too big and it may be beyond the scope and resources of the research, 
too little and it may not have ‘sufficient substance’. The research question for this study that 
originated with a wish to understand the viability of social groups with salient identities is 
certainly of sufficient substance but it also has the potential to be ‘too big’. The research 
question therefore, needs to be carefully framed to ensure it brings the research into scope.  
Shifting the research question from ‘explaining social identity viability’ to  ‘exploring social 
identity viability’ provides a method of reducing the research scope; Robson backs this 
approach by suggesting that;  
“…for much real world research we are in relatively uncharted 
waters and the most useful thing to concentrate on is to 
explore.(Robson, 2011, Kindle 1689) 
An exploratory study also fits the suggestion made by Robson (2011, Kindle 1691) that 
“many real world research questions call for an exploratory or descriptive focus”. This fits the 
original intention to question the ‘viability of social groups with salient identities’.  
If we seek to establish a link between social identities and their viability then we should be 
sure that we know how to establish that groups have salient social identities and secondly, 
what constitutes viability for a social group. Both issues will require careful research design. 
We have already defined the meaning of the term viable as “maintenance of identity” and 
related it specifically to Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems Model and its five key sub-systems. 
However, simply identifying groups that endure may not be sufficient to ensure that they are 
either viable or have a salient social identity. We know from Prentice et al (2006) that there 
are different types of group in addition to those with a salient social identity. Prentice 
identified common-bond groups as well as common-identity groups, although he suggested 
that common-bond groups were non-enduring by their very nature. The research questions 
needs, therefore, to be framed carefully to ensure these two requirements are recognised. 
3.2.1 The Primary Research Question 
Are social groups with salient social identities viable systems?  
3.2.2 Secondary Research Questions 
Robson (2011) states the importance of the research question as the ‘centrality’ of any real 
world research  that is based on a pragmatic approach.  
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“The centrality of research questions for the research process has 
been the mantra of this text. This view enjoys considerable 
support in the research community active in multi-strategy social 
research. It is, in part, accounted for by the pragmatist stance 
taken by many which regards the research question(s) as the 
driver for carrying out research. (Robson, 2011) 
The study process identified additional questions necessary to support the primary question 
that relate to the research model. The first of these additional questions queries if it is 
possible to map the processes we are interested in to the model framework; 
 Can we explain the core issues of a social group’s viability by translating the main of 
psychological activities of Social Identity Theory as components in  VSM Theory? 
and secondly can we verify that the model achieves what we are asking it to do. In this case 
represent social identity and viability. 
 Can we assess the validity of the model to identify viable groups with salient social 
identities? 
and lastly, does the model provide a measure of social viability that we can use to recognise 
those groups that are both salient social identities and viable systems;  
 Can we identify or assess the viability of social groups with salient identities.  
3.3 Research Focus 
The subject of groups and human collective social behaviour spans several disciplines from, 
psychology to sociology, anthropology, business studies and systems thinking. This 
research will focus in particular on the whether there is a connection between the viability of 
groups from a cybernetic perspective as determined by Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems 
Model, and the psychology of human social behaviour, determined by Social Identity Theory 
and where required Social Cognition. 
3.4 The Research Paradigm 
While the research question “provides the key to planning and carrying out research” 
Robson (2011, Kindle 1273) it is, nevertheless, necessary to ensure that the philosophical  
position of the research is identified, not to ensure that the study is “philosophically informed” 
but to ensure that the research is “able to reflect upon its philosophical choices and defend 
them in relation to the alternatives that could have been adopted” (Clark 2006 in Saunders et 
al, 2009). Saunders et al (2009) emphasises that the research philosophy “contains 
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important assumptions about the way you view the world” and the “relationship between 
knowledge and the process by which it is developed”.  
Kuhn (1962) saw researchers as working within research paradigms that are “universally 
recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to a 
community of practitioners” (Kuhn, 1962, p.viii), he suggests that in practice research tends 
to follow pre-determined paths that are accepted viewpoints. Burrell and Morgan (1982) 
demonstrate that these paradigms are a relationship between ontology, epistemology, 
axiology and data collection techniques. They place them into a grid of four conceptual 
dimensions with radical change and regulation at opposite ends of one axis and the 
ontological dimensions of subjectivism and objectivism at opposite ends of the other. This 
grid generates four basic paradigms which are identified as; radical humanist, radical 
structuralist, interpretivist and functionalist, which Burrell and Morgan suggest helps 
researchers “understand their assumptions and plot their way through their research”, see 
Figure 3.1. 
In combining two separate disciplines, in this case Social Identity Theory and the Viable 
Systems Model, it is important to examine the paradigms normally related to their use and 
identify how they relate to each other to prevent a dichotomy of interests in the subject 
matter or research methodology. It is also necessary to examine the purpose of the research 
and its relationship to these paradigms to place the researcher and audience into the frame 
of reference. A further comparison with other unrelated paradigms helps highlight the areas 
of difference and their meaning to the research; 
"…by reflecting on one’s favoured research strategy in relation to 
other strategies, the nature, strengths and limitations of one’s 
favoured approach becomes much clearer" (Morgan, 1983, 
p381). 
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Figure 3.1 – Research paradigms – Burrell and Morgan (1982) 
  
The four different paradigms are defined by the two dimensions to produce very different 
perspectives;   
Radical humanist – guided by a subjectivist ontology with a critical perspective. The 
practical outlook is one that has a high concern for change and a low concern for stability.  
Radical structuralist – guided by an objectivist ontology with a critical perspective. The 
practical outlook is one that has a high concern for change and a high concern for stability.  
Interpretivist – guided by a subjectivist ontology that is regulated by the need for 
discovering irrationalities. The practical outlook is one that has a low concern for change and 
also a low concern for stability. 
Functionalist – guided by an objectivist ontology that is regulated by the need for “rational 
explanation”. The practical outlook is one that has a low concern for change and a high 
concern for stability. 
Gharajedaghi (1983) identifies these paradigms in the Burrell and Morgan (1982) grid as 
‘modes of behaviour’ with functionalism relating to conservative behaviour, interpretivism as 
anarchic, radical humanism as radical and radical structuralism as ideal seeking, see Figure 
3.3. 
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Figure 3.2 – Mode of Behaviour – From Gharajedaghi (1983) – Based on Burrell and Morgan 
(1982) 
 
 
While Kuhn indicated that paradigms were ‘model solutions for practitioners’ (Kuhn, 1962, 
p.viii), the connections between paradigm, research philosophy, approach, strategy and data 
collection must be coherent as each layer can influence the next. To examine the complexity 
of research paradigms Denzin and Lincoln (2003) provide an interconnected net starting with 
the research paradigm and then the ontology, epistemology, approach and data collection, 
while Saunders et al (2009, p108) provide a framework demonstrating the layers from 
research philosophy to data collection, see Figure 3.3.  
The research has, therefore, to determine from an examination of the ontology, 
epistemology and normal research approaches as well as any considerations of previous 
researchers the paradigms of Social Identity Theory and the Viable Systems Model.   
3.5 The Paradigms of Social Identity Theory and the Viable Systems Model 
Starting then with the research philosophy we need to identify the ontology and 
epistemology of our subject. Psychology research is traditionally rooted in logical positivism 
and empiricism derived from the work of the Vienna Circle of philosophers and dominated, in 
the early years, by the Behaviourists (Skinner 1957) who were advocates of realism and 
quantitative research. To some degree this tradition is continued within social psychology 
research, which focuses on individual perception and understanding and tends to be biased 
towards quantitative methodologies. 
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Figure 3.3 – Research Philosophy, Approach, Strategy and Methodology – Saunders et al (2009)  
 
Social Identity Theory, however, is more rooted in a constructivist and symbolic 
interactionism philosophies (Ashforth and Mael 1989) and aspects of its research have been 
directed towards more qualitative methods to determine the meaning behind individual 
processes. Yolles (2004) places social constructivism theories, such as Social Identity 
Theory, within the domain of ‘bounded relativism’; with ontologies of “social relativism where 
reality is socially constructed.”   
So what of the ontology and epistemology of the VSM? Beer’s Viable Systems Model was 
categorized as ‘functionalist’ by the Operational Research community when it was first 
introduced. Jackson (1988) identifies that this was based on a lack of understanding of the 
nature of the VSM; with the OR community trying to represent it as a simple causal model 
with a set of causal relationships to be applied in a prescribed manner.  Jackson maintains 
that this was a fundamental error; the basis for the misrepresentation was that the model is 
difficult to understand, partly because it is based around the concept of variety, but also 
because its ontology is complex. 
Jackson (1988) explains that the VSM is based on structuralist ideas that come from Beer’s 
development of organisational cybernetics. Beer’s shift in ontology, from a positivist 
viewpoint of the era, to a more structuralist and constructivist approach was difficult for many 
to grasp. The structuralist approach enables the VSM to demonstrate surface phenomena 
that are underpinned by deeper constructs; so while it can show much of the positivist 
findings in management science it can, at the same time, show the core elements of a 
system and its meaning.  
 70 
Yolles (2004) identifies the ontology of the VSM as a “constructivist approach with bounded 
relativism”. More specifically the ontology is “personal and social relativism” where reality is 
“local and cognitively demiurgic; being shaped by socially related factors.”  Golinelli et al 
(2010) suggest that the VSM is a ‘grounded theory’; that is a theory that is systematically 
discovered through the analysis of data, because it; 
"…suggests a new interpretation both of corporate behaviour and 
relative inter action with the context (Beer, 1972) and 
consolidated strategic organizational managerial corporate 
models (Golinelli et al, 2003, p3). In other words it facilitates the 
analysis of the internal components (sub-systems) of a firm as 
well as the analysis of relationships between firms and the other 
influential systems entities of its context (supra-systems) 
(Golinelli, 2000; Barile 2008).” (Golinelli et al, 2010) 
It is easy to see how the system can be seen from all these perspectives. With the 
interaction of its elements the VSM appears constructivist yet the stable, viable structures 
that emerge from its epistemology can also be seen from a structuralist, ‘grounded theory’ or 
even functionalist perspective; hence Flood and Jackson (1991) statement that the “VSM 
crosses the hard, soft paradigms depending on the viewpoint of the observer”. 
Essentially, at its basic systems level, the ontology of the VSM is what it represents, a social 
system, organism, organisation etc… however, the inclusion of the meta-system means that 
any representation has to encompass the higher order domains that represent the rational, 
logical and belief systems. The VSM is therefore, in Schwarz’s Meta-Model, a system that is 
designed to represent self-reflective systems. There is therefore, no single ontology that 
defines the cybernetic paradigm. Beer’s system and meta-system have two different 
ontologies, when defined within a system this creates an ontological dichotomy as to the 
nature of the system itself, similar to cartesian dualism (Descartes 1641).  
Koestler (1967) provides one way out of this dilemma through the use of ‘holons’; where the 
entity is treated as a totality, however, an alternative is to use the “Three Domains Model” of 
Schwarz (1997). This problem is explored by Yolles (2004, 2006a, p54) who defines the 
ontologies as being “ontologically coupled” with a connection through their boundaries; 
labelled as a transverse ontology. Yolles identified the conditions for this to happen (Yolles 
2006a: p297-301). Essentially, the complex nature of the VSM divides the attributes, 
identified by Beer, across phenomenal, noumenal and existential domains with autogenesis 
and autopoiesis mechanisms making couplings by “melding “ their ontological horizons, see 
Figure 2.5 in the previous chapter. 
Smolensky (1987) details the possible solutions to the conflict between symbolism, which he 
calls the ‘hard’ and connectionism which he calls the ‘soft’. The last of these solutions is to; 
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“..make a system which is ‘soft’ at bottom complex enough that 
hardness will sometimes appear when viewed at a higher level.” 
(Smolensky, 1987, p137) 
Cilliers (1998) comments on this solution by saying; 
“…I find the last suggestion most intriguing. It postulates a system 
that does not function on the basis of rules, but where certain 
systematic properties can be described by means of rules if they 
prove to be useful.” (Cilliers, 1998, p34) 
This is very similar to the dilemma of finding a paradigm for the VSM. The homeostatic 
connections between all the elements of the VSM that are ‘chattering away’ to each other 
trying to find stability are identical to the connectionists ‘distributed representation’ of neural 
nets. This is constructivism in action. It describes a system of locally constructed realities, 
relevant to themselves, comparing and contrasting in a web of complex relationships to find 
shared meaning, as described by Heylighen and Joslyn (2001);  
“…von Foerster and Maturana note, in the nervous system there 
is no a priori distinction between a perception and a hallucination: 
both are merely patterns of neural activation. An extreme 
interpretation of this view might lead to solipsism, or the inability 
to distinguish self-generated ideas (dreams, imagination) from 
perceptions induced by the external environment. This danger of 
complete relativism, in which any model is considered to be as 
good as any other, can be avoided by the requirements for 
coherence and invariance. First, although no observation can 
prove the truth of a model, different observations and models can 
mutually confirm or support each other, thus increasing their joint 
reliability. Thus, the more coherent a piece of knowledge is with 
all other available information, the more reliable it is. Second, 
precepts appear more "real" as they vary less between 
observations. For example, an object can be defined as that 
aspect of a perception that remains invariant when the point of 
view of the observer is changed. In the formulation of von 
Foerster, an object is an eigenstate of a cognitive transformation. 
There is moreover invariance over observers: if different 
observers agree about a percept or concept, then this 
phenomenon may be considered "real" by consensus. This 
process of reaching consensus over shared concepts has been 
called "the social construction of reality". Gordon Pask's 
Conversation Theory provides a sophisticated formal model of 
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such a "conversational" interaction that ends in an 
agreement over shared meanings. Another implication of 
constructivism is that since all models are constructed by 
some observer, this observer must be included in the model for it 
to be complete. This applies in particular to those cases where 
the process of model-building affects the phenomenon 
being modelled. (Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001, p23)  
von Foerster, Maturana and Smolensky’s view that the complexity of a ‘soft’ complex system 
can sometimes be viewed by a set of ‘hard’ rules shows how a VSM system can be seen as 
both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ in itself. At one end a complex of interconnected constructivist and 
connectionist relationships and at a higher level a functionalist view of the same system’s 
emergent, invariant properties as a stable system with defined rules and behaviours. This 
has similarities with Heidegger who describes the essence of a phenomenon as “the way in 
which it remains through time as what it is” (1977, p3) and uses this to build hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Time, however, is an important aspect in this perspective. A complex 
systems changing and adapting to its environment every millisecond may seem like a stable 
entity to a being that lives only for a nanosecond.  
So what of its epistemology? The System Thinking paradigms created by Luhmann, Beer, 
Schwartz and Yolles are based on complex ontological frameworks joined through 
transverse structural couples of autopoietic and autogenetic mechanisms (Yolles 2004). 
These paradigms do not provide a positivistic ‘absolute’ framework of reality but instead, 
should be viewed as an epistemological mechanism for understanding the complex 
interaction of social systems as a complex process of connected processes and meanings. 
We are essentially talking about ‘socially constructed meaning’ but more importantly we 
have placed over that a mantle of ‘viability’ and we have seen, from Yolles that the VSM is 
the means by which we can understand viability, in his words “it is its own epistemology” 
(Yolles 2004).  
3.6 Pragmatism – Bringing the Paradigms Together 
This places Social Identity and the Viable Systems Model in different paradigms, however, 
as we have argued the structuralist nature of the VSM, built on constructivist principles 
aligns part of the mechanisms the research is studying. A more complete solution, however, 
is to extend or move Social Identity Theory from the constructivism paradigm to the  
structuralist one.  However, here we meet the same arguments that surrounded quantitative 
and qualitative data incompatibility (mixed methods research);  
“…different philosophic perspectives are distinct and 
incommensurable”, (Guba and Lincoln, 1994 in Yolles, 2004, p85) 
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Cupchik (2001) and Kuhn (1962) raised the issue that, 
“by allowing philosophic perspectives to be incommensurable, 
processes of inquiry (e.g., methodologies) must similarly be seen 
as incommensurable” (Yolles, (2004, p85)  
Cupchik demonstrated how apparently incommensurable qualitative and quantitative 
methods, can be used together through constructive realism and this same logic can be 
applied to the movement of the Social Identity paradigm. Howe (1988) also argues for mixed 
methods. He suggests that instead of being incommensurable  ‘there are important senses 
in which quantitative and qualitative methods are inseparable’ This approach has been 
extensively argued by  Creswell (2003), Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) and forms the basis 
of pragmatism as a philosophical underpinning for research (Denscombe, 2008). 
Pragmatism fits the research requirements well as it provides a good representation of the 
functioning of the VSM and recognises the pluralism of the research paradigms particularly; 
it rejects traditional dualisms in favour of more practical solutions that provide answers and 
solve problems, it recognises the real world as well as the emergent social and 
psychological worlds and accepts that knowledge is both constructed and experienced. 
Pragmatism also recognises the value of human enquiry and generally rejects reductionism 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 18)  
Pragmatism can be seen as providing a licence to carry out multi-
strategy research, safe in the knowledge that a body of leading 
researchers in the field have followed this path. For Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech (2005) what they term ‘pragmatic researchers’ are 
simply those who learn to utilize and to appreciate both 
quantitative and qualitative research. From this they consider that 
several advantages flow, including: researchers can be flexible in 
their investigative techniques; a wide range of research questions 
can be addressed; they are more likely to promote collaboration 
among researchers (including those of different philosophical 
orientations); they are more likely to view research as a ‘holistic 
endeavour’; and as they have a positive attitude to both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, they are likely to favour 
using qualitative techniques to inform the quantitative aspect of a 
study and vice versa (p. 383). (Robson,2011,Kindle  5644)  
3.7 Creating a Dialectic Argument for Change 
Aligning two paradigms raises the prospect of either a dichotomy or a dialectic argument. 
Gharajedaghi (1983) addresses this issue, particularly on how a dichotomy can be 
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transformed into a dialectic argument that can be dissolved (from Ackoff , 1981) and 
ultimately lead to development and progress. Gharajedaghi starts by demonstrating visually 
the two arguments as either opposing forces  (OR) dichotomies or as orthogonal forces 
(AND) dialectics, see Figure 3.4.    
Figure 3.4 – Dichotomy (OR) and Dialectic (AND)  – From Gharajedaghi (1983)  
 
Gharajedaghi states that the development of social systems is “a three dimensional 
phenomenon of purposeful transformation in the direction of 
increased integration and differentiation” (purpose is the third dimension but is not shown). 
This is demonstrated in Figure 3.5 and defined as; 
“Differentiation represents artistic orientation with emphasis on 
intrinsic (stylistic) value systems, signifying tendencies towards 
such things as: increased complexity, increased variety, 
increased individual autonomy (individual choice), 
and morphogenesis (creation of new structure. 
Integration represents a scientific orientation with emphasis on 
extrinsic (instrumental) value system, signifying tendencies 
toward such things as: increased order, increased uniformity and 
conformity, increased collectivity (collective choice), and 
morphostasis (maintenance of structure)” (Gharajedaghi, 1983) 
Gharajedaghi places differentiation and integration over the Burrell and Morgan (1982) grid, 
see Figure 3.5, to show that given the right arguments the integration of Social Identity 
Theory with the Viable Systems Model can create innovation, organisation, socialization, 
participation and adaptation, however, it involves moving Social Identity Theory from chaotic 
simplicity to organized complexity with a dialectic argument. From Ackoff’s (1972) concept of 
purposeful systems Gharajedaghi suggests that there are two strategies for a dialectic 
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argument both of which have a compatibility of ENDS but differ in the compatibility of 
MEANS, these are; cooperation, which is a compatibility of MEANS or competition which is 
an incompatibility of MEANS. 
“a dialectic is a conflict in tendencies that share a higher-level 
objective. It is a conflict of means, not ends. A dichotomy is a 
conflict in ends and means, a zero-sum game and a win/lose 
struggle”. (Gharajedaghi, 1983) 
Figure 3.5 – Differentiation and Integration- from Gharajedaghi (1983) 
 
  
 76 
Figure 3.6 Differentiation and Integration aligned with Burrell and Morgan Paradigm Grid (1982) 
Gharajedaghi (1983) 
 
3.8 The Research Approach and Strategy – Analysis and Synthesis Inherent in the 
VSM 
In the process of established the paradigmatic position of the research we identified that the 
research philosophy would have to be pragmatic to fit the complex paradigms of the two 
principle theories. We also recognised the need for a holistic approach that brings all the 
elements together in synthesis (Chapter 2 Section 2.9). The key question is – does the VSM 
provide these facilities? 
Barton and Haslett (2007) provide a systems analysis of the scientific method that 
incorporates analysis and synthesis and the use of inductive, deductive and abductive 
reasoning. They state; 
“The scientific method is most usefully interpreted as a dialectic 
between analysis and synthesis supported by the triadic logic of 
C.S. Peirce, and that the role of systems thinking is to frame this 
dialectic.” (Barton and Haslett, 2007)  
They demonstrate how a ‘surprising fact’ leads to synthesis of the known elements using 
abductive reasoning to generate a new hypothesis. This then leads to “action and analysis” 
using deduction and induction to generate new data and the creation of new categories. As 
new details emerge from these categories a new ‘surprising fact’ is discovered and the 
process starts again. Over time this dialectic process leads to new categories emerging with 
“increased powers of explanation and understanding”. Figure 3.7 shows the process in 
diagrammatical form.  
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All three of these processes are inherent in the construct of the VSM. We have seen how the 
viewpoint of the observer means that the VSM can be employed across a wide spectrum of 
paradigms, namely;   functionalism, structuralism, grounded theory or interpretivism since 
the VSM is its own epistemology (Yolles, 2004). In choosing the VSM as the foundation of 
the model we automatically select it as the research approach. Further we have seen that 
the VSM brings with it the ability to synthesise its internal components and from Golinelli et 
al (2003) the ability to “facilitate the analysis of relationships between […elements] of its 
context”. These enable deductive and inductive reasoning, however, the definition of the 
VSM by Golinelli et al (2010) as grounded theory expresses its capability for abduction.  
Abduction is defined by Peirce (1902) as a position “whereby the reasoning acts to infer a 
conclusion that fits the best explanation”.  
 Figure 3.7 – Synthesis, Abductive Reasoning, Analysis and Deductive and Inductive Reasoning 
– from Barton and Haslett (2007) 
 
3.9 Explicit and Implicit Purposes 
Stafford Beer stated “to know something properly, you must measure it.” (Beer, 1979, p270). 
He identifies three key measures of the output of any viable system; firstly its ‘actual output’, 
secondly its ‘capability’ and lastly its full ‘potential’ (Beer, 1979, p293). In the case of social 
groups these measures would directly relate to the explicit purpose of the groups being 
studied. We would normally identify a group with a specific explicit purpose as to ‘make this’, 
or to ‘sell that’, or even to ‘reassure each other’. However, as we have seen from Social 
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Identity Theory the main reasons people join groups is to boost self-esteem and to reduce 
uncertainty.  These are the implicit purposes.  
Put simply people can’t ‘do’ self-esteem, it is an emergent property of social activity. 
Just as self-esteem is an implicit measure of an individual’s function so stability and 
cohesion are implicit measures of a systems viability . Looking at these implicit measures 
Beer explains that they ‘set the criteria of stability’, ‘detect instability’ and ‘change the 
criteria’. He states; 
“The manager’s requirement of ‘measurement’ is that it should 
measure stability and instability in the system that he (this being 
his role) has subjectively defined.” (Beer, 1979, p 287) 
To Beer a system was either viable or it was not. If it could not achieve internal stability it 
was not viable it would ultimately fail; 
“complicated systems fail because they are potentially unstable. 
(Beer, 1979, p 290)   
and to Beer viability was directly connected to the stability of the system and its ability to 
balance variety; 
“The stability of the systems, in which we are acutely interested, 
derives from the ability of its subsystems to absorb one another’s 
variety. To this extent, control is intrinsic to the system; it derives 
from the automatic operation of Ashby’s Law, and is not 
embodied in a controller. However, the criteria to which the 
system answers, in terms of its degree of stability, derive from the 
criteria of systemic viability in the context of the total viable 
system - and in particular they derive from the understanding of 
cohesion, in which freedom and constraint are balanced to 
provide a workable level of autonomy.” (Beer, 1979, p289) 
Is this the case with our social groups? Does failure of a group to create all of the key sub-
systems leave it vulnerable? The key dependent variable in the research is that of viability 
which has ultimately to be ‘quantified’ in some way for the methodology of the research. We 
have seen from the above that it is related to the stability of the system as a whole and its 
ability to maintain balance and absorb variety. Therefore, viability is measured by the 
effective functioning of the VSM and the criteria for measurement of viability is to assess the 
level of social groups internal processes. An additional  measure that must also be 
examined is System 5 closure (Beer 1979, 289) which should be related to the internal 
stability.  
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This provides two means of assessing the viability of a system, firstly the effective stability of 
its intrinsic internal processes and secondly from its organisational closure with the 
environment,.  
3.10 Research Methodology – Mixed Methods 
Returning to the measurement of data in complex systems, the literature review at Section 
2.12 identified that it was feasible to take a ‘snapshot’ of a complex system to determine, “ 
the construction of some kind of interpretation of the nature of the systems at a given 
moment.” (Cilliers, 1998, p80). This provides the research with a basis for its methodology to 
measure the viability of social groups, namely;  
To use a pragmatic approach to determine the viability of social 
groups with salient identities by taking a ‘snapshot’ of the values 
of their internal components  to assess the stability of their  key 
processes  and to verify this with a comparison of their viability 
determined from an assessment of the groups’ organisational 
closure. .  
The key question then becomes - what are these internal components and key processes? 
For this we need to translate the main psychological activities of Social Identity Theory to 
defined points in  VSM Theory that can be measured. Maturana and Varela identify 
components as the principle elements of a network of processes of production; 
An autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a 
network of processes of production (transformation and 
destruction) of components that produces the components that: 
(1) through their interactions and transformations continuously 
regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that 
produce them; and (2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete 
unity in the space in which they exist by specifying the topological 
domain of its realization as such a network. (Varela, 1979, p. 13; 
see also Maturana and Varela, 1980). 
Therefore, by creating a set of components, as independent variables, a ‘snapshot’ of the 
social groups can be taken to assess the degree of viability.  
A key question at this point is whether or not the main psychological activities that are 
translated from Social Identity Theory to VSM theory as components will retain their 
significance and relationships once translated. The mapping of a process from one theory to 
the other may not address issues of interactions between the elements at both levels.  
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The answer to this question reflects on the very basis of cybernetics, The original concept of 
systems thinking and cybernetics, upon which the VSM is based, was as a meta-science, 
that is a science of sciences. By its very construct cybernetics examines the ‘states of 
systems’ and the relationships between these states, that is the trajectory of the system. 
This should mean that any science or theory where the states have been determined can be 
examined by cybernetics. As stated earlier at 1.11, this work is only possible now because 
psychologist have essential ‘mapped the state-space’ of individual and group cognition, 
opening the door to cybernetic principles. This should mean that translating the 
psychological activities of Social Identity Theory to VSM Theory is only possible as long as 
the research identifies the ‘states’ of these psychological activities to make the mapping as 
components in VSM Theory possible.  
Nevertheless, despite the apparent validity of VSM Theory for this application it is important 
to verify that the translations of components achieve accurate mapping from one theory to 
the other. There is no easy methodology to achieve this except for a practical assessment of 
the comparison of the results. The representation of each social group modelled by the VSM 
can be compared to other groups to confirm that the differences and the ‘differences 
between differences’ from the originals. A comparison of groups is therefore essential and 
for this a qualitative assessment of each original social group is necessary as a baseline.  
So while the components can be measured from quantitative measures, qualitative data will 
be necessary to confirm the ‘meaning’ or triangulate within the systems being measured and 
to confirm the validity of the model. This is a mixed model approach (Saunders et al, p152) 
as it requires taking quantitative data and ‘qualitising’ it – i.e. converting it in to a narrative 
during the synthesis of the components into their processes.  Saunders et al (quoting 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (2002) suggest that mixed methods and mixed models “provide 
better opportunities to answer research questions”, however, they also suggest it may lead 
to unexpected outcomes (p154). Robson (2011, Kindle 5451) refers to this as a multi-
strategy sequential explanatory design which is defined by the; collection and analysis of 
quantitative data followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data and where the 
two methods are analysed together so that the qualitative data can help to interpret the 
quantitative data.   
Robson (2011, Kindle 5497) (based, in part, on Bryman, 2006a) identifies the advantages of 
multi- strategy designs as achieving;  
“Triangulation. Corroboration between quantitative and 
qualitative data enhances the validity of findings.  
Completeness. Combining research approaches produces a 
more complete and comprehensive picture of the topic of the 
research.  
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Offsetting weaknesses and providing stronger inferences. Using 
these designs can help to neutralize the limitations of each 
approach while building on their strengths, leading to stronger 
inferences.  
Answering different research questions. Multi-strategy designs 
can address a wider range of research questions than is feasible 
with single method fixed or flexible designs.  
Ability to deal with complex phenomena and situations. A 
combination of research approaches is particularly valuable in 
real world settings because of the complex nature of the 
phenomena and the range of perspectives that are required to 
understand them.  
Explaining findings. One research approach can be used to 
explain the data generated from a study using a different 
approach (e.g. findings from a quantitative survey can be followed 
up and explained by conducting interviews with a sample of those 
surveyed to gain an understanding of the findings obtained). This 
can be particularly useful when unanticipated or unusual findings 
emerge.  
Illustration of data. Qualitative data can illustrate quantitative 
findings and help paint a better picture of the phenomenon under 
investigation. Bryman (2006a) refers to this as putting ‘meat on 
the bones’ of dry quantitative data.  
Refining research questions (hypothesis development and 
testing). A qualitative phase of a study may be undertaken to 
refine research questions, or develop hypotheses to be tested in a 
follow-up quantitative phase.” Robson (2011, Kindle 5497) 
(based, in part, on Bryman, 2006a) 
3.11 Fixed Design or Flexible 
Whether the research is a fixed design or flexible is also a matter that needs to be 
determined at an early stage. Fixed designs are usually used in social study research when 
examining “group properties and general tendencies” that report such properties as the 
“group averages” (Robson, 2011, Kindle 2947).  Fixed designs can, therefore, ‘transcend’ 
individual differences and “identify patterns and processes which can be linked to social 
structures and group or organisational features”, (Kindle 2978), however, it is also difficult to 
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assesses the behaviour of individuals from a fixed design.  Flexible designs on the other 
hand, are useful for case studies and grounded theory research where there is a good 
possibility of evolving parameters and the researchers themselves are a part of the study. 
They require high skill levels in the researchers who have to be able to identify emerging 
issues in the study.  
The fixed design methodology, therefore, is more aligned with the parameters of the 
research study. Within fixed design styles the non-experimental fixed design is used when it 
is not possible to manipulate the variables, Robson (2011, Kindle 4223) states that they are 
usually used with surveys in social studies and are well suited to understanding social 
phenomenon.   
3.12 Summary of Chapter 
The chapter examined the paradigms of Social Identity Theory and the Viable Systems 
Model and recognised their different constructs. The issue of moving Social Identity from a 
constructivist to a structuralist paradigm was studied and considered feasible under a 
pragmatist philosophy and dialectic argument. The flexible construct of the VSM was also 
discussed and its radical ontology and epistemology considered to be of benefit to the 
research. The chapter then examined the significance of the  pragmatic philosophy to the 
study and its principle advantages before examining an approach using abstraction and 
synthesis. The means by which viability could be measured then led to the identification of 
the research methodology using a multi-strategy sequential explanatory fixed design.   
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CHAPTER 4 – RESEARCH MODEL  
  4
 
 “The amazing thing that needs to be investigated is cultural 
stability, whenever and wherever it is found." Douglas (1985: xxii)  
4.1 Aim of the Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to take the first steps in relating the theory to the research. The 
process will be completed in the following chapter with the detail of the research 
methodology. This section starts by identifying the main psychological activities of Social 
Identity Theory. This information is used to construct an influence diagram to establish the 
relationships between these activities. VSM theory is then used as a meta-language to 
classify the key aspects of Social Identity Theory. The section then conducts an overview of 
the function of each VSM sub-system to add components as necessary for the functioning of 
the VSM systems.  The chapter then completes by  identifying the relationship between 
these components as key processes.  The components and key processes can then provide 
a value that can be quantified for the research.  
4.2 Theoretical Underpinnings - Translating Social Identity to the VSM 
The literature review, and examination of the research approach, established that the 
research needed firstly, to translate the main psychological activities of Social Identity 
Theory into components and key processes in VSM Theory and then to conduct the 
research by taking a ‘snapshot’ of groups at an instant in time through the measurement of 
the value of these components and key processes.  
4.3 The Psychological Actvities – Creating An Influence Diagram of SIT 
4.3.1 Self-Categorization 
As shown in the Literature Review in Chapter 2 Social Identity Theory posits that for a 
specific social context individuals, through the principle of meta-contrast, construct group 
categories through the comparative fit of intra and inter differences of individuals around 
them with a subjective relative reference to themselves. Individuals, therefore, identify with 
groups that they self-categorize with, providing that the groups also meet the perceiver’s 
expectations of normative behaviour in line with their knowledge of the group prototype. 
Figure 4.1 shows the processes of comparative and normative fit. Comparative fit is related 
to the meta-contrast ratio of the social context and other identifiable social categories, while 
normative fit is related to the perceivers expectations of the normative behaviour of these 
categories. The identity itself is governed by the principle of functional antagonism, that is 
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only one identity can be salient at a time and this is related to the social context often in 
relation to the level of threat from out-groups. 
Figure 4.1 – Self-categorization processes of comparative and normative fit. 
 
4.3.2 Distinctiveness and Identity Enhancing Behaviours 
Once individuals associate with a group they become representations of the group 
prototype, adopting group attitudes, behaviours and norms  through a process of 
depersonalisation and they seek to enhance their own group distinctiveness using  in-group 
favouritism and out-group derogation to obtain the maximum possible social value by 
maximising their self-esteem and reducing their uncertainty by making themselves secure. 
They also seek to establish their own unique place in the group to maintain a sense of self-
value in line with the theory of optimal distinctiveness and achieve self-understanding of 
themselves through their group memberships.  
Figure 4.2 shows the operation of positive distinctiveness which is connected from salient 
social identity (see previous Figure 4.1) directly to depersonalisation through the processes 
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of group enhancement (amplification of group identity) and group uniqueness (attenuation of 
group identity). These two processes are influenced by; the degree of anonymity (only if a 
low status out-group), the degree of optimal distinctiveness, the level of entitativity and the 
prestige of the group. Each of these effects is itself influenced by the social environment and 
the sum of their impact will affect the level of depersonalisation achieved. The process will 
then generate identity enhancing behaviours of in-group favouritism or out-group derogation 
to either enhance or define the group identity. The regulator of  the process will be the level 
of social value that is derived from these activities. Social value is a measure of the 
motivation from ‘survive to thrive”’ and is a combination of self-esteem, self-understanding 
(uncertainty reduction) and self-value (measure of optimal distinctiveness). 
Figure 4.2 – Positive Distinctiveness 
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4.3.3 Depersonalisation and Prototypicality 
The prototypicality of the group will be a combination of the image, attitudes, values and 
attributes that the group have assigned to their concept of group membership. Under strong 
salience or regular association, the individuals of the group may internalize these as their 
own values. Figure 4.3 shows the process from prototypicality to beliefs and the feedback to 
the self-categorization process to make the whole process self-reflective.  
Figure 4.3 – Prototypicality 
 
4.3.4 Social Mobility, Social Conflict and Social Creativity. 
Should group members not achieve a requisite level of self-esteem they may seek social 
mobility, that is to move from the group to another with higher status and greater prestige or 
within the group to a more elite sub-group. Alternatively they may internalise their sense of 
low status, or seek to re-categorise themselves through social creativity on a different 
dimension where they can be more certain of achieving greater prestige,  or lastly they may 
engage in social conflict challenging the group hierarchy, depending on the level of control in 
the group and the legitimacy of its management. These processes are shown in Figure 4.3, 
where low self-esteem can be seen connected to a high status in-group that is legitimate or 
a high status group that is seen as illegitimate. The former leads to social creativity and 
feeds back to the self-categorisation process, while the latter is connected to internalisation 
of low status. Figure 4.4 shows the process from self-categorization to prototypicality. 
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Figure 4.4 – Influence diagram of Social Identity Processes 
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4.4 Diagnosing the System 
There are several texts that demonstrate the use of the VSM and its practical application. 
Beer (1985) in “Diagnosing the System” demonstrates a methodology for examining a 
system for organisations. Espejo et al (1999) discuss a software learning package called 
‘VIPLAN’ that teaches a methodology to apply the VSM as a diagnostic tool to corporations. 
Both methodologies suggest a similar approach although neither method is ideally suited for 
social systems. The VIPLAN method suggest the following process which will be used as a 
broad guide;  
 Establish identity.  
 Model structural activities. 
 Unfold the complexity of the system by modelling structural levels. 
 Model ‘distribution of discretion’ - autonomy. 
 Model the structure through the study, diagnosis and design of regulatory 
mechanisms (adaptation and cohesion)” Espejo et al (1999) 
Espejo breaks down these processes into finer detail. The requirement to establish identity 
is defined in terms of what transformations are being undertaken and which processes 
control or utilize the output from the transformations. A key part of this process is the 
‘structural modelling’ which identifies the function and purpose of the individual sub-systems 
within the framework of the system’s overall purpose. These elements must demonstrate 
requisite variety, cohesion and coherence.  
Structural modelling should bring out the complexity of the system, so the next stage is to 
“unfold this complexity”, that is, to determine how the activities of the system are recursively 
structured to deliver the transformations. Often this recursive structuring will be evident from 
the “natural self-organising processes” of the system. In undertaking this processes the 
degree of autonomy of the sub-systems; known as the “distribution of discretion” needs to be 
determined. Too much autonomy and the system will lack a central focus, too little and the 
sub- systems will fail to be responsive to local effects. 
The ‘unfolding of complexity’ is the central process that determines how the system will 
provide requisite variety, however, this cannot be a rigid structure as to ensure the survival 
of the system two key-processes cohesion and adaptation must be allowed to act on the 
system to absorb influences both from within the system and the environment;.   
Cohesion is the ‘bringing together’ of all the key activities into a single, purposeful entity. It 
can be seen as a balance between the cooperation, coordination and competition of the 
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supporting sub-systems in an effort that best supports the whole enterprise. It involves the 
allocation of resources, the alert of failure and the coordination of the systems. These 
processes are also embedded recursively within each sub-system.  
Lastly, the mechanisms that allow the system to adapt must be identified. This can be minor 
on-going processes that deal seamlessly with perpetuations within the system or they can 
be a more dramatic planned change that is able to deal with fundamental threats to the 
system from the environment. It is also the centre of innovation and the development of new 
concepts.  
All of these processes must be brought together within a central identity and ethos which 
requires the identity of the key elements of the meta-system, namely coherence, planning 
and identity to be determined. 
4.5 Establish Identity and Purpose 
We saw in Section 2.19 that the identity of a social group is defined by its prototypicality, 
which is the summation of its image, values, attributes and beliefs along whatever 
dimensions are important to the group. Section 3.9 established that a group’s specific 
activity defined its explicit purpose while its implicit purpose is the improvement of social 
value. Beer (1985, p 98) states that; 
“…we have not spoken of the system's purposes before, except in 
declaring its viability - and therefore the implied purpose TO 
SURVIVE:” (Beer , 1985, p98) 
In his keynote address to a lecture on power, autonomy and utopia (1986) Stafford Beer 
quotes Canetti (1972); “power is the will to survive”. The implicit purpose of social systems to 
maintain and preserve self-esteem and reduce uncertainty is a function of self-preservation 
(on a continuum of  survive through to thrive), in other words exactly as Beer states; TO 
SURVIVE. Recalling “The Purpose of A System Is What It Does” (POSIWID) Beer (1985, p 
99); 
“On the most fundamental level, the goal of an autonomous or 
autopoietic system is survival, that is, maintenance of its essential 
organization. This goal has been built into all living systems by 
natural selection: those that were not focused on survival have 
simply been eliminated. In addition to this primary goal, the 
system will have various subsidiary goals, such as keeping warm 
or finding food, that indirectly contribute to its survival.” (Heylighen 
and Joslyn, 2001, p12)  
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4.6 Establish the System in Focus  
Stafford Beer maintained that to examine a complex system we must first establish the 
system in focus (1985, p 6). In other word we must be clear what system we are looking at 
since in any complex structure there may well be several multiple overlapping systems and a 
multitude of complex relationships. This is our ‘snapshot’ of the system (see Section 2.12) . 
For this research we will examine the viability of social groups with salient identities from 
individuals to group in two recursions of the VSM only.  
4.7 Unfolding Complexity 
To unfold complexity the breakdown of the social and cognitive processes involved in Social 
Identity Theory must be understood. First, however, it is useful to understand the full picture 
and the levels of recursion by mapping the state-space. Figure 4.5 shows a proposed state-
space diagram of social interaction with three levels of recursion.  
Figure 4.5 – State-space of Social Interactions and Norms 
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Firstly, at the top we have society, in the middle, group behaviour and at the bottom personal 
relationships. For each level of recursion the diagram shows four sets of normative 
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behaviours or paradigms, that are readily recognised; intimate, close, social and business 
and then identifies the collectives where these may be found. The analysis for the research 
is being conducted with groups. That is at the mid-level of recursion and across the range of 
normative behaviours. Social Identity Theory should be effective in all these collectives, 
although, there is evidence that in family groups, special relationships exist that cannot be 
explained in the Social Identity framework; such as those defined by Self-Evaluation 
Maintenance Theory (Tesser, 1988).  
Moving in closer to our subject area Figure 4.6 shows the state-space diagram 
(Friedland,2005) for the psychological activities of Social Identity Theory that were depicted 
in the influence diagram at Figure 4.4. 
Figure 4.6 – State-space diagram of Social Identity Theory 
 
The state-space diagram shows the different psychological activities of Social Identity 
Theory mapped out as ‘states’ of its system; a social group. The group can be considered in 
a particular ‘state’ if the activity is evident in the group,  The activities are sub-sets of 
previous states, in other words as the trajectory path moves through the system each activity 
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is added to the state of the group. Identity acts as the attractor because it is the final state of 
closure of the group.  
Starting on the outside of the diagram the state-space vector path or trajectory of states (red 
arrow) moves inward through successive activities that enhance and change the state of the 
group. These activities in order of development of the group are self-categorization 
comparative fit, self-categorisation normative fit, distinctiveness, group uniqueness followed 
by distinctiveness group enhancement, then through in-group favouritism and out-group 
derogation, depersonalisation and prototypicality, to group coherence and shared group 
attitudes and beliefs (internalization). Ultimately it arrives at the attractor (the ultimate state) 
identity, which contains entitativity and ethos.  Autopoiesis (yellow dotted circle) is shown to 
start at depersonalisation while autogenesis, recursivity and closure only at the final stage of 
identity. 
The state space diagram is offset to allow either slow or rapid development (blue arrow) 
from self-categorization to identity. It is also feasible that the trajectory could be reversed, 
starting with identity and working outwards. For this to occur the group would have to start 
with an ‘instant common identity’, such as can occur with an out-group that is suddenly being 
discriminated against. In this case self-categorization on the outside would be the attractor 
as it would be the final state.  
Social creativity and social conflict are shown as a separate attractor which is limited within 
the lower levels of activity because these two transformations disrupt autopoiesis and the 
development of the group. 
4.8 Identifying Transformations  
During the construct of the model below the psychological activities of Social Identity Theory 
that need to be translated to the VSM will be designated as components and labelled within 
[square brackets], each VSM component will then represent a value of the activity found in 
the social groups so that they can be quantified in the research. 
As the focus of the research is with Social Identity Theory wherever possible the concepts 
from that discipline will be used. So while Social Cognition provides a more comprehensive 
model of human social behaviour at an individual level, nevertheless, the allegiance to 
Social Identity Theory is maintained for the research, see Section 2.3 and 2.4 for details.  
The first task is to identify which of the psychological activities of Social Identity Theory are 
the ‘processes of production’ that ‘create themselves’ through ‘meaningful relationships’. 
These processes or transformations must be autonomous, in that they should be capable of 
independent existence. For a psychological activity this means that they should be 
recognised as a complete processes within themselves.  
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In translating the influence diagram, created at Fig 4.4, to the Viable System Model the first 
step is, therefore to identify which psychological activities of Social Identity Theory conduct  
transformations with the social environment. These transformations should be  homeostatic 
loops that maintain requisite variety by balancing between; attenuating the complexity of the 
environment and amplifying the behaviour of the system into the environment. Espejo (1999) 
also provides and alternative view of a transformation as a ‘learning loop’. This learning 
refers to the basic operation of adjusting the weighting of a homeostat as discussed by 
Ashby (1956) - see Figure 4.7. This provides a very relevant description of the interaction of 
these psychological activities with their environment as we can see these psychological 
activities as part of an individual’s and group’s knowledge process. 
Figure 4.7 – Homeostat as a Learning Loop 
 
4.9 System 1 - Group and Individual Level of Recursion  
Beer explains that the “Purpose of a System is What it Does” (Beer, 1985, p 99) and that this 
is dependent on the position of the observer. In the case of this research we need to take 
the psychological Social Identity viewpoint that the purpose of any group is about the self-
preservation and self-enhancement of its members and membership - not its explicit activity. 
The DOING in this case is the making of a social group and social group activities, i.e. the 
psychological process of how it is formed and how it is maintained. These functions must 
therefore define its implicit purpose, to maintain self-esteem, just as effectively as the main 
tasks of the group may define its explicit purpose.  
The main psychological activities of Social Identity Theory that make the group by 
maintaining operations with the social environment and transforming social resources 
through the attenuation of environmental states or the amplification of system states are; 
self-categorization comparative and normative fits, distinctiveness,  in-group favouritism and 
out-group derogation. These activities interact with the social environment with the purpose 
of creating or maintaining a group and its identity.  
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To achieve requisite variety and  maintain the viability of the group these activities must 
attenuate the external variety to a level that allows the group  control of its identity processes 
and yet, at the same time, be capable of being amplified sufficiently to ensure that the group 
can maintain relevance in its environment.  
One of the principle requirements for each System 1 is that it is capable of autonomous or 
independent operation, although for the purposes of viability it must also be related to the 
system in some manner that provides and overall coherence and identity. Each of the 
activities named above can act as independent social activities, however, this does not 
prevent them from being linked or related, in fact the process of System 1 would expect it. 
This linking or vertical variety restricts the freedom of these functions in order to achieve 
cohesion and coherence. The linking of these activities  is undertaken by System 2 using 
group norms or shared attitudes and will be covered in the next section. These psychological 
activities are detailed below in order of occurrence i.e. the sequence that they are believed 
to operate on a group in its social environment.  
 [Self-categorization comparative fit] is the psychological activity by which people identify 
with the groups around them based on the principle of meta-contrast. This is a social 
transformation and, therefore, a System 1 component and as such it is directly connected to 
the environment by a homeostat that attenuates and amplifies the process of self-
categorization, see Figure 4.9. 
[Self-categorization normative fit] is the psychological activity by which people identify 
with the groups around them based on the principle of perceiver readiness. That is, having 
consciously or sub-consciously made a comparative fit of an individual, or a group, to an 
internally maintained schema of that group type they then examine and compare the norms 
and behaviours that they observe to confirm their comparative assessment and self-select 
with groups with whom they have the most in common. Along with self-categorization 
comparative fit the degree of normative fit is an indication of the salience of a group to an 
individual. This is a psychological activity and, therefore, another System 1 component. The 
process of normative fit is also a homeostat that attenuates and amplifies the categorization 
process managed by the image of the group prototype. Both psychological activities  of self-
categorization are regulated by social value in System 3.  
Once an individual self-categorizes with a group they then seek to establish the social value 
of its identity by assessing its distinctiveness. [Distinctiveness1] is the degree that an 
individual believes a group is different from other ‘comparable groups’ on a dimension that is 
important to him. [Distinctiveness2] is the degree that individuals in the group are actively 
engaged in this psychological activity on a regular basis. The other ‘comparable groups’ are 
out-groups, although the degree of threat may range from ‘severe’ to ‘just not us’. 
Distinctiveness is an interaction with the social environment as both a ‘learning loop’ and a 
transformation, and therefore a System 1 operation connected to the ‘outside’ through a 
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homeostat that attenuates and amplifies the differences in the groups, again through the 
regulation of social value.  
Distinctiveness can be achieved by identity enhancing behaviours. These are [in-group 
favouritism], which is the self-reflective psychological activity by which group members 
enhance the social value of their group and themselves by directing positive actions inwards 
to the group and, [out-group derogation], which is the psychological activity of directing 
negative actions outwards to rival groups. The processes of  in-group favouritism and out-
group derogation act on the environment and the system at the same time; attenuating the 
positive values of group membership both internally for current members, and externally for 
new members, while attenuating the activities of out-group members in the environment. 
The creation of sub-groups within the main group can cause  in-group favouritism and out-
group derogation to be directed within the group causing a breakdown in the coherence and 
cohesion of the group and the creation of multiple images of prototypicality. In-group 
favouritism and out-group derogation are social operations which utilise the feedback 
operation of the homeostat and therefore System 1 components.  
The theory of optimal distinctiveness suggests that there is a limit to how much people are 
prepared to surrender their self-concept and suggests that they attempt to find a balance 
between their personal identity and the group identity.  [Optimal distinctiveness] is, 
therefore, the psychological activity by which  people assess how much they want to be 
included in the group identity and whether they are prepared to give up their personal 
identity in favour of the groups’. The only way that this can be achieved coherently is if their 
personal identity is aligned with the group identity in key areas of the group prototypicality.  
One solution to this alignment is if people can find a unique place in the group that benefits 
themselves as well as the group. The appreciation that they feel from the group is measured 
with one of the social value components; specifically, self-value. Optimal distinctiveness 
should therefore, be closely associated with self-value, and it should be strongly linked to 
self-esteem¸ their total measure of satisfaction with group membership. 
An assessment of the exclusiveness of groups  is an additional psychological activity  that 
occurs as an inherent result of human social activity. It is not part of Social Identity Theory 
but needs to be recognised at this stage and included as a component. It can be defined as 
the ease or difficulty with which people can join a group. This is the group’s social 
[boundary] and is a measure of the prejudice, exclusivity and elitism in a group. Boundary 
can be seen as  the ‘limits of membership’ of the group.  
A summary of the components is shown in pictorial form in Figure 4.8 and the System 1 in 
Figure 4.9.  
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Figure 4.8 – System 1 Components 
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Figure 4.9 – VSM System 1 at an Individual Level of Recursion for a Single Individual 
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4.10 The Individual’s Meta-System 
System 2 regulates the processes of System 1 shown earlier, by managing the cohesion of 
the self-categorization, distinctiveness and identity enhancing behaviours by utilizing the 
individual’s norms of behaviour, rituals (habits), attitudes, values and standards handed 
down from the meta-system. At the same time System 3 manages the processes of meta-
contrast and perceiver readiness that regulate the self-categorization processes in System 1 
and the process of functional antagonism i.e. the ‘hear and now identity’ along with ensuring 
that the social behaviours conducted by System 1 have coherence. System 3 also monitors 
the self-value the individual achieves for appreciation from other group members.  System 3* 
audits the System 1 activities for transgression of individual values and norms, while System 
4 manages the individuals personal foresight and anticipation. System 5 maintains the 
individual’s beliefs, identity and ethos, ‘concept of self’ and ‘group identity’ which, according 
to social identity theory, exist on a continuum.  
System 5 works to balance System 4’s ‘plans for change’ and System 3’s maintenance of 
the ‘here and now’ to maintain the identity in accord with the environment. System 5 
maintains prestige. Figure 4.10 shows the individual’s meta-system. 
Figure 4.10 – The Individual’s Meta-System  
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4.11 Cohesion 
Cohesion is managed in the VSM by System 2, however, before translating the 
psychological activities of Social Identity Theory to components in the VSM model a more 
comprehensive discussion of cohesion is required. 
Cohesion between the levels of recursion is vital in the VSM for a system to function 
effectively (Law of Cohesion) (Beer 1979);  
“We have seen how important it is to a Viable System that the 
lower levels of recursion are coherent with the higher levels. 
Without the embedded systems working in tandem with the 
system as a whole viability will be lost according to the Law of 
Recursion and the Law of Cohesion. (Beer, 1979)  
To cybernetics, “cohesion is the model, self-similarity and self-organisation rolled into one” 
(Beer, 1979). The embedded sub-systems of a recursive structure must conform to the key 
attributes that make the identity of the system;  
To understand cohesion well in cybernetic terms is most 
important, because it governs the question of identity in the viable 
system, and because its practical application is potentially 
valuable. (Beer, 1979, p351) 
Since, identities are a ‘summary of the whole’ in social systems this implies that the beliefs, 
values and attitudes that go to make up those ‘nested’ identities must, in compliance with the 
Law of Cohesion, align for the system to become viable. Espejo (2002) calls the System 2 
components in a social system the “non-autonomous processes of production” that create 
themselves though meaningful relationships.  
However, if groups could only function if everybody was aligned in values and beliefs little 
would ever get done; 
“Given the number of groups to which an individual might belong, 
his or her social identity is likely to consist of an amalgam of 
identities, identities that could impose inconsistent demands upon 
that person. Further, these demands also may conflict with those 
of the individual's personal identity (Cheek and Briggs, 1982; 
Leary, Wheeler, and Jenkins, 1986). Note that it is not the 
identities per se that conflict, but the values, beliefs, norms, and 
demands inherent in the identities. In organizations, conflicts 
between work-group, departmental, divisional, and organizational 
roles are somewhat constrained by the nested character of these 
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roles; that is, each hierarchical level encompasses the former 
such that the roles are connected in a means-end chain (March 
and Simon, 1958).  
One of the important concepts in Social Identity is that initially it does not appear necessary 
for there to be cohesion between deeper constructs such as values; an individual can join an 
organisation or group and not only differ in key beliefs from those around him but disagree 
with the values of the  group with which he is associated. Under the process of comparative 
fit and meta-contrast he simply sees a common connection that has more relevance than 
any other around him. The ability of people to use an aspect of identity to form alliances, 
enables them to be very adaptable to the circumstances.  
“Perhaps the greatest contribution that SIT makes to the literature 
on organizational behavior is the recognition that a psychological 
group is far more than an extension of interpersonal relationships 
(Turner, 1985): Identification with a collective can arise even in 
the absence of interpersonal cohesion, similarity, or interaction 
and yet have a powerful impact on affect and behavior. (Ashforth 
and Mael, 1989, p26) 
Dion (1973) demonstrated that one may like other group 
members, despite their negative personal attributes, simply by 
virtue of the common membership (cf. personal vs. social 
attraction, Hogg and Turner, 1985). In short, "one may like people 
as group members at the same time as one dislikes them as 
individual persons" (Turner, 1984, p. 525). 
“…and suggest that collective identities (whether social, 
organizational or corporate) are (a) made viable as a function of 
their positivity and distinctiveness, (b) inherently fluid rather than 
fixed, (c) a basis for shared perceptions and action, (d) 
strategically created and managed (i.e. with a more or less 
conscious intention to differentiate a group or organizational unit 
from others), (e) associated with behaviour that is qualitatively 
different from that associated with lower-order identities and (f) 
the basis for achievement of higher-order material outcomes and 
products”. (Cornelissen et al, 2007) 
The process of comparative fit appears, therefore, to relate to a groups explicit purpose, 
i.e. that which is readily identifiable to outsiders, the apparent purpose of the group, what it 
does. This can be very fluid and is determined by the context of the situation and the inter 
and intra differences between in-group and out-group. 
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However, despite this The Law of Cohesion, as it relates to social groups of nested beliefs 
and values, appears to hold in social systems as they become more established; 
"a wealth of evidence thus indicates that those who perceive 
themselves to share group membership in a given context are 
more likely to trust and respect each other, to help each other, 
and even to seek greater physical proximity to each other." 
(Haslam, 2011, p59) 
The difference in cohesion from comparative fit where there is a top down identity and  
normative fit where an internalization of group attitudes, beliefs, values and behaviours is 
apparent throughout the literature; 
“Norms are attitudinal and behavioural prescriptions associated 
with these roles or categories. They create expectations about 
how a person or group of people ought to think, feel and behave. 
They tend to be defined externally (in formal job descriptions or 
informal codes of conduct, for example), but are internalized by 
individual group members.” (Sherif, 1936).(Haslam 2004, p 2) 
 “The idea here is that groups are not only external features of the 
world that people encounter and interact with, they are also 
internalized so that they contribute to a person’s sense of self. 
Groups define who we are, what we see, what we think and what 
we do. (Haslam 2004, p14)  
“social identity is part of a person’s sense of ‘who they are’ 
associated with any internalized group membership” (Haslam 
2004, p21) 
We have seen from Ng (1980, 1982) that “the cognitive salience of group identity is not a 
sufficient condition for normative behaviour to occur”. the Law of Cohesion also suggests 
that this is true; in other words, using System 2 to coordinate a social system through the 
use of discipline or creating a strong ‘top down’ identity may create temporary cohesion 
through comparative fit  but it will not create coherence throughout the system, which is a 
necessary condition for local autonomy to exist.  
“Identification also may engender internalization of, and 
adherence to, group values and norms and homogeneity in 
attitudes and behavior. Just as the social classification of others 
engenders stereotypical perceptions of them, so too does the 
classification of oneself and subsequent identification engender 
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the attribution of prototypical characteristics to oneself (Turner, 
1984) 
Internalization of these values is a key area where the system becomes viable, as the 
systems establishes coherence, so it develops its viability.  
The process of normative fit appears, therefore, to relate more to a groups implicit 
purpose; namely that of providing self-esteem for its members and prestige or social value 
for the group as a whole. People  self-select the groups that they wish to join to align with 
their beliefs, values and attitudes, as observed by Schneider (1987) and his Attraction-
Selection-Attrition (ASA) framework. As group membership persists and becomes more 
salient the beliefs and values of the group become more relevant, normative behaviour 
emerges, and values can become internalised; a “bond” emerges between group members; 
a sense of ‘us’ System 2 - Group Level of Recursion 
4.12 System 2 – The Group Level of Recursion 
A viable system must maintain cohesion between the operating elements, in this case the 
semi-autonomous group members undertaking these social interactions. This is achieved 
through the psychological activity of depersonalisation, which is the sense of ‘us’ and 
harmony in the group. Harmony [depersonalisation1] is defined as ‘agreement of opinions’ 
and is a measure of the success of the alignment of individuals opinions.  
[Depersonalisation2] the sense of ‘us’ is the alignment of behaviours, achieved by the 
coordination of the group through  norms, rituals and standards, they are a natural means to 
achieve cohesion by aligning and coordinating the group, see Figure 4.11. These are the 
main elements that are self-produced by the system to create the autopoietic ‘life’ of the 
system. 
Within the VSM, System 1 operations should be as autonomous as possible with the 
minimum vertical variety restrictions on their ability to function. The attenuation of System 1 
operations by vertical variety should be limited to what is required to create group cohesion 
and group coherence only. System 2 dampens the oscillations of System 1 operations to 
ensure cohesion is achieved for the group as a whole. For social groups System 2 
operations are focused around the creation and implementation of group norms through the 
process of depersonalisation; creating and maintaining a sense of ‘us’.  
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Figure 4.11 – System 2 – Group Level of Recursion  
 
 
Excessive dampening of individual’s identity formation activities in System 1 though the 
implementation of rules, discipline or the misuse of power will restrict the achievement of 
requisite variety. Alternatively, if the group fails to create a sufficient sense of ‘us’ the 
individual sub-groups will look after their own self-interests to the detriment of group 
cohesion.  
So while depersonalisation is the main focus of System 2 it is not, by any means the only 
activity that System 2 accomplishes. When looking at the cohesion of a social group from a 
psychological perspective we have to ask what are the resources of a social group – they 
are not the same things that are the resources of the same group’s explicit activity such as 
finance or material goods, but the social resources of a group, which are self-esteem, self-
value and self-understanding. So the opportunity to develop these, being allowed to speak, 
being allowed to do, etc…, becomes important for the functioning of the group and it, 
therefore, becomes important that they are coordinated for the benefit of the group. [Group 
resource coordination] is, therefore, the degree that opportunities for self-esteem, self-
value and self-understanding are allocated and coordinated for the benefit of the group as a 
whole. In reality, this means that all individuals in the group need to feel that they have equal 
opportunities for development as a group member.  
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While group resources relates to the movement of opportunities to individuals, the 
psychological activity of [social mobility] is the movement of individuals to opportunity, in 
other words the ability of people to move from sub-group to sub-group to enhance their self-
value. To be viable both these processes have to be assigned to individuals and sub-groups 
for the most social value and prestige of the group. Group resources, therefore, along with 
social mobility will create oscillations in the group as each sub-group seeks the best 
opportunities for itself. The assignment of both processes must, therefore, be dampened by 
System 2 regulation to ensure cohesion.  
The opportunities to enhance social value and the ability for people to be able to move 
between sub-groups are, therefore, indications of the degree of freedom in the group, which 
is a measure of the vertical variety; therefore, the degree that individuals feel the need to 
move from sub-group to sub-group will be a key indication of the achievement of requisite 
variety within the group. Group resource and social mobility, in the research context, are 
therefore, a measure of the degree of autonomy, freedom and requisite variety of the group; 
summarised by the concept of power sharing. Mechanisms applied to dampen group 
resources or social mobility oscillations by discipline or direct use of power or control could 
restrict requisite variety. Figure 4.12 shows the Systems 2 components for the model. 
To maintain requisite variety, individuals in the group need to feel that they have an equal 
opportunity to enhance social value, or that the opportunities are legitimately controlled. 
Legitimate control should be through established norms, rituals and standards within the 
group that provide for the development of individuals as a group member within accepted 
rules that benefit the group and individual alike.  
Relevant to the coordination of the group and the effective operation of System 2 is the level 
of [network activity], the degree of social interaction evident within the group. Within 
System 2 the degree of network activity will provide drive to create the necessary cohesion. 
Little or excessive social activity will suggest poor requisite variety.  
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Figure 4.12 – Systems 2 Components 
 
4.13 System 3 – The Group Level of Recursion 
System 3, ‘here and now’, is the system that manages the emergent processes necessary 
for ‘shared organising’. System 3 has to achieve resonance, coherence and synergy in 
order to develop group social value and stability by managing the processes of; self-
categorization, group distinctiveness management (uniqueness and identity enhancement), 
group enhancement behaviours (out-group derogation, in-group favouritism; trust, belief, trait 
attribution, stereotyping) and group boundary management (social mobility, social stability, 
social creativity, social conflict). To do this it uses the command channel through which it 
controls System 1 resource allocation, accountability and attitude and knowledge 
management (transitive memory and network activity processes).  
Group coherence is an emergent property that occurs when individuals or sub-groups come 
together to form a cohesive group, it is traditionally expressed as ‘the whole is worth more 
than the sum of the parts’. The opposite of group coherence is the psychological activity of 
[social conflict] which is the degree of rivalry within the group. [Social conflict] is used as 
a component because it is easier to measure than social cohesion, however they are treated 
as the opposite ends of a continuum). Social Conflict occurs when there are individuals or 
sub-groups who see each other as threats or as competitors for resources (opportunities for 
enhancing self-esteem). This will cause the group to lose its cohesion and subsequently its 
coherence. As stated above System 3 achieves group coherence through the management 
of System 1 activities and the monitoring of the social value of the group. Social value is the 
summation of self-esteem, self-value and self-understanding.  
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Figure 4.13 – Meta System  - Group Level of Recursion 
 
 [Self-esteem] is the psychological activity  that can best be described as “an attitude 
towards oneself” and in the research is used as a measure of the ‘satisfaction achieved 
through group membership’ by the individuals of the group.  Self-esteem is a System 3 
component because it causes the System 1 identity formation processes to respond to its 
value. Self-esteem is therefore a ‘variety attenuator’ in that it ‘absorbs the variety’ of System 
1 identity formation processes by providing an ‘encapsulation’ of the ‘satisfaction of group 
membership’. Also, as a measure of the ‘satisfaction achieved by group membership’ its 
value is considered to be a good indicator of the degree of power sharing within the group, 
based on the assumption that people achieve greater self-esteem when they feel that they 
have a say in the running of the group.  
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Figure 4.14 – System 3 Components 
 
The second element of social value is [self-value], which is a measure of the ‘appreciation’ 
an individual feels he/she is given by the other members of the group for their unique 
contribution. Self-value should be strongly related to self-esteem; the total measure of self-
worth and satisfaction with group membership, and optimal distinctiveness, the need to 
balance social identity with personal identity. Self-value acts as a variety absorber on the 
System 1 identity processes below it by attenuating those aspects of appreciation for 
individual effort. Figure 4.13 shows the group System 3 
The last element of social value is [self-understanding] which is the degree that individuals 
derive ‘meaning’ from their group membership. The very process of self-categorisation 
creates significance for an individual because there has to be a reason or a decision to 
“create a distinction” (Spencer-Brown). The fact that recognition of the distinctions of a group 
is applied to the self is a key principle of Self-Categorization Theory. Self-understanding is, 
therefore, a variety absorber of the System 1 components below it by attenuating the 
function of the components that create distinctions and hence meaning. See Figure 4.14 and 
4.15. 
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Figure 4.15 – System 3 - Group Level of Recursion 
 
4.14 Autonomic Adaptation – The algenode 
Beer (1985) describes the three four homeostat as the “organ of adaptation” of a viable 
system. He defines this as the interaction between System 4, the “there and then” and 
System 3, the “here and now”. System 5 balances these two systems to maintain the identity 
of the system in its role as “identity protector”. This function creates the adaptation that the 
system needs to be ready for the future while at the same time coping with the present. 
From a psychological standpoint this is known as forethought (Bandura, 1989) and a less 
cognitive function of anticipation. Forethought and anticipation for a group are social 
processes whereby the members reach consensus as to the future direction of the group. 
These will be examined in section 4.16. However, there is a second form of adaptation that 
occurs in viable systems that Beer (1985) refers to as “autonomic” . This is a ‘low level’ 
function that keeps the system in balance. In Brain of the Firm (1972) Beer describes the 
operation of this autonomic mechanism with a description of an ‘algenode’. This process is 
of interest to the research because much of the change in a social group occurs sub-
consciously through autonomic processes ( Haslam, 2004).    
For the purposes of the research ‘autonomic adaptation’ is taken specifically to mean the 
automatic change of the system as opposed to forethought, anticipation and innovation 
which are ‘calculated changes’ originating from System 4. They are discussed later in the 
chapter. Despite the label of ‘automatic change’ autonomic adaptation will nevertheless be 
controlled by System 5 which acts as the ‘protector of identity’ and manages change and 
stability originating from System 3 and System 4.   
[Autonomic adaptation] is, therefore, the degree that the group is able to automatically 
adjust its internal components to match changes, or perturbations in the environment. It is a 
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process that involves System 3*, System 3 and System 2 operating as an algenode (Beer, 
1972, p67). Problems with System 1 activities picked up by the audit processes of System 3* 
and the algedonic signal act as an algenode to System 3 causing ‘pain’ or ‘pleasure’ which 
in turn causes System 3 to set new norms in System 2 to adjust the behaviours in System 1 
providing this is acceptable to System 5.  
Autonomic adaptation is a process, therefore, that spans several VSM Systems. The 
algedonic signal is an integral part of the algenode which causes the system to adapt. Figure 
4.15 shows the interconnection of System 3*, 3 and 2 with the autonomic adaptation 
process. 
When the audit process feels ‘pleasure’ or ‘pain’ from the algedonic signal it causes System 
3, the control mechanism of attitudes and intentions, and System 2, the coordination 
mechanism of norms of behaviour, to change. Ultimately the process causes changes to the 
belief system at System 5, Yolles shows this mechanism, known as autopoiesis between 
System 1 and System 3 and ‘autogenesis’ between System 3 and System 4 and 5, in his 
representation of the VSM using Schwarz’s meta-model, see Figure 2.4. The algenode  is a 
large variety attenuator (Beer 1972 p 233), as it sets the mode of behaviour of the system.  
Autonomic adaptation also applies to the operation of the System 1 homeostats linking the 
individuals and the group to the environment. Autonomic adaptation is a fundamental aspect 
of homeostatic operation (Ashby, 1948) which uses feedback to maintain stability of its 
system until it passes a critical threshold where it then adjusts the states of the system to 
maintain balance. Ashby called this adaptive system ‘ultra-stability’. In this respect a group is 
always adjusting to the social context through its main transformations of; self-
categorization, self/group enhancement, depersonalization and social mobility.  
The learning and autonomic adaptation of these homeostats can be compared to 
Heidegger’s concept of ‘dasein’ and Smith and Semin’s (2004)  proposal of ‘situated 
cognition’ in that they exist in the ‘here and now’ responding readily to changes in the 
environment. 
Heidegger used ‘dasein’ as a means of distinguishing everyday consciousness from how 
‘being’ shapes our understanding of the world. To Heidegger ‘dasein’ is how we are always 
‘a being engaged in the world’. While  Smith and Semin (2004) argue that social cognition is 
concerned with the regulation and coordination of action between people based on “adaptive 
action”, that it is deeply embedded in human neural structures at a low level and that these 
interactions are mutual and continuous and related to environmental, relational and 
communicational contexts. Lastly they also suggest that this ‘adaptive action’ is based on 
more than the cognition of individuals but employs ‘trans-active memory’ and ‘social 
coupling’.   
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While the process of autonomic adaptation spans the homeostats in System 1 and the meta-
system it is shown in the model in System 3*. This is a shortcoming of the use of 
components which require each component to be placed in a single sub-system. The 
adaptation key process attempts to overcome this deficiency by covering the full range of 
systems.  
4.15 System 3* 
System 3 also manages the [audit] process of the System 1 activities; known as System 3*. 
Audit is the VSM System 3* component that monitors the System 1 operations for signs that 
they are un-aligned with the purpose of the system as a whole. The algedonic signal 
[algedonic signal] is the alert from the operational system to the meta-system via the 
accountability channel to warn that things are ‘not normal’. See Figure 4.15 and 4.16. Social 
Identity Theory does not indicate how this could be achieved; however, social cognition 
suggests that this is maintained through ‘gossip’ which seeks to audit the transgression and 
failure of group norms and adapt them to maintain the social value of the group, see Section 
2.3.4.   
There are three problems with the concept of a ‘social group audit system’. The first is what 
serves as the ‘audit’ channel in groups? The second; what is the mechanism by which the 
‘audit’ signal is passed? and the last is what is the algedonic signal in a social group? 
Addressing the last question first, what is the algedonic signal in social groups? For an 
‘alarm’ to work it has to be something that threatens the group and is common to all; we 
have seen that social value is the principle method by which people assess the relevance of 
their groups. However, while the System 3 components self-understanding, self-value and 
optimal distinctiveness may contribute to the reason why an individual is related to the group 
these aspects cannot serve as an alarm as they are different for all. This leaves the 
collective self-esteem and uncertainty reduction of the group as the main areas for alert. So 
anything that threatens the self-esteem or creates uncertainty will raise an alarm. But how is 
it achieved?  
With individuals it is proposed that Self Discrepancy Theory (Higgins, 1978), based on 
Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1957) serve as an ‘audit’ signal for individuals by 
monitoring their beliefs. There is an apparent correspondence between Self Discrepancy 
Theory and System  4 operation. Beer demonstrates that System 4 must contain at least 
three models to conform to the Conant-Ashby theorem (Beer, 1979, p 234), namely; a model 
of the environment, a model of the system and a model of itself. Self-Discrepancy Theory 
(see section 2.8) also asserts that each individual holds three models, known as self-beliefs. 
These are a self-assessment of the ‘actual’ self, based on examination of own behaviour, an 
‘idealised’ view of self and ‘ought’ view of self, that is the belief of how one should behave. 
These beliefs are held from two different ‘standpoints’, namely, self and other.  These can be 
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correlated with the VSM models. ‘Actual’ matches the internal model of the system and its 
behaviour, ‘ideal’ matches the potential of this model and ‘ought’ matches how the self-
interacts with the environment from a wider perspective. 
Beer demonstrates that System 3* must audit the system for signs that the operational 
activities of the sub-groups, that is the System 1s, are congruent with the system as a whole. 
This audit process is part of the System 3 Algenode, the “Big Switch” (Beer, 1972, p67).  
Figure 4.16 – System 3* Components 
 
We saw from social cognition (Section 2.3)  that our individual cognitive processes operate 
by ‘auditing’ the world around us for change through the use of schema and at a basic level 
trigger our emotions when they wish to ‘alarm’ us.  
“Messages that evoke surprise or curiosity because they violate 
recipient expectancies will lead to greater message scrutiny 
regardless of whether they emanate from a majority of minority.” 
(Mackie and Hunter, 1999). 
At a higher level of abstraction, Self-Discrepancy Theory, see Section 2.8, similarly ‘audits’ 
misalignment of our social behaviour with our beliefs and, again, ‘alarms’ us through the use 
of emotions of shame, guilt and anxiety. System 3* does not swamp the meta-system with 
audit reports it only acknowledges when things are “not normal” or raises the alarm with an 
algedonic signal which sends a warning straight to System 5 when serious misalignment is 
found. 
However, no evidence can be found in Social Identity Theory of an equivalent of 
Discrepancy Theory for the group. Does a group feel collective shame and guilt, or is it felt 
individually, triggered by the depersonalised persona acting directly on the emotions? While 
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threats to the self-prestige of the group would create significant alarm, a collective emotion 
would allow greater effectiveness for the System 3* audit process at the higher ‘group’ levels 
of recursion to affect the shared beliefs of the group. Mackie, et al (2009) suggest that these 
emotions are possible with their Intergroup Emotion Theory. While Kets de Vries (1991) in 
his book “ organizations on the couch” adopts a Freudian view about dysfunctional and 
neurotic organization. We are told that they can develop feelings of guilt, adopt collective 
psychological defences that reduce pain through denial and cover-up, and operate through 
processes of power that might be unproductive. Yolles (2008) summaries the possibilities of 
collective emotions;  
Structural coupling exists between consciousness-systems 
(“individuals”) and social systems and not directly between 
individuals. The only reason, why social systems come into 
existence is the inability of people to read each other’s minds. As 
an example and referring to management, we can say, 
management should be a second-order observer of 
communication that is permanently irritated by consciousness-
systems, which in turn are both promoted and contaminated by 
communications (e.g. motivation, fluctuation). An important core 
competence of management is the comprehension and the 
consideration of the delicate requirements of the structural 
coupling between consciousness-systems and their organization. 
(Schuhmann, 2004, p621)   
These ‘collective feelings’ are also supported by our previous discussion on Cybersemiotics. 
The recognition of signs of shared group emotions coupled with the ‘languaging into being’ 
of a system of shared beliefs and meaning within a consensual domain is possible.  
Where, then, are the communication channels for System 3*? Clearly monitoring group 
behaviour is one; however, while this works well at an individual level it does not work well at 
a group level, since all people in the group may not be able to observe the behaviour of an 
extended group. The proposal for the research is that ‘gossip’ provides the key 
communication channel for group audit and also the mechanism for the algedonic signal. 
Hogg and Mullin suggest that; 
“Related to this last point, there is also evidence that widespread 
social uncertainty arising from, for example, massive social 
reorganization and economic collapse may encourage the 
development and spread of rumour” (Hogg and Mullin, 1999) 
‘Gossip’ provides a good candidate as it appears to function along the lines of System 3*. 
People do not waste time gossiping about things that are ‘normal’, gossip only has value 
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when it is about something that transgresses system norms and ethics or highlights a threat 
to part of the system or the system itself. In addition gossip, to coin a term “spreads like 
wildfire”. It has the ability to send an alarm through the system and bypass the normal 
command chain, the very requirements of an algedonic signal. 
‘Gossip’ was therefore, identified as the principle channel used to pass the alert and while 
Beer shows the algedonic channel functioning from System 1 to System 3 directly (see 
Figure 2.3) as part of the accountability channel, it was considered that in the case of social 
groups it was more likely that it passes from System 1 to System 3 via System 3* because it 
was considered that people do not ‘confess’ when they transgress group norms, rather they 
are audited by ‘gossip’. In other words gossip is the audit channel and the information 
contained in the channel can create an algedonic signal. For this reason it has been 
included in Systems 3*. A high score for the component algedonic signal would therefore 
suggest that there is an alert to the meta-system present in the group. 
4.16 Forethought, Anticipation and Innovation 
The alignment of group ethos, a System 5 activity, is only part of the role of the meta-
system’s ‘leadership’ activity. While individuals have forethought (Bandura, 1989, p. 39) and 
purposive organisations may have a ‘strategic’ department or individual who ‘looks ahead’ to 
anticipate the future, self-constructed and self-steering social systems have to create an 
emergent view of the future through the sharing of the intentions or expectations of the 
group. This is an activity that can be ‘socialised’ as an extension of ‘forethought’ or one 
which can be ‘anticipated’, that is ‘understood through shared feelings’ by the group as a 
whole. Beer provides a mechanism for innovation, that is the translation of one systems 
states to another though the constant adaptation of the system (Beer, 1979, p343). 
The future direction of a group is one that can be achieved by consensus through 
forethought, that is discussion, although, it is an area where the misuse of power is 
frequently applied. For a group to become viable, however, it has to form a system for 
steering the group that in some way ‘anticipates’ the future.  
“Goal-seeking by definition, due to its forward-looking nature 
involves anticipatory behaviour (Rosen, 1985). Through 
imagination we envisage the completion of the very act we are 
about to embark upon (Shibutani, 1961). Furthermore, we 
anticipate the responses of others whenever we engage in social 
action and pitch our behaviour accordingly to take these reactions 
into account (Mead and Morris, 1974). Anticipation is also a form 
of learning II (Argyris) or deutero-learning (Bateson) according to 
which we anticipate patterns of events by projecting forward into 
the future. In this way, we overcome the errors of over-learning 
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from past experiences by anticipating that things could happen 
that we have not had to deal with before. It is a form of learning 
that transcends the limitation of ordinary learning (from 
experience) (Bateson, 1973) or learning I (Argyris and Schon, 
1995).” (Stokes, 2006, p33) 
It does this by amplifying possible states of the environment and examining how its system 
would respond. From this mechanism it is able to develop future scenarios and best 
possibilities for its system. Discrepancy Theory (Higgins, 1987), from social cognition, 
requires that several models of self, ought and actual must be maintained by an individual’s 
cognition and also the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) holds a 
subconscious view of the world in order to asses environmental ‘cues’ to assign priorities to 
attitude formation.  
A reductionist or objectivist perspective of this process is perfectly straightforward; in other 
words somehow the system develops a representation of these three aspects within itself, 
however, Maturana’s (1978, 1980, 1983, 1985) arguments about the concept of cognitive 
models throws this viewpoint into disarray. Similar arguments about our connection to 
‘reality’ are forwarded by Piaget and Ibáñez (1992). Piaget’s anti-empiricist argument is 
identical to Ibáñez who notes that knowledge cannot logically be viewed as a representation 
or a copy of reality, since in order to know whether something is a good copy of something 
else we need to independently access both versions so as to compare them. However, how 
could we possibly have access to reality independently of our knowledge of it? As explained 
by Harnden; 
“Maturana suggests that the way we orient ourselves in the world 
is not a direct perception that grasps the features of the 
environment we find ourselves within, but that ourselves and our 
medium are coupled in a manner analogous to the coupling 
between the airline pilot flying instrumentally, and the environment 
the plane is in.” (Espejo and Harnden, 1989) 
This “structural coupling” is how, Maturana suggests, we “find our way around our own 
cognitive space”; which is a domain in which system and environment are in “coherent 
interaction” where both form ‘one medium’. In this world how an individual or system 
interprets the distinctions of the environment and its structural couplings with that 
environment create the ‘reality’ of its cognitive space. In the VSM “structural coupling”  is 
represented by autonomy (Mingers 2002). The models of the environment, self and own 
cognition needed in a VSM System 4 can be viewed not as models of representations of an 
‘objectivist’ reality but as a ‘hermeneutic enabler’ that we ‘bring forth’ to understand the 
‘structural couplings’ within a ‘consensual domain’ or in VSM terms “the groups autonomy 
within its own boundaries”. According to Maturana these are ‘languaged’ into existence as 
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we ‘orient’ ourselves through language, although we can add ‘emotional understanding’ to 
this in view of our discussion of Cybersemiotics. 
The structural coupling with the environment and recursion turns a Viable Social System into 
a ‘cognitive process’. So, by Harnden, System 4 can be seen more as a ‘modelling facility’ 
within a system that enables the system to say; 
“think what you are doing, and in that process demands that you 
discover who is doing the doing”. (Espejo and Harnden,1989) 
The application of this to an individual is straight forward but for a collective this implies that 
the system itself becomes a living system by means of its autopoietic connection to the 
plane of ‘being’ through the process of autogenesis. Wegner proposed that groups use a 
‘trans-active’ memory to create group cognition (Wegner, 1986), in a similar way it is 
speculated that they must also create ‘prototypicality’ for group membership. These 
processes create a consensual domain where the system and its couplings with the 
environment are understood within its reality by being ‘languaged into being’.  
This has complicated consequences for a social system. If ‘reality’ is a construct that is held 
in system 4 and it is structurally coupled to the environment in a ‘slow elegant dance’ then 
the construct of that reality relies on the systems own confidence and credibility of its own 
processes. In particular, a structural coupling is susceptible to self-fulfilling prophecies and 
these are indeed evident in the cognitive biases such as self-confirmation bias (Kahneman 
and Frederick, 2002). 
“Henshel, … extends the well-known notions of self-fulfilling and 
self-defeating prophecies to serial self-fulfilling prophecies, where 
the accuracy of the earlier predictions, themselves influenced by 
the self-fulfilling mechanism, impacts upon the accuracy of the 
subsequent predictions. He distinguishes credibility loops and 
confidence loops. (Geyer, 1991, paragraph 5) 
Stokes (2004) suggests how System 5, that is the identity of the system, resolves the 
tension  between the forethought or anticipation of System 4 and System 3 which has to 
meet the demands of ‘here and now’ and maintaining group coherence; 
“The acting person is in a state of constant tension between what 
he/she is here and now and what he/she is passing over into 
becoming in the ‘there and then’. This tension is managed by our 
sense of identity [System 5], another higher order control system. 
It manages the rate of change that is occurring between levels 3 
and 4 so as to keep things manageable within homeostatic limits 
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of cohesion on the one hand and the demands of the imminent 
and the future on the other. Change always poses a threat to 
existing ways and definitions. It therefore has to be managed so 
that there is a smooth transition of identity into the future. That is 
why Level 5 regulates interactions between Levels 3 and 4. Level 
Five carries out the requisite identity work according to which the 
new is joined to the old and a narrative of continuity is formulated 
(Somers 1994).. Level Five is the self-reference level of 
identity - it represents the self’s own understanding of itself 
to itself.” (Stokes, 2004, p33) 
Forethought and anticipation align with the interpretivists view of Appreciative Systems 
(Vickers 1983). Checkland (1999) expands Vickers idea that people attach meaning to a 
code of communication that is constantly updated, by suggesting that individuals make a 
“mental evaluative act, a cultural mechanism which maintains desired relationships and 
deletes undesired ones”. Vickers and Checkland believe that humans make ‘value 
judgements’ by comparing a mental ‘ideal’ of a situation with a ‘reality judgement’ of the 
state of affairs they see around them created from their subjective beliefs, standards and 
experiences. Vickers and Checkland then suggest this leads to action which in turn may lead 
to an adjustment of their Appreciative Settings. This method of ‘Appreciative Cycle’ aligns 
very closely with the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) which suggests that we 
form intentions based on our behavioural beliefs, attitudes and subjective norms, It also 
aligns with Self Discrepancy Theory (Higgins, 1987) where the process matches the 
interaction described above between System 3 and System 4 and the models of the systems 
(Actual, Ought, and Ideal) that are maintained in System 4. However there is one 
fundamental difference, while the constructivist believe that the Appreciative Cycle leads to 
action the Theory of Planned Behaviour recognises only that it develops intentions and that 
these intentions can be interrupted by habit, desires, conditioning, and emotions, as 
described by Gollwitzer’s (1990) two stage process.  
Once established it is easy to see how hard it is to change a groups culture by attempting to 
use simplistic mechanisms such as commands and how the process of adaptation and 
autonomic adaptation are probably the most effective. Schneider (1987) and Schein (1983) 
researched the effect the ‘founder’ of an  organisation plays in creating its organisational 
culture and determined that it has a significant importance. Chatman et al summarise why 
this could be the case; 
“…by rigorously screening employees to identify those who 
support his or her ideals and values. Once selected, founders 
continue to socialize their employees into their way of thinking, 
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and serve as a role model, encouraging employees to internalize 
these values ” (Chatman et al, 2008, p 77) 
This suggests that socializing, rather than command works effectively to manage the 
behaviours of social groups and will be examined more closely under the examination of 
forethought.  It also suggests that when a group forms by first establishing its viability, its 
identity, beliefs and values (System 5) the homeostats between its systems will maintain 
stability for some time into the future. 
4.17 System 4 -Group Level of Recursion 
System 4 of the VSM is charged with the function of reacting to the possible states of the 
environment in the future; as Beer states System 4 is “outside and then” while System 3 is 
“inside and now” (Beer, 1985, p 115). To do this Beer suggests that System 4 must maintain 
three models of activity; a model of the environment, a model of its Viable System and a 
model of System 4 itself. The three models that System 4 maintains are seen in social 
groups as a model of the social environment, prototypicality/group attitudes and the planning 
processes. These reflect the Conant-Ashby Theorem (Conant and Ashby, 1970) that "every 
good regulator of a system must be a model of that system"  
Beer (1985) places ‘self-reference’ in System 4 because it is where the system holds a 
model of itself (see Figure 2.14 – The VSM System 4). However, this is only a part of the 
self-referencing process because as Stokes (2004, p33) states System 5 is the “self-
reference level of identity” as it represents the “self’s own understanding of itself to itself”, 
The relationship to self-reference between System 5 and 4 is confirmed by Beer; 
 “…SYSTEM FOUR is not only concerned to manage the outside-
and-then, but to provide self-awareness for the System-in-focus…  
….it is the operational basis for the final self-referencing, system-
closing, System Five to which everything is now leading.” (Beer, 
1985) 
The self-reference of a VSM is therefore a model of the system held in System 4 that is used 
by System 5 to maintain continuity of its identity. This model is represented in the research 
by [Prototypicality] and [group attitudes], which are the internal model of the system 
‘itself’ of shared group attributes. [Prototypicality] and [group attitudes] are the self-
reference of the system to itself- it is the image the system has of its totality – what it is 
that is used by System 5 to achieve ‘closure’ and maintain identity.  
The [model of the external environment] is the degree that there is a shared view within 
the group of social categorization, and an understanding of group boundaries in the 
environment and  such as; social mobility, social stability, social creativity and social conflict.  
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Lastly [planning processes]  is a measure of the shared agreement about the ‘possible and 
probably’ group achievement and group potential that is generated through anticipation, 
innovation and forethought and used to derive future paths for the group. It is the main 
component in the adaptation process that relates the Systems three, four and five. 
“…it is just this infinite regression of self-images [System 4’s 
model of itself embedded in its own model of the whole system] 
that seems to hold the key to the characteristic self-awareness of 
viable systems” Beer (1985). 
Through the models held in System 4, System 4 itself is able to anticipate and innovate 
future states of its system in the environment.  
Figure 4.17 – System 4 Components 
 
Prototypicality is the model of the ‘ideal group member’ and in the research context is the 
‘image’ held by the individuals of the group. As a System 4 component prototypicality 
represents the model of the system ‘itself’ that must be held by System 4, it, therefore, 
absorbs the variety of the identity related components in the systems below it by creating a 
single representation of the group as a stereotype. Prototypicality contains not only a copy of 
a typical group member but also their normative behaviour and the embedded [group 
attitudes]. Attitudes are pre-planned opinions, feelings and behaviours towards specific 
events, items or states in the environment Group attitudes are separated as a component 
because they are a measure of the degree of common outlook amongst the group and it is 
important to detect this. Group attitudes absorb the variety of the normative components in 
the systems below as they represent the limitations to behaviour in anticipated states..  
Planning processes is a model of System 4 and is necessary to generate high variety 
responses to the System 4 enquiries in the environment for a creative response using 
forethought, anticipation and  innovation. See Figure 4.17 and 4.18. 
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Figure 4.18 – System 4 (and Meta-System) - Group Level of Recursion 
 
4.18 System 5 – Group Level of Recursion 
Lastly, System 5 contains the functions that maintain group identity by balancing the needs 
of System 3, the “here and now”, and System 4, the “there and then” as described above. To 
provide the closure between these two, System 5 must hold a model of System 3 and 
System 4. The higher order models of entitativity, ethos and prestige provide a means of 
comparing the view from ‘outside’ with the view from ‘within’. Entitativity [entitativity] 
represents the ‘group’s uniqueness’ and is used as a component to measure the amount a 
group is seen as ‘distinct and unique’. Entititivity ‘absorbs the variety’ of the lower level 
identity and cohesion components by ‘attenuating’ the main aspects of the group identity and 
coherence processes in System 3 and 4 by ‘encapsulating’ the ‘unity’ of the group, Similarly 
prestige [prestige] represents the system model for how much the group is ‘valued’ by the 
environment and by itself, it ‘encapsulates’ this ‘value’ of the identity to the group, in a similar 
way to how entititivity encapsulates the ‘uniqueness’ of the group, ethos encapsulates the 
‘ideals’ and purposefulness encapsulates the ‘drive’. Ethos [ethos] represents the ‘guiding 
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ideals and beliefs’ that provide a mechanism to identify the group with ‘what it stands for’. 
Ethos, ‘encapsulates’ the main aspects of the group that create cohesion by ‘absorbing the 
variety’ of the lower level cohesion processes in System 4 and 3 by ‘attenuating’ the 
behaviour of the individuals of the group and directing their activities in a specific direction; 
hence reducing their number of states. Lastly [symbols] of identity will  used to clarify and 
reinforce the purpose of the group. These three components help the system achieve 
requisite variety by attenuating the complex states of the system and the environment into 
simple ‘comparators’ that enable judgements for the group to be made.  
Figure 4.19 – System 5 Components 
 
System 5 also contains two other important components; purposefulness [purposefulness] 
and closure [closure]. Purposefulness as a System 5 component represents the degree of 
‘shared purpose’ within a group. Purposefulness absorbs the variety of System 3 identity 
formation and cohesion components and as such provides a measure of the amount of 
‘drive’ in the system to create both identity and cohesion. Closure represents the degree that 
the system is organisationally closed from its environment A viable system should be 
‘structurally coupled’ to the environment though its System 1s – that it is an ‘open system’ 
that allows; energy, information, people and materials in, but does not allow outside events 
to manage its internal processes; it may react to them to maintain its internal balance but it is 
not controlled by them. 
Closure is the degree that a group feels that they are insulated or protected from events in 
the outside world, and have achieved control of their own variables. The group prototype 
could be said to exist in System 5 as the ideal behind the policy of the group, or in System 4 
as a model of the group’s system or as a System 3 process that manages the normative 
function of depersonalisation.  
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Lastly boundary is the limits of membership of the group. In any group it relates the strength 
of identity, in particular the strength of the prototypicality, and the rigor with which the 
normative behaviour is enforced. In other words it provides an indication of when individuals 
who do not fit the definition of the group prototype are excluded from the group. Boundary is 
a System 1 activity because it is actively involved in operations in the environment. See 
Figure 4.19. 
Figure 4.20 – Social Identity as a Viable System The Full Model 
 
  
 122 
Figure 4.21 - VSM – Social Identity Components 
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4.19 The Key Processes  
While the components show the value of psychological activities the key processes show the 
interactions and relationships between these components in significant functional areas that 
span the full range of the VSM sub-systems. This attempts to capture the complex 
interactions in the VSM between the different sub-systems. The key processes are; System 
Closure, Individual/Group Identity Formation, Cohesion and Coherence, Power Sharing and 
Adaptation.  
4.19.1 System Closure Process 
The system closure of the group is the point that we would consider that the group has 
achieved a significant level of isolation from the environment so that it can be managed by 
its internal components; in other words, it is ‘organisationally closed’ (Maturana, 1976). The 
research proposed that this is indicated by several factors, specifically; the entitativity of the 
group, - that is the amount the group feels it is a distinct unity, the closure of the group, - the 
amount it feels it is  insulated from the world, the ethos of the group - the amount it feels that 
it has ‘guiding ideals and beliefs’, its depersonalisation - that is the strength and harmony of 
‘us’ and finally the boundaries that surround the group - the restrictions on group 
membership. The system closure process is, therefore made up of the following components 
across the systems to determine the level of organisational closure of the system as a 
whole; entitativity, closure, ethos, depersonalisation1and2 and boundary. 
4.19.2 Individual/Group Identity Formation Process  
The individual/group identity formation process enables the individuals and group to achieve 
a salient social identity that provides them, individually and as a group, with the greatest 
social value in any given social environment. The components that make up this process are 
all associated with the processes of Social Identity Theory and Self-Categorization Theory. 
The identity formation process is essentially about individuals finding an exclusive place for 
themselves in their group and a unique place for their group in the social environment 
enhancing the prestige of the group and their own self-esteem. The manner in which 
components are related indicates how individuals are able to make this place for themselves 
in the group. The components group attitudes, self-value, optimal distinctiveness and 
boundary, along with entitativty and prestige, suggest whether the individuals of the group 
have found a unique place for themselves in the group and their group has a unique place in 
the social environment, Table 4.1 shows the different combination of these first four 
components and the related identities. The identity formation process is, therefore, made up 
of the following components across the VSM sub-systems; entitativity, prestige, 
purposefulness, prototypicality, group attitudes, self-esteem, self-value, self-
understanding, self-categorization comparative and normative fit, 
distinctiveness1and2, optimal distinctiveness, in-group favouritism, out-group 
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derogation. These measure a combination of the degree the group feel that they are united, 
their social standing, the level of shared purpose, the amount they feel they share an image 
of the ideal member, the level of shared beliefs, the benefit they feel they gain from group 
membership, the degree that belonging to the group provides them with meaning, the level 
of normative behaviour in the group, the harmony, sense of self, and level of ‘them’ and ‘us’,  
4.19.3 The Group Cohesion/Coherence Process 
The components that make up this process are all those associated with the creation of 
group cohesion, harmony and coherence. At the lowest level (System 1) the coordinating 
activities are only self-categorization normative fit, however, the group activity of creating 
distinctiveness and in-group favouritism or out-group derogation although not scored in this 
section, should also be recognised as ‘unifying’. The organising processes in System 2 of 
depersonalisation (harmony and the sense of ‘us’) manage the group norms, activities and 
rituals to maintain cohesion, while System 3 activities of group synergy (inverse of social 
conflict) bring the group into line with the group prototype (including group attitudes) and the 
ideals of the group ethos (System 4 and 5) to achieve cohesion, coherence and synergy. 
Finally, the shared purposefulness creates the entitativity of the group and brings about 
closure insulating the group from its environment 
The group cohesion process is, therefore, made up of the following components across the 
systems; entitativity, closure, ethos, purposefulness, group attitudes, social conflict, 
algedonic signal (-ve), depersonalisation1and2, network activity, group resource 
coordination, self-categorization normative fit. These measure a combination of the degree 
the group feel that they are united, the amount they feel they are isolated from the 
environment, the level of shared purpose, the shared beliefs, degree of cohesion, amount of 
gossip, harmony and sense of ‘us’, network activity, opportunities for development and 
normative behaviour,  
The group cohesion/coherence processes is a fundamental part of a viable system and 
therefore has components that span the whole system from the transformation activities to 
the identity processes. Cohesion is achieved through the coordination of activities, social 
norms and rituals that create group coordination and harmony by aligning an individual’s 
personal identity to an individual identity or role that is coherent with the group identity. To 
be coherent the individual identities must support the group prototypicality that binds the 
group. 
4.19.4 Power-Sharing Process 
In viable systems each System 1 ‘sub-system’ should attain the maximum autonomy 
necessary to achieve its purpose and only be constricted in its activities where it is 
necessary for the ‘purpose’ of the system as a whole. In a social system, therefore, 
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individuals and sub-groups should not be controlled outside of the prototypicality (group 
norms, attitudes rituals and behaviours). Since the need for self-esteem can cause people to 
seek self-enhancement and self-verification (see Section 2.3) through power and control by 
using the system for their own ends or constricting others unnecessarily through the use of 
discipline, power or punishment. The more a group can find methods to share power the 
more they are likely to remain organisationally closed and retain requisite variety. The 
power-sharing key-process looks to identify how much control is ‘shared’ around the system 
by examining the amount people feel they are driven by the same purpose, the lack of 
rivalry, the ability of people to feel free to join different sub-groups to boost their self-esteem 
and the amount people feel that opportunities to gain social-value and self-esteem are 
equitably distributed amongst the group members. 
The control of the system, achieved by System 3’s activities, will determine the type of social 
system that we are dealing with, in a self-constructing social system, that is what we have 
defined as a purposeful system, the meta-system, and in particular System 3, is achieved 
through mutual cooperation, action and shared beliefs of the collective; this is known as 
“self-steering”. In a purposive system individuals will control the meta-system and attempt to 
steer the organisation. 
According to Beer, autonomy is an important factor for viability and interference in the 
operation system by the meta-system will destroy viability. In a hierarchical  organisation, 
where the levels of recursion reflect the sub-division of the organisation, our VSM will be 
populated by people. That is people will undertake the functions of System 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
These individuals, to maintain the integrity and viability of the system have to deal with the 
emergent properties of the systems below and respect the autonomy of these lower 
systems. This is a tall order for any human, especially those that seek power or wish to 
pursue their own self-interest. Power is readily accessible for those controlling System 3, 4 
or 5 that manage the resources of the system; and we have seen that people seek to 
improve their position within a group through self-enhancement. It is easy to see, therefore, 
that the system can become corrupted very quickly. However, assuming that these people 
do act in the interests of the system one can easily see the advantage of having people in 
the higher level systems. These ‘reflective beings’ are able to process the attenuated 
information from below and respond to system requirements.  
"Purposeful collective action, whatever its circumstances, requires 
the coordination of activities of a diverse and heterogeneous 
membership. There is, however, an inherent conflict between 
demands organizations place on the time and efforts of their 
member and the desire and needs of members when left to their 
own devices. Thus the age-old dilemma: how to cause members 
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to behave in ways compatible with organizational goals" (Kunda, 
1992, p355) 
In a self-steering social system, however, the emergent properties have to be managed by 
the very people that are generating them at all the lower levels of recursion. The situation is 
not as simple as it may first seem; even a purposeful system, in which the purpose and 
identity have been created by the collective, will come under pressure from excessive variety 
from the environment. This will generate a strong temptation to create an executive who act, 
for and on behalf, of the people. The degree to which these individuals adhered to the 
purpose and identity of the system will determine whether or not the system remains 
purposeful and viable. If the individuals in charge of System 3 are unable to communicate 
effectively with the sub-systems, they pursue their own agenda, or seek power to control the 
system, then; the system will become purposive rather than purposeful. 
Hobbes's (2010) definition of the Leviathan, in which the collective elect a representative 
under a covenant to fulfil the symbolic role of the monarch, and in doing so give up 
significant rights in return for law and order, demonstrates how Hobbes saw the problem of 
excessive social variety, albeit this solution provides a model that would be unacceptable by 
today's standards. Hobbes resolves his problem through the application of large amounts of 
vertical variety; that is control.  
Human interaction is subject to the laws of requisite variety just as any other complex 
system. As the size or complexity of a group grows so it will become impossible for all to 
communicate with each other. In psychology we see this with Dynamic Social Impact Theory 
(DSIT). DSIT examines, and attempts to predict, how beliefs and ideas are transmitted 
through social groups.  
Rituals provide a useful way of communicating the values of the group to the many. The 
purpose of rituals, as reported by King (2011), is to communicate the ethos of the system to 
the people. This is why symbols, rituals and other social constructs are created by groups to 
attenuate the variety of ideas and beliefs to those relevant or significant for the group and to 
find opportunities to amplify them to the largest audience.  
Aulin (1984), however, suggests in the Law of Requisite Hierarchy suggests that as social 
systems become more complex so their ability to manage requires greater decentralisation 
and autonomy towards the individual units that make up the system.  
But a human society is not only a system pursuing survival by 
means of regulation and control. Any animal community shares 
this feature as well. What makes the society of men different is its 
intellectual life and, closely connected with it, the pursuit of 
freedom, i.e. human emancipation. This is to say that a human 
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society, though it is also a self-regulating, i.e. surviving system, is 
above all a self-steering system aiming at an enlargement of its 
domain of self-steering, i.e. at an increasing freedom of action 
and thought of its members. Self-steering has, roughly speaking, 
an inverse relation to hierarchy. The more hierarchy there is in a 
given system, the less there can be self-steering, and vice versa. 
In a strictly hierarchical system there are no circuits of feedback, 
and the system is of the mechanistic, not cybernetic type (c.f. Fig. 
1). Conversely, every added circuit of feedback improves the 
cybernetic qualities of the system, the possibilities of its self-
steering par excellence, while it simultaneously reduces the 
internal hierarchy. (Aulin, 1984, p153) 
A complex social system with a limited hierarchy that is pursuing its own agenda will become 
unviable and fail. Foucault (1975) observers this phenomenon in the changing use of power 
throughout the ages. 
The overriding problem, therefore, is how the collective is able to combine and steer the 
system, not only in any purposeful way, but also within the requirements of requisite variety? 
Espejo (2002) suggests that this is through the constitution of autonomous and non-
autonomous roles through a process of interactive meaning created through conversation, 
He argues, however, that frequently people fail to “achieve alignment between the meanings 
they construct in their informational domain and the organization (identity and structure) they 
produce in their operational domain”. But how do viable systems stop people in the system 
from destroying viability as they seek power? Achieving shared beliefs in a self-steering 
system or for that matter in any system becomes a function of the communications 
bandwidth.  
Effective citizenship implies effective communications between 
those representing the subsumed and subsuming organization. 
Information is not enough; they have to develop communications 
between them. It is not good enough to allocate resources at a 
distance nor just be informed about progress on agreed 
programmes. People at the two levels not only may operate in 
different places and even at different times but more 
fundamentally, if true recursion is happening, in different 
organizations; the subsuming and subsumed primary activities. 
This fact makes it apparent that what is going on in the subsumed 
primary activity will remain beyond the experience of the 
subsuming people unless they develop communications beyond 
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information. This is a requirement to avoid communication 
breakdowns. (Espejo, 1999, p651) 
The process of depersonalisation in SIT reduces communications between groups. 
Depersonalisation creates out-groups and the stereotyping of out-group members. Where 
there are group boundaries communications is slowed, restricted or in some cases non-
existent. This last case occurs particularly when there is social conflict between groups. To 
ensure groups communicate effectively a strong meta-system identity must be prevalent as 
well as transparency and trust. Espejo demonstrates the concept of transparency based on 
Habermas's communicative constituent interests in his RISCOM model of the VSM.  
“Beyond cost-efficiency, our organizational activities need 
legitimacy and authenticity. Performance cannot be only a 
technical concern, it has to include legitimacy and authenticity as 
well (Habermas, 1996). And, to make these criteria operational 
we depend on recursive organizations. Technical efficiency, 
legitimacy and authenticity apply to all autonomous organizations, 
that is, to all primary activities. Legitimacy is an assessment made 
about the grounding of an organization's actions in social norms; 
are these actions just and fair? In other words, if these actions are 
aligned with the norms shared by stakeholders they are likely to 
assess them as legitimate. On the other hand, authenticity is an 
assessment made about the coherence of an organization's 
declarations with its observed identity and actions”. (Espejo,1999, 
p653) 
These issues; the need for effective communications and the need for activities to be 
legitimate and authentic for a viable social system to operate need to be examined by the 
model. Espejo also makes a very valid point (ibid), and that is that transparency and trust is 
needed to ‘achieve creative amplification of the corporate policies’, that is, it helps to cope 
with the problem of bandwidth. These properties are not only evident from a systems 
perspective but also make sense from a Social Identity viewpoint; in Social Identity Theory 
the legitimacy of any influential group similarly plays an important role in the behaviour of 
minorities, and that the anonymity of minorities encourages social conflict or strengthens in 
group favouritism and out group derogation.  
Salient Social Identities also seek to establish a coordinated meaning and coherence 
through better communications, greater transparency and trust; 
“Research has also shown that when a social identity is salient 
people are more likely to accept new ideas from those with whom 
they identify. This is because group members see each other as 
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valid sources of information about what the group should do 
(Turner 1987, 1991). When there is disagreement between 
people who define themselves as a group, these people are more 
likely to actively seek to reconcile discordant attitudes and actions 
(Turner 1987). Through this process there are opportunities for 
creative disagreement (mutual influence) and the emergence and 
endorsement of new ideas. In this way, a salient social identity 
works to improve communication and produce coordinated 
collective behaviour …this leads to; increased liking for the 
relevant  organizational in-group (Terry and Callan 1998) 
increased  organizational citizenship (Ouwerkerk, Ellemers, and 
de Gilder 1999), increased willingness to contribute to collective 
goals (Ellemers de Gilder and van den Heuvel 1998), increased 
willingness to act together to implement change (Kelly and Kelly 
1994; Veenstra and Haslam 2000), greater trust (eg Kramer, 
Brewer and Hanna 1996), better communication (Dovidio, et al. 
1997; Postmes, Tanis and de Wit 2001), improved cooperation 
(Kramer 1993; Tyler and Blader 2000), increased group 
productivity (James and Greenberg 1989; Worchel, et al. 1998).” 
(Eggins et al 2002, p57) 
The power sharing process is therefore made up of the components purposefulness, self-
esteem, social conflict, social mobility, group resource coordination in order to measure the 
degree that a group shares purpose, feels good about belonging, is coherent, free and 
individuals are  given opportunity to develop,  
4.19.5 The Adaptation Process 
Autonomic adaption was discussed in full in Section 4.14, however, while the component 
[autonomic adaptation] measures the degree that the group members feel the group is 
able to rapidly react to change in the environment the Adaption key process examines the 
whole process, attempting to identify how each group is able to change. The adaptation key 
process is, therefore, made up of the components; closure, model of external 
environment, planning processes, audit, algedonic signal (-ve), autonomic adaptation, 
network activity. These measure the degree the group feel that they are isolated from the 
environment, the amount they socialise the group’s future direction, the level of awareness 
of inconsistencies in their group norms, the amount of gossip, the ability to autonomically 
adapt to change and the amount of network activity.  
 130 
4.20 Creating Viable Social Groups 
We have seen how the increasing complexity of social groups forces them to become more 
democratic to cope with the Law of Requisite Variety (Aulin, 1984)) and how the more viable 
they become the more they have to develop self-steering processes. This implies that they 
have to clarify identity issues, create coherence, develop mechanisms for recognising 
threats to their purpose or prestige and adapt to cope with change.  
From a psychological perspective the development of these processes would, simplistically, 
seem to suggest the creation of a focused, robust, adaptable yet ‘viable’ group that would 
provide more self-worth for its constituents because they are required to ‘wilfully engage’ 
with it, and ‘wilful engagement’ by its participants is a key to a successful  groups (Peters 
and Waterman 1982, Deal and Kennedy 1982, Ott 1989, Denison 1990, Kotter and Heskett 
1992 Bate 1994, Chatman and Cha 2003).  
Cybernetics also provides a useful viewpoint from a very human perspective, Espejo, 
applies the Law of Requisite Variety to the trust that must exist between people in a viable 
system, he states;  
“If these [activities] are based on defining for primary activities 
what they have to do, in a hierarchical manner, their complexity is 
being attenuated and the overall outcome is a task that does not 
get the best out of people in the primary activities. In other words, 
performance is hindered. On the other hand, if the process is one 
of responsible trust building, where the primary activities have the 
opportunity to create their own tasks and to integrate them in the 
context of the overall task, they will effectively amplify it, by 
adding their creativity and by aligning their own interests with 
those of the total organization. Effective citizenship is therefore a 
truly enabling type of relationship which increases greatly the 
cohesion and performance of the organization” (Espejo,1999, 
p653) 
Social Identity has demonstrated how the need to improve social value is one of the driving 
mechanisms for people and group interaction; in particular, the prestige that a person 
derives from group membership plays an important part in their desire to participate. This 
raises the question, would people prefer to belong to a ‘purposive’ group with high prestige 
or a viable ‘purposeful’ group with lower prestige? Empirical evidence shows that people-to-
culture ‘fit’ is related to commitment, and social integration (Finegan 2000; Verquer et al 
2003), turnover (Chatman 1991; O’Reilly et al 1991; McCulloch, 2001) and, most 
significantly, value and goal congruence (Adkins et al 1996). Slattery et al (2010) show that 
commitment of both full and part time staff is related to “the extent to which their jobs are 
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high in skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback”. Together, 
these suggest that people seek ‘high prestige’ through ‘wilful and purposeful engagement’ in 
other words they want both high prestige and purposefulness, and that they will have more 
chance of finding these if they are part of a ‘viable’ system. These leads us to develop 
measures in the model to assess the purposefulness of the groups researched. That is the 
degree that power is shared.  
The above discussion would suggest a means of examining the interaction of individuals 
with the group to assess the type of group that is formed. The suggestion is that the 
components of prototypicality, boundary, self-value and optimal distinctiveness are important 
factors that interact to shape the nature of the group. Prototypicality, that is the shared 
image and opinions of the ideal group member drives the normative behaviour of the group 
while boundary gives  the degree of availability of the group to new members i.e. its 
exclusivity. Self-value measures the degree that the members feel they gain benefit from 
their membership and optimal distinctiveness shows the amount they feel they retain an 
element of personal identity. These factors all contribute to determining what type of group is 
being examined with the following logic.  
Firstly, if the value for group attitudes and boundary are high then the group members are 
reporting that the group identity has a strong prototypicality and is strongly exclusive, in 
other words it is an ‘elite’. If the value for group attitudes is high but boundary is low, then 
there is a strong group prototype but the group is open to those that wish to join and so is 
considered an association. A weak but exclusive prototypicality will be a clique, or artificially 
maintained identity while a weak and open prototypicality will be an assembly. The scores 
for self-value and optimal distinctiveness will suggest how individuals in these groups have 
engaged with the other members. Those that have found a unique place for themselves, 
indicated by a high score for self-value, and feel that they are ‘themselves’ i.e. reporting a 
high score for optimal distinctiveness, will most likely have developed an individual identity 
i.e. they are ‘in’ with the ‘in-crowd’. This is exactly Stafford Beer’s “convergence of purpose” 
– the perfect level of autonomy for System 1. Those who do not feel ‘themselves’ will have 
inherited a role or identity in the group and are demonstrating evidence of greater vertical 
variety control. Those who do not have a high score for self-value but feel ‘themselves’ are 
reporting that they are only affiliated to the group and most likely have inherited an identity 
within it. Those members who report that they are not ‘valued by the group’ and not 
‘themselves’ in the group are reporting that they are ‘outside’ or ‘disengaged’ from the group. 
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Table 4.1 – Personal, individual and group identity formation from the components, group 
attitudes (prototypicality), boundary, self-value and optimal distinctiveness  
 
4.21 Pathologies of Viable Systems 
We have seen how Beer defines viability and its construct but what causes a system to be 
un-viable and to fail? Yolles provides an overview; 
 “Pathologies occur when individuals and groups in a social 
system are prevented from autonomously regulating their 
collective existence in a way that opposes their capacity to be 
viable. So pathology is important to understanding why particular 
types of behaviour are manifested, and how they may be dealt 
with where they represent important degrees of ill-health or 
conditions of unfitness”. (Yolles, 2008, p2) 
The most frequent pathologies of a viable system are listed by Stafford Beer in his paper 
The Viable Systems Model: Its Provenance, Development , Methodology and Pathology 
(1984) (amended to remove management references); 
 Is it a viable system? If any of Beer’s five functions are removed from any level 
of recursion then its abilities to operate will diminish. This includes the autonomy 
of sub-systems. 
 Does subsystem Five truly represent the entire system within the context of 
larger, more comprehensive and more powerful systems?  
 Do people understand the need for subsystems Two and Four? If Two is 
missing, activity in One can turn deadly and self–defeating as units fight for 
resources and against entropy; if Four is missing. Three and Five can collapse 
into each other, leaving the critical Five subsystem a mere functionary. 
Prototypicality 
(group attitudes) Boundary Self value Optimal distinctivenessMembership
strong exclusive high aligned elite individual identity
strong exclusive high unaligned elite inherited identity
strong exclusive low aligned affiliate inherited identity
strong exclusive low unaligned excluded personal identity
strong open high aligned associate individual identity
strong open high unaligned associate inherited identity
strong open low aligned affiliate inherited identity
strong open low unaligned non-responsive inherited identity
weak exclusive high aligned clique individual identity
weak exclusive high unaligned clique inherited identity
weak exclusive low aligned affiliate clique personal identity
weak exclusive low unaligned non responsive clique personal identity
weak open high aligned engaged personal identity
weak open high unaligned non-responsive personal identity
weak open low aligned affiliate personal identity
weak open low unaligned disengaged personal identity
out member of an association
affiliate member as self
not valued and disinterested
Identity type
in and aligned with a clique
in but not aligned with a clique
affiliated member of a clique
out member of a clique
in as self
valued for self but disinterested
in & aligned with an elite
in but not aligned with an elite
affiliated member of an elite
excluded member of an elite
in & aligned with an association
in but not aligned with an association
affiliated member of an association
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 Do the Three, Four and Five subsystems need to form a Three-Four-Five 
subsystem to encourage ‘synergy’ and interactivity? Without a constant 
interaction and exchange of information between these three functions, Three is 
vulnerable to ‘narrow tunnel’ syndrome and Four is exposed to the perils of 
‘flights of imagination’.  
Can we relate these to our model of human social behaviour?  
The first point establishes much of what we have already discussed, that is without all the 
elements of viability the group fails to maintain its identity. The key aspect of autonomy, 
which Beer singles out, is the issue discussed with Social Identity; that is the need for 
groups to seek out distinctiveness from other groups and at the individual level the need for 
people to maintain optimal distinctiveness (Brewer 1991, 1993) in group formation. 
The second point and third points suggest that groups need a clear and cohesive meta-
identity to bring them together and without it they will revert to ‘tribal conflict’. 
The last point demonstrates the need for cohesion in the meta-system. 
There is a further pathology that is mentioned by Beer (1979, p410) and that is pathological 
autopoiesis. He defines this as “…any viable system that devoted more time that this 
constant proportion of time to autopoiesis could be declared to be pathologically 
autopoietic.” The constant he refers to is that effort and time required to maintain the system. 
4.22 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter identified the processes of Social Identity Theory and mapped the state-space 
of social groups. The chapter then applied the processes to the Viable Systems Model, 
starting with the transformations in System 1. At each stage the chapter detailed the 
components that would be used to measure the viability of the social groups the  
researched. As well as the transformations for System 1 the chapter covered the System 2 
cohesion process, the System 3 coherence and synergy processes, the audit system of 
System 3* and the adaptation process. Following this the chapter discussed System 4 and 5 
activities before completing with an examination of the power sharing process.    
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CHAPTER 5 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  5
 
5.1 Aim of the Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to complete the research design started in chapter 4 with the 
research methodology;  clarifying how the theory was translated into research. It states the 
research objectives and propositions and identifies the variables used. It then proceeds to 
lay out the conduct of the research including the pilot study, questionnaire and semi-
structured interviews and it discusses key issues surrounding the work such as validity, 
reliability and ethics permission. 
5.2 Paradigm, Approach, Strategy and Design 
Chapter 3 identified that the research was feasible under a structuralist paradigm with a 
pragmatist philosophy and dialectic argument using abductive, deductive and inductive 
reasoning in a synthesis with a multi-strategy sequential explanatory fixed design. Chapter 4 
identified the components that will form the basis of the data collection for a ‘snapshot’ of 
complex social systems, groups, being studied.  
5.3 Research Objectives 
 To identify a research paradigm and approach necessary to address the 
research question. 
 To create an influence map of the psychological activities of social group 
behaviour from Social Identity Theory. 
 To utilize the systems map of social identity psychological activities  to develop 
a Viable Systems Model of social groups with salient identities.  
 To develop a research design, consistent with the research philosophy, 
approach and strategy, to examine the research question.  
 To conduct research and assess the validity of the model to identify viable 
groups with salient social identities.  
 To identify if any groups with salient social identities can be assessed by the 
model as viable systems and if possible to assess which factors affect the 
development of viability in groups with salient social identities.  
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5.4 The Research Propositions 
 The viability of a group with a salient social identity can be understood through 
the VSM 
 A social group with a salient identity will only become viable when it has a high 
level of salience to its members. 
 A viable social group with a salient identity will have the following characteristics 
of the VSM systems at the group level of recursion; 
o A System 5, represented by components entitativity, closure, ethos, 
prestige, purposefulness and symbols that represent the ideal of 
‘identity maintenance’.  
o A System 4 that monitors and manages the ‘outside and then’  
represented by the components of an external model of the social 
environment, an internal model of membership (prototypically and group 
attitudes) and the group potential of planning processes.  
o A System 3 that monitors and manages the ‘here and now’ represented 
by  components of shared organising and managing processes to 
achieve social value in self-esteem, self-value, self-understanding, and 
social coherence (reverse scored as social conflict) 
o A System 3* that sporadically audits System 1 activities to monitor 
group prestige, potential threats to group status and group 
understanding by utilising ‘gossip’ to provide a channel for an algedonic 
alert to System 4-5 and autonomic adaptation with System 3 and 2. 
o A System 2 that creates cohesion by  coordinating System 1 activities to 
create group harmony by the depersonalisation of individual identity and 
maintenance of network activity and shared group resource/social 
mobility development opportunities for group members. 
o System 1 activities to achieve attenuation and amplification of 
complexity and group boundaries through; self-categorization 
comparative and normative fit  to achieve distinctiveness through the 
identity enhancing behaviours of in-group favouritism and out-group 
derogation while maintain individual optimal distinctiveness. 
 The viability of a group can be determined by the strength of its prototypicality 
(and/or group attitudes) its entitativity, purposefulness, coherence, cohesion 
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(depersonalisation), level of distinctiveness and degree of self-categorization 
measured as components. 
5.5 Research Hypothesises  
Social groups  can only become self-producing autopoietic social systems and achieve 
‘autopoietic take off’ when they develop a high identity salience, as defined in the research 
propositions above, through high levels of self-categorization normative fit, depersonalisation 
(a sense of ‘us’), group coherence and group attitudes and are operationally closed from 
their environment. 
5.6 Mixed-Strategy Design 
A mixed-strategy design was with quantitative data collected to determine the components 
of the main data while a qualitative study using semi-structured interviews will provide a 
means to triangulate, complete, offset, explain, illustrate and refine the results. 
Robson,(2011, Kindle 4499) suggests that “ ideally this kind of research calls for well-trained 
and experienced investigators” , therefore training focus group management was undertaken 
and a pilot study undertaken before commencing the research.  
5.7 Data Acquisition  
The data was collected in the Chichester area of West Sussex by questionnaire and semi-
structured interview. Overall 103 groups in a wide spread of different organisational and 
social environments were approached, of these 18 responded providing a total of 100 
questionnaires to provide the quantitative data. Each group also undertook a semi-structured 
interview that provided qualitative data. The groups interviewed varied from individual 
representatives to collections of 24 people. Of the 100 questionnaires returned 9 had one or 
more missing answers, only one had no answers.  
The intention was to ensure that groups were sampled from as broad a range of social 
environments as possible but for all of them to be in the SE of the United Kingdom to reduce 
issues of country, culture and language. The group types were therefore all constituted from 
people with a similar background and while this simplified the research and enabled the 
questions to be tailored to people from this area it raises the issue of the generalization of 
the finding across different cultures. Sampling of groups within the area was done from an 
internet search of group types under five different categories; business groups, social 
groups, religious groups and institutions using the quota sampling technique (Saunders et al, 
2009, p235). See Appendix 2 Section 2.5 Table 2.1 for details of sampling plan.  
The initial approach to many organisations was made by correspondence, either letter or 
email; however, this had a very poor success ratio. Thereafter, a face-to-face methodology 
was tried with greater success (Saunders et al, 2009, p324). The pilot group had suggested 
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improving this face-to-face methodology with a social exchange by providing snacks as 
people filled in the questionnaire and answered the questions. Incentive is seen as a high 
impact strategy for raising response rates (Saunders et al, 2009, p 396) although financial 
rewards are unethical.   
The protocol for the interview and questionnaire completion were important, following Yin 
(2009, p 80) and Saunders et al (2009, p 326). For every group interviewed the importance 
of context was explained, frequently groups wanted to take the questionnaire home rather 
than complete it in the group setting; however, strong evidence from Social Identity Theory 
(Haslam et al, 1999) shows that context is necessary to make the group’s identity salient. 
Interviewing each group in its environment, such as its place of work, meeting place, office 
or business area was necessary to invoke the correct identity and get the correct response 
on the questionnaire.  
After the introduction it was explained to the group that while the questionnaire elicited 
individual answers from the group, the semi-structured interviews were usually looking for 
group consensus on the examined subjects. Therefore, the expression “can we agree on an 
answer” was frequently to be used in eliciting a response during the semi-structured 
interview, however, it was often the case that individuals had different responses and when 
this was encountered all answers were recorded. Since the semi-structured interviews 
elicited a consensus it was necessary to conduct the questionnaire prior to any discussion to 
prevent peoples’ answers from being ‘framed’ by the interchange. However, since it was 
important to set the context for the questionnaire to ensure that the group Identity was 
salient the first five questions (up to “if we are us who is them?”) of the qualitative semi-
structured interview were asked before the questionnaire, while the rest were asked on its 
completion. The semi-structured interviews were based around the critical incident technique 
(Saunders et al, 2009, p332) that asked for examples whenever possible to ensure that 
answers were relevant and based on evidence. Interviews were recorded and notes made to 
improve the reliability of the data (Saunders et al, 2009, p334). 
Despite running a pilot study several questions had to be explained to people as they were 
completing the questionnaire as it became clear, during the course of the research, that the 
meaning of some of the questions was too obscure.  The research was examining aspects 
of people’s lives that they were often unaware of. The abstract nature of the subject being 
researched; identity, boundaries and particularly group norms required careful questioning to 
‘tease out’ the areas of interest without leading the interviewees. In a new subject areas this 
is an ‘on-going learning experience’ and despite the pilot study new insights were being 
discovered all through the interviews. In several cases it was discovered that indirect 
questions sometimes uncovered the answers more effectively than direct questions, for 
instance; in determining the level of group norms asking the group directly “what are your 
group norms?” was normally met with no response, while asking people “what made you feel 
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uncomfortable when you first joined” proved effective in identify where group norms differed 
from social norms. People appear to adjust to group norms sub-consciously and once 
established in the group find it hard to identify normative behaviour.  To overcome these 
problems professional help was requested to provide focus group training prior to the start of 
the research.  
5.8 Pilot Study 
A pilot study focus group was conducted partly for training and partly to identify any issues 
with the questionnaire or semi-structured interview. The focus group did not feel that a Likert 
Scale worked well with the questions and put forward suggestions for change (Saunders et 
al, 2009, p374), they were also concerned about the time it took to complete the 
questionnaire because of the number of questions and the semi-structured interview 
process. These were refined but still remain an issue. Further work needs to be done to 
simplify the process of data acquisition.  
5.9 Questionnaire 
The questionnaire as part of the multi-strategy design asked investigative questions that 
provided rating category data that could be defined by ranked ordinal variables. To do this 
the research focused on pre-coded closed questions (Saunders et al, 2009, p374) that 
provide greater explanation than that provide by the Likert-scale. The pilot study focus group 
was used to determine the pre-coding questions and answers. The questions and pre-coded 
closed ranked answers are shown in Table 5.2. 
5.10 Semi-structured Interview  
The semi-structured interview follows Saunders et al (2009, p320). The design is shown in 
Table 5.6, this details the questions asked, the purpose behind each question and the 
related components. Appendix 2 has a full breakdown on the qualitative data and its analysis 
by group-id and group-type. The semi-structured interview will also be used to measure the 
salience and the organisational closure of the group identity.  
5.11 Variables 
The questionnaire asked 33 questions which corresponded to the different components 
identified in Chapter 4 that were considered to constitute a Viable System within the social 
identity framework (prototypicality, self-categorization, depersonalisation and distinctiveness 
all had two questions). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 detail the dependent and independent variables 
used. 
Variables (A), (B) and (C) provide the detail of the individual, group and group type; (A). 
Group-id – The group each individual belongs to, (B). Name of individual – kept confidential, 
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(C). Group-type – The type of group that each individual belongs to (Business, Social, 
Religious, Institution, Charity) 
Variable (D) is the Role Code, that is a designation of any role undertaken by the group 
member as either; member, supervisor or manager.  
Variables (E) and variable (2) designate the membership time of a group member and the 
age of the group from its earliest recorded beginnings. 
Variable 1 is the main dependent variable as the viability of the group-id 
The principle dependent variable for the research, viability, has no know direct measures, 
however, the following variables were used to test for correlations with the final averaged 
viability score from the quantitative data; age of group and length of membership time.  
The component scores from the questionnaire are averaged by VSM system type to provide 
variables that are dependent on the main component scores; 
 Individual’s component score. 
 Group-id component score 
 Group-type component score 
 Individuals VSM System (1 to 5) score  
 Group-id VSM System (1 to 5) score 
 Group-type VSM System (1 to 5) score 
 Group-id mean – The average of average VSM System score for each group as a 
total measure of viability . 
 Group-type mean – The average of average VSM  System score for each group-
type as a total measure of viability . 
Strength of identity salience and organisational closure are independent variables 
determined from the interviews. 
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Table 5.1 - List of Variables and Components 
No Variable Name Dependent Explanation Variable Type 
A Group Id  Number designator Catagorial 
B Name Id  Group name Catagorial 
C Group Type  Business, social etc. Catagorial 
D Role Code  Manager, member Catagorial 
E Membership time Independent 
The length of time the 
interviewee has been 
a part of the group 
Continuous 
F Group Salience Independent 
The relevance and 
strength of group id 
Catagorial 
G 
Group Autonomy 
(organisational 
closure) 
Independent 
The degree of 
insulation from the 
environment 
Catagorial 
1 Viability 
Dependent 
 
The ability to maintain 
the identity of the 
group 
Continuous 
2 Age of Group Independent 
Length of time the 
group has been in 
existence 
Continuous 
3 Size Independent Size of the group Discrete 
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Table 5.2 – List of Variables, Components and Ranked Answers 
Va
r 
Questio
n 
No 
VSM 
System 
Component Description of 
component 
Variable 
type 
 
Question Ranked answers 
4 5 System 5 Entitativity 
The degree that 
people feel their group 
has an identifiable 
unity 
Ranked - 
Interval 
In relation to other 
comparable groups do 
you feel your group is… 
5=Close knit,  
4=Very united,  
3=United, 
2=Hardly united at all, 
1=Divided 
5 6 System 5 Closure 
The degree that 
outside influences are 
able to impact on the 
identity, purpose and 
processes of the 
group 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Could you image any 
single event that would 
easily close down or 
severely disrupt your 
group? 
5=Not at all, 
4=Very little,  
3=Sometimes,  
2=All the time,  
1=Outside events control us 
6 8 System 5 Ethos 
The degree people 
feel that there are 
'guiding beliefs and 
ideals' that 
characterize the group 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Our group has … 5=Strong beliefs and ideals,  
4=A clear group ethos, 
3=Distinctive character, 
2=Some beliefs, 
1=We don't believe in much out of the 
ordinary 
7 9 System 5 Prestige 
The degree that 
people feel the group 
has high status 
Ranked - 
Interval 
What status does your 
group have in relation to 
comparable groups 
5=We are known as the best,  
4=People admire us,  
3=Above average, 
2=We are ok,  
1=Very low  
8 10 System 5 Purposefulness 
The amount people 
feel that they have a 
say in what the group 
stands for 
Ranked - 
Interval 
How much say do you 
have about what the 
group stands for? 
5=Yes, we all have a say all the time, 
4=We have a say but not all the time, 
3=We rarely have a say, 
2=A few decide what we stand for, 
1=One person holds the power to say 
what we stand for.  
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9 11 System 5 Symbols 
Are there strong 
symbols of shared 
group belief, 
leadership and myths  
Ranked - 
Interval 
Does your group have 
leadership, symbols 
and myths that 
represent your beliefs? 
5=Yes very strong ones, 
4=Yes,  
3=Some, 
2=Hardly any, 
1=No - none at all 
10 13 System 4 Prototypicality 
The degree that there 
is a shared model of 
an ideal group 
member 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Close your eyes and 
see if you have an 
image of a perfect 
group member (it might 
be an actual person or 
a caricature) 
5=Yes I have a very clear image, 
4=Yes I can see an image,  
3=I see only the traits that they must 
have,  
2=I don't have an clear image, 
1=No none at all 
11 15 System 4 Group attitudes 
The degree of shared 
group opinions 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you share attitudes 
with the other member 
of your group 
5=Yes all the time, 
4=Most of the time, 
3=More often than not,  
2=Sometimes, 
1=Not at all 
12 12 System 4 
Model of external 
environment 
The degree to which 
people feel that there 
is a shared 
understanding of the 
world around their 
group.  
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you feel that your 
group understands how 
the world around it 
operates - is it in-tune 
with its environment? 
5=Yes all the time, 
4=Most of the time, 
3=Often,2=Occasionally, 
1=The world is a complete mystery to us 
13 14 System 4 
Planning 
processes 
The degree of  
innovation, 
anticipation and 
forethought in the 
group 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you and your group 
actively discuss plans 
for the group's future? 
5=Yes we socialise plans all the time, 
4=We discuss plans when we need to,  
3=Sometimes we discuss plans, 
2=Not very often,  
1=Not at all.  
14 16 System 3 Self-esteem 
The degree that 
people feel they gain 
self-esteem from 
belonging to the 
group? 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you feel good about 
belonging to your 
group? 
5=Yes a lot, 
4=Yes, 
3=Sometimes,  
2=Not really,  
1=No not at all  
15 17 System 3 Self-value 
The degree that 
people feel valued by 
the group for their 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you think you are 
valued by the other 
members of the group 
5=Yes a lot,  
4=Yes, 
3=Sometimes,  
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unique contribution for a unique contribution 2=Not really,  
1=No not at all 
16 18 System 3 
Self-
understanding 
The degree that 
belonging to the group 
provides meaning  
Ranked - 
Interval 
Why do you belong to 
the group? 
5=It's my life,  
4=I love it, 
3=I like it, 
2=It's just a pastime , 
1=I don't really know 
17 33 System 3 
Social conflict 
Social creativity 
The degree of 
legitimacy of the 
dominant group or 
leadership and the 
need to either change 
identity or act 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Is this high status group 
legitimate?  
5=There is no high status group,  
4=The group is legitimate, honest and 
fair,  
3=The group is legitimate I have to 
accept that, 
2=They misuse their power but I have to 
live with it, 
1=They misuse their power and I rebel 
against them 
18 21 System # Audit 
The speed and 
accuracy that 
problems in the group 
are identified, 
including the 
behaviour of people 
who act outside the 
accepted norms for 
the group 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Does your group 
recognise when things 
are going wrong and 
when people do not 
behave according to the 
group rules? 
5=Yes very quickly, 
4=Yes quickly,  
3=Yes often,  
2=Sometimes,  
1=No never  
19 22 System # Algedonic signal 
How much do people 
'gossip' about what 
goes on in the group. 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do people 'gossip' 
about what goes on in 
the group. 
5=All the time,  
4=Most of the time,  
3=Often,  
2=Occasionally,  
1=No never 
20 23 System # 
Autonomic 
adaptation 
The amount the 
system can adapt. 
Does the group make 
changes when 
Ranked - 
Interval 
How readily does the 
group adapt when 
something goes wrong 
5=Yes very quickly, 
4=Yes quickly, 
3=It reacts,  
2=Not very fast, 
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something good or 
bad happens? 
1=No - it does not respond 
21 24 System 2 
De 
personalisation 1 
The degree of 
harmony in the group 
Ranked - 
Interval 
How much harmony 
does the group have 
5=Yes there's always agreement, 
4=Most of the time we all agree,  
3=Sometimes there are disagreements,  
2=There are a lot of disagreements,  
1=We all fight all the time 
22 31 System 2 
De 
personalisation 2 
The degree that 
people feel and act as 
if they are  one with 
the group  
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you feel one with the 
group? 
5=Yes without a doubt,  
4=Yes generally,  
3=Pretty much,  
2=Not really,  
1=Not at all 
23 27 System 2 Network activity 
The degree that 
people socialize and 
affiliate across the 
group 
Ranked - 
Interval 
How much do you 
socialise and affiliate 
within your group? 
5=A lot across the whole group,  
4=A lot but only with the people I know,  
3=As much as I can,  
2=Not a lot,  
1=Never 
24 32 System 2 Social mobility 
The ability of out-
group members to join 
the high status  
Ranked - 
Interval 
If there is a high status 
set within your group 
are you in it or able to 
join it? 
5=There's no high status group,  
4=There is a high status group and I can 
join easily, 
3=There is and I could join if I wanted, 
2=There is but it's hard to join, 
1=There is but I could not join it 
25 20 System 2 
Group Resource 
Coordination 
The degree that 
people feel that 
resources 
(opportunities for self-
esteem - social value 
and self-
understanding) are 
shared for the benefit 
of the group  
Ranked - 
Interval 
Does your group share 
resources (opportunities 
for self-esteem - social 
value and self-
understanding) to those 
that need it? 
5=All the time,  
4=Most of the time, 
3=Often,  
2=Occasionally, 
1=No never  
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26 29 System 1 
Self-
categorization 
collaborative fit 
The degree that 
individuals feel they 
have more in common 
with group members 
than people from other 
groups. 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you have more in 
common with group 
members than people 
from other groups? 
5=Yes without a doubt, 
4=Yes generally,  
3=Pretty much,  
2=Not really, 
1=No not at all 
27 28 System 1 
Self-
categorization 
normative fit 
The degree that 
individuals feel they 
'fit' the group's values 
and beliefs 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you feel that you 'fit' 
the group's values and 
beliefs? 
5=Yes without a doubt,  
4=Yes generally,  
3=Pretty much, 
2=Not really,  
1=No not at all 
28 4 System 1 Distinctiveness 1 
The degree people 
feel their group is 
distinct from other 
groups 
Ranked - 
Interval 
In relation to other 
comparable groups do 
you feel you group is… 
5=One of a kind, 
4=Distinct,  
3=Different,  
2=Sometimes different,  
1=The same as any other. 
29 30 System 1 Distinctiveness 2 
The degree that 
people feel they 
actively try to make 
their group different 
from other groups 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you notice the 
difference between your 
group and other 
comparable groups? 
5=Yes without a doubt,  
4=Yes generally,  
3=Pretty much, 
2=Not really,  
1=No not at all 
30 19 System 1 
Optimal 
distinctiveness 
The degree that 
people feel that they 
retain a sense of self 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you feel that you are 
swallowed up by the 
group? 
5=No I am always me,  
4=Not really,  
3=Sometimes, 
2=Yes,  
1=Yes - I totally loose myself 
31 25 System 1 
In-group 
favouritism 
The degree that 
positive attributes are 
assigned to people in 
the group compared to 
those outside 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Do you find that people 
in the group are, better, 
nicer people and more 
trustworthy than people 
from comparable 
groups? 
5=Yes without a doubt, 
4=Yes generally,  
3=Sometimes, 
2=Not really,  
1=No they are no different  
32 26 System 1 
Out-group 
derogation 
The degree  to which 
negative attributes are 
assigned to people in 
Ranked - 
Interval 
If there are comparable 
groups to your own 
would you be less 
5=Yes without a doubt,  
4=Yes generally,  
3=Sometimes,  
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out-groups trusting of people and 
information coming from 
these groups? 
2=Not really,  
1=No they are no different 
33 7 System 1 Boundary  
Are there clear 
boundaries for group 
membership 
Ranked - 
Interval 
Is it clear who is in the 
group and who is out? 
5=Yes - it's a clique,  
4=There are clear rules, 
3=It helps if your face fits,  
2=Not really,  
1=There are no rules for membership. 
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Table 5.3 – Semi-structured Interview Format 
 
Name Components Questions Purpose of question
Approach Order
Group ID
Group Type
Approach Method
Agreed
WHOS_US meta-system “Who is us?” “Who is us?”
WHENSALIENT meta-system “When do you associate with this group?’ “When is ‘us’ salient….?” 
METAGROUP meta-system “Does this group represent the whole of ‘us’ or 
are you just a part?”
“Level of recursion of group….?” 
PURPOSE sel f-categorisation col laborative 
fi t, prototypica l i ty
“What do ‘we’ do? “What does the group do….?”
SOCIALVALUE socia l  va lue “Are you valued by the group for a unique 
contribution? What is it?”  
“Are you valued and how….?” 
WHOSTHEM in-group favouri ti sm, out-group 
derogation, dis tinctiveness
“If we are ‘us’ who is ‘them’? “Who does the group see as an out-
group….?” 
DIFFTHEM in-group favouri ti sm, out-group 
derogation, dis tinctiveness
How do we differ from them?” “How is the group different from 
them….?” 
PROTOTYPE prototypica l i ty “Is there a typical member of the group – give 
me an example?” 
“What is the group prototype….?” 
GROUPVALUE enti tativi ty, prestige, 
purposefulness
“How do others see your group – are you 
respected or ignored - How is your group 
unique ?” “Do you play a part in the running of 
the group?”
“What is the group value….?” 
ID_STRENGTH meta-system “Summary of identity strength….?” 
NORMATIVE sel f-categorisation normative fi t, 
depersonal isation, group 
atti tudes , ideals
“When you joined the group what made you 
feel uncomfortab le? What made you feel like 
you didn’t fit? Generally do new joiners fit in 
easily or with difficulty?
“is there evidence of normative 
behaviour….?” 
COHERENT socia l  confl ict, depersonal isation, 
network activi ty, a lgedonic s ignal
“Do you feel that you are a coherent group that 
actively works together as one? How much 
harmony is in the group?  Are we aligned with 
who we are and what we do? Is there 
transparency and trust?” 
“Are the individuals coherent as a 
group….?” 
SELF_ESTEEM sel f-esteem and prestige “Does belonging to the group make you feel 
good about yourself – are you proud of it – 
give me an example?”
“How much self-esteem is 
achieved….?” 
IDEALS enti tativi ty, closure, ethos , 
purposefulness , group atti tudes
“What beliefs and ideals b ind you together - 
what do you believe in - give me an example?”
“Is there a belief or ideal tying the 
group together….?” 
LEADER enti tativi ty, ethos , prestige, 
symbols
“Do you follow any one in the group – is there a 
leader? Are there symbols of leadership or 
symbols that represent your group – give me 
an example?”
“Who or what do you follow….?” 
ALIGNED meta-system “Is the group coherent with its 
parent organisation….?” 
ID_OWNERSHIP purposefulness , sel f-esteem, 
socia l  confl ict, socia l  mobi l i ty, 
group resource coordination
“Who says what happens in this group?” Who 
holds power – who ought to hold power? Why 
do some have a higher status? Could you 
become a member of the higher status group? 
Is it about power sharing or something else ?” 
“Who owns the group/meta-group 
Identity….?” 
CLOSURE enti tativty, closure, ethos , 
prestige, depersonal isation, sel f-
categorisation, boundary
“Is what happens in this group isolated from 
the real world?”
“Has the group achieved a degree 
of closure….?” 
ADAPTABILITY closure, model  of external  
environment, planning processes , 
audit, a lgedonic s ignal , 
adaptation, network activi ty
“What do you ‘gossip’ about?” Does your 
group react and change - Can you think of any 
way that your group has changed since you 
joined?”
“How well does the group 
adapt….?” 
PLANNING model  of external  environment, 
model  of prototypica l i ty, planning 
processes , group atti tudes
“Do you discuss the way forward for your group 
– not just your organisation but your group? 
Who decides the way forward – give me an 
example?”
“How well does the group plan 
ahead….?” 
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5.12 The Criteria for Interpreting the Findings 
From the research hypothesis it was anticipated that the quantitative data would 
demonstrate the highest score for the components averaged by VSM System from those 
groups with greatest age of group. Viability could also be triangulated, from the qualitative 
data with the components averaged by key-process and with the qualitative data. Those 
groups who demonstrate a significantly diminished score in any ‘system area’ would be 
regarded as missing that key attribute and be ’unviable’ despite their average score and they 
should not be included in the viability – age correlation.  
The groups of particular interest wold be those who demonstrated; 
 High viability scores in the quantitative study correlated with high age scores 
(viable systems) 
 Low viability scores in the quantitative study correlated with low age scores 
(non-viable systems) 
 Low viability scores in the quantitative study correlated with high age scores 
(non-viable systems that have survived and need to be explained – these falsify 
the hypothesis). 
5.13 Analysis of Data 
The methodology used to analyse the data was derived from Barton and Haslett’s (2007) 
analysis of the scientific method that used inductive, deductive and abductive reasoning to 
produce both an analysis and synthesis of the data. 
Starting at the level of the individual the components scores were averaged by group-id and 
then again by group-type. These scores were again combined at group-id and group-type 
levels but by VSM System. A similar processes was undertaken at each level to produce the 
scores for the key-processes.  
Starting at group-id level the data was then examined for patterns and correlations that could 
provide what Barton and Haslett call  a ‘surprising fact’. Then, using abductive reasoning a 
hypothesis was generated about its significance. A pattern recognised in any one of the 
component, VSM System or key-process groups was then synthesised with the other groups 
and at different levels i.e. group-type, to determine its meaning in relation to the whole.. 
Following this a detailed “action and analysis” was used to categorise the phenomenon into 
‘sub-meanings’ based on the new understanding developed of its significance. In the 
analysis of these new categories and sub-categories new patterns and correlations may 
emerge and a new ‘surprising fact’ discovered and the process started again.  
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An example of this process was the ‘surprising fact’ that while the component optimal 
distinctiveness did not correlate strongly with many other components it did act as a 
moderator between the components  prototypicality (group attitudes), boundary and self-
value, leading to strong correlations when combined with their data. This led to the 
hypothesis, shown in Section 4.2 and at Figure 4.1 that there is a relationship linking the 
image/attitudes of the group with its exclusivity, the appreciation that people feel from others 
in the group and their need to retain a ‘sense of self’. Analysis of this relationship led to the 
categorisation of groups as ‘elites’, ‘associations’, ‘cliques’, or ‘affiliates’.  These conclusions 
were derived from repeated iterations of the data at several levels of group-id and group-
type to recognise the ‘meaning’ achieved.  
In a similar manner the correlations between the two components ethos and purposefulness 
with  membership time and age of group suggested that these were key indicators of a 
group’s ‘maturity’ and, by implication, viability. This lead to an analysis of groups ‘maturity’ at 
several levels and a recognition that the formation of ‘normative behaviour’ was also a key 
parameter in this categorisation. Further synthesis of data at group-id and group-type levels 
and inclusion of the qualitative data led to confirmation that this was a critical factor in the 
understanding of groups’ viability. 
The main focus of the research, the understanding of viability in social groups through the 
use of the  method of abstraction, induction and deduction was mainly achieved in the study 
through investigating the research ‘hypothesis’ that groups become viable when they 
develop a strong identity salience, see Section 5.5. This ‘hypothesis’ originated from the 
‘surprising fact’ that emerged from initial observations of the researcher into Social Identity 
and VSM Theory that ‘social groups with salient identities group be viable groups’ and 
developed during the exploration of its meaning through the synthesis of the quantitative 
data by component, VSM System or key-process categories at group-id and group-type 
levels. It was further synthesised be relating it to the qualitative data and finally analysed to 
categorise the results by the invariances common to group-types. Although presented here 
as a straight forward narrative for clarity in fact the results were achieved through many 
iterations of observation of invariance, hypothesis, meaning development, confirmation, and 
categorisation. 
5.14 Validation of past use of the VSM 
As a final validation of the research design this section compares past use of the VSM for 
theory development with the methodology to verify its applicability. 
Beer used the VSM to advance Managerial Cybernetics and the study of organisation. He 
developed it from the human neurological system in Brain of the Firm (1972) and since its 
conception it has been used extensively for the study of organisations.  
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Mingers (2000) provides a list of 6 research projects with the VSM that demonstrate its 
practical application. These range from using the VSM to model San Francisco Zoo, 
municipal organisations, restructuring projects and change management to developing 
information systems strategy or Fouzi M. Ben-Ali’s (2011) structural design of a national 
youth and sports information system. 
The close association between viability and sustainability also lends the VSM for studies into 
the latter. Espinosa, et al (2011a) (2015) examine the self-organisation of communities that 
aim to regenerate and improve their sustainability and ‘governance for sustainability’ while 
Leonard (2008) conducts a theoretical study into the future sustainability of human existence 
that is based on concepts from the VSM. Schwaninger (2015) examines organizing for 
sustainability as a cybernetic concept for sustainable renewal and Smith (2011) looks at the 
learning organization and sustainability Espinosa et al (2011b) compares the VSM with CAS 
for examining sustainability and (2011c) examines the self-organising processes of an eco-
village.   
While there are many more examples of the application of the VSM to organisation, the 
basis on which it was formed, the Literature Review demonstrated that at its heart the VSM 
can model any self-reflective viable systems and could therefore be used for the 
development of many theoretical studies, for instance the study of language or of human 
perception and to validate the research design comparisons need to be made with instances 
when the VSM has been applied to theory development particularly with groups, sociology or 
psychology.  
Stokes (2006, 2007) shows the application of the VSM to the study of sociology. This is 
close to the direction of the research and provides a useful parallel although Stokes uses the 
concepts from the VSM rather than models social structures per se. Stokes (2004) also uses 
the VSM to investigate the wider issue of Identity. Also close to the research Holten and 
Rosencrantz (2011) examine the role of linguistic communication in the self-organization of 
viable social systems and Yolles (2009) studies the VSM and cybernetic basis of corruption 
and sociopathology in social behaviours, while Espejo (2002) examines the transformation 
of a small collective, with a shared purpose or meaning into an organization with closure 
through the processes of constitution (VSM).  Johnson (2011) uses the VSM to examine 
human memory and cognition through the perception of music. 
Less relevant to the research but nevertheless useful as examples of the versatility of the 
VSM  Chyan Yang and Hsueh-Chuan Yen (2007) and Leonard (2000) show how the VSM 
can be used as a perspective on knowledge management while Ríos and Jiménez (2015) 
apply the VSM to complex decision making. Losscher (2011) uses variety engineering and 
the VSM to examine leadership from a cybernetic perspective and Leonard (1993) uses it to 
model response to catastrophe. 
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These studies demonstrate, not only the wide versatility of the VSM, but its ability, stated 
previously, to cross the ‘hard soft divide’ and provide deeper insight into the viability of a 
wide range of systems.  They provide another piece of evidence, but they do not prove, that 
the construct adopted for the research should be suitable for studies into human behaviour.  
5.15 Validity Measures 
Saunders et al (2009 p372) provides five criteria for judging the soundness of research, 
namely internal validity, content validity, predicative validity, construct validity and reliability. 
Yin (p40), also, provides four alternate criteria for judging the quality of case study design, 
namely; construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. For this research 
three measure were considered appropriate internal validity and construct validity and 
reliability.  
The results of each question are examined for internal and construct validity in light of the 
results and feedback from the interviewees. Internal validity “refers to the ability of the 
question to measure what the research intended to measure” (Saunders et al 2009, p 372). 
In the type of questions asked in the questionnaire there could be a range of factors which 
contribute to reducing the validity of the question, such as; failure to understand the 
question, social bias, embarrassment at answering the question, or quite simply respondents 
anticipating the question and not wishing to portray their group in a certain light that conflicts 
with social or group norms.  
Construct validity “refers to the extent to which the measurements obtained actually 
measure the presence of those constructs the researcher intended” (Saunders et al 2009, p 
373). Several questions in the questionnaire query complex abstract ideas or feelings. While 
the question may have internal validity, in other words people respond with ‘what was 
asked’, it may, nevertheless, not have construct validity if ‘what was asked’ is not what the 
research question intended to find out. The ability of a single question to measure complex 
feelings about aspects of group membership was recognised from the pilot study as being 
difficult to achieve. Internal and construct validity require careful and accurate assessment if 
the data is to have scientific value. 
Robson, (2011- Kindle 5223) suggests Maxwell’s (1996) typology of; description, 
interpretation and theory are important to understand as they pose particular threats to the 
research validity. The key aspects are; description - good record keeping is essential to 
provide a sound description, interpretation, imposing too rigid a framework may prevent 
meaning from emerging during the research, “validity of interpretation in any form of 
qualitative research is contingent upon the ‘end product’ including a demonstration of how 
that interpretation was reached.”, theory, alternative explanations and understanding of the 
phenomena observed should be put forward and examined. Additionally; particularly for 
qualitative studies  bias and rigour are key factors. Research involving people will always 
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include bias which must be identified wherever possible. Multiple sources and observations 
should be used whenever possible to confirm findings through triangulation and finally, 
reliability is important. Being thorough, careful and honest in carrying out the research and 
also being able to show others what you have done.  
5.16 Validity of Research Findings 
Table 5.4 shows the assessments of the internal and construct validity for each component. 
A full assessment is contained in Appendix 3 at Section 3.2.6 the analysis of individual 
components. 
While generally the validity was considered satisfactory, it was evident that some 
components were not well suited to a questionnaire design because of their complicated 
nature, specifically; group attitudes, model of external environment, planning processes, 
audit, autonomic adaptation, group resource, self-categorization comparative fit, 
distinctiveness 2 and boundary. Individuals sometimes had difficulty in grasping the concept 
of the question and this had to be added verbally when the questionnaire was being 
completed; for instance, with the component planning processes individuals would need 
some examples such as, “does your group ever sit down and talk about how it will…?” This 
issue was partly identified at the pilot study focus group who suggested moving away from 
Likert style questions to ranked questions that explained more about the issues involved. 
Finding the right questions remains a key issue in the research. 
Only one component, symbols was found to have poor validity and was subsequently 
removed. 
The validity of the qualitative data is assessed very differently . As Robson (2011, Kindle 
5155) states “…in a qualitative study, the quality of data is paramount. Investigators must 
attend to sampling adequacy (enough data), and sampling appropriateness (by interviewing 
‘good informants’ who have experienced the phenomenon and who know the necessary 
information). If the proposed methods of data collection are not working and resulting in 
useful data, the investigator must change strategies.” In the research more data could have 
been useful, although this had to be balanced against the large analysis workload it 
produced to keep it within the scope of the research, however, those interviewed produced 
good results – so the qualitative data was considered valid.  
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Table 5.4 – Summary of Internal and Construct Validity 
Component name 
(Anderson-Darling 
test for normality) 
Validity  (internal/construct) 
Entitativity 
(normal) 
Satisfactory 
Doubtful -  requires qualitative methods and external perspective to provide more 
comprehensive answer and triangulate 
closure 
(normal) 
Just satisfactory 
Limited – single question  was unable to explore the full richness of a groups external 
modelling 
ethos 
(normal) 
Good 
Sound 
prestige 
(normal) 
Good 
Sound 
purposefulness 
(normal) 
Moderate – subject to some social stigma/bias 
Sound 
symbols 
(normal) 
Poor – wrong association 
Poor – tendency of people to identify with organisational symbols and not social group 
ones. 
prototypicality 
(non-normal) 
Good 
Sound 
group attitudes 
(normal) 
Good 
Limited – single question  was unable to explore the full richness of a groups attitudes 
model of external 
environment 
(normal) 
Good 
Limited – single question  was unable to explore the full richness of a groups external 
modelling 
planning processes 
(normal) 
Good 
Limited – single question  was unable to explore the full richness of a groups planning 
process 
self-esteem 
(non-normal) 
Good 
Reasonable. 
self-value 
(normal) 
Good 
Good 
self-understanding 
(normal) 
Good 
Adequate 
social conflict 
(group synergy) 
(normal) 
Satisfactory – sensitive question 
Good 
audit 
(normal) 
Satisfactory 
Limited – single question  was unable to explore the full richness of a groups audit 
processes 
algedonic signal 
(normal) 
Doubtful - wrong term used 
Doubtful – needs further investigation 
autonomic adaptation 
(normal) 
Doubtful 
Limited – single question  was unable to explore the full ability of a groups adaptation 
processes 
depersonalisation1 
(normal)  
Good 
Good 
depersonalisation 2 
(non-normal) 
Satisfactory 
Reasonable 
network activity 
(normal) 
Good 
Good 
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social mobility 
(normal) 
Satisfactory - but social bias 
Good 
group resource 
 coordination 
(normal) 
Required assistance 
Satisfactory but limited – single question  was unable to explore the full ability of a group 
to allocate opportunities for self esteem 
self-categorization 
comparative fit 
(normal) 
Adequate – but social stigma 
Limited – needs to identify behaviours more effectively and would benefit from 
qualitative methods 
self-categorization 
normative fit 
(normal) 
Good 
Limited – needs to identify behaviours more effectively 
distinctiveness1 
(non-normal) 
Doubtful 
Doubtful 
distinctiveness2 
(normal) 
Good – but sensitive 
Limited – needs to identify behaviours more effectively and would benefit from 
qualitative methods 
optimal 
distinctiveness 
(non-normal) 
Sound – but needed help 
Reasonable 
in-group favouritism 
(normal) 
Doubtful – social bias 
Sound 
out-group derogation 
(normal) 
Good – but sensitive 
Sound 
boundary 
(normal) 
Sound 
Limited – needs to identify behaviours more effectively and would benefit from 
qualitative methods 
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5.17 Reliability 
A definition of research reliability is given by Robson; 
Reliability - This is the stability or consistency with which we 
measure something. (Robson, 2011, Kindle 3038).  
The quantitative reliability was examined using Cronbach’s Alpha tests. The Cronbach’s 
Alpha scores for the VSM System averaged components were used to assess the reliability 
of the VSM System’s  ‘unidimensionality’; that is the degree to which they consistently reflect 
the construct that they are measuring (Field 2013 p 709). However, the components that 
make up a VSM System are not necessarily measuring the same thing, for instance; System 
2 components are measuring cohesion, however, this can be seen as ‘a sense of us’ or 
harmony or group resource coordination, so whether they all contribute to the 
unidimensionality of cohesion in the same manner is another question.  
Field (2013, p709) states that academic opinion varies as to the minimum value at which 
Cronbach’s Alpha indicates reliability. Estimations vary from .8 (Kline, 1999) to .5 (Nunnally, 
1978); however, Field suggests that there are many reasons not to use these guidelines 
blindly. He recommends that in order for Cronbach’s Alpha to provide a good measure of 
‘reliability’ the data should be carefully examined for sub-factors.  
Table 5.5 – Cronbach’s Alpha for VSM System Scores 
VSM 
System 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Corrected 
Assessment of 
unidimensionality 
VSM 
System 
.648 reliable  
System 5 .479 (.520) Low (just reliable) 
System 4 .474 (.541) Low (just reliable) 
System 3  .667  reliable 
System 3* .403 (.598) very low (just reliable) 
System 2  .567 (.616) just reliable (reliable) 
System 1  .442  (.595) Low (just reliable) 
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The presence of sub-factors will reduce the ability of Cronbach’s Alpha to measure the 
‘unidimensionality’ of the data. Where these are discovered the data should be broken down 
and Cronbach’s Alpha used to measure the reliability of each of these sub-areas. Table 5.5 
shows the Cronbach’s Alpha scores for the VSM Systems and the corrected scores where 
suspect components were removed. 
As such, the research data suggests that there are sub-factors in each of the VSM Systems.  
The Factor Analysis at Appendix 3 Section 3.4 partly endorses the suggested breakdown of 
components in the key-processes, although in nearly all systems the removal of some 
components was required to achieve a better score. Field (2013, p709) suggests that if a 
questionnaire can be divided into different factors then these should be measured 
separately.  
The key-processes which are designed to measure specific attributes of the model; such as 
the identity formation process, achieve this and should, therefore, not show the presence of 
sub-factors and this is indeed the case. The key-processes scored highly for  Cronbach’s 
Alpha suggesting good unidimensionality, see Table 5.6 
Table 5.6 – Cronbach’s Alpha Scores for Key-processes 
Key-process Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Assessment of unidimensionality 
System closure .6561 Reliable  
Identity formation .8727 Very reliable 
Cohesion .8938 Very reliable 
Power sharing .7413 Very reliable 
Autonomic adaptation .7711 Very reliable 
 
The reliability for the qualitative data was achieved by maintaining an audit trail with 
recordings of the interviews and notes in accordance with Robson (2011, Kindle 5301). 
5.18 Secondary Data 
Secondary data was used in the research for the evidence of ‘age of group’. Group records 
where available were examined for the; 
History of the group,  
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 When it was founded and how long it has been going  
 Any fundamental changes to the identity of the group in that time 
 The purpose of the group – Vision and Mission statements 
 The group values and beliefs – statements of values  
 Logos and symbols of identity 
 Group plans and strategies and targets 
 Group outputs and functions determined from publications 
 Attitude Surveys, notice boards,  
 Company Magazines  
5.19 Ethics 
There were ethical issues surrounding the research. The greatest problem encountered was 
gaining informed consent. The issue of ‘identity ownership’ i.e. who is in charge of the 
group’s identity,   became an issue when trying to gain access. Frequently junior individuals 
of a group would be keen to undertake the research but this would be blocked  when 
permission was sought at a higher level. Full details of the ethical considerations are 
contained at Appendix 1 
5.20 Summary of Chapter 
The chapter aims complete the research design by detailing the conduct of the research in 
accordance with the research methodology. The chapter identified the research objectives, 
propositions and hypothesis, It then detailed the conduct of data acquisition including the 
selection of groups by sampling, key aspects of the protocol and the pilot study focus group 
before detailing the variables used. It  then discussed key issues surrounding the work such 
as validity, reliability and ethics permission. 
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CHAPTER 6 – RESEARCH RESULTS 
  6
6.1 Aim of the Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to present the results of the research. The results shown are for 
the presentation of the final synthesis of group-type only for reasons of completeness. The 
full analysis and synthesis from individual to group-id and from group-id to group-type is 
available at Appendix 3, which will be referred to in the text of this chapter. The chapter 
starts with a summary of the quantitative data analysis and then presents the quantitative 
results. Following this the chapter provides an overview the qualitative results so that the 
next chapter is able to combine the two sets together to produce a synthesis of the group-
types.  
6.2 Quantitative Data Analysis Summary 
The following sections contain an overview of the  analysis of the data collected by the 
questionnaire. The section starts with an summary of the results of the analysis of the 
individual components which were examined by a correspondence table breakdown by 
group-id and group-type for each component, as well as for correlations between 
components and for validity in light of the answers and other evidence gathered during data 
collection. 
Before comparing the means of the VSM Systems group-type scores a reliability analysis is 
conducted using Cronbach’s Alpha to investigate their ‘unidimensionality’ and a factor 
analysis is used to determine if there is an alternative breakdown of the components other 
than the VSM Systems and the key-processes. 
Having confirmed the suitability of the data for the research each component score is 
averaged by VSM System and then again by group-id and by group-type. Tests for normality 
at each stage are undertaken to examine the data for skewness, kurtosis, normality and 
homogeneity of variance to confirm its suitability for analysis. 
Both non-parametric and parametric tests are then used to compare the differences between 
the VSM System means by group-type. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis pairwise 
comparison and examination of homogeneous subsets is followed by a parametric ANOVA 
using a Games-Howell post hoc test to compare means to avoid incurring significant Type I 
and II errors.    
Any correlations are then examined, starting with an inspection for any relationships 
between the average viability of group-types and the age of group and the membership time 
to identify if these factors are able to provide an overall measure of viability. The analysis 
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then examines if there are any correlations between the components and the age of group 
and the membership time.  
The key-processes are then studied for their internal relationships and a narrative of internal 
process is developed. Lastly the qualitative data is examined for each group-type using the 
knowledge gained from the semi-structured interviews. 
The statistical computations used in the analysis are from three sources. Firstly, a model of 
the data was built in Microsoft Excel which was used to examine the basic descriptive 
statistics and to provide graphs of the outputs, secondly much of the more complex analysis, 
such as ‘factor analysis’, was done with SPSS statistical software and lastly, the online 
facility at Wessa.net
1
 was used for determining the relationship between components. 
6.3 Analysis of the Individual Components 
6.3.1 Visual Inspection and Descriptive Tests 
The components that make up each VSM System were examined for mean, standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis to assess normality in order to ensure that any conclusions 
drawn from the data were cognisant of possible bias as confidence intervals and parametric 
significance tests for small samples can be influenced by non-normality.  The mean, 
standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis values for each VSM System component are 
shown in Table 6.1. The significance test for skewness and kurtosis are derived from the 
standard error (Field 2013 p184). 
Three components were identified with a significant negative kurtosis statistic (flat or level) 
namely; symbols (System 5), distinctiveness1 (System 1) and distinctiveness2 (System 1) – 
symbols was also identified in the qualitative analysis as a problem variable and this led to 
its exclusion from further analysis.  
6.3.2 Goodness of Fit Tests 
Field (2013, p184) suggests that running the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) and Shapiro-Wilk 
(SW) tests for normality for large samples (>30) will, by the Central Limit Theorem produce 
significant results for even small differences, he suggests that this is misleading. To 
overcome this problem the Anderson-Darling test for normality is recommended. The 
Anderson-Darling test for normality is a Goodness of Fitness test that is a modification of the 
                                                     
 
 
1
 Wessa, P. (2014), Free Statistics Software, Office for Research Development and 
Education, 
 
 160 
KS test. It gives more weight to the tails than the KS test and has the advantage of greater 
sensitivity; however, critical values must be calculated for each distribution.  
The Anderson-Darling test is severely affected by ties in the data due to poor precision. 
When this is the case the Anderson-Darling test will frequently reject the data as non-normal 
regardless of how well the data fits a normal distribution. The results of the Anderson-Darling 
test are shown in Table 6.1. They show 5 components that are significant with p <0.05 
therefore, for these components the null hypothesis was rejected and the distributions were 
considered not normal. These were; prototypicality, self-esteem, depersonalisation2, 
distinctiveness1 and optimal distinctiveness.  
Table 6.1 – Descriptive Statistics for all System Components 
 
6.3.3 Correspondence Tables of Group-id and Group-type 
Following the Anderson-Darling test, examination of group-ids by correspondence (crosstab) 
table was undertaken. The crosstab tables were produced for the observed, expected and 
row percentages of each system component variable by group-id and by group-type. The 
tables were examined for patterns and then the Pearson’s Chi-Squared, Likelihood Ratio 
Statistic and Fisher’s Exact were run, to see if the relationships and differences identified 
between the components were significant.  
To compensate for issues with sample size the Likelihood Ratio Statistic and Fisher’s Exact 
Tests were also run on each component. The Likelihood Ratio Statistic provides the most 
reliable results in this case (Field 2013, p724).The Likelihood Ratio statistic is structured on 
N Minimum Maximum
Std. 
Deviation
Anderson 
Darling
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Statistic Std. Error Sig Statistic Std. Error Sig test
Entitativity 99 1 5 3.56 .097 .961 -.408 .243 1.681 .386 .481 .803 .454
Closure 99 1 5 3.93 .093 .929 -.950 .243 3.916 1.309 .481 2.724 .991
Ethos 99 1 5 3.72 .111 1.107 -.659 .243 2.718 -.084 .481 .175 .196
Prestige 98 1 5 3.23 .088 .871 -.288 .244 1.182 .093 .483 .192 .286
Purposefulness 99 1 5 4.11 .093 .925 -1.173 .243 4.838 1.157 .481 2.407 .187
Symbols 99 1 5 3.23 .143 1.427 -.399 .243 1.645 -1.172 .481 2.437 .435
Model of prototypicality 98 1 5 3.36 .115 1.142 -.445 .244 1.826 -.628 .483 1.300 .012
Group attitudes 99 2 5 3.81 .087 .865 -.580 .243 2.391 -.132 .481 .275 .055
Model of external environment 99 1 5 4.09 .084 .834 -1.143 .243 4.711 1.854 .481 3.857 .711
Planning processes 99 2 5 3.99 .091 .909 -.562 .243 2.317 -.500 .481 1.040 .263
Self-esteem 99 1 5 4.32 .076 .754 -1.346 .243 5.549 3.147 .481 6.547 .020
Self-value 99 1 5 3.78 .087 .864 -.617 .243 2.544 .379 .481 .788 .173
Self-understanding 98 1 5 3.59 .089 .883 .081 .244 .334 -.314 .483 .650 .089
Social conflict social creativity 95 1 5 4.23 .085 .831 -1.142 .247 4.613 1.675 .490 3.417 .143
Audit 96 1 5 3.45 .109 1.065 -.395 .246 1.605 -.682 .488 1.399 .424
Algedonic signal 98 1 5 2.87 .123 1.215 .470 .244 1.930 -.781 .483 1.616 .435
Adaptation 96 2 5 3.56 .087 .856 .059 .246 .238 -.623 .488 1.278 .197
De personalisation 1 98 1 5 3.59 .074 .730 -.651 .244 2.672 1.015 .483 2.101 .830
De personalisation 2 96 1 5 3.77 .100 .978 -.830 .246 3.370 .582 .488 1.193 .000
Network activity 97 1 5 3.18 .115 1.137 .125 .245 .511 -.651 .485 1.342 .085
Social mobility 96 0 5 3.94 .129 1.263 -1.096 .246 4.451 .499 .488 1.024 .290
Group resource coordination 97 1 5 3.36 .126 1.243 -.289 .245 1.179 -.929 .485 1.915 .539
Self-categorization comparative fit 94 1 5 3.20 .105 1.022 -.048 .249 .194 -.989 .493 2.007 .317
Self-categorization normative fit 96 1 5 3.86 .079 .776 -.724 .246 2.942 1.338 .488 2.744 .179
Distinctiveness 1 99 1 5 3.31 .122 1.218 -.245 .243 1.011 -1.131 .481 2.352 .030
Distinctiveness 2 95 1 5 3.25 .104 1.010 -.087 .247 .351 -1.126 .490 2.296 .180
Optimal distinctiveness 98 1 5 2.23 .099 .982 .509 .244 2.087 -.401 .483 .830 .006
In-group favouritism 93 1 5 3.22 .116 1.121 -.296 .250 1.184 -.723 .495 1.461 .883
Out-group derogation 94 1 5 2.57 .107 1.042 .468 .249 1.880 -.383 .493 .778 .064
Boundary 99 1 5 2.49 .129 1.281 .636 .243 2.622 -.817 .481 1.700 .172
Valid N (listwise) 86
Mean Skewness Kurtosis
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maximum-likelihood theory and is also based on the Chi Squared Distribution but provides 
more reliable results with small samples. Fisher’s Exact Tests were previously only used for 
2 x 2 tables, however, the correction methods applied by SBSS allow it to be applied in this 
case (Field 2013, p724). Both tests are suitable for use with nominal or ordinal data. 
The Likelihood Ratio Statistic and Fisher’s Exact Tests were followed by a ‘post hoc’ Cramer 
V test to determine the ‘strength of association’ between the two variables. Cramer V is 
essentially an ‘effect size’ calculation on the Chi Squared Distribution it does not assume 
randomly sampled data. Cramer's V is the most popular of the chi-square-based measures 
of nominal association because it gives good norming from 0 to 1 regardless of table size, 
when row marginals equal column marginals, and it may be used with nominal or ordinal 
data. With Cramer V the test statistic is modified to provide a value from 0 to 1 with 1 
indicating a perfect relationship. The crosstab results are summarised in Table 6.4. 
Entitativity, prototypicality, group attitudes, model of external environment, self-value, self-
categorization comparative fit  and self-categorization normative fit were all found to have no 
significant associations with group-id or group-type.  
6.3.4 Relationship to other components 
The complex relationship between VSM components means that each may well have an 
effect on the other. Where this may have influenced the results the cross components were 
identified by both parametric and non-parametric methods, see Appendix 3 Section 3.2. 
Pearson’s R was used to establish where there were any relationships between components 
by average group-id as this provided the greatest sensitivity; however, Pearson’s R is 
susceptible to Type I errors, therefore, Kendall’s tau was used in addition to compare and 
confirm the relationships, particularly with those components that tested ‘non-normal’ with 
the visual inspection or the Anderson-Darling ‘goodness of fit’ test. Group-type averages 
were not compared as there were insufficient data points for a reliable result. Kendall’s tau 
was used rather than Spearman’s rho for the non-parametric tests because it provides better 
results with small data sets and there is evidence to suggest that Kendall’s statistic is 
actually a better estimate of the correlation in the population (Field 2013, p 278). 
The Pearson’s R correlation coefficients for all components are shown at Table 6.2 and the 
Kendall’s tau at Table 6.3, while a graphical representation of the correlations between 
System components is shown at Figure 6.1. Only those coefficients with a significant p value 
of less than .05 are reported. Where the Pearson’s r and Kendall’s tau both show significant 
p values the relationship is confirmed and shown in bold, otherwise it is treated with caution. 
Where there is only a significant Pearson’ r correlation and no corresponding Kendall’s tau 
the relationship is shown in normal text.  Where there is a significant Kendall’s tau 
relationship and no Pearson’s r then the data is shown in italics. Those with a Pearson 
correlation coefficient of r above .7 are assessed as strong, those above .6 moderate  
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6.3.5 Tests for Statistical Difference between group-types  
T-tests were not run to establish parametric differences between components by group-type 
for statistical significance because of the problems with testing small samples for normality. 
These tests were used in the combined data of the averaged system components later in the 
research.   
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Table 6.2 – Parametric Test – Pearson’s R Correlations Coefficients between Components 
 
A
n
d
e
rs
o
n
-D
a
rl
in
g
 
N
o
rm
a
lit
y
 t
e
s
t
E
n
ti
ti
ti
v
it
y
C
lo
s
u
re
E
th
o
s
P
re
s
ti
g
e
P
u
rp
o
s
e
fu
ln
e
s
s
S
y
m
b
o
ls
P
ro
to
ty
p
ic
a
li
ty
G
ro
u
p
 a
tt
it
u
d
e
s
E
x
te
rn
a
l 
e
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
t
P
la
n
n
in
g
 p
ro
c
e
s
s
S
e
lf
-e
s
te
e
m
S
e
lf
-v
a
lu
e
S
e
lf
-u
n
d
e
rs
ta
n
d
in
g
S
o
c
ia
l 
c
o
n
fl
ic
t
A
u
d
it
A
lg
e
d
o
n
ic
 s
ig
n
a
l
A
d
a
p
ta
ti
o
n
D
e
p
e
rs
o
n
a
li
s
a
ti
o
n
1
D
e
p
e
rs
o
n
a
li
s
a
ti
o
n
2
N
e
tw
o
rk
 a
c
ti
v
it
y
S
o
c
ia
l 
m
o
b
il
it
y
G
ro
u
p
 r
e
s
o
u
rc
e
S
e
lf
-c
a
te
g
o
ri
s
a
ti
o
n
 c
o
m
p
S
e
lf
-c
a
te
g
o
ri
s
a
ti
o
n
 n
o
rm
D
is
ti
n
c
ti
v
e
n
e
s
s
1
D
is
ti
n
c
ti
v
e
n
e
s
s
2
O
p
ti
m
a
l 
d
is
ti
n
c
ti
v
e
n
e
s
s
In
-g
ro
u
p
 f
a
v
o
u
ri
ti
s
m
O
u
t-
g
ro
u
p
 d
e
ro
g
a
ti
o
n
B
o
u
n
d
a
ry
Anderson-Darling Normality test 0.45 0.99 0.20 0.29 0.19 0.44 0.01 0.05 0.71 0.26 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.42 0.43 0.20 0.83 0.00 0.08 0.29 0.54 0.32 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.88 0.06 0.17
Entititivity 0.454 1.000 0.609 0.166 0.402 0.136 -0.201 0.142 0.600 0.452 0.149 0.702 0.658 0.327 0.478 0.205 -0.530 0.628 0.682 0.709 0.342 0.407 0.556 -0.074 0.411 0.427 0.016 0.117 0.329 -0.079 -0.575
Closure 0.991 0.609 1.000 0.081 0.238 0.425 -0.349 -0.100 0.482 0.547 0.516 0.714 0.601 0.227 0.559 0.080 -0.813 0.338 0.595 0.479 0.292 0.549 0.630 -0.045 0.282 0.100 -0.294 -0.095 -0.069 -0.404 -0.505
Ethos 0.196 0.166 0.081 1.000 -0.022 -0.119 0.333 -0.003 0.147 0.200 0.369 -0.041 -0.191 0.245 -0.276 0.287 0.069 0.107 0.019 -0.105 0.016 -0.210 0.293 0.291 0.265 -0.313 0.561 0.291 -0.009 -0.123 -0.126
Prestige 0.286 0.402 0.238 -0.022 1.000 0.190 -0.320 -0.346 0.414 0.345 0.106 0.271 0.174 0.115 0.320 0.122 -0.352 0.083 0.152 0.275 0.171 0.140 0.565 -0.066 0.282 0.305 -0.090 0.213 -0.252 -0.320 0.044
Purposefulness 0.187 0.136 0.425 -0.119 0.190 1.000 -0.410 -0.110 0.534 0.340 0.540 0.664 0.425 0.636 0.683 -0.139 -0.537 -0.012 0.204 0.480 0.339 0.619 0.493 0.170 0.385 0.411 -0.099 -0.421 0.204 -0.566 -0.342
Symbols 0.435 -0.201 -0.349 0.333 -0.320 -0.410 1.000 -0.027 0.089 0.068 -0.329 -0.320 -0.453 0.048 -0.431 0.229 0.357 0.100 -0.170 -0.185 -0.410 -0.355 -0.187 -0.227 -0.003 0.078 -0.096 0.193 0.141 0.061 -0.320
Prototypicality 0.012 0.142 -0.100 -0.003 -0.346 -0.110 -0.027 1.000 0.158 0.025 -0.136 0.084 0.009 0.114 -0.361 -0.207 -0.062 0.256 -0.036 0.138 -0.378 -0.321 -0.196 0.294 0.517 0.265 -0.005 -0.254 0.219 0.352 -0.329
Group attitudes 0.055 0.600 0.482 0.147 0.414 0.534 0.089 0.158 1.000 0.525 0.336 0.713 0.531 0.690 0.327 0.132 -0.561 0.328 0.317 0.605 0.016 0.312 0.652 0.511 0.728 0.391 0.255 0.138 0.388 -0.179 -0.476
External environment 0.711 0.452 0.547 0.200 0.345 0.340 0.068 0.025 0.525 1.000 0.552 0.543 0.262 0.262 0.208 0.447 -0.733 0.438 0.391 0.268 0.164 0.239 0.674 -0.050 0.461 -0.089 0.082 -0.135 -0.034 -0.247 -0.703
Planning process 0.263 0.149 0.516 0.369 0.106 0.540 -0.329 -0.136 0.336 0.552 1.000 0.327 0.138 0.343 0.186 0.318 -0.400 0.056 0.192 -0.011 0.345 0.382 0.485 0.218 0.315 -0.090 0.003 -0.083 -0.151 -0.346 -0.394
Self-esteem 0.020 0.702 0.714 -0.041 0.271 0.664 -0.320 0.084 0.713 0.543 0.327 1.000 0.790 0.624 0.723 0.036 -0.813 0.493 0.569 0.748 0.320 0.602 0.614 0.009 0.500 0.416 -0.201 -0.348 0.301 -0.492 -0.588
Self-value 0.173 0.658 0.601 -0.191 0.174 0.425 -0.453 0.009 0.531 0.262 0.138 0.790 1.000 0.379 0.699 0.297 -0.529 0.554 0.551 0.679 0.273 0.654 0.454 -0.128 0.203 0.253 -0.322 -0.108 0.438 -0.103 -0.396
Self-understanding 0.089 0.327 0.227 0.245 0.115 0.636 0.048 0.114 0.690 0.262 0.343 0.624 0.379 1.000 0.374 0.053 -0.298 0.128 0.125 0.465 0.175 0.415 0.564 0.484 0.620 0.313 0.222 -0.156 0.388 -0.369 -0.352
Social conflict 0.143 0.478 0.559 -0.276 0.320 0.683 -0.431 -0.361 0.327 0.208 0.186 0.723 0.699 0.374 1.000 -0.084 -0.510 0.181 0.499 0.673 0.562 0.856 0.509 -0.323 0.073 0.401 -0.341 -0.309 0.214 -0.497 -0.324
Audit 0.424 0.205 0.080 0.287 0.122 -0.139 0.229 -0.207 0.132 0.447 0.318 0.036 0.297 0.053 -0.084 1.000 -0.017 0.535 0.184 -0.082 0.014 0.033 0.325 -0.168 -0.013 -0.446 0.202 0.423 0.138 0.228 -0.150
Algedonic signal 0.435 -0.530 -0.813 0.069 -0.352 -0.537 0.357 -0.062 -0.561 -0.733 -0.400 -0.813 -0.529 -0.298 -0.510 -0.017 1.000 -0.351 -0.414 -0.434 -0.227 -0.381 -0.665 0.124 -0.466 -0.273 0.258 0.380 0.154 0.577 0.564
Adaptation 0.197 0.628 0.338 0.107 0.083 -0.012 0.100 0.256 0.328 0.438 0.056 0.493 0.554 0.128 0.181 0.535 -0.351 1.000 0.704 0.515 -0.212 0.005 0.187 -0.297 0.276 0.132 0.026 0.220 0.400 0.085 -0.445
Depersonalisation1 0.830 0.682 0.595 0.019 0.152 0.204 -0.170 -0.036 0.317 0.391 0.192 0.569 0.551 0.125 0.499 0.184 -0.414 0.704 1.000 0.712 0.051 0.429 0.211 -0.244 0.066 0.216 -0.166 0.082 0.425 -0.016 -0.626
Depersonalisation2 0.000 0.709 0.479 -0.105 0.275 0.480 -0.185 0.138 0.605 0.268 -0.011 0.748 0.679 0.465 0.673 -0.082 -0.434 0.515 0.712 1.000 0.141 0.505 0.378 0.000 0.403 0.480 -0.140 -0.075 0.589 -0.107 -0.485
Network activity 0.085 0.342 0.292 0.016 0.171 0.339 -0.410 -0.378 0.016 0.164 0.345 0.320 0.273 0.175 0.562 0.014 -0.227 -0.212 0.051 0.141 1.000 0.658 0.395 -0.208 -0.159 0.139 -0.122 -0.347 -0.038 -0.331 -0.161
Social mobility 0.290 0.407 0.549 -0.210 0.140 0.619 -0.355 -0.321 0.312 0.239 0.382 0.602 0.654 0.415 0.856 0.033 -0.381 0.005 0.429 0.505 0.658 1.000 0.499 -0.085 0.006 0.167 -0.336 -0.328 0.264 -0.242 -0.469
Group resource 0.539 0.556 0.630 0.293 0.565 0.493 -0.187 -0.196 0.652 0.674 0.485 0.614 0.454 0.564 0.509 0.325 -0.665 0.187 0.211 0.378 0.395 0.499 1.000 0.047 0.570 0.114 0.090 0.000 -0.095 -0.482 -0.436
Self-categorisation comp 0.317 -0.074 -0.045 0.291 -0.066 0.170 -0.227 0.294 0.511 -0.050 0.218 0.009 -0.128 0.484 -0.323 -0.168 0.124 -0.297 -0.244 0.000 -0.208 -0.085 0.047 1.000 0.372 0.017 0.374 0.151 0.290 0.206 -0.016
Self-categorisation norm 0.179 0.411 0.282 0.265 0.282 0.385 -0.003 0.517 0.728 0.461 0.315 0.500 0.203 0.620 0.073 -0.013 -0.466 0.276 0.066 0.403 -0.159 0.006 0.570 0.372 1.000 0.378 0.145 -0.045 0.028 -0.269 -0.424
Distinctiveness1 0.030 0.427 0.100 -0.313 0.305 0.411 0.078 0.265 0.391 -0.089 -0.090 0.416 0.253 0.313 0.401 -0.446 -0.273 0.132 0.216 0.480 0.139 0.167 0.114 0.017 0.378 1.000 0.014 -0.123 0.207 -0.258 -0.163
Distinctiveness2 0.180 0.016 -0.294 0.561 -0.090 -0.099 -0.096 -0.005 0.255 0.082 0.003 -0.201 -0.322 0.222 -0.341 0.202 0.258 0.026 -0.166 -0.140 -0.122 -0.336 0.090 0.374 0.145 0.014 1.000 0.496 0.338 0.140 -0.043
Optimal distinctiveness 0.006 0.117 -0.095 0.291 0.213 -0.421 0.193 -0.254 0.138 -0.135 -0.083 -0.348 -0.108 -0.156 -0.309 0.423 0.380 0.220 0.082 -0.075 -0.347 -0.328 0.000 0.151 -0.045 -0.123 0.496 1.000 0.127 0.370 0.293
In-group favouritism 0.883 0.329 -0.069 -0.009 -0.252 0.204 0.141 0.219 0.388 -0.034 -0.151 0.301 0.438 0.388 0.214 0.138 0.154 0.400 0.425 0.589 -0.038 0.264 -0.095 0.290 0.028 0.207 0.338 0.127 1.000 0.441 -0.345
Out-group derogation 0.064 -0.079 -0.404 -0.123 -0.320 -0.566 0.061 0.352 -0.179 -0.247 -0.346 -0.492 -0.103 -0.369 -0.497 0.228 0.577 0.085 -0.016 -0.107 -0.331 -0.242 -0.482 0.206 -0.269 -0.258 0.140 0.370 0.441 1.000 0.004
Boundary 0.172 -0.575 -0.505 -0.126 0.044 -0.342 -0.320 -0.329 -0.476 -0.703 -0.394 -0.588 -0.396 -0.352 -0.324 -0.150 0.564 -0.445 -0.626 -0.485 -0.161 -0.469 -0.436 -0.016 -0.424 -0.163 -0.043 0.293 -0.345 0.004 1.000
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Table 6.3 – Non-Parametric Test - Kendall’s tau Correlations Coefficients between Components 
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Figure 6.1 – Plot of Pearson’s R Correlations Between Individual Components for All Systems 
(blue +ve orange –ve and dotted for weak correlations)  
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Table 6.4 - Summary of Component Analysis (significant associations and validity) 
Component name 
(Anderson-Darling 
test for normality) 
Group-type 
ranking 
Significant 
association 
group-id 
group type 
Correlations Pearson’s r  
(strong –moderate – Kendall ) 
Validity  Analysis 
(internal/construct) 
entitativity 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 institutions 
3 business 
4 religious 
5 social  
 
 
no 
 
no 
depersonalisation2 (.709) 
self-esteem (.702) 
depersonalisation1 (.682) 
self-value (.658) 
adaptation  (.628) 
closure (.609) 
group attitudes (.600) 
group resource (.556) 
social conflict (.478) 
external environment (.452) 
distinctiveness1 (.427) 
boundary (-.575) 
algedonic signal (-.530) 
Satisfactory 
Doubtful -  requires 
qualitative methods 
and external 
perspective to 
provide more 
comprehensive 
answer and 
triangulate 
 
 
 
closure 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 social 
3 religious 
4 business 
5 institutions 
 
 
sig but not 
determined 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
self-esteem (.714) 
group resource (.630) 
entitativity (.609) 
self-value (.601) 
depersonalisation1 (.595) 
social conflict (.559) 
social mobility (.549) 
external environment (.547) 
planning process (.516) 
group attitudes (.482) 
depersonalisation2 (.479) 
purposefulness (.425) 
boundary (-.505) 
algedonic signal(-.813) 
Just satisfactory 
Limited – single 
question  was unable 
to explore the full 
richness of a groups 
external modelling 
ethos 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 institutions 
3 charities 
4 business 
5 social 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
 
sig but not 
determined 
distinctiveness2 (.561) 
 Good 
Sound 
  
prestige 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 institutions 
3 business 
4 religious 
5 social 
 
sig but not 
determined  
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
 
group resource (.565) 
 
 
 
 
 
Good 
Sound 
purposefulness 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 charities 
3 social 
4 business 
5 institutions 
sig and 
strong 
 
sig and 
strong 
 
social conflict (.683) 
self-esteem (.664) 
self-understanding (.636) 
social mobility (.619) 
planning process (.540) 
group attitudes (.534) 
group resource (.493) 
depersonalisation2 (.480) 
closure (.425) 
distinctiveness1 (.411) 
Moderate – subject 
to some social 
stigma/bias 
Sound 
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symbols 
(normal) 
1 institutions 
2 business 
3 social 
4 charities 
5 religious 
sig but not 
determined  
 
no 
 Poor – wrong 
association 
Poor – tendency of 
people to identify 
with organisational 
symbols and not 
social group ones. 
prototypicality 
(non-normal) 
1 institutions 
2 business 
3 social 
4 religious 
5 charities 
no 
 
no 
self-categorization norm (.517) 
 Good 
Sound 
group attitudes 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 institutions 
3 charities 
4 business 
5 social 
no 
 
no 
self-categorization norm (.728) 
self-esteem (.713) 
self-understanding (.690) 
group resource (.652) 
depersonalisation2 (.605) 
entitativity (.600) 
purposefulness (.534) 
self-value (.531) 
external environment (.525) 
self-categorization comp (.511) 
closure (.482) 
algedonic signal (-.561) 
Good 
Limited – single 
question  was unable 
to explore the full 
richness of a groups 
attitudes 
model of external 
environment 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 religious 
3 business 
4 social 
5 institutions 
no 
 
no 
group resource (.674) 
planning process (.552) 
closure (.547) 
self-esteem (.543) 
group attitudes (.525) 
self-categorization norm (.461) 
entitativity (.452) 
adaptation (.438) 
algedonic signal (-.733) 
Good 
Limited – single 
question  was unable 
to explore the full 
richness of a groups 
external modelling 
planning 
processes 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 social 
3 charities 
4 business 
5 institutions 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
external environment (.552) 
purposefulness (.540) 
closure (.516) 
group resource (.485) 
Good 
Limited – single 
question  was unable 
to explore the full 
richness of a groups 
planning process 
self-esteem 
(non-normal) 
1 charities 
2 religious 
3 social 
4 business 
5 institutions 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
no 
self-value (.790) 
depersonalisation2 (.748) 
social conflict (.723) 
closure (.714) 
group attitudes (.713) 
entitativity (.702) 
purposefulness (.664) 
self-understanding (.624) 
group resource (.614) 
social mobility (.602) 
depersonalisation1 (.569) 
external environment (.543) 
self-categorization norm (.500) 
adaptation (.493) 
boundary (-.588) 
algedonic signal (-.813) 
Good 
Reasonable. 
self-value 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 business 
3 religious 
4 institutions 
5 social 
no 
 
no 
self-esteem (.790) 
social conflict (.699) 
depersonalisation2 (.679) 
entitativity (.658) 
social mobility (.654) 
closure (.601) 
adaptation (.554) 
depersonalisation1 (.551) 
group attitudes (.531) 
algedonic signal (-.529) 
Good 
Good 
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self-understanding 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 charities 
3 business 
4 institutions 
5 social 
 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
sig and 
strong 
 
group attitudes (.690) 
purposefulness (.636) 
self-esteem (.624) 
self-categorization norm (.620) 
group resource (.564) 
self-categorization comp (.484) 
Good 
Adequate 
social conflict 
(group synergy) 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 religious 
3 institutions 
4 social 
5 business 
sig but not 
determined 
 
no 
social mobility (.856) 
self-esteem (.723) 
self-value (.699) 
purposefulness (.683) 
depersonalisation2 (.673) 
network activity (.562) 
closure (.559) 
social conflict (-.510) 
group resource (.509) 
depersonalisation1 (.499) 
entitativity (.478) 
Satisfactory – 
sensitive question 
Good 
audit 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 business 
3 institutions 
4 religious 
5 social 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
Adaptation (.535) 
Optimal distinctiveness (.423) 
 
Satisfactory 
Limited – single 
question  was unable 
to explore the full 
richness of a groups 
audit processes 
algedonic signal 
(normal) 
1 institutions 
2 business 
3 religious 
4 social 
5 charities 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
out-group derogation (.577) 
boundary (.564) 
optimal distinctiveness (.380) 
self-categorization norm (-.466) 
social conflict (-.510) 
self-value (-.529) 
entitativity (-.530) 
purposefulness (-.537) 
group attitudes (-.561) 
group resource (-.665) 
external environment (-.733) 
closure (-.813) 
self-esteem (-.813) 
Doubtful - wrong 
term used 
Doubtful – needs 
further investigation 
autonomic 
adaptation 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 business 
3 institutions 
4 social 
5 religious 
no 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
depersonalisation1 (.704) 
entitativity (.628) 
self-value (.554) 
audit (.535) 
depersonalisation2 (.515) 
self-esteem (.493) 
external environment (.438) 
Doubtful 
Limited – single 
question  was unable 
to explore the full 
ability of a groups 
adaptation 
processes 
depersonalisation1 
(normal)  
1 charities 
2 social 
3 business 
4 religious 
5 institutions 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
depersonalisation2 (.712) 
adaptation (.704) 
entitativity (.682) 
closure (.595) 
self-esteem (.569) 
self-value (.551) 
boundary (-.626) 
 
Good 
Good 
depersonalisation 
2 
(non-normal) 
1 charities 
2 religious 
3 institutions 
4 business 
5 social 
sig but not 
determined  
 
no 
self-esteem (.748) 
depersonalisation1 (.712) 
entitativity (.709) 
self-value (.679) 
social conflict (.673) 
group attitudes (.605) 
in-group favouritism (.589) 
adaptation (.515) 
social mobility (.505) 
distinctiveness1 (.480) 
purposefulness (.480) 
closure (.479) 
self-categorization norm (.403) 
boundary (-.485) 
Satisfactory 
Reasonable 
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network activity 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 social 
3 charities 
4 institutions 
5 business 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
social mobility (.658) 
social conflict (.562) 
Good 
Good 
social mobility 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 charities 
3 business 
4 social 
5 institutions 
sig but not 
determined  
 
no 
social conflict (.856) 
network activity (.658) 
self-value (.654) 
purposefulness (.619) 
self-esteem (.602) 
closure (.549) 
depersonalisation2 (.505) 
group resource (.499) 
Satisfactory - but 
social bias 
Good 
group resource 
 coordination 
(normal) 
1 charities 
2 religious 
3 business 
4 institutions 
5 social 
 
sig and 
w’strong 
 
sig and 
strong 
 
external environment (.674) 
group attitudes (.652) 
closure (.630) 
self-esteem (.614) 
self-categorization norm (.570) 
prestige (.565) 
self-understanding (.564) 
entitativity (.556) 
social conflict (.509) 
social mobility (.499) 
purposefulness (.493) 
planning process (.485 
boundary (-.436) 
algedonic signal (-.561) 
Required assistance 
Satisfactory but 
limited – single 
question  was unable 
to explore the full 
ability of a group to 
allocate opportunities 
for self esteem 
self-categorization 
comparative fit 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 institutions 
3 business 
4 social 
5 charities 
no 
 
no 
group attitudes (.511) 
self-understanding (.484) 
 
Adequate – but 
social stigma 
Limited – needs to 
identify behaviours 
more effectively and 
would benefit from 
qualitative methods 
self-categorization 
normative fit 
(normal) 
1 religious  
2 charities 
3 institutions 
4 business 
5 social 
no 
 
no 
group attitudes (.728) 
self-understanding (.620) 
group resource (.570) 
prototypicality (.517) 
self-esteem (.500) 
external environment (.461) 
depersonalisation2 (,403) 
algedonic signal (-.466) 
Good 
Limited – needs to 
identify behaviours 
more effectively 
distinctiveness1 
(non-normal) 
1 institutions 
2 social 
3 charities 
4 religious 
5 business 
sig but not 
determined  
 
no 
depersonalisation2 (.480) 
entitativity (.427) 
purposefulness (.411) 
Doubtful 
Doubtful 
distinctiveness2 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 business 
3 institutions 
4 charities 
5 social 
sig but not 
determined  
 
no 
ethos (.561) 
optimal distinctiveness (.496) 
 
Good – but 
sensitive 
Limited – needs to 
identify behaviours 
more effectively and 
would benefit from 
qualitative methods 
optimal 
distinctiveness 
(non-normal) 
1 business 
2 institutions 
3 charities 
4 religious 
5 social 
 
sig but not 
determined  
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
distinctiveness2 (.496) 
audit (.423) 
algedonic signal (.380) 
 
Sound – but 
needed help 
Reasonable 
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in-group 
favouritism 
(normal) 
1 religious 
2 business 
3 institutions 
4 charities 
5 social 
no 
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
depersonalisation2 (.589) 
out-group derogation (.441) 
 
Doubtful – social bias 
Sound 
out-group 
derogation 
(normal) 
1 business 
2 institutions 
3 religious 
4 charities 
5 social 
sig but not 
determined  
 
sig and 
moderately 
strong 
algedonic signal (.577) 
in-group favouritism (.441) 
 
 
Good – but 
sensitive 
Sound 
boundary 
(normal) 
1 institutions 
2 business 
3 charities 
4 social 
5 religious 
no 
 
no 
algedonic signal (.564) 
group resource (-.436) 
adaptation (-.445) 
social mobility (-.469) 
group attitudes (-.476) 
depersonalisation2 (-.485) 
closure (-.505) 
entitativity (-.575) 
self-esteem (-.588) 
depersonalisation1 (-.626) 
external environment (-.703) 
Sound 
Limited – needs to 
identify behaviours 
more effectively and 
would benefit from 
qualitative methods 
 
6.4 Analysis of The Individual Components For Suitability With VSM Systems  
Before the components were examined by group-id and group-type they were tested for 
reliability to assess their level of unidimensionality. A factor analysis was then undertaken to 
inspect for hidden factors and to confirm the makeup of  components for the VSM Systems.  
6.4.1 Reliability Analysis of System Components by VSM System 
The Reliability Analysis using Cronbach’s Alpha was covered in Chapter 5 Section  5.16, 
however, the full analysis at Appendix 3 Section 3.3 also provides an indication of which 
components were not  suited to their VSM System, this is relevant to the study in this section 
and so will be discussed here; 
System 5 scored .479 on the reliability test without the component symbols removed (the 
removal of symbols is discussed later in the section)  This was revised to .520 with ethos, 
prestige and symbols removed with a Corrected Item Total Correlation all over 0.3. This was 
considered just reliable. 
System 4 scored .474. This was revised to .541 with model of prototypicality removed with a 
Corrected Item Total Correlation all over 0.3. This was considered just reliable. 
System 3 scored .667. removal of any of the components decreases the score.  
System 3* scored .403. This was revised to .598 with algedonic signal removed with a 
Corrected Item Total Correlation all over 0.3. This was considered just reliable.  
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System 2 scored .567. This was revised to .616 with group resource coordination removed 
with a Corrected Item Total Correlation all over 0.3. This was considered reasonable. 
System 1 scored .442. This was revised to .595 with Out Group Derogation, self-
categorization normative fit, optimal distinctiveness, boundary and Positive distinctiveness1 
removed with a Corrected Item Total Correlation all over 0.3. This was considered 
reasonable. 
6.4.2 Factor Analysis 
The final assessment of the suitability of the individual components as elements of VSM 
Systems was an examination for hidden factors. The data was investigated using Principle 
Component Analysis (See Field 2013, p675 – Factor Analysis or Principle Component 
Analysis) to identify the presence of sub-factors in line with the VSM Systems.  Principle 
Component Analysis can also investigate the possibility that there were hidden factors 
embedded in the structure or the possibility that there are other ways to unfold the 
complexity of the model components other than by the VSM Systems? 
An oblique rotation (Promax - Kappa 4) was conducted on a Principle Component Analysis 
to provide a total of eight factors. Factor 1 accounts for 23% of the variance, Factor 2 nearly 
12%, Factor 3 approximately 8%, while Factors 4 through to 8 vary from nearly 7% to just 
above 4%. Overall the eight factors account for 68% of the variance. The factors are 
examined at the Pattern Matrix at Appendix 3 Table 3.236 and the Structure Matrix at 
Appendix 3 Table 3.237.  
Factor 1 captures the main components involved in the group cohesion/coherence process 
and includes some components of system closure.  
Factor 2 appears to capture the main components involved in the power-sharing process.  
Factor 3 with the inclusion of audit, autonomic adaptation and self-categorization normative 
fit appears to represents the adaptation key-process.  
Factor 4 relates to the need for people not to belong to the group. It was negatively related 
to the key components that determine group membership and strongly related to optimal 
distinctiveness, the need to retain a sense of self and boundary the need to limit 
membership.  
Factor 5 represents the “alert processes” that warn the system. It was negatively related to 
closure which as a result of the reverse findings in the data for gossip.  
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Factor 6 relates to the individual/group identity formation processes. It ties together several 
of the System 1 components and also group attitudes; however, if would have expected to 
also relate to self-value one of the key identity formation components.  
Factors beyond Factor 6 are not considered sufficiently relevant to analyse further. 
The breakdown of Factors 1 to 6 identifies several of the key-processes that span the full 
range of VSM Systems. The factors extracted did not group by VSM System type but 
instead tended to range across Systems and align with the key processes. This could be a 
weakness with the conceptual model by demonstrating the lack of similarity between 
components in the same VSM system, i.e. all components in System 2 should be measuring 
cohesion. However, since the components were established to identify different ‘aspects’ of 
cohesion, for instance, harmony or ‘a sense of us’, the lack of a high Cronbach’s Alpha could 
just be identifying these differences.  
On the other hand the high Cronbach’s Alpha for the key processes does appear to reflect 
the similarity of their components. This seems reasonable as they were selected because 
they all relate to a common process.   
The Factor Analysis in this area produced results that were much better than expected and 
suggest that the processes of the VSM are easier to measure than the individual 
components. This reflects quite an important ‘’system thinking’ principle namely, that 
cybernetics is focused on processes and not values. This suggests that a more processes 
driven methodology might produce better results in future research.  
6.5 Summary of Suitability of System Components 
The next step in building the VSM Systems from the individual components was to 
determine which components should be used to average the system scores. The Summary 
of Component Analysis at Table 6.5, the Reliability Analysis at Section 6.4.1 and the 
Principle Components Analysis (Factor Analysis) at Section 6.4.2 broadly confirmed the 
reliability and sub-group construct of the data; however, examination of Table 6.5, which 
summarises all tests on the components, showed several that appear poor in comparison to 
the others. The component symbol fails all the tests while prototypicality and 
distinctiveness1 fail all the tests but are considered at least adequate for validity. Symbols 
was therefore removed from the analysis. 
6.6 Average of System Components by Group-id 
The full data analysis at Appendix 3 continues from the analysis of the individual 
components and the examination of their suitability as VSM System elements to average the 
components by their group-ids. This is not covered in this chapter but is available at 
Appendix 3 Section 3.5.3. To provide an indication of the fidelity of the analysis with a 
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comparison of the group-type results Table 6.6 shows a summary of the results, those 
components that score above average are highlighted in green and those below in red. 
6.7 Average of System Components by Group-type 
The main interest of the research was to compare groups formed in different environments 
to identify the factors affecting the viability of the group, therefore, the mean of the average 
of the system components was calculated for group-type (business, social, religious, 
institution and charity) by aggregating the averages of system components into group-type 
to create the necessary data.  
The group-type data was assessed for normality in order to ensure that any conclusions 
drawn were cognisant of possible bias. The previous examination for normality of system 
components was not necessarily relevant because of the Central Limit Theorem, however, in 
this case the samples are small and the significance of the CLT will be limited. 
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Table 6.5- Summary of Components Suitability for Inclusion As VSM Systems  
Component (Anderson Darling) Sig correlation 
group-id group-
type 
Corr 
other 
comp 
Validity      
(Internal/Construct) 
Reliability 
Analysis 
Factor 
Analysis 
Entitativity (normal) No/no Strong Sat/Doubtful  Used Factor 1 
Closure (normal) sig (nd)/sig (ms) Strong Just Sat/Limited  Used Factor 1,5 
Ethos (normal) sig (ms)/ sig (nd) Weak Good/Sound Removed  
Prestige (normal) sig (nd)/sig (ms) Weak Good/Sound Removed Removed 
Purposefulness (normal) sig (s)/sig (s) Mod Moderate/Sound Used Factor 1,2,4 
symbols (normal) sig (nd)/no None Poor /Poor  Removed Removed 
prototypicality (non-normal) No/no Weak Good/Sound Removed Removed 
group attitudes (normal) No/no Strong Good/Limited  Used 
Factor 
1,2,3,6 
external environ (normal) No/no Mod Good/Limited  Used Factor 3 
planning processes (normal) sig (s)/sig (ms) Weak Good/Limited  Used Factor 3 
self-esteem (non-normal) sig (s)/no Strong Good/Reasonable. Used Factor 1,2 
self-value (normal) No/no Strong Good/Good Used Factor 5 
self-understanding (normal) sig (s)/sig (s) Mod Good/Adequate Used Factor 2 
social conflict  (normal) sig (nd)/no Strong Satisfactory/Good Used Factor 1,2,4 
audit (normal) sig (s)/sig (ms) Weak Satisfactory/Limited  Used Factor 3,5 
algedonic signal (normal) sig (s)/sig (ms) Strong Doubtful/Doubtful  Removed Factor 5 
Auto adaptation (normal) No/sig (ms) Strong Doubtful/Limited  Used Factor 1,3 
depers1 (normal)  sig (s)/sig (ms) Strong Good/Good Used Factor 1 
depers2 (non-normal) sig (nd)/no Strong Sat/Reasonable Used Factor 1,3 
network activity (normal) sig (s)/sig (ms) Mod Good/Good Used  
social mobility (normal) sig (nd)/no Strong Sat/Good Used Factor 1,2,4 
group resource coord (normal) sig (s)/sig (s) Strong Doubtful/Limited  Removed Factor 2 
self-cat com fit (normal) No/no Weak Adequate/Limited  Used Factor 6 
self-cat norm fit (normal) No/no Strong Good/Limited  Removed Factor 3 
distinctiveness1 (non-normal) sig (nd)/no Weak Doubtful/Doubtful Removed Removed 
distinctiveness2 (normal) sig (nd)/no Weak Good/Limited  Used Factor 6 
optimal distinct (non-normal) sig (nd)/sig (ms) Weak Sound/Reasonable  Removed Factor 4 
in-group favouritism (normal) No/sig (ms) Weak Doubtful/Sound Used Factor 6 
out-group derogation (normal) sig (nd)/sig (ms) Weak Good/Sound Removed Removed 
boundary (normal) No/no Strong Sound/Limited  Removed Factor 4 
 
6.7.1 Quality of Data – Tests For Normality 
The group-type data was first examined for skewness and kurtosis, then for normality using 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests, then the Levene’s test for homogeneity of 
variance and finally through visual inspection of histogram and normal Quantile-Quantile 
(QQ) plots.  
Using the Statistic/SE ratio (Field 2013, p184) the significance of the statistics was assessed 
as; 
Group1 S3 and S2, Group 3 S2, Group 4 S1, Group 5 S4 and S3* all have a significant level 
of skewness.   
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Group 1 S3 S2, Group 2 S3*, Group 3 S2, Group 4 S4, Group 5 3 and 3* all have a 
significant level of kurtosis.  
The data was then examined by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests for 
normality for the averaged system components by group-type.  
For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test ; groups 5 S4, 2 S3, 3 S3, 3 S3*,2 S1 were all significantly 
not normal. 
For the Shapiro-Wilk test; groups 5 S4, 1,S3, 5 S3, 2 S3*5 S3 and2 S1* were all significantly 
not normal. 
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Table 6.6 - Averaged Component Scores by Group-id  
Group Type
Group Id 2 3 5 6 9 14 15 8 18 1 17 4 7 10 11 12 13 16 Avg And-Darl
Entitativity 4.00 3.75 5.00 4.25 3.00 3.00 2.33 2.56 3.70 3.44 3.50 3.50 4.00 3.00 3.67 5.00 4.00 4.00 3.65 0.4536
Closure 3.75 3.50 5.00 4.00 3.00 3.67 2.67 3.33 4.52 4.17 3.50 3.25 3.20 4.00 4.67 4.00 3.80 4.33 3.80 0.9914
Ethos 4.00 2.50 5.00 2.75 2.67 4.33 4.00 3.67 3.09 4.44 5.00 4.00 4.20 3.00 3.67 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.74 0.1959
Prestige 3.25 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.33 3.67 3.33 2.22 2.91 3.47 2.50 3.50 4.00 4.00 3.33 4.00 4.00 4.33 3.41 0.2855
Purposefulness 4.00 4.25 3.00 3.75 3.33 4.00 2.67 3.56 4.35 4.94 4.00 3.75 3.20 4.00 4.33 4.00 4.40 4.00 3.86 0.1867
Symbols 4.00 2.25 3.00 3.25 3.67 4.67 4.33 3.56 3.48 1.89 4.25 3.25 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.20 2.33 3.45 nc
Model of prototypicality 3.75 2.50 3.00 4.50 3.33 3.00 3.33 3.44 3.39 3.41 3.00 3.50 3.40 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.40 3.33 3.24 0.0124
Group attitudes 4.00 4.50 4.00 4.25 2.67 4.00 3.00 3.44 3.57 4.11 4.00 3.50 3.60 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.40 4.33 3.80 0.05463
Model of external environment 4.50 3.75 4.50 4.25 3.33 4.67 4.00 3.67 4.26 4.17 4.00 3.75 3.00 4.00 4.00 5.00 4.60 4.67 4.12 0.7109
Planning processes 3.75 3.50 4.00 3.75 2.67 4.33 3.67 3.33 4.57 4.33 4.00 3.75 3.00 4.00 4.33 4.00 4.40 3.00 3.80 0.2631
Self-esteem 4.50 4.25 4.50 4.75 3.67 4.33 2.00 3.89 4.57 4.44 4.25 4.00 3.80 4.00 4.67 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.26 0.0199
Self-value 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.00 3.33 2.33 3.44 3.57 3.83 3.75 3.75 3.40 4.00 4.33 4.00 4.60 4.00 3.87 0.1725
Self-understanding 3.75 3.75 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.33 2.33 3.33 3.13 4.24 4.25 3.00 3.80 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.33 3.57 0.0887
Social conflict Social creativity 4.25 4.75 4.00 4.00 4.33 3.67 2.33 3.33 4.43 4.61 4.25 4.25 3.80 5.00 5.00 5.00 4.20 4.67 4.22 0.1432
Audit 4.25 3.75 4.50 3.67 3.67 4.00 4.00 3.33 2.96 3.25 3.75 3.25 3.00 4.00 3.67 4.00 4.60 3.00 3.70 0.4235
Algedonic signal 3.00 3.75 2.50 2.67 4.33 3.00 4.67 3.00 2.26 2.61 4.00 3.75 4.20 3.00 2.33 2.00 2.20 1.33 3.03 0.4348
Adaptation 4.75 3.50 4.50 3.67 4.00 3.67 3.00 3.22 3.65 3.06 3.25 3.50 3.40 3.00 3.67 4.00 4.40 3.67 3.66 0.1968
De personalisation 1 3.75 3.75 4.50 3.33 4.00 3.67 2.67 2.67 4.13 3.50 3.25 3.50 3.20 3.00 3.67 4.00 3.60 3.67 3.55 0.8297
De personalisation 2 4.25 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.33 2.00 2.33 4.00 4.12 4.00 3.50 3.80 3.00 3.67 4.00 4.00 4.67 3.72 0.001
Network activity 2.25 3.00 3.00 3.33 2.33 2.00 2.00 2.56 3.68 3.61 4.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 2.67 5.00 3.00 2.33 3.10 0.0845
Social mobility 3.25 4.75 4.00 4.67 4.00 3.67 2.00 2.67 4.19 4.72 4.50 4.00 2.80 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.60 3.67 3.97 0.2896
Group Resource Coordination 3.75 3.25 4.00 3.67 1.67 3.67 2.67 2.38 2.52 4.50 3.75 2.50 3.00 4.00 4.67 5.00 4.20 4.33 3.53 0.5387
Self-categorization comparative fit 2.75 3.75 3.00 4.00 1.67 4.00 3.00 3.33 2.81 4.00 3.75 3.00 3.40 2.00 2.67 2.00 2.80 2.67 3.03 0.3171
Self-categorization normative fit 4.25 3.50 3.50 4.33 3.00 4.00 3.67 3.44 3.73 4.06 4.00 3.75 4.00 3.00 4.33 4.00 4.40 4.33 3.85 0.1785
Distinctiveness 1 3.25 4.00 2.00 3.25 2.67 2.00 2.00 2.89 3.78 3.56 2.00 3.25 4.20 2.00 3.33 4.00 3.40 3.33 3.05 0.0301
Distinctiveness 2 4.25 4.00 3.50 2.33 2.33 3.33 4.00 4.11 2.41 3.75 4.25 3.00 3.40 2.00 2.67 4.00 3.00 2.67 3.28 0.1796
Optimal distinctiveness 3.00 3.50 3.50 1.75 2.00 2.33 3.33 2.00 1.87 1.88 2.50 2.00 3.00 2.00 2.67 2.00 2.40 2.00 2.43 0.0058
In-group favouritism 4.00 4.50 3.50 3.67 4.00 3.00 2.00 2.89 2.85 3.59 4.00 3.25 2.80 2.00 2.33 3.18 3.20 2.67 3.19 0.8825
Out-group derogation 3.00 3.50 3.50 4.00 3.67 2.33 4.00 2.33 2.20 2.41 2.75 3.00 2.40 2.00 1.67 2.00 2.20 2.00 2.72 0.0636
Boundary 2.50 3.00 2.00 1.75 2.67 2.33 3.33 3.33 2.13 2.06 2.50 2.50 4.20 4.00 2.33 1.00 2.60 2.33 2.59 0.1717
Buisiness (1) Social (2) Religious (3) Institution (4) Charities (5)
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6.7.2 Tests for Homogeneity 
The Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variance hypothesizes that the variance in the group-
types is equal. Leven’s Test can produce a significant difference for large samples where 
there is only a small difference in variance between the groups; however, in this case the 
samples sizes are small. Nevertheless, Field (2013, p194) suggests that the Levene’s Test 
for Homogeneity only works well where the group sizes are similar and there was a large 
sample. In this case both criteria are broken and so the test must be used with caution. 
For the test the results were; 
System 3; F (4, 3.108) =3.108, p=.019. The variances for S3 were significantly different.  
System 2; F (4, 93) = 2.496, p=.048. The variances for S2 were significantly different.  
For all other Systems p>0.5. Therefore the variances were not significantly different.  
6.7.3 Summary of Tests for Normality 
A final test of normality was undertaken through a visual inspection of the histograms and 
QQ plots, see Appendix 3 Section 3.5.9.  
Table 6.7 summarises the normality tests on the mean of the averaged system components.  
Those areas where there was an agreement of non-normality across a range of different 
types of assessment are shown in dark red, those where there was less agreement in light 
red and those considered to follow a normal distribution are left in white. Greater significance 
was given to the S, K, KS, and SW tests than the others.  
Group 5 (charities) has the three areas of non-normality, System 4 (significant), System 3 
(significant), System 3* (possibly significant). This was probably due to the small sample 
sizes obtained in this area (many charities consisted of small groups working together). 
From the Systems perspective System 2 has three areas that are possibly significant not-
normal. This was not explained. 
Key - Skewness (S), Kurtosis significant (K), Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS), Shapiro-Wilk (SW), 
Levene’s Test for Homogeneity of Variance (L), Histogram Visual Inspection (H), QQ Plot 
(Q). 
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Table 6.7 – Summary of Test for Normality on Averaged System Components by Group-type 
 group-type 
 1 business 2 social 3 religious 4 institution 5 charity 
System 5 S  
K  
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q-not normal 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
System 4 S 
K  
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K-not normal 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S-not normal 
K 
KS-not normal 
SW–not normal 
L 
H 
Q-not normal 
System 3 S-not normal 
K-not normal 
KS 
SW-not normal 
L-not normal 
H 
Q-not normal 
S 
K 
KS-not normal 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q-not normal 
S 
K-not normal 
KS 
SW-not normal 
L-not normal 
H-not normal 
Q-not normal 
System 3* S 
K  
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K-not normal 
KS 
SW-not normal 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS-not normal 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H-not normal 
Q 
S-not normal 
K-not normal 
KS 
SW-not normal 
L 
H-not normal 
Q-not normal 
System 2 S-not normal 
K-not normal 
KS 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q 
S 
K-not normal 
KS-not normal 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q 
S-not normal 
K-not normal 
KS 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L-not normal 
H 
Q 
System 1 S 
K  
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS-not normal 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
S-not normal 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H-not normal 
Q-not normal 
S 
K 
KS 
SW 
L 
H 
Q 
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6.8 Tests for Significant Differences Between Group-type VSM System Means 
6.8.1 Non-Parametric Kruskal-Wallis Test 
Having examined the data for normality the mixed results achieved suggest that the data 
must be treated with caution as some components fail tests for normality. A non-parametric 
test to determine the difference between group-types would at least provide results that are 
independent of the requirement for normality as data was ranked.  
The Kruskal-Wallis Test can be used to test the hypothesis that multiple independent groups 
come from different populations. It is especially useful if the data has failed the test of 
normality or has unusual cases (Field 2013). The null hypothesis, that the distribution of the 
average of the system components is the same across all group-types, was rejected in 
favour of the alternate hypothesis for all Systems except System 4. This indicated that there 
were significant differences across group-types with the exception of System 4. (Full details 
including the pairwise comparison are available at Appendix 3 Section 3.6.1. 
The Kruskal-Wallis Test only showed that there were significant differences between the 
populations of the averaged system components it did not say where the differences were. 
Examination of the data and comparisons between individual Systems is required to 
establish the differences; however this increases the probability of Type 1 Errors. For this 
reason SPSS presents two different test results; a pairwise comparison, and an analysis of 
homogenous subsets, see Appendix 3 Section Figure 3.111 and , 3.112 and 3.113. The 
pairwise comparison was more susceptible to Type 1 Errors. 
This analysis identified the significant differences as being between;  
System 5 - business groups and religious groups and social groups and religious groups  
System 4 - does not produce significant results and fails the hypothesis test. This could be 
due to a poor conceptual model or failure to ask questions that have internal and external 
validity that result in a complete picture of System 4 function. 
System 3 - social groups and religious groups, and social groups and charity groups, also 
social groups and religious groups and social groups and charity groups and religious 
groups and institution groups and institution groups and charity groups  
System 3* - business groups and social groups, business groups and religious groups,  
System 2 - business groups and religious groups, social groups and religious groups, and 
religious groups and institution groups,  
System 1 - business groups and social groups, social groups and religious groups and social 
groups and institution groups.  
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6.8.2 Parametric Tests - ANOVA 
Conducting multiple independent t-tests on multiple variables to determine if there are any 
significant difference between their means readily leads to Type I (acceptance of a false null 
hypothesis) and Type II errors (acceptance of a false alternate hypothesis) (Field, 2013, p 
67). Caution, therefore, must be used with parametric tests if there are any doubts about the 
normality, linearity and homogeneity of the data. The data showed some signs of non-
normality, however, it was considered worth investigating if any parametric test provided 
evidence for the comparison of the average system means. With the dependent variable as 
the group-types and the independent variables as the average of system means an ANOVA 
was conducted to examine for significant differences.  
Field (2013, p442) suggests that Levene’s Test should first be run on any data to test that 
the variances in the groups are equal. The previous section contains the tests for normality, 
linearity and homogeneity of the group-type data which includes, the Leven’s Test for 
homogeneity. This showed that some of the groups do not have homogeneous variance; 
System 3 and System 2 both show significant values for Levene’s Test at p=.019 and 
p=.048. In this case Field (2013, 443) suggests running Welch’s test to verify the F-Test of 
the ANOVA. See Appendix 3 Section 3.6.3. 
A further factor to consider in running an ANOVA is that it is generally considered a ‘robust 
test’ (Field, 2013, p 444). That is it does not matter much if the assumptions of the test are 
broken. Quoting Glass et al (1972), Field suggests that there is a lot of evidence to support 
the assumption that F controls Type I errors well under conditions of skew, kurtosis and non-
normality, however, this only occurs when the group sample sizes are similar – which is not 
the case with the research data. In this case Field suggests running non-parametric tests 
such as Kruskal-Wallis; this has already been done at Section 6.7.1.  
SPSS also provides a means to overcome bias by bootstrapping the data; however, Field 
(2013, p 465) advises that this only corrects confidence intervals around the means, 
contrasts and differences between the means with the post-hoc tests but does not bootstrap 
the main data.  
The ANOVA determines whether or not there are significant differences between the groups, 
however, it does not assess where the differences are between the individual groups. Due to 
Type 1 errors comparison between individual averaged system components by multiple t-
tests was not recommended. SPSS, therefore, provides a number of post-hoc tests to 
determine the differences between individual groups. In cases where there is no 
homogeneity of variance Field (2013, p459) suggests that the Games-Howell post hoc test 
will provide the most effective method to cope with variances differences and unequal 
sample sizes. 
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The full results of the ANOVA run in SPSS with Welch’s test and bootstrapping are shown in 
Appendix 3 Table 3.249. The tests for the average of components for systems gives 
statistically significant differences between the averaged of components system means by 
group-type for all VSM Systems except System 4. Appendix 3 Table 3.250 confirms through 
Welch’s tests that the results for these Systems are robust as the p values are less than .05.  
To determine where the differences lay between the averaged component systems means 
for group-types post-hoc Games-Howell tests were run in SPSS with bootstrapping. The 
results are shown at Appendix 3 Table 3.251 and summarised below for the significant 
differences at the .05 level.  
System 5    
social groups were significantly different from religious and charity groups  
System 4    
there are no significant differences  
System 3   
business groups were significantly different from charity groups  
social groups were significantly different from religious groups, charity groups 
religious groups were significantly different from institutions 
institutions were significantly different from charity groups 
System 3*  
business groups were significantly different from social groups, religious groups 
System 2    
business groups were significantly different from religious groups 
social groups were significantly different from religious groups, charity groups 
religious groups were significantly different from institutions 
institutions were significantly different from charity groups 
System 1    
business groups were significantly different from social groups 
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social groups were significantly different from religious groups 
 
Both the non-parametric and the parametric tests produce broadly similar comparisons. 
These differences are summarised by the plot at Figure 6.2 of the confidence intervals 
between the averaged system components system scores 
6.9 System 3* 
System 3* demonstrated very different results from those expected. Those groups with high 
System 5, 3 and 2 Scores appear to have low System 3* scores and those groups with low 
System 5,3 and 2  scores have generally have higher System 3* scores . This could be 
attributable to two possible reasons;  
That there was a problem with the interpretation of the theory. While it was expected that 
more viable groups would demonstrate greater activity in System 3* it was possible that the 
opposite could be the case. In other words, more viable groups show less activity. This 
would suggest that ‘activity’ and ‘viability’ are not the same thing. System 3* might be 
working hard to audit an ‘unviable’ system with many problems, it would, therefore, show 
high activity but the system as a whole would have low viability. Alternatively, a group with 
strong identity, coherence and cohesion may be more established in its environment and 
hence appear more stable, it would therefore need to adapt less and show low activity but 
high viability. Just because the audit channel has low activity does not mean it is ineffective 
just so long as when it detects a problem it responds appropriately. 
That there was a problem with the construct of the model . Although, there is concern over 
the validity of algedonic signal and autonomic adaptation, see Table 6.4, and the placing of 
these components in System 3* when the data is examined in Table 6.4 it can be see that 
the components audit and autonomic adaptation show very similar results. The order of 
groups for both these components are very similar with charities at the top, followed by 
business groups, institutions and religious/social groups. The component algedonic signal, 
however shows a slightly different order with institutions at the top and then businesses, 
religious, social and charity groups. However the order is not fundamentally different, with 
the exception of charities, and this would suggest that all three components show a degree 
of agreement. From the measurements alone this would suggest that System 3* scores are 
reasonable and that the preference must be for the first reason, namely, that there was a 
problem with the interpretation of the theory and that activity and viability are not related in 
the manner that was expected. 
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Figure 6.2 – Plot of Averaged System Components with 95% CI by Group-type 
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6.10 Correlations 
The data was examined for correlations between the dependent variables, total average 
viability, the independent variables age of group (2) and average membership time (E). 
These two variables were also inspected for correlations between the individual 
components. 
6.10.1 Age of group 
The age of group data was not considered suitable for parametric tests, see Appendix 3 
Section 3.7.1.2. Since the values of age of group were significantly not normal non-
parametric tests for correlation between total viability (both with System 3* and without) and 
age of group were used. The Kendall’s tau_b and Spearman’s rho correlation coefficients for 
age of group and total viability (with System 3*) indicated that age of group was not 
significantly related to total viability and the Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho correlation 
coefficients for age of group and total viability (minus System 3*) indicated that age of group 
was significantly and positively related to total viability  
6.10.2 Membership time 
The membership time data also did not pass the tests for normality, see Appendix 3 Section 
3.7.2. The Kendall’s tau non-parametric tests for correlation of membership time and total 
viability (minus System 3*) indicates that the data are not correlated. The Spearman’s rho 
non-parametric tests for correlation of membership time and total viability (minus System 3*) 
also suggests that the data are not correlated. The Kendall’s tau non-parametric tests for 
correlation of membership time and total viability (minus System 3*) suggests that the data 
are not correlated. The Spearman’s rho non-parametric tests for correlation of membership 
time and total viability (minus System 3*) suggests that the data are not correlated 
6.10.3 Averaged Individual Components Correlations Age of Group and Membership Time 
From previous inspections age of group and membership time are both considered not 
normally distributed and so the non-parametric Kendall’s tau test was used to determine the 
correlations between components and membership time and age of group. The full analysis 
is at Appendix 3 Section 3.7.3.  
The results show that several group cohesion/coherence components were correlated with 
age of group, these were; ethos, purposefulness. social conflict (group synergy), network 
activity and depersonalisation; suggesting that groups that survive for longer develop greater 
cohesion, social activity, social mobility and a stronger sense of ‘us’. Interestingly entitativity 
did not correlate with age of group. Entitativity, audit and autonomic adaptation were 
negatively correlated with membership time suggesting that as groups become more familiar 
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with each other and develop their internal group processes their need to be seen as an 
entity and their adaptation processes reduce, i.e. activity in System 3* declines. This is 
contrary to expectations but as discussed at 6.9 low activity in System 3* does not 
necessarily mean reduced viability, provided the audit and adaption processes remain 
effective. 
Several components from the power-sharing process showed correlations with age of group, 
specifically; purposefulness, social conflict  and social mobility suggesting that groups 
become more democratic as they get older or alternatively, if age is related to viability, that 
the more democratic a group is then the more viable it becomes. 
Two components were seen to be correlated with both membership time and age of group, 
namely; ethos and purposefulness. This could suggest that these two components are key 
indicators of a group’s maturity and, by implication, possibly viability.   
Self-understanding was seen to be correlated only with membership time suggesting that 
people and groups gain insight the longer they are together, however, this correlation was 
not seen in age of group. 
Prototypicality and prestige could have been expected to be associated with age of group 
but were not among the significant correlations.  
6.10.4 Correlations between Components and VSM Systems 
The relationships between the components and the VSM Systems become relevant when 
attempting the synthesis of the groups from the individual components to an overview of 
their viability. This is done at group-id level to provide fidelity and a better distribution of data. 
The results are shown at Appendix 3 Section 3.7.4  
Most notable of the components for cross system correlations are entitativity, closure, 
purposefulness, group attitudes, self-esteem, algedonic signal, group resource coordination 
and self-categorization normative fit and boundary. Also significant was that entitativity, 
purposefulness and closure are correlated to System 2, suggesting a close link between the 
processes of group creation, that is forming group norms, creating harmony, a sense of ‘us’ 
and the ‘closure’ of the system from the outside environment. Similarly all the System 3 
components are closely correlated to System 2, again suggesting that the processes 
occurring in System 2 are important to group formation. 
6.11 Key-Processes 
The key-processes are constructs used in the research to identify and analyse functions and 
activities within the model. In VSM terminology, they help to bring certain aspects of the 
model ‘into focus’; however despite their temporary spotlight they remain related to the other 
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processes of the VSM in its act of dynamic homeostatic balance. This section explains the 
methodology used in later parts of the section to analyse and verify the presence of key-
processes.  
Each key-process is made up of the average of several theoretically related components. 
This data has already been examined for normality, however, when combining several 
components it is necessary to test that they all measure the same concept. Cronbach’s 
Alpha tests for the key-processes have already been presented in Chapter 5 Section 5.16. 
For each key-process a generalised methodology is derived for assessing its function in any 
social group, this is then used in the synthesis of the components to assess the viability of 
the groups. The details of these processes are provided in Appendix 3 Section 3.8.The 
generalised methodology aims to provide a systematic process that accounts for all the main 
factors in the construct of the process from its components using the processes of 
deduction, induction and abduction.  
A full analysis of the key-processes is contained in Appendix 3 Section 3.8, this shows the 
correlations between components of the same process, the reliability of the process and an 
assessment of its function in relation to the theory. In this section only a summary of their 
uncovered function is given, not the process of discovering it, the working of which are 
shown in Appendix 3. 
6.11.1 The System Closure Process  
The system closure process showed a ‘feedback loop’ around all the main components 
suggesting that it is a continuous procedure. Overall the relationships between its 
components indicates that the less the restrictions on group membership and the greater the 
group unity, sense of ‘us’, and ‘harmony’ then the greater the group will feel it is insulated 
from its social environment. The exclusion of ethos from the process suggests that ideals 
and beliefs, in themselves, are not that important to systems closure. The components group 
attitudes, self-esteem and autonomic adaptation, showed strong correlations with the 
process and should be considered for inclusion. Figure 6.3 shows the relationships between 
the components. 
  
 187 
Figure 6.3 – Internal Correlations Between System Closure Components 
 
6.11.2 The Identity Formation Process  
The relationships observed between the identity formation components corroborate 
elements of the theory, showing that the more the individuals of the group achieve normative 
activity in System 1 then the greater the shared opinions of the group, the more the 
individuals’ feel that they derive meaning and satisfaction from group membership and the 
greater they share a common image of the group prototype. The correlations show how 
prototypicality, specifically group attitudes, are important to the self-categorization process 
and social value to the social identity process.  
Further evidence of theory corroboration is shown with the relationship between 
distinctiveness and several components, indicating that the more the members see 
differences between their group and rival groups then the greater is the group unity, the 
drive to create identity and the less people retain a sense of self and adopt the group 
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identity. These relationships suggest that the identification of distinctions between groups is 
a purposeful behaviour and helps form group identity with a loss of personal identity.  
The correlations also showed that the identity formation behaviours create cohesion within 
the group with a relationship to depersonalisation i.e. the more individuals of the group have 
common normative behaviours, see their group as distinct from its rivals and actively attempt 
to make it more distinct then the greater will be the sense of ‘us’ within the group.  
The place of the individual within the group was also confirmed with correlations to self-
value, which suggest that the greater individuals feel that they hold a unique place in the 
group the greater they derive satisfaction from group membership, the more the group is 
united and the greater the alignment of group opinion and norms. This last correlation seems 
contradictory unless we accept the concept of the coherence between individual identity and 
group identity. This is none other than Beer’s “convergence of purpose” – the concept of 
autonomy.  
Further associations show that the more restrictions there are on group membership the less 
there is unity, shared opinions and a feeling of satisfaction of group membership. In addition 
the greater the shared opinions, unity, drive for identity and normative behaviours in a group 
i.e. the more it is a group, then the greater individuals will derive social value from group 
membership. This partially corroborates the theory that people seek social value from group 
membership. Since it is not possible to determine which way the correlations operate this 
could indicate that social value could be derived ‘top down’ or ‘bottom up’ i.e. inherited from 
a strong group identity or as an emergent property of strong group normative behaviour. 
The degree that the group appears as a united entity, that is to say its ‘groupness’, and the 
drive to create identity must, therefore, absorb the variety from System 3 and 4 below to 
maintain requisite variety through the regulation of the 3-4 homeostat. The correlations 
observed show a feedback loop between the high and low level components; this suggests 
that identity is not necessarily an emergent property of the lower level systems but can be 
generated or modified anywhere in the loop, as would be expected from a homeostatic 
relationship. This could indicate that the prototypicality of a group, or the group attitudes, 
could be maintained, adapted or adopted through internal or external influence in System 4 
and then driven into the lower level systems; possibly though processes like ‘selective 
recruitment’ with the introduction of the same ‘type of people’ i.e. self-selection, or by 
imposition of roles that force the identity onto group members. It is suggested that this option 
will not have the same effect of enhancing self-value, self-esteem or self-understanding as if 
it were generated internally as an emergent property of the shared beliefs of group 
members.  
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Figure 6.4 – Internal Correlations Between Individual/Group Identity Formation Components 
 
6.11.3 Group Cohesion Process,  
The data showed significant associations between the group cohesion/coherence 
components. Common to several of the components were relationships with entitativity, 
closure and social conflict.  Entitativity is the degree that the group is seen as a distinct unit, 
which reinforces the idea that the sense of ‘us’ is passed from System 2, through the 
Systems 3 component social value to System 5, where it is encapsulated as a concept or 
simple idea of ‘us’. The greater this feeling of ‘us’ created by the depersonalisation process 
the greater the group will be able to achieve system closure from the environment and the 
more there will be a shared purpose driving the group. These correlations could also work 
downwards through the systems i.e. a concept of unity inherited from a higher level of 
recursion could create coherence in System 3 and a ‘sense of us’  in System  2. The System 
2 connections to the System 4 group attitudes, also suggests that the greater the shared 
opinions of the group the greater the cohesion of the group the stronger its prototypicality. 
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The connection observed to self-categorization normative fit is vital as it shows that the 
System 1 elements are being maintained by central regulatory control. 
The System 3 associations suggest that the greater the shared opinion, drive, opportunities 
for development and accepted normative behaviour then the greater the group synergy and 
the group cohesion. These show that System 3 manages the cohesion activities of System 2 
and the System 1 activities to create coherence and synergy within the group.  
The negative correlations to algedonic signal in System 3* suggest that the less people feel 
that they fit the group norms, feel there is a group synergy, feel united, are driven to create 
identity, share group attitudes, benefit from group development and feel that the group is 
insulated from the environment then the greater is the ‘gossip’ or algedonic signal  in the 
group. These correlations complete feedback loops around all the systems which relates all 
the cohesion components. 
In System 4 the correlations show that the greater the strength of prototypicality the greater 
the group appears united, insulated from the environment and driven to create identity and 
cohesion.  
The System 5 component associations have been discussed in the lower level systems, 
there appears several internal System 5 correlations between entitativity and closure, and 
closure and purposefulness. No correlations were observed with ethos which would be 
expected to be included in this process as the guiding ideals of the group and the overall 
unifying factor – instead entitativity appears to take its System 5 role as identity protector. 
Since there is evidence from other VSM research (Espinosa, 2015- forthcoming) that ethos 
plays a significant role in the cohesion of groups and hence influences viability these results 
would appear to reflect on the validity of the question. It could be that the component group 
attitudes took  the focus from ethos. People found it easier to assess whether they had a 
‘common attitude’ with others than if they shared ‘ideals’. This is similar to asking people to 
determine the group ‘norms’. Since these behaviours are automatic and semi-conscious 
people are not always aware of them and therefore unable to identify them in the 
questionnaire. With ‘norms’ people were asked “what made you feel uncomfortable when 
you joined the group?”. Identifying this feeling, of which people were much more aware, 
helped identify the norms of behaviour in the group. A similar line of questioning should be 
developed for ideals.  
There appears to be a feedback loop between the System 5 components and the System 4, 
3, 2 and 1 components, control could be initiated anywhere in this loop which suggests that 
cohesion is a continuous alignment of behaviours.    
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Figure 6.5 – Internal Correlations Between Group Cohesion/Coherence Process Components 
 
6.11.4 The Power Sharing Process  
The analysis showed that the more people feel that they are able to move to other sub-
groups i.e. the greater their social mobility, then the more they have a shared purpose and 
drive with the other members of the group. This seems confusing, unless one considerers 
that when everybody shares the same overarching goals changing sub-groups may not be 
solely for individual self-esteem but part of the wish of individuals to improve group synergy 
– “I could do more good over there”. The association between social mobility and group 
synergy suggests this, although a correlation between group synergy and self-esteem would 
further suggest that people gain self-esteem from the combined effectiveness of the group. 
The more flexible the group is the more likely it is to work effectively, the more group 
members feel satisfaction from the combined effects of group membership and combined 
action. The System 5 component purposefulness completes a ‘feedback loop’ from the 
System 3 and the System 2 components suggesting that the power-sharing process is in a 
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continuous state of adjustment between the drive to create identity, the self-esteem of 
individuals in the group, the synergy of the group and the ability of people to move within the 
group and develop. 
Figure 6.6 – Internal Correlations Between Power-Sharing Components 
 
6.11.5 The Adaptation Process 
The relationships between the adaptation processes components show a feedback loop 
between several of the components. The System 3* components audit and autonomic 
adaptation are related to each other and then to model of external environment while 
algedonic signal is associated directly with model of external environment and the System 5 
component closure, see Figure 3.125. The System 4 components model of external 
environment and planning processes were correlated to each other and both complete the 
feedback loop be connecting to closure. Network activity was not correlated with any of the 
adaptation components. These associations form a feedback loop between System 5, 4 and 
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3* that suggests that the better a group’s ability to plan ahead with forethought and 
anticipation and the better its understanding of its environment then the greater will be its 
degree of insulation from the outside world and the better will be its ability to audit itself and 
adapt, also the less will be the concern about the internal activities of the group and the 
‘gossip’.  
The process shown only examined a sub-set of the adaptation process and does not 
indicate the full operation of the algenode; for this to occur there needs to be a relationship 
between System 4, 3*, 3 and 2. As shown the system is missing any connection to System 3 
and 2. These can be readily seen in the correlations between the autonomic adaptation 
component and self-esteem in System 3 and depersonalisation1&2 in System 2, see Figure 
6.1.  
Figure 6.7 – Internal Correlations Between Group Adaptation Process Components 
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6.12 Qualitative Data Analysis Summary 
In this section the semi-structured interviews are resolved into a narrative that aims to 
‘describe’ the group-types from a summary of the records collected. This ‘description’ is then 
used both to triangulate the qualitative data in the synthesis and also to provide evidence of 
group coherence and organisational closure.  
6.12.1 Analysis of Answers by Group-Type  
6.12.1.1 Group Type 1 – Business 
All of the business groups associated themselves with an identity that had the most prestige 
and gave them the greatest self-esteem. When asked about the social-value or prestige of 
their group, it was evident that the research subjects were acutely aware of the relationships 
and the relative social standing of the different aspects of their job, picking the one that put 
them in the best light. Gp 2, a coffee shop group, believed it had the highest standing as an 
organisation amongst its rivals and so the individuals of this group discussed its brand name 
and its place on the high street, while Gps 3 and 5, also coffee shops, but of less standing, 
were keener to discuss their association with what they saw as a highly regarded profession. 
Gp 6 was from the more traditional end of the cafe business and was, therefore, unable to 
use either high standing or profession to derive prestige; however, as a ‘single gender group’ 
they focused on gender to grow self-esteem and a sense of identity. The commercial 
business groups generally suffered with poor social-value. Gp 9 had a serious problem due 
to social stigma of both its organisation and its profession and this had a detrimental effect 
on the group’s self-esteem. Gps 14 and 15 felt that their groups were not valued at all. Gp 
15 was in open conflict with its management. 
Surprisingly given the poor view of commercialism in the modern world those working in the 
business groups were keen to indicate that they worked to high ideals. Their ideals differed 
substantially from the concepts used by other groups, they were unique in using words such 
as "hard work", "trustworthy" to describe what they valued, and one group (Gp 14) felt that 
their “professionalism” stood for high ideals.  
When asked “who is ‘us’” the groups provided identities that correlated with the prestige 
associations discussed earlier. This was either the brand name of their organisation, i.e. 
their meta-group (Gp 2, 5, 9), the team that they worked with (Gp 6, 15), or their profession 
(Gp 3, 5, 14). When it came to defining the purpose of their group, two groups named their 
meta-groups as their purpose (Gps 2, 9) while the remainder named their profession or 
aspects of their profession.  
The salience of these identities was mixed. The identity that the groups gave was rarely 
salient outside of the workplace except with those groups that had named their identity as 
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their profession or in the case of Gp 6, who frequently met socially. Yet, despite having 
named different sources of identity the business groups (Gps 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 14 and 15) nearly 
all tended to see themselves as a ‘team’, in other words, when asked, the members being 
interviewed normally said that those present made up “the whole group”. This fitted the fact 
that these same groups gave a description of prototypicality for their ‘work group’ that 
differed from the prototypicality given for their managers; suggesting a lack of cohesion and 
power sharing within the meta-group. This was the case even when they were part of a 
larger organisation and even when they had named the meta-group as their identity. The 
coffee shop groups tended to identify the prototypicality of their groups based on age, while 
Gps 6 and 14 included gender. Gp 9 was based on the personality trait of “trustworthiness” 
and Gp 15 was based on profession.  
The coffee shop business groups (Gp 2, 3, 5 and6) saw their leader as their local manager 
or supervisor who was very much seen as part of the group and “one of us”. The other 
business groups, however, quoted the most senior member of the group (Gp 9, 14), 
deferring to the organisational ‘workgroup’ leader. The final business group (Gp 15) all 
spoke out against their leadership and management (Gp 15). 
The business groups were divided into two distinct sets, namely; those that saw their 
business competitors (Gps 2, 3, 5, 14) as the out-group and those that saw their own 
management (Gps 6, 9, 15) as the out-group. It is possible that more groups would have 
been found in this category had the high status groups in many of the organisations 
approached not had control of ‘identity ownership’ and blocked access for research. The 
coffee shop business groups (Gps 2, 3, 5, 6) used in-group favouritism to defined 
themselves as somehow “better” than their rivals. The conventional business groups (Gps 9, 
14, 15) derogated their out-group rivals as “disorganised”, “elitist” and “without values”. 
The coffee shop business groups tended to see themselves as isolated teams, and although 
they sometimes derived prestige and self-esteem from their parent organisations the need 
for them to work as a close group overruled other sources of social value. The members of 
those groups that tended to see themselves as ‘teams’ all stated specific areas of work as 
the source of their self-value, such as “I am good with the till”, while in Gp 6, which was a 
single gender group, the individuals achieved self-value more for personality traits, such as 
“I get on well with everybody”. The conventional business groups (Gp 9, 14, 15) struggled to 
identify specific areas where they felt valued as individuals.  
The business groups had different levels of apparent normative behaviour. Gp 2 was a 
‘mature’ group where the normative behaviour appeared to have become established, 
newcomers to the group reported that "initially getting accepted by the other members was 
hard". Gp 3, 5 did not provide any evidence of normative behaviour. Gp 6 was hard to 
assess as the group had a focus on gender to achieve social-value. This meant that they 
had strong gender norms which made it hard to identify any specific group norms. New 
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joiners reported that they fitted in easily, which would make sense because they would 
already have been accustomed to the gender norms required. Gp 9 was the group with one 
of the longest membership times. Members reported that fitting in always took time which 
would suggest that group norms were evident. Gp 14 again reported difficulty with new 
joiners suggesting the presence of group norms, while there was little evidence of normative 
behaviour in Gp 15. 
The coffee shop business groups (Gp 2, 3, 5 and 6) appeared very much as hard-working 
teams that toiled together to achieve the explicit purpose of the organisation. They varied, 
however, in the degree that they worked as social groups. Gp 2 showed mature normative 
behaviours and worked together in their role as a coherent team stating that "it's hard work 
and it gets very busy but we enjoy it". Gp 3, 5 worked together well stating that "we get on 
well together-we have a great time", while Gp 6 reported that "we all know what we have to 
do and how to do it". However, these groups also reported higher levels of "gossip" 
suggesting that there were increased levels of concern over internal activities and some 
issues with harmony. Two of the commercial business groups (Gp 9, 14) claimed that they 
worked together well, although they admitted that they did not socialise outside of work. Gp 
15 appeared to be in open conflict with its management and did not appear to have any 
cohesion or coherence. All of the business groups reported that they gossiped about each 
other's behaviours within the context of the group. Gp 9 stated that "we gossip about each 
other all the time; promotion, work everything", Gp 14 stated that they gossiped about a 
"wide range of issues that ranged from social to professional". Gp 15 stated that their gossip 
consisted of "we whinge a lot". 
All of the business groups were very aware of their vulnerability from commercial pressures 
and the fact that their organisations would cease to be viable if that business failed. 
Ultimately to determine the closure of these groups the question is whether or not they are 
dependent or autonomous from their environments. If the social groups are dependent on 
organisations then when the organisations fail so will the social group. If the groups are 
autonomous then they will continue when, or if, the organisation fails. Only one of the 
business groups, namely Gp 6, reported that the group readily met out of work indicating 
that despite the work environment they still continued as a social group and could possibly 
maintain their identity no matter what happened to the organisation they were aligned with. 
Quite a number of the groups, however, identified with their profession rather than their 
organisation and the question then becomes whether or not their profession is the focus of 
the closure. 
All of the business groups reported that they did not discuss the way forward as a social 
group and sometimes even as a business group. The reason for this was that the groups 
interviewed were frequently not part of the management structure which often had ‘exclusive 
rights’ to planning. This is a fundamental issue in power sharing at the high levels of 
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recursion of the group and significantly impacted on the requisite variety and viability of the 
groups. 
6.12.1.2 Group Type 2 – Social 
Neither of the social groups (Gps 8 and 18) felt that they had much social standing or 
prestige in the wider social environment; reporting that they were not that “well known or 
understood” but that they were “respected” by those that knew them. The two groups 
identified themselves differently, one as the reason they met, the other with a clear meta-
group label. Both groups represented all, or nearly all, of the members and saw their 
purposes as the activities they undertook when they met as a group. Gp 18 appeared to 
have a strong, well-known identity, however, this identity had not been locally generated and 
it appeared that the group called on the prestige of its parent organisation to maintain self-
esteem. The other social group, Gp 8, was associated with each individual’s personal 
identity, as the group identity itself was very immature, due to the lack of salience of the 
group to its members. The salience of the identities varied, for one group (Gp 8) the identity 
was weak and was not relevant away from the group, while the other (Gp18) had some 
members who were very active in the group for whom it had high relevance “a good deal of 
the time” but the other members reported no relevance at all between meetings saying the 
group was salient only "when we meet". 
The social groups did not report strong beliefs or ideals, preferring instead to comment about 
"shared interests”. Gp 8 suggested that its prototypicality was ‘interest based’, while Gp18 
produced an “age, gender and class definition”. Both groups found it hard to answer who 
their rivals or out-groups were and tended to settle for “not us”. 
Members from the social groups (Gp 8, 18) found it hard to find areas where they could 
achieve something ‘unique’ to develop self-value. There tended to be a few people who ran 
and organised the activities while the rest only participated at meetings if they wanted to; Gp 
8 “they could contribute and have a say if they wanted to”, Gp 18 "no not really we don’t get 
a chance" or "we just sit and listen most of the time" or "you have to be prepared to do 
something special". Most individuals based their assessment of the value of their self-
esteem on a general feeling of well-being to describe their level of benefit of group 
membership with those from Gp 8 reporting that they did not benefit greatly and those from 
Gp 18 suggesting that “I like coming here" and "I wouldn't come if I didn’t like it". 
It was difficult to tell whether these groups were guided by social norms or were developing 
group norms. Gp 18 members reported having to learn to adapt " when they joined”, but Gp 
8 did were not able to identify any conventions. Both appeared to work together with a 
degree of coherence by using traditional office mechanisms such as meetings and agendas 
to maintain cohesion, and did not report much ‘gossip’. Gp 18 members reported that there 
was "good harmony". They were largely autonomous, that is to say there were no other 
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associated groups or levels of recursion and, being locally-made constructs were insulated 
from the outside world. Serving no other purpose than for their own members and therefore 
would appear to achieve system closure if they were viable systems. They both reported 
varied levels of effort at discussing the future.   
6.12.1.3 Group Type 3 – Religious 
The religious groups (Gps 1 and17) were very clear about their identity and named 
themselves as both sub-group and meta-group, seeing themselves as one entity. Neither 
group was concerned about the prestige of the group, reporting that they were “not that well 
known or understood” in society but that they were respected by those that knew them. 
Prestige did not appear to play a part in the way they chose to define their identity. This was 
because both groups were founded in strong ideals and beliefs that supported the group. Gp 
1 stated that their organisation had "developed and maintained" their ideals over many 
years, while Gp 17 felt that they were held together by their "strong faith". Gp 1 had a very 
strong ethos but at the same time effective power sharing arrangements and no hierarchy, 
while Gp 17 had a defined hierarchy, clear roles but equitable power sharing arrangements. 
The members of both groups were very active in running their group and attempting to build 
individual and a local identity at the same time. Both saw that the purpose of their groups 
was to conduct the activities that they undertook when they met as a group, in line with their 
identity. The groups were highly salient to their members, who reported that the ideals and 
beliefs of the group were relevant to them “in their daily lives” and not just when the group 
met.  
Of the religious groups, Gp 1 represented a good cross section of the local church, while Gp 
17 represented only a small set of the full membership; however, this group were the main 
part of the church hierarchy and so could have been seen to represent a significant sub-
group. 
The groups were not easily able to recognise out-groups or rivals, although a variety of 
suggestions were given from “people outside the group” to “other parts of the organisation” 
but then they were pushed to explain how these individuals were different from them, with 
the only suggestions being "we have a faith" for the former and "more welcoming", and 
"more active" for the latter. Both groups also found it hard to identify a typical member, "we 
are very open to all", although when socialised, several standard behaviours emerged. 
Neither group was able to recognise personalities that were different from this prototypicality 
within the groups’ hierarchies, Gp 17 reporting of their leaders and management “we are the 
same" while Gp 1 members stated that “the individuals of the group and the rest of the 
organisation serve the same purpose, there is no separation between us”. 
The individual members of both groups found it hard to find areas where they could make a 
unique place for themselves in the group to create self-value. It was not determined why this 
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was, whether the groups were simply not active enough, whether people were not 
interested, or whether the group identity was inherited along with the roles for people to 
undertake, leaving no room for members to make a place for themselves. Those in the 
hierarchy of Gp 17 felt "they [the other members] appreciate that we do all the organizing". 
In Gp 1 “a sizable proportion felt that they were not recognised for any unique contribution.” 
Both groups showed very strong signs of normative behaviour. The groups were very 
mature and clearly had norms and rituals that directed their activities. New joiners reported 
that they had trouble "fitting in" but were "guided" in the ways of the organisation. 
Gp 1 was unique in having mechanisms to assist coherence. There was also a remarkably 
high level of trust between individuals, and the members reported little if no “gossip". 
Individuals from Gp 17 however, felt that there were "disagreements from time to time mainly 
over future plans but otherwise the group worked together well". The groups did not see their 
managers as a ‘leader’ but more as an “elected representative”. Both reported processes for 
discussing the future of the group. 
Gp 1 had no hierarchy and was very insistent on power-sharing arrangements throughout 
the group’s organisation. A large proportion of the group was seen and no sub-groups were 
detected. The group behaved as a single entity. Gp 17 was part of a larger structure, 
although, the members interviewed did not see a difference between the prototypicality of 
the other parts of the wider group and themselves. 
Both groups did not appear to be dependent on any systems in the social environment 
suggesting that they had achieved system closure and a high degree of viability. 
6.12.1.4 Group Type 4 – Institution 
The members from both institutional groups (Gp 4 and 7) were all very aware that they were 
just a part of a much larger organisation which they did not think had a high social standing, 
although they felt that they offered a ‘unique service’ and that this was ‘appreciated’ by the 
public. As a result they tended to categorize themselves by their ‘sub-group’ or team, from 
which they appeared to gain more self-esteem rather than their organisation which they felt 
lacked prestige. Both groups claimed that they had guiding ideals and beliefs which focused 
on their ‘service to the public’. Gp 7 was salient with its members “24/7” while Gp 4 had a 
very weak scope, stating that the group had no relevance outside of work. When asked to 
indicate the purpose of their group they stated their individual sub-group functions. Gp 7 
appeared to almost distance themselves from their organisational identity and strongly 
associated with sub-identities as different ‘tribes’. Gp 4 struggled with its identity. The group 
appeared to get most of its prestige from its purpose as a ‘national service’, locally; however, 
they were not a strong entity although they appeared united, although resigned, against their 
national management. 
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In Gp 7 the sub-groups had clearly different prototypicalities that matched their purpose. 
These were obvious even to an external observer, for example; individuals from one sub-
group came dressed to the interview wearing definite symbols (tattoos, badges, style of 
dress) in a manner that clearly indicated their sub-group and its purpose. All the members 
were highly aware of the intra-group differences in prototypicality 
The members from Gp 4 could not identify unique areas where they were appreciated by the 
rest of their group to develop self-value, while those in Gp 7 had clearly established unique 
sub-identities and within those had created identities or utilized their personal identities to 
enable them to be appreciated by their peers. When asked what it was that they were 
appreciated for, the members of Gp 7 gave very diverse responses that were focused 
exclusively on personality traits, such as “good with the public”, “realistic” and 
“understanding people”.  
Both groups named their own management as the out-group. They both saw a difference in 
the prototypicality between themselves and their management indicating a lack of cohesion 
and coherence in the group. Gp 7 felt that their management were ‘in it for themselves’, 
while Gp 4 did not identify the out-group character. The members of both groups felt that the 
individuals in management did not have legitimacy, they did not “follow” anyone as such "the 
supervisor says what we do". Gp 7 displayed a difference between the individual members 
with those in high status positions indicating more self-esteem than those in lower positions.  
With the institutional groups, Gp 7 showed very strong signs of normative behaviour within 
each of the individual ‘tribes’, "there's a very set way things are done", "it takes a while to get 
used to who everybody is", "you have to tread carefully when you join" - "only the right sort 
of person can do this job", however the different sub-groups had different norms, "the ....are 
different from us" or "they like to....". There were clear signs of different dress codes 
amongst the different sub-groups. Gp 4 showed very few signs, the members said that they 
had fitted in but making friends took "awhile". Neither group reported working with cohesion, 
coherence or harmony. Gp 4 stated that "we are always changing the way we do things" 
while Gp 7 felt that there was “not a lot of harmony and they did not work together as well as 
they could stating "we have our differences". Both groups indicated that gossip was "rife" 
and "we are grumbling and moaning about most things". 
At first glance the institutional groups appeared dependent on the social environment and 
therefore vulnerable to perturbations, they are after all public services. However, if the 
systems focus is shifted to a high level of recursion, namely that of society, the public 
services become function providers for the community. That is they are part of societies 
System 2. Since System 2 is an emergent property of a VSM it is possible that these 
institutions ‘automatically’ come into existence where society exists (obviously not always in 
the exact same form). In this argument institutions are not viable systems in themselves but 
functions of a viable system (while the Recursive System Theorem states that "In a recursive 
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organisational structure, any viable system contains, and is contained in, a viable system." 
(Beer 1990 p118) this refers to the System 1s and not every element of a VSM as this would 
be impossible) this could indicate why the institutions examined in the research appeared to 
have pathological autopoiesis because they are not threatened and appear to their members 
to have an inherent right to exist. Both institutional groups (Gp 4, 7) indicated that they did 
not discuss the future at all. 
6.12.1.5 Group Type 5 – Charity 
The charity groups (Gps 10, 11, 12, 13 and16) all identified themselves by their meta-group 
name, even when they were just affiliates of a wider network. All reported that they were not 
that well known or understood in society but that they were respected by those that knew 
them. The association of the local group with its wider affiliates was seen as an attempt to 
enhance the prestige of the group. The groups all had very strong identities except for Gp 
10, despite not being well known in public, which indicated “what they did” and provided 
them with their purpose. The lack of a wider acknowledgement did not seem to disturb the 
members who normally stated “we are appreciated by the people who know us” and “what 
we do is worthwhile” both of which derived self-esteem and therefore there was little need 
for external appreciation, for instance Gp 11; “the group was a very small little known charity 
that was still forming; however the dedication of the members was obvious”. The charity 
groups all reported that the groups’ ideals “filled their lives” and that they achieved their self-
esteem from the social-value of the work they did indicating that it was “worthwhile”, Gp 12 
members stated "we all believe in what we are doing - in trying to help people”. Most of the 
members had also found a ‘unique place’ for themselves with high levels of self-value, 
interacting as individuals with the group over a wide range of characteristics and activities; 
Gp 12 members said "yes I feel appreciated - I help with a wide range of jobs - we are a very 
small team.", in Gp 13 the members interviewed mainly provided answers that related to 
people skills "I am good at communications", "I have patience", I am a good listener", "I try to 
be a problem solver",  "I try to bring the clients point of view". One member said "I could earn 
more at Sainsbury's if I wanted but what I do here is worthwhile"; nearly all the groups 
identified a prototype by traits, such as “kind and caring”; Gp 11, however, also identified by 
gender and activity Each member reported undertaking different functions that they felt they 
were valued for "I organise the events", "I do the art work" 
The groups were not able to readily identify out-group or rivals and found the question hard 
to answer, giving a wide variety of answers from “the council” to “the clients” to “not us” a GP 
12 member stated “them is the people that make the 'red tape' that stops us doing what we 
need to do”, and also a positive 'them' “the people that we interact with".  When asked how 
these groups were different from them they were normally unable to answer, although Gp 13 
stated "we are more trustworthy than the clients" and "the logistics group are patronising". 
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The charity groups were very hard to assess for group norms. Several of the groups (Gp 12, 
13) gave indications of interaction with new joiners, in particular; the statement "you have to 
be a certain type to work here" indicated that there could well have been pre-established 
norms based around behaviours and attitudes and that these norms tended to cause people 
to self-select or self- deselect with or from the group. All reported working as close teams 
with harmony and trust. A member from Gp 13 reported "you have to be very careful when 
dealing with the clients - they are very diverse so we need to all support each other". "We 
need to trust and rely on each other". The charities frequently use the word "worthwhile" or 
"we believe in what we are doing" in their reply to questions, and it was this purpose, linked 
to their identity that drove their cohesion and coherence. While several of the groups had a 
manager none of them had a leader ‘per se’; “we are all accountable to each other” was a 
typical reply.  The groups did not report that they gossiped much. Gp 12 stated that they 
"gossiped in a positive way". 
Examining the closure of the charities was a difficult problem; however, all of them appeared 
to be in sectors where there was an endless need for their assistance. So as long as they 
were able to maintain viability there was nothing in the social environment that would cause 
them to fail. They all reported varied levels of effort at discussing the future.   
6.13 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter presented an overview of the data. The quantitative data was examined 
through the statistical tests necessary to assess its suitability for statistical analysis at group-
type level. Once these were complete the tests were conducted to establish the significant 
differences between the mean of the VSM Systems by group-type. The correlations between 
age of group, membership time and individual components were then resolved before the 
results of the key-processes were inspected and the significance of the findings discussed. 
The chapter then presented the qualitative data so that the two sets were ready for the 
synthesis in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 7 - SYNTHESIS OF COMPONENTS INTO VIABLE SYSTEMS BY GROUP-TYPE 
  7
7.1 Aim of chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to undertake the final synthesis of the components from the 
quantitative data and the narrative from the qualitative data to enable the research to identify 
the invariances of the groups.  
7.2 Synthesis  
In this chapter the quantitative data is synthesised with the qualitative data to bring together 
the components to identify the group-id and group-type cohesions, coherences, invariances 
and key-processes in relation to their viable systems and autonomy (organisational closure). 
This synthesis is considered only a ‘snapshot’ of a complex system used to help map its 
state-space and it is appreciated that this system could change the value of any component 
at any time and move to a different state. This section mimics the action taken in Appendix 3 
Section 3.9.1, the synthesis of the group-ids, only at a higher level of recursion. It takes all 
the evidence found in the preceding analysis including that in Section 3.9.1, and uses it to 
synthesis the components into group-type systems. It and then uses the construct to 
assesses the strength of group-type viability.  
The synthesis starts by examining each group-type by assessing the average age of group, 
membership time, total viability, average score of each VSM system, the strength and 
consistency of each component, the correlations between systems and components and the 
qualitative assessments made of each group-type. Again, consistency was determined from 
the standard deviation (SD) of the answer means.  
Each group-type is also examined for its key-processes; individual/group identity formation, 
group cohesion/coherence, system closure, power-sharing and adaptation. It relies on the 
methodology established in Appendix 3 Section 3.8.3 to analyse these key-processes, and 
relates them to the appropriate VSM System averaged by group-type, and the qualitative 
summary established in Appendix 2. The assessment of viability at the final section involves 
deductive, inductive and abductive reasoning and should triangulate the quantitative and 
qualitative datasets. Importantly, the process of synthesis used to combine components 
allows for emergent properties created by the combination of components to be identified.  
These processes are examined for loss of fidelity and the need to retain requisite variety 
with the group-id synthesis in the next chapter.  
7.2.1 Inspection of Data by Group-type 
Table 7.1 shows the descriptive data for the statistics with the average membership time as 
7.62 years, the average viability score 3.58 (out of 5), the average group age 140.68 years, 
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the average number of members interviewed in each group-type and their average of 20. (In 
most parametric statistics tests, such as the t-test, a total of 33 is normally the minimum 
recommended number of elements required to achieve valid results – for this reason the 
Shapiro-Wilk test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests were run on the data to inspect for 
normality and the Levene test for homogeneity - see Appendix 3 Section 3.5.4 - 3.5.10 and. 
Non-parametric tests were used wherever the data failed these test, see Appendix 3 Section 
3.6  
Table 7.3 along with Figure 7.1 shows the VSM system scores averaged by group-type, 
while Table 7.4 a and b provides the assessment of the key-processes and Table 7.5 gives 
the individual identity descriptions for each group-type. Lastly, Table 7.6 shows the averaged 
component scores.  
The synthesis of the quantitative data into group-types will utilise the methodology 
developed in Section Appendix 3 Section 3.8.3 with reference to the data in these tables.  
Table 7.1 - Scores and Standard Deviations of Averaged System Components by Group-Type 
(showing green above-average, red below-average) 
 
The comparison of the group-type means to determine differences in the viability of group-
types should take into account whether or not there was a statistically significant difference 
between means. Table 7.2 (see Appendix 3 Section 3.9.2.1 and Table 3.270 for statistically 
significant differences between group-type scores at p>0.5 significance level) summarises 
the different parametric and none-parametric tests conducted on the group-type means, 
namely; Kruskal-Wallis Pairwise, Kruskal-Wallis Homogenous Significant Differences, 
Kruskal-Wallis Homogenous Sub-sets, Confidence Intervals and the ANOVA with Games-
Howell. The table shows which groups, in which VSM System, have significant differences 
and also shows the direction of the difference (greater than, less than).  
Examining the VSM System scores at Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1, starting at System 5 - the 
strength of group-type identity, shows the religious and charity groups with significantly 
higher scores  than the business, institution and social-groups who show no significant 
difference.  
Group Type
VSM System 1 2 3 4 5 Avg
Avg Mem Time (yrs) 2.76 2.18 23.85 8.90 1.89 7.92
Average Viability 3.57 3.39 3.75 3.46 3.71 3.58
Avg Gp Age (yrs) 52.29 51.50 313.00 264.00 22.60 140.68
No Members 23.00 33.00 22.00 9.00 13.00 20.00
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System 4, the degree of planning and forethought, shows the religious and charity groups 
with the highest score, social and business groups with a middle score and institutions with 
the lowest score; however, these results are not significantly different.  
System 3, group coherence and synergy, again shows the religious and charity groups with 
significantly higher scores than the business, institution and social-groups who show no 
significant differences.  
System 3*, the audit system, which incorporates the algedonic signal and adaptation 
process, shows the business groups with the highest score, followed by institutional groups, 
charities, and then religious and social-groups. Only the differences between the first and 
the last groups are significantly different.  
System 2, the assessment of group-type cohesion, again shows the religious and charity 
groups with significantly higher scores than the business, institution and social groups who 
show no significant difference.  
System 1 shows very little difference between group-types with institutional groups with the 
highest mark from business and religious groups followed by social and charity groups at the 
bottom.  
Table 7.2 - Summary of Significant Differences Between Group-type Means by Non-Parametric 
and Parametric Tests 
 Kruskal-
Wallis 
Pairwise 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Homogenous 
sig differences 
Kruskal-Wallis 
Sub-Sets 
CI ANOVA 
Games-Howell 
System 5 
3>1,2  3>1,2 
 
 3,  4,  5 
 1,  2,  4,  5 
 
 
 3> 1,  2 
 5> 1,  2 
 3> 2 
 5> 2 
System 4  
 
 
  
 
 
System 3 3>2 
5>2 
 3>2,4 
 5>2,4   
 
 3,  5 
 1,  3 
 1,  2,  4 
 
 3> 1, 2, 4 
 5> 1, 2, 4 
 3> 2,4 
 5> 1, 2,  4 
System 3* 
1>2,3  1> 2,3 
 
 1  4  5 
 2,  3,  4,  5 
 
 1> 2, 3  1> 2, 3 
System 2  
3>1,2,4 
 
 3>1,2,4  
 5>1,2,4  
 1,  2,  4 
 1,  4,  5 
 
 3>1,  2, 4 
 5>1,  2, 4 
 
 3>1, 2, 4 
 5>2, 4 
System 1 
 
  
 1>2 
 3>2 
 4>2   
 
 2, 5 
 1, 3, 4, 5 
 
1>2,5 
 1>2 
 3>2 
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Examination of the key-process scores for the group-types at Table 7.4 a and b show 
religious groups with an above-average score for all the key-processes, while charities show 
an above-average score for every key-process except identity formation. Social groups show 
a below-average score for every key-process except adaptation. Business groups also show 
a below-average score for every key-process except identity formation. Institutions show 
above-average scores for system closure and identity formation but not for cohesion, power-
sharing or adaptation. 
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Table 7.3 Scores And Standard Deviations Of VSM Systems From System Components 
Averaged by Group-type (showing green above-average, red below-average)  
 
Figure 7.1 - Line Plot of VSM Systems from System Components Averaged by Group-Type 
 
  
Group Type
VSM System 1 2 3 4 5 Avg
System 5 3.53 3.53 4.03 3.67 3.97 3.74
System 4 3.75 3.81 3.96 3.42 3.94 3.78
System 3 3.86 3.79 4.25 3.72 4.38 4.00
System # 3.76 3.02 3.09 3.52 3.31 3.34
System 2 3.38 3.35 4.05 3.22 3.85 3.57
System 1 3.14 2.81 3.13 3.22 2.81 3.03
System 5 Std Dev 0.68 0.49 0.43 0.42 0.34 0.47
System 4 0.67 0.54 0.61 0.53 0.47 0.56
System 3 0.84 0.46 0.49 0.26 0.32 0.47
System 3# 0.68 0.65 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.66
System 2 0.70 0.72 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.51
System 1 0.61 0.39 0.46 0.61 0.38 0.49
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Table 7.4a – Averaged Scores For Group-Type Processes (Showing Green Above-Average, Red 
Below-Average) 
 
Table 7.4b – Averaged Scores For Group-Type Processes (Showing Green Above-Average, Red 
Below-Average 
 
Table 7.4 shows the individual identity description by group-type. These are assessed from 
the scores for group attitudes, boundary, self-value and optimal distinctiveness at Table 4.11 
for each group-type and synthesised using the methodology detailed at Appendix 3 Section 
3.8.3.2 and Table 3.269. 
Table 7.5 –Identity By Group-Type – Showing Relationship Between Prototypicality, Boundary, 
Self-Value and Optimal Distinctiveness 
 
Table 7.6 shows the individual components averaged by group-type. Group 1, 3 and 5 the 
business, religious and the charity groups show more above-average components than 
below-average, while Group 2 and Group 4, the social and institutional groups, show a 
greater number of below-average components.  
  
Group-type System closure Identity formation Cohesion Power sharing Adaptation Openness
1 3.46 3.45 3.47 3.70 3.49 3.49
2 3.29 3.19 3.40 3.59 3.56 3.27
3 3.62 3.59 3.92 4.40 3.61 3.72
4 3.57 3.41 3.40 3.51 3.08 2.65
5 3.59 3.40 3.99 4.51 3.94 3.55
3.51 3.40 3.64 3.94 3.54 3.34
Group-type identity hi (5&4) identity med (3&2) identity low (1) cohesion hi (5&4)cohesion med (3&2)cohesion low (1)
1 3.52 3.77 3.25 3.65 3.36 3.75
2 3.31 3.65 2.90 3.58 3.42 3.59
3 3.64 4.13 3.32 4.11 3.73 4.03
4 3.60 3.63 3.18 3.62 3.32 3.88
5 3.78 4.20 2.78 3.94 3.94 4.01
3.57 3.87 3.09 3.78 3.56 3.85
Group-type Group attitudesBoundary Self-value Optimal distinctivenessPrototype strengthSelf-value Optimal distinctIdentity
1 3.77 2.51 3.85 2.77 strong high aligned associate individual identity
2 3.50 2.73 3.50 1.93 weak low unaligned non responsive clique personal identity
3 4.06 2.28 3.79 2.19 strong high unaligned associate inherited identity
4 3.55 3.35 3.58 2.50 weak low aligned affiliate clique personal identity
5 3.95 2.45 4.19 2.21 strong high unaligned associate inherited identity
3.77 2.66 3.78 2.32
 209 
Table 7.6 – Individual Components Averaged By Group-Type (Showing Green Above-Average, 
Red Below-Average) 
 
7.2.2 Synthesis Process  
7.2.2.1 Business Groups – examination of components 
Together the business groups scored the third lowest marks for average viability at 3.57. 
They had an average membership time of 2.76 years the average age of each group (Meta 
groups) was 52.29 years. 23 members were interviewed from a variety of commercial 
enterprises. These were split into two groups; the first group consisted largely of coffee shop 
businesses, while the second group consisted of a high street bank and two repair garages. 
Compared to the other groups the business groups had the lowest score for System 5 (joint 
with social groups) suggesting a weak identity. They had the second lowest score for 
System 4 (group planning ‘there and then’) and were below-average for System 3 (group 
coherence ‘here and now’). The System 3* score, however, was the highest of all the 
groups. System 2 (cohesion/coherence) was just below-average and taken with the below-
Components Group type
1 2 3 4 5 Avg
Entitativity 3.62 3.13 3.47 3.75 3.93 3.58
Closure 3.65 3.93 3.83 3.23 4.16 3.76
Ethos 3.61 3.38 4.72 4.10 3.53 3.87
Prestige 3.30 2.57 2.99 3.75 3.93 3.31
Purposefulness 3.57 3.95 4.47 3.48 4.15 3.92
Model of prototypicality 3.35 3.42 3.21 3.45 2.95 3.27
Group attitudes 3.77 3.50 4.06 3.55 3.95 3.77
Model of external environment 4.14 3.96 4.08 3.38 4.45 4.00
Planning processes 3.67 3.95 4.17 3.38 3.95 3.82
Self-esteem 4.00 4.23 4.35 3.90 4.73 4.24
Self-value 3.85 3.50 3.79 3.58 4.19 3.78
Self-understanding 3.45 3.23 4.24 3.40 3.67 3.60
Social conflict Social creativity 3.90 3.88 4.43 4.03 4.77 4.20
Audit 3.98 3.14 3.50 3.13 3.85 3.52
Algedonic signal 3.42 2.63 3.31 3.98 2.17 3.10
Adaptation 3.87 3.44 3.16 3.45 3.75 3.53
De personalisation 1 3.67 3.40 3.38 3.35 3.59 3.48
De personalisation 2 3.69 3.17 4.06 3.65 3.87 3.69
Network activity 2.56 3.12 3.81 3.00 3.60 3.22
Social mobility 3.76 3.43 4.61 3.40 4.45 3.93
Group Resource Coordination 3.24 2.45 4.13 2.75 4.44 3.40
Self-categorization comparative fit 3.17 3.07 3.88 3.20 2.43 3.15
Self-categorization normative fit 3.75 3.59 4.03 3.88 4.01 3.85
Distinctiveness 1 2.74 3.34 2.78 3.73 3.21 3.16
Distinctiveness 2 3.39 3.26 4.00 3.20 2.87 3.34
Optimal distinctiveness 2.77 1.93 2.19 2.50 2.21 2.32
In-group favouritism 3.52 2.87 3.79 3.03 2.68 3.18
Out-group derogation 3.43 2.27 2.58 2.70 1.97 2.59
Boundary 2.51 2.73 2.28 3.35 2.45 2.66
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average score for System 3 suggest low levels of cohesion. System 1 was the second 
highest score suggesting high levels of activity to establish identity.  
Key-process scores for  group-type 1, the business groups, shows identity formation as 
above-average overall, however, examination of the different levels reveals it to be below-
average at high and mid-level and only above-average at low level. A below-average score 
for cohesion was below-average at every level, as was power-sharing, adaptation and 
system closure 
For business groups the VSM scores show below-average marks for System 5, suggesting 
that overall, as a group, they have a low strength of identity. This is partially confirmed by the 
key-process scores which show below-average marks for the high and mid-level but not for 
the low-level. VSM System 1 shows an above-average mark and this matches the high 
score for low-level identity formation, suggesting that business groups are actively involved 
in identity formation processes although they do not achieve high group identity strength. 
This could indicate that their identity formation is local and “for themselves” i.e. they focus on 
finding a place for themselves in the group. 
Examination of the individual components for business groups, starting at System 1, shows 
an above-average score for self-categorization collaborative fit but a below-average score 
for normative fit. This suggests that business group tend to be 'immature' in that they do not 
manage to move to normative behaviour. Distinctiveness1 is below-average, indicating that, 
as a whole, business groups are not able to see themselves as different from their rivals, 
however, distinctiveness2, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation were above-
average, which suggests that they are actively attempting to make their group more 
discernible through identity enhancing behaviours. 
The identity formation activity in System 1 does not translate into a high value for self-
esteem or self-understanding in System 3. The above-average value for self-value, group 
attitudes, optimal distinctiveness but low score for boundary, indicates that business groups 
tend to have an ‘associate individual identity’. That is, the members are guided by clear 
group attitudes and are able to find a place for themselves in the group, where they feel 
appreciated and derive self-value in what they see as a non-exclusive system; although, 
they are at times swamped by the group identity and are therefore not always able to align 
their individual identity with that of the group. 
The business groups appear to have a good image of their prototypicality and group 
attitudes with above average scores for both of these components. This leads to a high 
score for entitativity in System 5, however, the overall strength of identity is reduced with low 
values for prestige and purposefulness, suggesting that business groups do not feel they 
have much standing in their social environment and do not have a strong shared purpose. 
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System 3 and 2 had below-average scores, suggesting low levels of cohesion and 
coherence. This is confirmed by the key-process scores which show the 
cohesion/coherence process as below-average at all levels. Examination of the individual 
components that make up the cohesion/coherence process, starting in System 1 show self-
categorization normative fit to be below-average, suggesting little normative behaviour. 
However, depersonalisation1and2 are above-average, indicating good harmony within the 
business groups and a strong sense of 'us', although network activity and group resource 
coordination are low. Despite the good harmony and sense of ‘us’ in System 2, the lack of 
normative behaviour in System 1 appears to prevent group coherence/synergy (inverse of 
social conflict) from forming in System 3 and despite the apparent good harmony a high 
score for algedonic signal suggests that business group members are concerned about the 
internal activities of the group. The strong group unity, indicated by a high score for 
entitativity and group attitudes could be the result of inherited processes from parent 
organisations because the lack of cohesion/coherence processes in System 1 and 3 could 
possibly not generate the strength seen in the high-level cohesion/coherence process 
components. This is partially confirmed with the lowest score for purposefulness, in System 
5, indicating a lack of shared group purpose. 
The power-sharing key-process is shown as below-average for business groups as a whole. 
Examination of the individual components that make up the process shows that the 
purposefulness, self-esteem, group synergy (inverse of social conflict), social mobility and 
group resource coordination are all below-average, suggesting that the lack of power-
sharing is a serious drawback to the cohesion/coherence of businesses as social groups.  
Adaptation was also below-average as a key-process because of a low score for planning 
process, however, the other individual components, audit, algedonic signal model of the 
environment and adaptation were all above average. 
The business groups scored below-average for system closure. Examination of the 
individual components shows that while the members feel that entitativity and 
depersonalisation are good, they recognise their close ‘operational connection’ with the 
environment with a low value for closure and their lack of ethos. 
These scores, however, hide a very obvious split in the group between the ‘coffee shop’ 
businesses and the ‘conventional’ businesses. Taken separately the ‘coffee shop’ groups 
show a combined score that closely matches the religious and charity groups, see Figure 
3.122 and 3.123, with high levels for System 4, 3, 2 and 1, and low levels for System 3*. 
Analysing this split more closely several distinct patterns were evident that can be seen in 
Table 3.266. The ‘coffee shop’ groups tended to show strong identity formation processes 
although these had often not matured to produce high levels for components in System 5 
and not always developed from comparative to normative behaviours. They all tended to 
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have a high score for distinctiveness suggesting that they were trying to make their group 
more distinct and optimal distinctiveness suggesting that the individuals and the group were 
working to find a place for themselves within the group and in the environment. The groups 
tended to have an adequate score for purposefulness which would suggest that there was 
sufficient drive to achieve a unique identity. The effort to achieve distinction was followed by 
a high score for in-group favouritism and out-group derogation across all the ‘coffee shop’ 
groups as they sought to implement identity enhancing behaviours that favoured the group. 
The result of these activities in System 1; however, did not appear to lead to a high level of 
self-esteem. In System 3, and it is suspected that the high level for group attitudes in System 
4, and a strong score for entitativity in System 5 is inherited from the parent organisation.  
Figure 7.2 – Plot Of System Scores With Removal Of ‘Conventional’ Business Groups Leaving 
Only ‘Coffee Shop’ Groups 
 
The ‘’coffee shop’ groups also showed strong scores for the low level group 
cohesion/coherence processes with above-average results for depersonalisation in System 
2 resulting in high scores for self-esteem in System 3 and group attitudes in System 4; 
however, there was little evidence to suggest that these group cohesion/coherence 
processes in System 1, 2, 3 and 4 had created greater purposefulness or ethos in System 5. 
It was speculated that this was because there was often little sign of power-sharing at high 
system levels in the business groups. There was, however, evidence of the start of system 
closure in some of the groups and high levels of adaptation, they were still open to new 
joiners and showed little activity on the algedonic network suggesting a lack of internal strife. 
The ‘conventional’ business groups by contrast showed a very different pattern. They tended 
to show much lower values for individual and group identity formation processes. 
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Distinctiveness was normally below-average which suggested that the group’s members had 
not found a distinct identity for the group. While self-categorization and in-group favouritism 
showed a more varied response between groups, dependent on the group’s development, 
the end result tended to be a reduction in self-value in System 3, group attitudes in System 4 
and entitativity in System 5. The groups did, however, tend to show more prototypicality, and 
it was evident that the groups’ prototypes were inherited from their profession. The 
‘conventional’ business groups also showed lower group cohesion/coherence processes 
with less self-categorization normative fit in System 1, less depersonalisation in System 2, 
low levels of social conflict (group synergy) and self-esteem in System 3, lower group 
attitudes in System 4 and poor results for purposefulness, ethos and prestige in System 5. 
However, those groups with a greater age and membership time appeared to show some 
degree of closure, although the lack of any high level power-sharing processes appeared to 
prevent any real development of the groups. Boundary tended to show the groups reducing 
acceptance of new joiners and levels of algedonic signal were high suggesting a degree of 
concern about internal activities.    
Figure 7.3 – Plot Of System Scores With Removal Of ‘Coffee Shop’ Business Groups Leaving 
Only ‘Conventional’ Groups 
 
7.2.2.2 Business Groups – qualitative summary (see Appendix 2 for full analysis) 
All of the business groups associated themselves with an identity that had the most prestige 
and gave them the greatest self-esteem. When asked about the prestige of their group, it 
was evident that the research subjects were acutely aware of the relationships and the 
relative social standing of the different aspects of their job, picking the one that put them in 
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the best light by using either the organisations ‘brand name’, their profession, their gender or 
the ‘team’ that they worked with.  
Surprisingly, given the poor view of commercialism in the modern world those working in the 
business groups were keen to indicate that they worked to high ideals, using words such as 
"hard work", "trustworthy" to describe what they valued. 
The identity that the groups gave was rarely salient outside of the workplace except with 
those groups that had named their identity as their profession or gender. Yet, despite having 
named different sources of identity the business groups nearly all tended to see themselves 
as a ‘team’. This fitted the fact that these same groups gave a description of prototypicality 
for their ‘work group’ that differed from the prototypicality given for their managers; 
suggesting a lack of cohesion and power-sharing within the meta-group.  
The business groups were divided into two distinct sets, namely; those that saw their 
business competitors as the out-group and those that saw their own management as the 
out-group. Those that defined their competitors as the out-group generally used in-group 
favouritism to define themselves as somehow “better” than their rivals, however, the other 
groups tended to derogated their out-group.  
Some of the business groups tended to see themselves as isolated teams, and although 
they sometimes derived prestige and self-esteem from their parent organisations the need 
for them to work as a close group overruled other sources of social value. The members of 
those groups that tended to see themselves as ‘teams’ all stated specific areas of work as 
the source of their self-value, such as “I am good with the till”,  
The business groups had different levels of normative behaviour, and ‘maturity’ and they 
varied in the degree that they worked as social groups. Some worked together as a coherent 
team, although, these groups also reported higher levels of "gossip" suggesting that there 
were increased levels of concern over internal activities and some issues with harmony. One 
group was in open conflict with its management and did not appear to have any cohesion or 
coherence. All of the business groups reported that they gossiped about each other's 
behaviours within the context of the group.  
All of the business groups were very aware of their vulnerability from commercial pressures 
and the fact that their organisations would cease to be feasible if that business failed. 
Ultimately to determine the closure of these groups the question is whether or not they are 
operationally closed from their environment. If the social-groups are dependent on 
organisations then when these organisations fail so will the social-group. If the groups are 
autonomous then they will continue when, or if, the organisation fails. Only one of the 
business groups, namely Gp 6, reported that the group readily met out of work indicating 
that despite the work environment they still continued as a social group and could possibly 
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maintain their identity no matter what happened to the organisation they were aligned with. 
Quite a number of the groups, however, identified with their profession rather than their 
organisation and the question then becomes whether or not their profession is the focus of 
the closure. 
All of the business groups reported that they did not discuss the way forward as a social-
group and sometimes even as a business group. The reason for this was that the groups 
interviewed were frequently not part of the management structure which often had ‘exclusive 
rights’ to planning. This is a fundamental issue in power-sharing at the high levels of 
recursion of the group and significantly impacted on the requisite variety and viability of the 
groups. 
7.2.2.3 Social-groups – examination of components 
The social-groups had the lowest score for average viability of all the groups at 3.39. The 
average membership time was 2.18 years and the average meta-group age was 51.50 
years. 33 members were interviewed in two groups. 
The key-process scores for social-groups show system closure as below-average with the 
lowest recorded score amongst all the groups, identity formation as below-average at all 
levels, also with the lowest recorded overall score of all the groups. Cohesion is below-
average and scores low at all levels. Power-sharing is below-average with the second lowest 
score. Adaptation is above average. 
The very low score for System 5 suggests that social-groups have a very weak identity. This 
appeared to be confirmed by the key-process scores which show identity formation as low at 
all levels. Examination of the averaged components by group-type shows both self-
categorization comparative and normative fit as below average. This suggests a very low 
level of categorization activity. Distinctiveness1 scores above-average, indicating that the 
group members see the group as distinct from any comparable group, however, a low score 
for distinctiveness2, in-group favouritism and out-group derogation suggests that they have 
no intention of attempting to make their group more distinct with identity enhancing 
behaviours. Since the score for purposefulness is above-average it would suggest that most 
of the members of social-groups share a common purpose but are content with a low level of 
identity. 
The low System 1 identity forming activity translates into a low score for all the System 3 
components; self-esteem, self-value and self-understanding are all below-average. At 
System 4 group attitudes is below-average, suggesting that the low effort at identity 
formation continues and is not inherited from any meta-group. Prototypicality, however, is 
above-average; this suggests that members of social-groups have a very clear image of a 
typical group member. In System 5 entitativity and prestige are low, indicating that social-
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groups do not see themselves as particularly united, nor do they see their groups as having 
much standing in their social environments. 
The low score for group attitudes, self-value and optimal distinctiveness but high score for 
boundary suggests that social-groups have, in general, a "non-responsive clique personal 
identity". That is they see themselves as 'exclusive' despite the weak shared attitudes, their 
members are unable to create a unique place for themselves within the group to gain self-
value and therefore, they do not align with the group identity, preferring to maintain their 
individuality. 
Below-average scores for System 2 and 3 suggests weak cohesion/coherence in the group 
and this is confirmed with the low scores at all levels for the cohesion key-process. 
Examining the averaged components, starting at System 1; shows limited normative 
behaviour with a low score for self-categorization normative fit. The limited normative action 
in System 1 translates into low harmony and a low sense of ‘us’ in System 2; where network 
activity and group resource coordination are also low. In System 3 group 
cohesion/coherence is low as are group attitudes in System 4. The low score for algedonic 
signal in System 3 * indicates that the members of social-groups are not concerned with the 
internal activities of the group. Closure was above average, suggesting that members of 
social-groups see themselves as insulated from the environment. Ultimately, in System 5, 
social-groups appear to have low entitativity, ethos and prestige; however, they do have a 
‘shared purpose’. 
Despite the ‘shared purpose’ power-sharing in social-groups appears low and there is an 
apparent lack of shared opportunities for development and ability to move amongst the 
groups. 
7.2.2.4 Social-groups – qualitative summary (see Appendix 2 for full analysis) 
Neither of the social-groups (Gps 8 and 18) felt that they had much social standing or 
prestige in the wider social environment; reporting that they were not that “well known or 
understood” but that they were “respected” by those that knew them. The two groups 
identified themselves differently, one as the reason they met, the other with a clear meta-
group label. Both groups represented all, or nearly all, of the members and saw their 
purposes as the activities they undertook when they met as a group. Gp 18 appeared to 
have a strong, well-known identity, however, this identity had not been locally generated and 
it appeared that the group called on the prestige of its parent organisation to maintain self-
esteem. The other social group, Gp 8, was associated with each individual’s personal 
identity, as the group identity itself was very immature, due to the lack of salience of the 
group to its members. The salience of the identities varied, for one group (Gp 8) the identity 
was weak and was not relevant away from the group, while the other (Gp18) had some 
members who were very active in the group for whom it had high relevance “a good deal of 
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the time” but the other members reported no relevance at all between meetings saying the 
group was salient only "when we meet". 
The social-groups did not report strong beliefs or ideals, preferring instead to comment 
about "shared interests”. Gp 8 suggested that its prototypicality was ‘interest based’, while 
Gp18 produced an “age, gender and class definition”. Both groups found it hard to answer 
who their rivals or out-groups were and tended to settle for “not us”. 
Members from the social-groups (Gp 8, 18) found it hard to find areas where they could 
achieve something ‘unique’ to develop self-value. There tended to be a few people who ran 
and organised the activities while the rest only participated at meetings if they wanted to; Gp 
8 “they could contribute and have a say if they wanted to”, Gp 18 "no not really we don’t get 
a chance" or "we just sit and listen most of the time" or "you have to be prepared to do 
something special". Most individuals based their assessment of the value of their self-
esteem on a general feeling of well-being to describe their level of benefit of group 
membership with those from Gp 8 reporting that they did not benefit greatly and those from 
Gp 18 suggesting that “I like coming here" and "I wouldn't come if I didn’t like it". 
It was difficult to tell whether these groups were guided by social norms or were developing 
group norms. Gp 18 members reported having to learn to adapt " when they joined”, but Gp 
8 were not able to identify any conventions. Both appeared to work together with a degree of 
coherence by using traditional office mechanisms such as meetings and agendas to 
maintain cohesion, and did not report much ‘gossip’. Gp 18 members reported that there 
was "good harmony". They were largely autonomous, that is to say there were no other 
associated groups or levels of recursion and, being locally-made constructs were insulated 
from the outside world. Serving no other purpose than for their own members and therefore 
would appear to achieve system closure if they were viable systems. They both reported 
varied levels of effort at discussing the future.   
7.2.2.5 Religious groups – examination of components 
The religious groups had the highest score for average viability amongst all of the groups at 
3.75. They had an average membership time of 23.85 years and an average meta-group 
age of 313 years. 22 members of religious groups were interviewed in two groups. 
The key-process scores for the religious groups show all processes as above-average at all 
levels. System closure and identity formation are the highest recorded scores of all groups, 
while cohesion, power-sharing and adaptation are the second highest. 
The VSM System 5 score for the religious groups combined suggests that they have the 
strongest identity of any of the groups researched. The key-process scores for identity 
formation confirm this with identity formation above-average overall and at every level. 
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Examination of the averaged components for the religious groups, starting at System 1, 
shows above-average levels of self-categorization comparative and normative fit and these 
suggest that religious groups are fairly 'mature'. The combined group scores show 
distinctiveness1 as below-average, suggesting that religious groups do not see themselves 
as different from comparable groups; however, distinctiveness2 and in-group favouritism 
were above-average, suggesting that the members of the groups are attempting to make 
them more distinct through the identity enhancing behaviour of favouritism rather than 
derogating an out-group. These identity maintaining activities in System 1 lead to significant 
levels of self-esteem, self-understanding, group cohesion/coherence (inverse of social 
conflict) and group attitudes in System 3 and 4. The individuals of the religious groups do not 
see the groups as particularly united or with much prestige, however, they do feel that they 
have strong ideals and beliefs and a shared purpose, and this drive helps to maintain 
identity.  
The individuals of the religious groups felt that their groups were not exclusive and they were 
able to find a unique place for themselves within the group identity to build self-value, 
however, it is possible, because of the strength of the identity of the groups, that this unique 
place was a 'role' inherited from the ‘mature’ group and therefore they sometimes felt that 
the group identity 'swamped them'. Religious groups therefore had an "associated inherited 
identity". The lack of exclusivity of the group with a low level for boundary also appears to 
reduce the image of prototypicality of the group 
The VSM System 2 score for the religious groups is the highest of any of group-types 
researched, suggesting high levels of cohesion. The VSM System 3 score is also above 
average indicating a high level of coherence. The scores are confirmed with the marks for 
cohesion/coherence key-process which shows religious groups to be above-average at all 
levels. Examining the cohesion/coherence of the group starting with System 1 suggests that 
there are significant levels of normative behaviour with an above-average score for self-
categorization normative fit. This appears to lead to a strong sense of ‘us’ in System 2, but 
not a high level of harmony. The lack of harmony could be an issue because the religious 
groups showed a just above average level for algedonic signal suggesting that there is some 
concern about internal activity. Network activity and resource coordination are also high. The 
strong group attitudes in System 4 and purposefulness and ethos in System 5 completes 
what appears to be a 'self-producing' system. 
All the components of the religious groups’ power-sharing process are above-average 
suggesting that there are opportunities for the individuals of the groups to develop and 
preventing any one sub-group from dominating the system. 
The religious groups are not dependent on any system in the environment as they are 
founded in beliefs. This makes them autonomous and their social systems are able to exhibit 
system-closure provided they have sufficient viability.  
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7.2.2.6 Religious Groups – qualitative summary (see Appendix 2 for full analysis) 
The religious groups (Gps 1 and17) were very clear about their identity and named 
themselves as both sub-group and meta-group, seeing themselves as one entity. Neither 
group was concerned about the prestige of the group, reporting that they were “not that well 
known or understood” in society but that they were respected by those that knew them. 
Prestige did not appear to play a part in the way they chose to define their identity. This was 
because both groups were founded in strong ideals and beliefs that supported the group. Gp 
1 stated that their organisation had "developed and maintained" their ideals over many 
years, while Gp 17 felt that they were held together by their "strong faith". Gp 1 had a very 
strong ethos but at the same time effective power sharing arrangements and no hierarchy, 
while Gp 17 had a defined hierarchy, clear roles but equitable power sharing arrangements. 
The members of both groups were very active in running their group and attempting to build 
individual and local group identity at the same time. Both saw that the purpose of their 
groups was to conduct the activities that they undertook when they met as a group, in line 
with their identity. The groups were highly salient to their members, who reported that the 
ideals and beliefs of the group were relevant to them “in their daily lives” and not just when 
the group met.  
Of the religious groups, Gp 1 represented a good cross section of the local church, while Gp 
17 represented only a small set of the full membership; however, this group were the main 
part of the church hierarchy and so could have been seen to represent a significant sub-
group. 
The groups were not easily able to recognise out-groups or rivals, although a variety of 
suggestions were given from “people outside the group” to “other parts of the organisation” 
but then they were pushed to explain how these individuals were different from them, with 
the only suggestions being "we have a faith" for the former and "more welcoming", and 
"more active" for the latter. Both groups also found it hard to identify a typical member, "we 
are very open to all", although when socialised, several standard behaviours emerged. 
Neither group was able to recognise personalities that were different from this prototypicality 
within the groups’ hierarchies, Gp 17 reporting of their leaders and management “we are the 
same" while Gp 1 members stated that “the individuals of the group and the rest of the 
organisation serve the same purpose, there is no separation between us”. 
The individual members of both groups found it hard to find areas where they could make a 
unique place for themselves in the group to create self-value. It was not determined why this 
was, whether the groups were simply not active enough, whether people were not 
interested, or whether the group identity was inherited along with the roles for people to 
undertake, leaving no room for members to make a place for themselves. Those in the 
hierarchy of Gp 17 felt "they [the other members] appreciate that we do all the organizing". 
In Gp 1 “a sizable proportion felt that they were not recognised for any unique contribution.” 
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Both groups showed very strong signs of normative behaviour. The groups were very 
mature and clearly had norms and rituals that directed their activities. New joiners reported 
that they had trouble "fitting in" but were "guided" in the ways of the organisation. 
Gp 1 was unique in having mechanisms to assist coherence. There was also a remarkably 
high level of trust between individuals, and the members reported little if no “gossip". 
Individuals from Gp 17 however, felt that there were "disagreements from time to time mainly 
over future plans but otherwise the group worked together well". The groups did not see their 
managers as a ‘leader’ but more as an “elected representative”. Both reported processes for 
discussing the future of the group. 
Gp 1 had no hierarchy and was very insistent on power-sharing arrangements throughout 
the group’s organisation. A large proportion of the group was seen and no sub-groups were 
detected. The group behaved as a single entity. Gp 17 was part of a larger structure, 
although, the members interviewed did not see a difference between the prototypicality of 
the other parts of the wider group and themselves. 
Both groups did not appear to be operationally coupled to any systems in the social 
environment suggesting that they had achieved system closure and a high degree of 
viability. 
7.2.2.7 Institutional groups – examination of components 
The institutional groups had a below-average score of average viability at 3.46; this was the 
second lowest score. They had an average membership time of 8.9 years with an average 
meta-group age of 264 years. Nine members from institutions were interviewed in two 
groups. 
The key-process scores for the institutional groups show above-average scores for system 
closure and identity formation and below-average scores for cohesion, power-sharing and 
adaptation. Identity formation is above average at high and low level and below-average at 
mid-level, whereas cohesion is below-average at high and mid-level and above-average at 
low-level. 
The institutional groups show a below-average score for System 5, which suggests a low 
level of identity. The key-process score for identity formation, however, shows overall that 
institutional groups are above-average, although, inspection of the different levels shows 
that they are above-average at high and low-level but not at mid-level. Examination of the 
averaged components, starting at System 1, shows above-average scores for self-
categorisation comparative and normative fit. This suggests a reasonable level of normative 
behaviour and that institutions are ‘mature’ groups. The averaged components also show 
distinctiveness1 as above-average, indicating that members of institutional groups see 
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themselves as distinct from their rivals, or comparable groups. Distinctiveness2, however, is 
below-average. So while the members see themselves as ‘distinct’ from their rivals they do 
not appear to want to make them more discernible, this is confirmed by the high score for 
entitativity but low level of purposefulness in System 5. However, in-group favouritism is 
below-average but out-group derogation is high; this would suggest that the members of 
institutional groups are maintaining the difference between themselves and their rivals 
(normally their management) using-group derogation rather than in group favouritism. 
The normative behaviour in System 1 does not materialise into high self-esteem in System 3 
or an above average score for group attitudes in System 4, which would normally suggest a 
group that has a poor level of prestige or an inherited identity with poor social standing. In 
this case of averaged scores, however, institutional groups have high levels of prestige and 
so the low System 3 scores are not accounted for; but could possibly relate to the poor 
levels of cohesion within the group or because individuals area retaining their personal 
identities (see section below) or it could be an issue with the validity of extending the model 
by averaging the components to group-type level 
The high marks for boundary suggest that institutions tend to be ‘exclusive’ while the weak 
score for group attitudes indicates a weak prototypicality; together these two components 
suggest a ‘clique’. Looking at the members the averaged component scores show a low 
mark for self-value, indicating that they do not feel appreciated for a unique contribution to 
the group; however, the high score for optimal distinctiveness suggests that they, 
nevertheless, feel that they remain aligned with their sense of self; together these 
components suggest that institutional groups have an “affiliate clique personal identity”. This 
states that the members maintain their personal identities and are only partially engaged 
with the group because they cannot find a unique place where they can build self-value; 
additionally, the ‘exclusivity’ of the group makes it difficult to join and the weak group 
attitudes make it unclear as to ‘what’ it is they are joining. This ‘confused identity’ could 
explain the difficulty experienced earlier with high levels of normative behaviour, high 
prestige but low self-esteem (these three components are normally strongly correlated). The 
institutional groups have high levels of normative behaviour because they are ‘mature’ and 
well established, their members see them as having high prestige because of their role in 
society and established identity, however, the individuals cannot easily make a ‘place for 
themselves’ in the group because of the exclusivity and ‘clique’ nature of the group identity. 
This leads to low self-esteem and poor self-understanding and crosses over into poor 
cohesion and power-sharing.       
The System 2 and 3 scores were the lowest of all the groups, suggesting very low levels of 
cohesion and coherence and this was confirmed by the key-process scores which marked 
cohesion as below average overall and at the high and mid-levels but not at the lowest level. 
Examination of the averaged components for cohesion show an above-average level of self-
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categorisation normative fit, indicating reasonable levels of normative behaviour. This does 
not, however, translate into a reasonable score for depersonalisation1and2, suggesting that 
the group has low levels of harmony and a low sense of 'us'. This is confirmed by the below-
average score for purposefulness in System 5 and a high algedonic signal, indicating little 
drive to create cohesion and identity and a large amount of concern over internal group 
activities. The weak cohesion processes continue with a below-average score for group 
cohesion/synergy (inverse of social conflict) in System 3 and group attitudes in System 4. 
7.2.2.8 Institutional Groups – qualitative summary (see Appendix 2 for full analysis) 
The members from both institutional groups (Gp 4 and 7) were all very aware that they were 
just a part of a much larger organisation. They felt that this organisation had high social 
standing and that they provided a ‘unique service’ and that this was ‘appreciated’ by the 
public. However, they tended to categorize themselves by their ‘sub-group’ or team, from 
which they appeared to gain more self-esteem rather than from their organisation which 
included the other ‘tribes’. Both groups claimed that they had guiding ideals and beliefs 
which focused on their ‘service to the public’. Gp 7 appeared to almost distance themselves 
from their organisational identity and strongly associated with sub-identities as different 
‘tribes’. Gp 4 struggled with its identity. The group appeared to get most of its prestige from 
its purpose as a ‘national service’, locally; however, they were not a strong entity although 
they appeared united against their national management. 
In Gp 7 the sub-groups had clearly different prototypicalities that matched their purpose. 
These were obvious even to an external observer, for example; individuals from one sub-
group came dressed to the interview wearing definite symbols (tattoos, badges, style of 
dress) in a manner that clearly indicated their sub-group and its purpose. All the members 
were highly aware of the intra-group differences in prototypicality 
The members from Gp 4 could not identify unique areas where they were appreciated by the 
rest of their group to develop self-value, while those in Gp 7 had clearly established unique 
sub-identities and within those had created identities or utilized their personal identities to 
enable them to be appreciated by their peers. When asked what it was that they were 
appreciated for by their peers, the members of Gp 7 gave very diverse responses that were 
focused exclusively on personality traits. 
Both groups named their own management as the out-group. They both saw a difference in 
the prototypicality between themselves and their management indicating a lack of cohesion 
and coherence in the group. Gp 7 felt that their management were ‘in it for themselves’, 
while Gp 4 did not identify the out-group character. The members of both groups felt that the 
individuals in management did not have legitimacy, they did not “follow” anyone as such "the 
supervisor says what we do". Gp 7 displayed a difference between the individual members 
with those in high status positions indicating more self-esteem than those in lower positions.  
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With the institutional groups, Gp 7 showed very strong signs of normative behaviour within 
each of the individual ‘tribes’, Neither group reported working with cohesion, coherence or 
harmony. Gp 4 stated that "we are always changing the way we do things" while Gp 7 felt 
that there was “not a lot of harmony and they did not work together as well as they could 
stating "we have our differences". Both groups indicated that gossip was "rife" and "we are 
grumbling and moaning about most things". 
At first glance the institutional groups appeared dependent on their social environment and 
therefore vulnerable to perturbations, they are after all public services. However, if the 
systems focus is shifted to a high level of recursion, namely that of society, the public 
services become function providers for the community. That is they are part of societies 
System 2. Since System 2 is an emergent property of a VSM it is possible that these 
institutions ‘automatically’ come into existence where society exists (obviously not always in 
the exact same form). In this argument institutions are not viable systems in themselves but 
functions of a viable system (while the Recursive System Theorem states that "In a recursive 
organisational structure, any viable system contains, and is contained in, a viable system." 
(Beer 1990 p118) this refers to the System 1s and not every element of a VSM as this would 
be impossible) this could indicate why the institutions examined in the research appeared to 
have pathological autopoiesis because they are not threatened and appear to their members 
to have an inherent right to exist. 
Both institutional groups (Gp 4, 7) indicated that they did not discuss the future at all. 
7.2.2.9 Charity groups – examination of components 
The charity groups had the second highest score for average viability at 3.71. They had the 
lowest average membership time of 1.89 years and the lowest meta-group age of 22.6 
years. 13 individuals were interviewed from five different charity groups 
The key-process scores for the charity groups show above-average scores for all processes 
except identity formation. Identity formation is just below-average overall and below-average 
at low-level. At high and mid-level it is above-average. Cohesion is above average at all 
levels. 
System 5 for the charity groups shows a high score, the second highest of all the groups, 
which suggests a strong overall identity. The key-processes for identity formation however, 
shows a low score overall. When examined at the different levels identity formation is above-
average at high and mid-levels but not at low-level. Examination of the averaged 
components, starting at System 1 shows self-categorisation comparative fit to be below-
average but self-categorisation normative fit to have a very high score. This suggests that 
charity groups tend to be ‘mature’. Distinctiveness1 is above average, however 
distinctiveness2 is below-average; indicating that charity group members are aware that 
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their groups are more distinct than their rivals, however, they do not feel the need to make 
them more discernible. This appears to be confirmed by the lack of the identity enhancing 
behaviours of in-group favouritism and out-group derogation which both have low scores. 
The purposefulness of charity groups is high indicating that the lack of identity enhancing 
behaviours is not due to a shortage of drive or ‘shared purpose’ within the groups. The high 
level of normative behaviour in System 1 leads to a very high score for self-esteem and self-
understanding in System 3 as well as a high mark for group attitudes in System 4. Self-
esteem is fed from high values in both System 5 and System 1 with high scores for 
entitativity and prestige in System 5. These suggest a united group that feels it has standing 
in its social environment. This pattern of identity formation for the averaged group matches 
the overall trend found in the individual charity groups. The low score for identity formation in 
the key-process at overall and low-level is attributed to the possible reason that, having 
established normative behaviour and high prestige and self-esteem, the charity groups, 
therefore, see little need for further identity enhancing behaviours.  
On an individual level a lower level of exclusivity, indicated by a low score for boundary, 
coupled with the strong group attitudes suggests a group that is easy to join but has a very 
clear prototypicality. The high score for self-value suggests that individuals have little 
problem finding a unique place for themselves where they can be appreciated, however, the 
low score for optimal distinctiveness suggests that, for at least some of the time, the role or 
identity that individuals adopt within charity groups is not aligned fully with their personal and 
the group identities, indicating that the individuals in charity groups may have to use 
inherited identities. Charity groups, therefore, have an "associate inherited identity". 
The VSM System 2 and 3 scores are above-average, suggesting a high level of cohesion 
and coherence, additionally, the key-process scores for cohesion show is above-average at 
all levels. Examining the averaged components, starting at System 1 shows a high score for 
self-categorisation normative fit, indicating normative behaviour. This normative behaviour 
appears to result in a strong sense of 'us' and harmony in System 2 with high scores for 
depersonalisation1and2. The low score for algedonic signal in System 3 *suggests that the 
members of charity groups are not concerned by internal activities despite the fact that 
network activity and group resource coordination are also high. These last two suggest a 
highly dynamic system. In System 3 group coherence/synergy (inverse of social conflict) is 
high and so are the group attitudes in System 4. Overall these signs indicate strong 
cohesion and coherence at all levels. Only at System 5 do we see a low score for ethos. 
This is not explained. 
Power-sharing is above-average and all components that make up power-sharing are 
above-average as is the adaptation process with only algedonic signal scoring low marks. 
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7.2.2.10 Charity Groups – qualitative summary (see Appendix 2 for full analysis) 
The charity groups (Gps 10, 11, 12, 13 and16) all identified themselves by their meta-group 
name, even when they were just affiliates of a wider network. All reported that they were not 
that well known or understood in society but that they were respected by those that knew 
them. The association of the local group with its wider affiliates was seen as an attempt to 
enhance the prestige of the group. The groups all had very strong identities except for Gp 
10, despite not being well known in public, which indicated “what they did” and provided 
them with their purpose. The lack of a wider acknowledgement did not seem to disturb the 
members who normally stated “we are appreciated by the people who know us” and “what 
we do is worthwhile” both of which derived self-esteem and therefore there was little need 
for external appreciation, for instance Gp 11; “the group was a very small little known charity 
that was still forming; however the dedication of the members was obvious”. The charity 
groups all reported that the groups’ ideals “filled their lives” and that they achieved their self-
esteem from the social-value of the work they did indicating that it was “worthwhile”, Gp 12 
members stated "we all believe in what we are doing - in trying to help people”. Most of the 
members had also found a ‘unique place’ for themselves with high levels of self-value, 
interacting as individuals with the group over a wide range of characteristics and activities; 
Gp 12 members said "yes I feel appreciated - I help with a wide range of jobs - we are a very 
small team.", in Gp 13 the members interviewed mainly provided answers that related to 
people skills "I am good at communications", "I have patience", I am a good listener", "I try to 
be a problem solver",  "I try to bring the clients point of view". One member said "I could earn 
more at Sainsbury's if I wanted but what I do here is worthwhile"; nearly all the groups 
identified a prototype by traits, such as “kind and caring”; Gp 11, however, also identified by 
gender and activity Each member reported undertaking different functions that they felt they 
were valued for "I organise the events", "I do the art work" 
The groups were not able to readily identify out-group or rivals and found the question hard 
to answer, giving a wide variety of answers from “the council” to “the clients” to “not us” a GP 
12 member stated “them is the people that make the 'red tape' that stops us doing what we 
need to do”, and also a positive 'them' “the people that we interact with".  When asked how 
these groups were different from themselves they were normally unable to answer, although 
Gp 13 stated "we are more trustworthy than the clients" and "the logistics group are 
patronising". 
The charity groups were very hard to assess for group norms. Several of the groups (Gp 12, 
13) gave indications of interaction with new joiners, in particular; the statement "you have to 
be a certain type to work here" indicated that there could well have been pre-established 
norms based around behaviours and attitudes and that these norms tended to cause people 
to self-select or self-deselect with or from the group. All reported working as ‘close teams’ 
with harmony and trust. A member from Gp 13 reported "you have to be very careful when 
dealing with the clients - they are very diverse so we need to all support each other". "We 
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need to trust and rely on each other". The charities frequently use the word "worthwhile" or 
"we believe in what we are doing" in their reply to questions, and it was this purpose, linked 
to their identity that drove their cohesion and coherence. While several of the groups had a 
manager none of them had a leader ‘per se’; “we are all accountable to each other” was a 
typical reply.  The groups did not report that they gossiped much. Gp 12 stated that they 
"gossiped in a positive way". 
Examining the closure of the charities was a difficult problem; however, all of them appeared 
to be in sectors where there was an endless need for their assistance. So as long as they 
were able to maintain viability there was nothing in the social environment that would cause 
them to fail. They all reported varied levels of effort at discussing the future.   
7.3 Invariances of Group-types 
To assess the apparent areas of invariance between the group-types the data was 
compared for consistencies (invariances), either strong or weak between; the averaged 
components by group-id, the averaged components by group-type and the qualitative data. 
7.3.3 Consistencies and Coherence Between Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
7.3.3.1 Business groups 
The wide disparity between the coffee shop business groups and the conventional business 
groups makes any analysis of the invariants of the two as a combined group hard to 
achieve. The ‘consistent differences’ observed between the two groups show that there was 
a much greater level of depersonalisation2, a sense of ‘us’, with the coffee shop groups, who 
also showed a much higher score for entitativity, suggesting that they saw themselves as 
more ‘united’. This came from much higher levels of shared group attitudes in the coffee 
shop groups and also a greater feeling that they were distinct from their rivals. The coffee 
shop groups generated considerably more self-value for their members and as a result were 
more engaged and aligned with their groups than the conventional businesses who were 
‘swamped’ by the group identity and as a consequence disengaged from it.   
Despite this diversity in the business groups, continuing with the methodology by taking the 
description derived from the synthesis of the combined business groups’ average 
component scores and key-processes and comparing them with the qualitative description 
we can, nevertheless, identify   several invariances – that is components or properties 
remain consistent at every level of the process, across the business groups.  
Firstly, from both the qualitative and quantitative data it is evident that the business groups, 
in general, suffer from poor prestige. The lack of prestige affected the individuals of the 
groups by causing them to inherit identities from outside of the meta-group in order to 
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enhance their self-esteem, this was evident in the quantitative study and confirmed by the 
qualitative data. The overall lack of internally generated identity was reflected in both the 
VSM System 5 scores and a lack of identity salience detected in the interviews. 
Secondly, in System 1 only a few business groups demonstrated normative behaviour in 
both datasets. Although most groups indicated efforts at identity enhancing behaviours these 
efforts seldom appear to improve self-esteem or self-understanding. Both the qualitative and 
quantitative data suggest that identities, prototypes and group attitudes tend to be inherited 
and hence provide most of the identity components. Identity was rarely generated or derived 
from internal purposefulness.  
Despite the low prestige and self-esteem the individuals of the groups, nevertheless, 
managed to make a place for themselves. Both datasets suggests that the strong inherited 
group attitudes and openness allow individuals to create an ‘individual identity’ (the 
measurement of self-value to assess the identity formation process was difficult with the 
qualitative data). The high level of System 1 identity enhancing activity, which does not 
include normative behaviour, coupled with the high level of inherited identity components 
suggest that many people in the business groups focused their activity on ‘finding a place for 
themselves’ in the group rather than creating group identity.  
The lack of purposefulness also appeared to severely affect the cohesion and coherence of 
the groups, which was confirmed by both datasets. While there was an apparent sense of 
‘us’ and good harmony it is difficult to see how these can be created without the normative 
behaviours in System 1 unless they are inherited along with the identity. A clue that this 
could be the case is provided by the high score for algedonic signal, which suggests the 
individuals in the business groups are concerned about internal activity despite the apparent 
harmony. 
Perhaps the most significant invariance of the business groups was the lack of power-
sharing within the groups. In the quantitative study every component of the power-sharing 
key-process was below average, while in the qualitative study there was a significant 
difference between the prototypicality of the workforce and that of the managers in all the 
business groups; so much so that many of the business groups considered the management 
as 'them' - the out-group. This significant break in the cohesion of the business groups 
severely restricts their viability as there is no higher level of recursion to create social 
cohesion and social coherence only a higher group that hands down identity and 
organisation. 
7.3.3.2 Social group-types 
On examining social-groups the most significant invariance that appears is the lack of 
normative and identity enhancing behaviours in System 1. As a result social-groups do not 
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appear to generate much self-esteem, self-understanding, group attitudes, ethos or prestige 
unless they inherit this from a meta-group. However, they also do not seem to be concerned 
about this failing, with a high level of purposefulness, and little ‘gossip’ or concern about 
internal activities. Social-groups also appear to have a clear idea of their prototypicality, 
which would make sense as they focus on individuals with a particular shared interest.  
Many of the individuals within the social-groups appear to simply participate with the group's 
activities and do not appear to seek a unique place for themselves. As a result self-value in 
social-groups is low except for a few ‘organisers’. So while social-groups appear fairly 
exclusive, because of their shared interests, the members are also only engaged on a 
personal identity level; maintaining their individuality. In the groups researched a few 
members had seized the initiative and ran or organized the social group, This means that 
there for many of the members there are a lack of ‘opportunities for development’, in other 
words the sharing of chances to enhance individual self-esteem; which would account for 
the data suggesting a lack of power-sharing and low group resource coordination within the 
groups. 
A significant failing in the viability of social-groups appears to be that of cohesion and 
coherence. While the groups utilise 'office procedures' such as agendas, meetings and so 
forth, to achieve cohesion there is little evidence of normative behaviour in the research 
groups that will enable them to become autopoietic, in other words self-producing. While the 
individuals of the group have shared interests they do not adopt shared group attitudes, 
maintaining their personal identity. The groups simply do not have sufficient salience and 
network activity to generate themselves; however that is not to say that they could not be 
capable of achieving autopoiesis given greater network activity. 
System closure is difficult to assess within social-groups. Firstly, they do not appear to be 
operationally coupled to any significant elements in the real world and are, therefore, 
probably able to maintain their identity (existence) despite any perturbations in the social 
environment. However, the social-groups appear to have poor viability with many weak 
areas, particularly a lack of normative activity, and so ultimately they cannot be considered 
viable systems with any level of cohesion or coherence. Put simple - if the key people 
running the groups stop doing so the groups would probably die. So on the one hand they 
appear to have achieved closure but on the other hand they do not appear viable.  
7.3.3.3 Religious group-types 
The most evident invariance of the religious groups is that ethos is strong by all measures 
and this has significant consequences.  
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“Group prestige did not appear to play a part in the way that they 
chose to define their identity. This was because both groups were 
founded in strong ideals and beliefs that supported the group.”  
The maturity of the religious groups is significantly consistent. Strong self-categorization 
comparative and normative fit i.e. categorization processes generate normative behaviours 
in System 1 which are evident, not only from the average component scores, but also from 
the rituals, manners and conduct of the groups seen in the qualitative research. These 
normative behaviours generated a strong sense of ‘us’ in System 2 with high marks in the 
averaged components and qualitative evidence of depersonalisation2 (a sense of ‘us’) and 
strong group attitude. 
The high levels of purposefulness of the religious groups, coupled with their mature 
normative behaviours, ethos and strong group attitudes created meaning for the group 
members who show high levels of self-understanding. This coherence is fashioned by good 
cohesion throughout the groups and is driven by normative behaviours, ethos and 
purposefulness but assisted by the equitable arrangements for power-sharing focused by 
high levels of social mobility and group resource coordination. 
The groups are not exclusive, with members reporting that they are able to find a unique 
place for themselves within the groups and achieve high levels of self-value; however, the 
low levels of optimal distinctiveness indicate that the members are no always aligned with 
the group identity. They also do not see the group as united and suggest that there are 
below-average levels of harmony. 
While religious groups do not readily admit to being more distinct from their comparable 
groups they nevertheless are keen to make themselves more discernible and tend to use the 
identity enhancing behaviour of in-group favouritism rather than out-group derogation to 
achieve this.  
Lastly, religious group show high levels for planning processes and adaptation, socializing 
the group plans for the future.  
Religious group appear to have achieved system closure. Driven by guiding ideals and 
beliefs and not dependent on any systems in the environment they appear well insulated 
from any perturbations that may occur. Organisational closure therefore exists, that is to say, 
changes in the environment may influence change internally but it will be managed by the 
system to maintain identity. With closure and evidence of maturity it is suggested that 
religious groups are viable social groups.  
 230 
7.3.3.4 Institutional group-types 
The institutional groups show consistently high levels of prestige that they derived from their 
strong ethos of ‘public service’; however, they categorize themselves by their sub-group for 
which strong prototypicalities exist and which the members see as distinct from the other 
sub-groups. The management are seen as another sub-group and when together, the sub-
group members see the management as the out-group.   
While within the sub-groups or ‘tribes’ there are reasonable levels of cohesion and identity, 
demonstrated by normative behaviours, depersonalisation, group attitudes and 
purposefulness, as a combined group the cohesion is reduced, to be replaced by social 
conflict, a lack of purposefulness and a high algedonic signal, which results in low group 
self-esteem and concerns about internal activities. 
The variety of the institutional groups is further reduced by strict control between sub-
groups. Group resource coordination and social mobility are low which limit the opportunities 
for individuals to find a unique place for themselves and build self-value. The poor power-
sharing arrangements, possibly caused by the rivalries between sub-groups, results in 
further restrictions to opportunities; and as a consequence of these factors the members do 
not feel that they are engaged with their institutional group and tend to retain their personal 
identity.  
The institutional groups show poor adaptation processes with a weak model of the external 
environment, few planning processes and low levels of autonomic adaptation and audit. 
7.3.3.5 Charity group-types 
The charity groups show a high degree of similarity across a fairly broad range. All charity 
groups show signs of maturity with strong levels of; normative behaviour, distinctiveness, 
good harmony and strong shared group attitudes. Charity groups see themselves as 
purposeful and united and derived high self-esteem from what they see as a ‘worthwhile’ 
activity. Members feel that their groups’ identity is well established but recognised that it 
does not have high standing in general but does develop prestige in the areas it was well 
known.  
The individuals of charity groups manage to find a unique place for themselves within the 
group and derive self-value from a unique contribution, that they feel they are appreciated 
for; however they nearly all feel that they are at times ‘swamped’ by the group identity which 
they have to inherit.  
Charity groups show signs of system closure and viability. They are not weakly operationally 
coupled to the environment in so much that should their cause diminish then their reason for 
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existence will have gone, however, all the charities seen were unlikely to achieve this in the 
short term. 
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CHAPTER 8 – RESEARCH SUMMARY 
  8
8.1 Aim of the Chapter 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a summary of the invariances of the invariances. In 
other words those aspects that were found to be common across all groups-types and 
across all group-ids. These are then related to the assessment of the viability and the 
strength of salience of groups to give an indication of when salient social identities become 
viable; the research question. The chapter then continues with an assessment of the validity 
and reliability of the model used by examining the components, questions and design. It 
concludes with a revision of the model in light of these assessments.  
8.2 Finding Viability 
Since “maintenance of identity” is the definition of viability a correlation between age of 
group and the average viability score for groups would have appeared to have been an 
obvious confirmation of a group’s viability. However, this relationship showed only a weak 
correlation, see Section 6.10, and the length of group membership time showed no 
significant correlation at all. This means that, subject to the reliability of the research data, 
there is no easy assessment of viability by relating it to the age of the group.  
This leaves two principle factors to determine viability. The average score of the components 
in the model and a separate assessment of the organisational closure of the group. We can 
add to these a third factor; the salience of the group, which the research proposed was a 
factor in viability, see research propositions Section 5.4. 
8.2.1 The Invariances of Group-types 
We finish our search for viability, therefore, with a completion of the synthesis process of the 
groups we have studied, looking for the invariances that suggest those that are viable and 
those that are not and relating it to the independent assessments made in the qualitative 
study of organisational closure and salience. 
8.2.2 Social Identity Theory 
Strong evidence was found during the research to support the effects of Social Identity 
Theory, although, at the same time it was found that the theory did not have requisite variety 
in that it did not explain all the evidence found.  
Indication of both comparative and normative fit were detected, as was the need for 
distinctiveness.  In-group favouritism was evident in most groups while out-group derogation 
was only really evident in collaborative groups, principally the business groups. Although this 
area was subject to suspected reporting bias, it would nevertheless appear that groups with 
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high levels of cohesion and maturity prefer in-group favouritism whereas collaborative 
groups with low levels of maturity utilise out-group derogation. Where the research differs 
from Social Identity Theory is in the recognition of several different group types. The 
research identified collaborative and mature groups but within these specifications is also 
recognised groups that were formed from a top-down identity or those that built the identity 
from their normative behaviours or collaboration from the bottom up. Further, some groups 
were a mix of these two processes both creating a cohesive local group from normative or 
collaborative behaviour while at the same time adopting or inheriting the high level identity 
components such as prestige and prototypicality from a higher level of abstraction. The 
study had not expected to find strongly salient groups with very low levels of comparative fit 
but high levels of normative fit. The pattern that was expected was that similar to the one 
found in religious groups where both types of fit were balanced. However the pattern 
observed in most of the charity groups showed only normative behaviour in System 1 and 
little comparative behaviour or drive to create greater distinctiveness.   
8.2.3 Comparative and Normative Fit 
Social identity theory does not focus on the distinction between those groups formed through 
comparative fit and those through normative fit, preferring to describe the process as part of 
a continuum with groups starting with comparative fit and eventually internalising the beliefs 
and values of the group to become normative, see Section 4.16. However, while this may be 
the case for some groups the research suggests that it is not the case for all. The effects of 
the environment, autonomy, power sharing and purposefulness all seem to determine the 
development of normative behaviour. The research seemed to suggest that on some 
occasions these factors are set when the group first forms and that no amount of 
internalisation of beliefs will turn a group formed by comparative fit into a mature group 
displaying normative behaviour. The reverse appears to also be true. The highly mature 
normative behaviour of charity groups, who despite demonstrating very short membership 
times and age of group have developed normative fit within a short period.  
Lastly the assumption that many of the mechanism in social identity are on continuum 
between individual and groups implies a linear relationship, this is a simplistic view for which 
there is no evidence. System Theory suggests that in a complex system non-linear 
relationships and complex feedback loops may well exist. The interrelation between the 
many factors in Social Identity Theory has been assumed as linear and simplistic the 
evidence from the research is that it is anything but. 
8.2.4 Prestige 
The research uncovered unusual ways that groups assigned prestige. Charity groups, along 
with religious groups reported high prestige, although at the same time they readily admitted 
that they had little social standing except for “the people that knew them”. Both groups also 
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seemed to derive their self-esteem from doing something that was “worthwhile” rather than a 
more egocentric based definition that was seen in other group types. This does not fit the 
Social Identity model well and suggests that self-esteem and prestige, the driving force 
behind the theory, may be more complicated than predicted. In this definition the individuals 
involved seemed to be more self-actualizing.   
8.2.5 Initial Group Formation 
The circumstances of initial group formation would appear to have a significant impact on 
whether or not the group develops normative behaviour. Initializing factors such as 
organisational closure and structure, particularly power-sharing would appear to be major 
factors that allow groups to develop maturity. It would appear that those groups that are 
united with a strong purposefulness, shared group attitudes (prototypicality), a high level of 
coherence and cohesion indicated by strong group norms, rituals and the sharing of power 
within the group achieve maturity. A case study into group formation, however, would be 
required to examine this issue in greater detail. 
Social Identity Theory relates much of its processes to the salience of group identity. These 
factors, namely; whether a group is collaborative or mature suggests that salience is not 
necessarily a sufficient indicator of the relationship between an individual and group. While 
salience provides an indication of the strength and relevance of identity it does not give an 
indication of the type of identity. Therefore in answering the research question the statement 
salient social identities is not a sufficient link to viability. A more appropriate phrase would be 
salient, mature social identities. The model suggests that Social Identity Theory does not 
have the requisite variety to model the full scope of groups and needs to be extended. 
8.2.6 Creation of Identity and Self-Value 
The research results suggest that the creation of identity within a viable group is a complex 
interaction between the values of the group and those of the individuals. People need to feel 
appreciated for a unique contribution by the other members of the group to fully engage but 
this contribution needs to be aligned with the prototypicality of the collective to maintain 
cohesion, see Section on self-value below. The more restrictions there are on group 
membership the less there will be  unity, shared opinions and satisfaction with group 
membership and the less salient will be the group identity. Put simply the more a group is a 
‘group’, then the more its individuals will derive social value from group membership. Social 
value can be inherited from a strong group identity or be an emergent property of strong 
group normative behaviour. However, normative behaviours in System 1, supported by 
strong shared opinions, satisfaction from group membership and a common group prototype 
are essential to maintaining a viable identity.  
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Key to the creation of viability is the autonomy of System 1. To achieve the requisite 
autonomy yet still be aligned with the identity of the ‘whole’ System 1s need to achieve 
“convergence of purpose” with that of the system.  Reminding ourselves of the definition, 
autonomy is; 
“…the freedom of an embedded subsystem to act on its own 
initiative, but only within the framework of action determined by 
the purpose of the total system.” Beer (1987). 
The research found that the highest level of autonomy, that of an individual identity only 
occurred in small groups. An individual identity is one that is aligned with the group yet the 
person still feels they are ‘themselves’, This is achieved when people ‘align’ their personality 
with that of the group prototype, in other words the individuals collectively achieve 
‘convergence of purpose’. It is possible that this can only occur in small groups because of 
the need to maintain requisite variety. The larger groups becomes the harder it is to achieve 
cohesion and coherence without greater vertical variety. In the viable groups, namely the 
religious and charity groups, an inherited identity predominated, however, this was 
accompanied by a high score for self-value. The individuals of the group reporting that they 
felt that they were appreciated for a unique contribution to the group but were not ‘always’ 
aligned with the group. From the definition of autonomy above, it would appear that the price 
of group membership to a large viable system was a degree of loss of personal identity. This 
would appear to conform with Beer’s concepts of autonomy and viability by being “within the 
framework of action determined by the total system”.  
8.2.7 Environment 
It was evident from the research that the environment played a significant part in determining 
whether individuals were able to be self-seeking in the groups that they joined. Some 
individuals were not always able to self-select the groups that they were a part of, for 
instance; individuals seeking a job might not get much of a choice as to which group they get 
to join. The lack of self-selection was most readily apparent in the research results amongst 
the business groups and had a significant impact on their relationship to the group. 
Comparing the business groups and charity groups where the former tended to lack self-
selection and the latter were highly self-selected, the business groups showed lower levels 
of normative fit and higher levels of comparative fit while the charity groups showed the 
opposite. This would suggest that when people are unable to self-select the groups that they 
wish to join they are less likely to internalise the group's beliefs and instead rely on 
comparative fit in a mode of collaboration. These groups found it much harder to establish a 
source of prestige, using branding, professional associations, or gender as a means of 
deriving self-esteem. The other groups demonstrating normative fit had high self-esteem and 
were less concerned about prestige and even in some cases harmony within the group. 
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8.2.8 Collaborative Groups 
In general, collaborative groups demonstrated considerably higher levels of gossip and 
despite sometimes scoring high marks for harmony most groups nevertheless also 
demonstrated high levels of concern about internal activities. It would appear that whereas 
people readily form groups through comparative fit the mismatch of personalities, values and 
beliefs that this creates could possibly lead to high levels of internal unrest indicated by 
gossip. This was not always the case however, social-groups readily formed under 
comparative fit for collaboration and frequently demonstrated a clear prototypicality, however 
they did not show a high score for algedonic signal suggesting little concern over internal 
activities. This appears to be born out of a need to collaborate over interests only, and while 
some members of the group gained self-esteem and prestige from group organisation, most 
members maintained a personal identity and low engagement. This would appear to suggest 
that there are also several different forms of comparative fit groups with high and low levels 
of salience. What was not determined by the research, was whether or not the low-level of 
audit and algedonic signal seen in mature groups was an indication of low activity or whether 
these processes had been turned off. 
8.2.9 Self-value 
The research also highlighted the importance of the individual's self-value in the process of 
group formation. Although, the link between the individual self-value and the viability of 
groups still needs more research it is thought to be related to the power-sharing 
arrangements, the identity formation and the coherence in the group. Both group types 
assessed as viable, that is religious and charity groups, demonstrated individuals with 
associate inherited identities. That is a non-exclusive group with strong shared attitudes 
where individuals can find a place for themselves, however, they do not always feel that they 
are aligned with the group. Perhaps, this lack of alignment means that the group is always 
looking for stability.  
Only one group type, that is the coffee shop business groups, demonstrated an associate 
individual identity. That is a non-exclusive group with strong group attitudes where 
individuals can both be appreciated and create an individual identity that is aligned with the 
local group prototype. However the lack of power-sharing with the higher orders of recursion 
and no autonomy prevent these groups from ever becoming viable.  
Institutional and social groups demonstrated a clique personal identity. That is an exclusive 
group with low levels of identity where the individuals have not engaged or aligned with the 
group identity. These individuals identity descriptions provide a useful indicator of the 
internal group processes. It would appear that there is a small price to pay for viability with 
those individuals in a viable group being aware of how much they have to sacrifice for the 
group identity. 
 237 
8.2.10 Group Age 
The correlation between group age and the power sharing key process suggest that groups 
become more democratic as they get older or alternatively, if age is related to viability, that 
the more democratic a group is then the more viable it becomes. 
8.2.11 The Viable Groups 
The research identified two sets of groups that were considered viable social groups with 
salient identities. Firstly the charity groups and secondly the religious groups. Both these 
group types showed strong identity, coherence and cohesion. Both group types also 
demonstrated that they were operationally closed from the environment. These two group 
types spanned the range of age of group. The religious groups had been in existence for 
many years (average 313 years) while the charity groups had only been formed for a short 
period (average 22 years).  
The institutional groups showed signs of operationally closure from their unique position in 
society. They also showed many of the signs of a mature group with strong evidence of 
normative behaviour, entitativity, and prototypicality but not coherence or cohesion. These 
latter issues were created by strong intergroup rivalry suggesting that the viable groups 
might have become pathologically autopoietic. 
8.2.12 Viability of Group Types 
The key factors in assessing viability were therefore placed in a grid to map out the state-
space. These three factors, from the discussion above are, salience, maturity and 
organisational closure. The state-space map at Table 8.1 shows where the group-types fit 
with religious and charity groups the only two with high salience, high maturity and 
organisational closure. The red sector indicates areas of viability. 
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Table 8.1 – Social Group State-Space (red sector indicating viability) 
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Religious Groups 
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8.3 Assessment of Model Validity 
This section examines the research components and model to assess how reliably and 
effectively the model determined viability.  
8.3.1 VSM Scores 
The averaged group scores for the VSM System demonstrated to some degree that the 
viability of groups could be detected from a questionnaire. Although this approach should be 
treated with great caution as there is as yet no understanding of the factors which would 
disrupt the stability of these systems, nevertheless, a quick snapshot of the group taken with 
the questionnaire could provide some evidence of what type of group it was and whether or 
not it was viable. If this was coupled with an assessment of the group's organisational 
closure a reasonable indication of the viability could be obtained. However, the model needs 
to be refined for this process.  
Starting with the scores at group-type level the model indicated that religious groups had a 
viability score of 3.75 while charities had a score of 3.71, the business groups 3.57, 
institutions 3.46 and the social-groups 3.39. Despite their very limited fidelity these scores 
nevertheless provide a crude relative measure of the viability of the groups that matches that 
found in the previous section.  
Despite this, however, the research highlighted several deficiencies with the model which 
will be discussed in the following section starting with the individual components. 
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8.3.2 Components Lacking Correlations 
There were four components that did not produce the results expected, they were; ethos, 
prestige, symbols, and prototypicality. While Symbols was removed from the research the 
others were not. The section below discusses their significance.  
8.3.2.1 Ethos 
Ethos the ‘guiding ideals and beliefs’ of a group, was anticipated to achieve the role of 
‘encapsulating’ the main aspects of the group that create cohesion. Ethos was expected to 
‘absorb the variety’ from the lower level cohesion processes in System 4 and 3 by 
‘attenuating’ the behaviour of the individuals of the group and directing their activities in a 
specific direction; hence reducing their number of states. This matches closely the effect that 
‘ideals’ achieve within a group. Ethos was therefore predicted to be part of the group 
cohesion/coherence and the system closure processes; although it could also be expected 
to be part of the individual/group identity formation process as groups could be recognised 
by ‘what they stand for.’ 
Examination of the correlations between ethos and the key-processes showed that ethos 
only had only one significant and weak correlation with the system closure process that 
would suggest that the greater the ‘guiding ideals’ in a group the greater the group was 
operationally closed. Examination of the correlations between the individual components, 
see Appendix 3 Table 3.216 a and b, only shows one significant association with 
distinctiveness2 which is part of the individual/group identity formation process which would 
suggest that the greater the ‘guiding ideals’ of the group the more the members notice a 
difference between their group and other groups.  
When the relationship with VSM systems was examined, see Appendix 3 Table 3.265, ethos 
showed no significant correlations with any VSM System. The lack of correlations with ethos 
and other components, key-processes or VSM systems is noteworthy.  
This component attempted to assess the strength of each group’s belief system. In VSM 
terms it attempted to measure the presence and strength of each group’s System 5; 
however, it also has implications in System 4, System 3 and System 2.  This was a simple 
question that was fairly straight forward. Its internal validity generally seemed good as 
people did not have any problem answering the question. It was also considered that people 
were able to judge if their group had high or low ideals as this was a normal social attribute 
so its construct validity was also considered sound. Therefore its lack of correlation was not 
understood. Within the research ethos showed high scores with religious groups and 
institutions, which makes sense, however other group types did not feel that they had 
‘guiding beliefs’. 
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8.3.2.2 Prestige 
Prestige was predicted to be one of the System 5 components of the individual/group 
identity formation process. As such it was expected to ‘encapsulate’ the ‘value’ of the identity 
to the group, in a similar way to how entitativity encapsulates the ‘uniqueness’ of the group, 
ethos encapsulates the ‘ideals’ and purposefulness encapsulates the ‘drive’. Examination of 
the correlations between prestige and the key-processes showed no significant correlations. 
Examination of the correlations between prestige and the individual components showed 
that prestige correlates significantly only with group resource coordination suggesting that 
more resources (opportunities for development) are shared with those who need them the 
more the prestige of the group.  
This component attempted to assess the level of prestige that each group felt they had. 
Prestige as a System 5 component was believed to be closely related to system closure. It 
was also considered to be closely associated with self-esteem and self-value the difference 
between the internal judgement of self/group and the belief of the group’s external standing. 
This was a straight forward question. Its internal validity was good as people did not have 
any problem answering the question and its meaning was never disputed. Only two people 
declined to answer the question so it was not considered sensitive. It was also assessed that 
people were able to judge if their group had high prestige as this was a normal social 
attribute; hence, it was considered that its construct validity was sound. Charities and 
institutions saw themselves as having high prestige and in both these cases it related to a 
feeling of “appreciation in society”.  
8.3.2.3 Symbols 
While ‘symbols’ was originally predicted to be part of the individual/group identity process it 
was removed due to a lack of validity. Examination of the correlations between symbols and 
the key-processes see Appendix 3 Table 3.266c, shows only non-significant and weak 
correlations with key-processes and other components see Appendix 3 Table 216 a and b.  
At first sight this question seemed reasonable; however it suffered from a real issue of both 
internal and construct-validity. Most people associated signs or symbols with the associated 
organisation and not with the social group. In some cases where organisation and groups 
were aligned this was not an issue; however, where they were not aligned it was evident that 
people struggled to identify what was meant by symbols. For instance, one group in open 
conflict with its management had adopted an unruly dress style; another institutional group 
had clear signs of membership in the form of tattoos. While these were identified and 
discussed in the qualitative semi-structured interviews, they were not often readily apparent 
to group members. They appear to be adopted semi sub-consciously. The question was, 
therefore, rated very low for validity.   
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8.3.2.4 Prototypicality 
Prototypicality is the model of the ‘ideal group member’ and in the research context is the 
‘image’ held by the individuals of the group, (group attitudes is the ‘behavioural’ aspects of 
prototypicality). As a System 4 component prototypicality represents the model of the system 
‘itself’ that must be held by System 4, it absorbs the variety of the identity related 
components in the systems below it by creating a single representation of the group identity 
– a stereotype. Prototypicality was, therefore, predicted to be part of the individual/group 
identity process. Examination of the correlations between prototypicality and key-processes 
at Appendix 3 Table 3.266c, however, shows no significant correlations.  
Examination correlations between prototypicality and the individual components, see 
Appendix 3 Table 3.216 a and b shows only one significant correlation with self-
categorization normative fit. While a connection between the System 4 prototypicality and 
System 5 and System 3 components would have been expected a direct connection to one 
of the important components for identity formation in System 1, nevertheless, makes sense - 
suggesting that the greater the group recognise themselves with shared group normative 
behaviours the greater they see an ‘image’ of a typical group member..  This relationship is, 
however, not confirmed with the analysis of correlations between components and VSM 
systems which shows no significant correlations between prototypicality and VSM systems.  
This was a question that asked people to identify if they thought there was a typical member 
of their group in order to identify if there was a recognisable group prototype. Only two 
people failed to answer the question and it did not experience any difficulty during form 
completion. There was no indication that the question touched on difficult areas; although it 
was possible that people did not want to provide an answer that they felt indicated that their 
group was stereotyped. It was also interesting that those groups who need to appeal to a 
wide audience for membership, charities and religious groups felt that they did not have a 
typical member. However, they also, in the semi-structured interviews were able to identify 
traits of members. Its internal validity was therefore considered good.  The question’s 
construct validity, the degree to which it identifies prototypicality is, therefore, also 
considered good. However; the component produced several surprises. Firstly, although the 
data appeared to indicate differences between groups this was not supported by the 
significance tests. Secondly, the component was almost unique in being one of the few with 
hardly any correlations with the other components. It was expected that prototypicality would 
be closely related to the other components that related to identity, however, only a single 
correlations with self-categorization was seen. Group Attitudes, the other component that 
was considered related to prototypicality showed considerably more correlations and 
appeared to be a better determinant of prototypicality.  
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8.3.3 Components Not Understood 
There were six component who’s questions were not always understood by the 
interviewees. These were algedonic signal, autonomic adaptation, group resource, self-
categorization and distinctiveness.  
8.3.3.1 Algedonic Signal   
This was a question that attempted to measure the amount of activity on the algedonic 
network of the groups’ viable social system. Only two people failed to answer the question, 
however, considerable number of people had problems with the question. In many ways use 
of the word "gossip", while technically correct from an academic standpoint, was an error 
from a social investigation perspective. It was very evident from the questions asked during 
the interviews that many people consider "gossip" a ‘bad thing’ and were therefore reluctant 
to associate their group with this activity even though they were given a careful definition 
before form completion. This definition explained to them that "gossip" meant the amount 
they talked about things that were a threat or a danger to their group. Despite this 
explanation there was a very real danger to the internal validity of this question from this bias 
and, therefore, the internal validity must be considered doubtful. This concern must carry 
over into the construct validity as well. Before the results were analysed it was considered 
that a more viable system would show greater activity on the algedonic network for the 
simple reason that this would show evidence of a better functioning system. The results of 
this question, even considering the doubts over validity, must throw doubt on to this theory 
and suggest that, alternatively, there may be a case that needs to be considered that greater 
activity measured on the algedonic network indicates a less viable system. 
8.3.3.2 Autonomic Adaptation 
This question asked people to assess how quickly the group adapted when things went 
wrong. Its strong correlation to audit could well be because both questions are very similar; 
audit asked “Does your group recognise when things are going wrong?” while autonomic 
adaptation asked “How readily does the group adapt when something goes wrong?” As such 
the questions validity is, therefore, subject to the same issues as audit. Its internal validity 
was doubtful because people found it difficult to answer, four people failed to respond, and 
its construct validity suffered from the problem that people could not readily visualise 
occasions when something had “gone wrong” let alone how the group had adapted. It was 
thought  that autonomic adaptation was a sub-conscious reaction within groups, particularly 
as it relates to group norms, and therefore needs a different methodology to research. Like 
audit this question was probably best answered through qualitative methods. 
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8.3.3.3 Group Resource 
This question attempted to establish if opportunities for self-esteem were coordinated. In 
most VSM systems System 2 coordinates the activities of the group, however, in social 
groups the activities focus around self-esteem, self-value and self-understanding. System 2 
therefore has to coordinate the social norms of the group in relation to these values. The 
question had to be explained to people and, therefore, as it stands and without support from 
a researcher the question has problems with internal validity. It became apparent in the 
research that a group’s social norms, as opposed to business or social norms are very hard 
to establish, however, by asking people to remember when they first joined the group ‘what 
made them feel uncomfortable’ individuals were able to suggest the norms that differed from 
other groups. People appeared to have a sub-conscious ability to detect that they are 
transgressing a group’s norms and they adjust their behaviour to fit in – evident from a 
feeling of discomfort. However, when referred back to the question, individuals had no 
difficulty in knowing whether the group fairly allocated opportunities for self-esteem, the 
chance to speak, the chance to ‘do’ etc... The construct validity was therefore assessed as 
satisfactory. This component, however, would be best analysed through a case study to 
investigate how norms are managed within the group.  
8.3.3.4 Self-categorization 
The question was straight forward so the internal validity was considered reasonable; 
however, the construct validity was more of a problem. Are people aware of what the beliefs 
and values of their group are? While it was understandable that the religious or charity group 
members have a good understanding of this issue can we assume that the business groups 
are also similarly aware? The mixed results of this question were common to several other 
System 1 components and it could be that at this level the questions should have been more 
‘behavioural’ related, i.e. what do you do, and less about concepts or feelings as this was 
the area where the group acts. The construct validity of this question was therefore 
considered doubtful  
8.3.3.5 Distinctiveness  
There were no apparent difficulties when the form was being completed, although, 5 people 
failed to answer this question. The internal validity was therefore considered sound; 
however, the construct validity was more circumspect. The question asked people to 
compare their group against other comparable groups and this was difficult for some. 
Charities and social-groups found it hard to relate to ‘other’ groups. As with the question of 
out-groups these groups do not seem to compare themselves that readily with others. To 
answer this question people need more of a focus; for example an idea of how they might be 
different. Determining if people were ‘actively’ trying to make their group distinct from its 
rivals also proved difficult. The question should have been more specific.  This question 
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would benefit from a less direct approach and qualitative methods of investigation.  Its 
construct validity was therefore considered limited and would benefit from qualitative method 
8.3.4 Components Misplaced 
The failure to implement the command channels in the model, namely; the accountability 
channel, the resource bargaining channel and the legal/corporate channel meant that their 
components were misplaced. In the VSM, see Figure 2.4, the algedonic signal originates 
from the accountability channel. This channel enables the System 1’s to let System 3 know 
that the resources achieved in the resource bargain are accounted for. It heavily attenuates 
the variety associated with System 1 achievement to only report when things are not correct. 
The algedonic signal is shown emanating from this channel up through the meta-system to 
System 5. In the model the algedonic signal was misplaced in System 3* which should by 
rights only be sporadic audit. Similarly the component resource coordination was misplaced 
in System 2 and not within its own resource bargain channel. 
Autonomic adaptation was placed in System 3* due to the limited systems used in the 
research, however, this could distort the values for System 3* and would, therefore, be 
better placed as its own system independent of the others. Autonomic adaptation was 
implemented to identify the sub-conscious element of ‘balance’ within a system as distinct 
from the adaptation of forethought, anticipation and innovation that originates in System 4 
and is managed by System 5 and the three four homeostat. It was modelled with the 
component planning processes and the key process adaptation.     
8.4 Refining The Model 
The model performed to expectations and provided a valuable insight into the working of 
social groups. Experience of the analysis suggested that there were three changes that were 
required to refine the model. These were; improving the scope by adding recursivity, the 
introduction of the command channels, and repositioning some of the components.  
Adding recursivity to the model by including a level of recursion for the individual based on 
Social Cognition would allow the model to represent the process of group formation more 
effectively because it would show the interaction between individual and group. One of the 
key features of the VSM is its recursivity. Failure to use this by simplifying the model to a 
single level denies the research of significant assessment capability. The sum of the 
individual may not be the same as the individual’s sum at a higher level of recursion. The 
model should therefore be refined to show the sum of individuals at the person layer and the 
individual sum at the group layer. Comparison between these two figures would provide for 
improved diagnosis.  
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Recursivity would add self-reflection to the process of individual action and group formation.  
The addition of a level of recursion for the individual would require some of the components 
to be repositioned. System 5 at the lower level of recursion would need to be the individual’s 
‘self-concept’ to represent their identity. System 4 would consist of components that 
represent the Theory of Planned Behaviour i.e. intentions, while System 3 would contain 
components that represent the psychological activities that manage an individual’s day to 
day life such as self-esteem, self-value and self-understanding attitudes, habits and desires. 
For the individual the System 2 component depersonalisation that manages group norms 
would be replaced by the equivalent elements of the ‘self-concept’ that provide cohesion for 
internal processes internal harmony and self-norms. System 3* ‘audit’ would be represented 
by Discrepancy Theory, see Section 2.8.  
The second refinement to the model was the inclusion of the command channels discussed 
in the previous paragraph. Including algedonic signal and resource bargaining in a separate 
framework of  the accountability and resource bargaining channels would allow these 
components to be monitored more effectively. Additionally including autonomic adaption in 
its own framework would avoid interfering with the measurement of the other sub-systems. 
The final refinement to the model was possible repositioning of some of the components in 
different sub-systems. Prototypicality and group attitudes the image of the group represent 
two aspects of the system. They represent the ‘recursive self-reflective model’ of the group 
which places them in System 4 or they represent ‘identity’ which places them in System 5. 
One solution to the problem of where they are to be represented would be to divide them 
further into and identity component and a self-reflective component. Purposefulness was 
seen as the ‘drive to create group identity and cohesion’  and in light of the research was felt 
to be a Systems 3 component rather than a System 5 component as it helps define the 
group synergy. 
8.5 Refining the Process of Analysis and Synthesis  
The process of analysis and synthesis was very laborious but produced insight into the 
workings of social groups. It was felt important to maintain a methodology and the 
construction of each groups viability from the VSM Systems and key processes using the 
method identified in Appendix 3 was maintained throughout. This was to ensure that there 
was scientific method behind the process. No suggestions for improvement in the 
methodology, with the exceptions of improving the questionnaire, are proposed.  
8.6 Summary of Chapter 
This chapter identified the invariances across the groups starting with the aspects that 
related to Social Identity Theory. If commented that the theory did not fully match the 
different group types and group formations observed. The chapter discussed the difference 
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between groups formed by comparative fit and those formed under normative fit. It also 
examined the different factors on group formation including prestige, the environment and 
self-value. The social group state-space was then presented with an explanation  of the 
position of the groups in relation to salience, maturity and organisational closure. The 
chapter then discussed the effectiveness of the model and made suggestions for its 
improvement.  
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS 
  9
  
All nice people, like us are ‘We’, And everyone else is ‘They’; But 
if you cross over the sea, Instead of over the way, You may end 
by (think of it!) Looking on ‘We’,  As only a sort of ‘They’!  Rudyard 
Kipling ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ 
9.1 Aim of the Chapter 
This chapter concludes the research and re-examines findings in light of the research 
objectives and research question. It summarises the research findings and identifies their 
scientific significance and the contribution to knowledge.  
9.2 Research Findings  
The research identified two sets of group-types that it considered were viable systems; the 
charity groups and the religious groups. These showed all the signs of viability that the study 
had identified as necessary to constitute a viable system, namely; they were organisationally 
closed, had salient identities, and had established maturity of the key processes. 
The research was able to map out the state-space of viability for all the groups studied, 
relating the key attributes of salient identity, maturity and organisational closure, see Figure 
8.1. 
Further the research identified those aspect that appeared as invariances across group-
types that indicated group-formation or definition. Principle amongst these was the 
differentiation of groups into those that are formed using comparative fit and those formed 
with normative fit. The research concluded that only those that exhibited strong normative 
behaviours were able to achieve viability. It recognised that there were several possible 
means to achieving this state through the process of maturity, however, the research also 
indicated that some groups appeared unable to mature due to a lack of internal key-
processes and that this could be related to the manner in which they formed and their 
environment (parent organisation) .  
The research found that there were several methods of group formation, some of  which 
focused around the generation of self-esteem, as indicted by Social Identity Theory. In some 
self-esteem was generated from the social activities of the group while in others it was 
inherited from a higher order of recursion. Further the research observed that some groups 
achieved a combination of top down inherited identity and bottom up generated norms.  
While the study confirmed many of Social Identity Theory’s principles it also found some 
limitations. The first shortfall has already been discussed and involves the greater number of 
group definitions and formations then is recognised under the theory. The second relates to 
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the definition of self-esteem. While Social Identity posits that self-esteem is the principle 
driver for group formation the research found that the definition of self-esteem and prestige 
varied widely across the group-types. Whereas business groups appeared to follow the 
theory exactly and attempted to associate with the group that gave them the greatest social 
standing, charity groups and religious groups were not concerned at all with social standing 
and were driven by what they considered was “worthwhile”. The lack of a focus on status or 
prestige meant that these groups strong purposefulness and sense of identity were strong 
enough to absorb a lack of harmony within the group. The last discrepancy identified with 
Social Identity through its study by the VSM is the assumption that its processes are on a 
continuum from individual to group. Complex systems are dynamic and non-linear and the 
assumption that there is a linear connections was not evident in the research, in fact the 
evidence of the fixed nature of many groups basic identity definition and its relationship to 
the environment in which it was formed leads to the opposite conclusion, that the 
connections between the many processes could be stepped functions and non-linear. In 
other words while people are dynamic and adaptive the groups themselves appear to find 
‘stability’ in their environments. What conditions could cause this stability to change were not 
determined by the study.   
The research also found that those group who showed maturity of internal processes, that is 
normative behaviour that leads to the development of group norms, rituals and shared 
attitudes to create a strong sense of identity and internal cohesion and coherence, did not 
necessarily take a long time to develop. While the religious groups had an average age of 
313 years the charity groups average age was only 22 years. Further evidence of strong key 
processes were evident in some very newly formed groups. Which suggested to the 
research that the circumstances of group formation may have a significant effect on whether 
the groups can go on to develop mature processes and viability. The converse of this was 
also suggested by the research, that is that some groups would never be able to form viable 
groups because of their construct.  
The study made independent assessments of the organisational closure of groups and 
concluded that it was a key factor in the creation of maturity. It also determined that power-
sharing in groups was a key factor in their development. The ability for each individual of the 
group to find a place for themselves was found to play a significant role in group function 
and did much to define the type of group. Those groups that were found to be viable 
demonstrated strong shared group attitudes, were non-exclusive, and generated self-value 
for their members. The members, however, also reported that they were not always aligned 
with the group identity. An aligned individual identity would demonstrate a high level of 
autonomy in System 1 because it would show “convergence of purpose”. The inherited 
identity adopted by the two religious groups and the five charity groups appeared to be the 
‘cost of group membership’. That is the vertical variety required to create cohesion. 
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Returning to the different types of groups discussed at the start of the assessment, the 
engagement of group members was found to be very different between group types and was 
related to the power sharing arrangements, the identity formation and the coherence. The 
research showed that social and institutional groups retained a personal identity whereas 
business groups ranged from a highly engaged individual identity that was aligned to the 
group identity to a disengaged and unaligned identity depending on the key factors 
discussed. Social-groups scored the lowest viability of all the group types and this was 
attributed to the infrequency of their meeting which directly impacted on the salience of the 
group identity to the individuals of the group.  
9.3 Research Objectives 
The study now returns to the research objectives to assess the achievement of the research 
aim. Working through these we have; 
 To identify a research paradigm and approach necessary to address the 
research question. 
This was achieved in Chapter 3. The research recognised that a pragmatic philosophy was 
needed to relate a constructivist Social Identity Theory to a structuralist VSM paradigm using 
a dialectic argument. The radical epistemology of the VSM was used as the means of 
understanding the viability of the groups studied. It was further recognised that to be able to 
examine the data from a complex system an approach using abstraction and synthesis was 
be required.  
This philosophical approach was felt to work well and provided the correct framework for the 
research allowing it to fulfil its requirements. As the research unfolded confidence grew in 
the ability of the VSM to demonstrated the ability to represent the psychological activities of 
Social Identity Theory and Social Cognition. It became apparent that not only could the VSM 
represents organisations but that it could represent any self-reflective system, in particular, it 
could represent how humans make sense of the complexity of their world. 
 The more the research developed the greater it was felt that there was 
substantial truth in Yolles (2004) comments that the VSM was very much its 
‘own epistemology’ in that it provides a framework for not only understanding 
viability but also concepts of variety, homeostasis, autopoiesis, autogenesis, 
autonomy, organisational closure, and identity. Labelling the VSM with a single 
philosophical standpoint, such as ‘functionalist’ was, therefore, incorrect as it 
could be adapted to represent all the philosophical positions. More, importantly 
not only could it represent systems from these different philosophical 
approaches it could represent the viewpoint of the philosophical approaches 
themselves. This was because each of these are basically no more than 
 250 
different views of how humans construct their reality. However, because it 
adopts a model of ‘structural representation’ with a meta-system the VSM is not 
suitable for representing the post-modernist standpoint although in the research 
it uses this standpoint to represent the complexity of the environment. To create 
an influence map of the psychological activities of social group behaviour from 
Social Identity Theory 
The systems map of Social Identity Theory was developed in Section 4.6 and mapped to the 
social state-space in Section 4.10. The psychological activities of Social Identity Theory 
were mapped as independent activities, however, and not related to those of Social 
Cognition with which there is a clear overlap. It is felt, therefore, that the systems map 
created was only a partial representation of the means by which individuals interact with 
their social environments. Furthermore, constructing an ‘influence map’ of this type is itself 
limiting in that it attempts to show the complex relationships between many psychological 
activities as though they are a simple set of feedback loops. It was felt that the true 
complexity of the situation, which is based in human cognition, could only really be 
understood through a recursive network, as suggested by von Forester (2004). There is 
therefore a need to tie the various ‘levels’ of cognition that are evident in social interaction 
into a more comprehensive model. However, the influence diagram is limited in its ability to 
do this while the VSM is designed to show recursive structures. It might be more effective 
therefore to create the model directly in the VSM. 
 To utilize the systems map of social identity psychological activities  to develop 
a Viable Systems Model of social groups with salient identities.  
 Section 4.8 to 4.28 developed the Viable Systems Model of Social Identity. The 
issues with this model were discussed fully in Section 8.4. The principle 
problems were the lack of recursivity and the failure to represent the command 
channels of accountability and resource bargaining with the appropriate 
components. Placing the components that represented these channels in other 
sub-systems caused these to be misrepresented, particularly System 3* the 
sporadic audit system, To develop a research design, consistent with the 
research philosophy, approach and strategy, to examine the research question. 
The means by which viability could be measured led to the identification of the research 
methodology of taking a ‘snapshot’ of a complex system by using the multi-strategy 
sequential explanatory fixed design that was developed in Chapter 5. This process produced 
mixed results. While some components stood out others were more elusive. The difficult 
components to detect were ethos, prestige, symbols, and prototypicality. These components 
appeared to have good internal and construct validity yet failed to produce significant 
correlations with other components, see Table 6.4, The failure could not always be 
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explained. Several components were misrepresented in the model because the command 
channels were not implemented. These were algedonic signal, autonomic adaptation, group 
resource. Several components exhibited poor internal or construct validity these were self-
categorisation and distinctiveness, see Section 8.33, These were difficult to implement 
because of their abstract nature.  
Attempting such a broad spread of independent variables was always going to be 
challenging, however, combining the components into key-processes produced results that 
were significantly more valid than those of the individual components themselves and 
provided a degree of redundancy in the methodology. Looking at processes rather than just 
values appeared to be a more effective design, although it could be argued that the methods 
complemented each other.  
Identifying the right question for each component again provided a wide range results. Some 
questions were immediately apparent to the interviewees and produced accurate valid 
results  while others appeared too abstract, see Section 8.33. This area would require 
greater development for future research.     
 To conduct research and assess the validity of the model to identify viable 
groups with salient identities.  
The conduct of the research was uneventful although time consuming due to the 
requirement to interview groups in situ to maintain context. This was often difficult to 
arrange. The abstract nature of the study also required a high degree of intervention with 
interviewees from the researcher during the semi-structured interviews. The research 
process was therefore not easily generalised. Once the research was completed the validity 
of the model proved satisfactory in identifying those groups with salient identities that were 
viable, see Section  8.3. However, the model had several shortcomings that need 
improvement and Section 8.4 made recommendations for the development and 
improvement of the model for future use.  
 To identify if any groups with salient social identities can be assessed by the 
model as viable systems and if possible to assess which factors affect the 
development of viability in groups with salient social identities.  
The religious and charity groups were identified as viable systems within the meaning of the 
VSM. Section 8.2 identified the invariances of the social groups that indicated the formation 
of viable systems. The key factors that determined the viability of groups with salient 
identities were the organisational closure of the group and its maturity. Maturity was evident 
in groups that were united with a strong purposefulness, shared group attitudes 
(prototypicality), a high level of coherence and cohesion indicated by strong group norms, 
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rituals and the sharing of power. In other words strong behaviour across all of the VSM sub-
systems. The Research Questions Revisited 
The introduction identified the difficulty of conducting research on complex systems, 
particularly social systems. The achievement of the research objectives above recognises 
that, in part, the research achieved its aim, although as is often the case we are left with 
more questions.  
The model used in the research demonstrated several well know properties of Social Identity 
Theory. It was able to show self-categorization comparative and normative fit, meta-contrast 
and perceiver readiness, the need for self-esteem, distinctiveness,  in-group favouritism and 
out-group derogation. It showed the collective use of ‘us’ and optimal distinctiveness, social 
creativity and social conflict. However, it also showed much more, that has been catalogued 
in the previous sections.  
The temptation to believe that we have uncovered permanent, fixed process that dictate the 
formation of social groups is very alluring. However, the research philosophy, approach and 
design forces us to recognise that we are dealing with a complex dynamic system and the 
synthesis process should have convinced us that these processes are on-going and non-
linear. Stafford Beer suggests that “we constantly take a high-variety system, slash down its 
variety in order to penetrate its invariance, get the wrong answer – and then project the 
wrong answer onto the system”. Our trait attribution and cognitive biases have evolved to 
skew this process to reduce the risk of danger to ourselves, however, since “we [humans] 
have no choice but to hold in our heads low variety models of high variety realities” (1979 p 
44) we can choose to either face the discrepancies of our beliefs systems that our 
observations show us or ignore them;  
“we can either casually select aspects of the new variety 
generated that reinforce the low-variety models in our heads or 
we can actively search for manifested states of the systems that 
clash with that model and constantly adjust it” Beer (1979, p44) 
9.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
While the research started out to use and endorse Social Identity Theory it quickly 
uncovered the situation described above that Social Identity Theory does not have requisite 
variety to explain all the effects seen and had to be combined with Social Cognition to 
explain them. The recommendation from the research is that a more sophisticated model of 
human social activity built on the framework of the VSM would provide a significant step 
forward in the study of human social behaviour and bring the two theories into alignment. 
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That this is possible is indicated by the research uncovering the role of ‘gossip’. While this 
area has been covered in Social Cognition as a separate study it has not really been 
introduced into other disciplines or areas of psychology and is not considered relevant in 
Social Identity Theory.  Modelling the formation of social groups forced the research to find a 
process that provided an accountability  channel and an algedonic signal and ‘gossip’ 
provided an answer. Without the VSM’s framework this would not have been achieved. The 
use of the VSM similarly identified the complexity of group formation and the role of maturity 
of norms and the use of inherited identity to maintain prestige.  
While recognising the achievement of identifying viable social systems the most significant 
feature of the research is easily lost. That of undertaking research on social systems at all. A 
task abandoned by Geyer (1995). The work of the Social Identity and Social Cognition 
scientists in mapping the state-space of social behaviour opened the door to allow 
cybernetics in. Cybernetics relies on states, they are its basic constituents and the factors 
that move a system from one state to another are its processes known as the trajectory of 
the system. The Viable Systems Model provides a framework on which to hang these states 
and their associated processes that is missing from psychology and sociology. 
Demonstrating that this is feasible is the hope of this research.  
Conducting research on complex systems needs to be recognised as the problem it is. The 
research methodology of creating a narrative from quantitative and qualitative data 
synthesised in recursive layers to identify the invariances provides a  scientifically repeatable 
method that is falsifiable (Popper, 1959). 
The research contributed to one final area of knowledge that cannot be imparted easily in 
the thesis. That of the implicit knowledge of the researcher. The study not only provided 
insight into the workings of groups, the VSM and psychology it also brought understanding 
of research methodology and philosophy.    
9.5 Generalisation 
The methodology developed during the course of the research for examining the viability of 
social groups should be applicable to wider areas of study into complex social systems. The 
research methodology itself involved the process of induction, taking each layer of findings 
to the next level as a form of generalisation, however, the process ensured that the findings 
were grounded in the data and confirmed by the qualitative work. Taking the findings to a 
higher levels of generalisation is undertaken in the final stages of the research in this 
chapter where the research findings question the established theory. The methodology 
however is not easily simplified as it is recommended that it requires an experienced social 
researcher to undertake the semi-structured interviews, an understanding of the VSM and 
the psychological activities of Social Identity Theory.   
 254 
9.6 Research Applicability  
The VSM provides a powerful diagnostic tool but is limited in other areas like design 
(Achterbergh and Vriens (2011). The study focused on answering the research question “are 
social groups with salient identities viable systems?” Taking the next step to use the findings 
in a practical application is difficult to assess. The research originated because of a desire to 
find out why and where social groups formed and developed during change management. 
The study demonstrates some of the factors involved and also identifies that changing a 
group from one construct to another, i.e. from collaborative to mature, may be very difficult. 
The study does provide change managers with a diagnostic tool to identify the sub-groups 
and their identity components, but is does not provide any indication of the steps to go from 
there except to establish work groups based around the construct of charity groups or 
religions.  
The surprise of the research was the dynamic and purposeful nature observed with the 
coffee shop teams. These showed good levels of many of the key components but were not 
considered viable because of a lack of organisational closure and power sharing. Contrasted 
with the institutional groups where there was little engagement and constant rivalry they 
demonstrate a good model for any organisation.  
The important question is why would a manger what to establish viable groups? The viable 
groups in the research showed the highest levels of purposefulness, engagement and 
motivation and they are self-producing and self-steering. These would be sound reasons, 
enough for any manager if they were prepared to let go of power. The one group not 
investigated where this occurs was cooperatives and this requires further work. . 
The approach, design and methodology of the research proved effective and  
9.7  Research Limitations  
The research aimed to conduct an exploration of as wide a spectrum as it could within the 
research scope to uncover areas of interest. While it did this to a degree the limited data 
obtained from a small area creates several questions on the extent of its validity. There is no 
indication in the study of how the findings would translate to other areas, cultures, countries 
or organisations. Further the research used small samples, again a limitation of the research 
scope which could have biased or exaggerated the findings. While the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research have proved strong the research itself must be recognised for 
what it is, a single person research project with limited time and resources.  Groups studied 
needed a wider selection of environments and group types to be able to tease out the 
invariances. Methodology of taking a ‘snapshot’ provided a surprising insight into the 
functioning of the groups, however, it should be remembered that   
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9.8 Recommendations for Further Research  
A further study with broader data collection and multiple case studies into the different 
group-types and their formation is required to build further evidence. The research points to 
the study of cooperatives where there are better opportunities for power sharing and self-
value. A case study needs to be undertaken into the development of groups to provide 
greater detail on the creation of maturity and initial group development appears a highly 
significant area. 
9.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter reported the research findings and confirmed that the research objectives had 
been achieved and hence the research question had been answered. It re-examined the 
conduct of the research and discussed its contribution to knowledge, research applicability 
and limitations. It concluded with recommendations for future research.  
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